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
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
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# The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY, 1915

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## CHURCH HISTORY AS A SCIENCE AND AS A THEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE\*

*Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Board of Directors:*

It is with mingled feelings that I rise to address you on this occasion. So strong, indeed, are some of the emotions which the solemn business of this hour reawakens within me, that it would be a sheer affectation on my part not to allude to them.

At your earnest solicitation I have exchanged the chair of Homiletics for that of Church History. In this connection I can only say—but thus much I must say—that as I was unable to make, so I have remained unable to review this decision, without many a secret pang alike of regret and of anxious solicitude. I should be untrue to myself, as I certainly should appear wanting in my obligations to your honorable body, if I should fail to take this opportunity of giving you the renewed assurance of my sincere and grateful appreciation of the privilege of working for three years in the Practical Department of the Seminary,—a service which many cherished testimonies have emboldened me to believe has probably been as useful as any of equal length that I may ever render, and which memory persuades me has been as happy as any that I have ever been permitted to undertake.

But on the other hand, as I face the new duties to which you have called me and to-day formally introduced me, I find much comfort and inspiration in the conviction that in your action I have heard the voice of the Lord,

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\* An address delivered in Miller Chapel on the occasion of induction into the Archibald Alexander Professorship of Church History, October 13, 1914.



too clear to be misunderstood and too imperative to be disobeyed. And other satisfactions have abounded. The work itself, as I have renewed my acquaintance with it these past months, has more and more resumed those charming features and that benign expression which years ago, as an Instructor in this department, I had learned to recognize as belonging peculiarly to the muse of sacred history. Nor can I conceal my joy in the reflection that you have asked me to succeed one for whom as teacher my reverence, as superior colleague my esteem, and as companion and friend my affectionate regard have been equalled only by my admiration for the exceptional abilities, the signal devotion, and the distinguished success with which for twenty years he has adorned the chair of Church History in this Seminary, the Reverend John DeWitt, D.D., LL.D.

But deeply and gratefully sensible as I am of the high honor your call has conferred upon me, I am at the same time conscious, most of all, of my inadequacy to the task I have assumed and of my unworthiness to follow in the steps of my illustrious predecessors during the century of the Seminary's history. I can only give you my pledge that, as divine grace may enable me, I shall be faithful to the sacred trust committed to my care.

In choosing the theme of the present address, I was led to think that I might perhaps best meet the proprieties of the occasion, if I should strive to realize that double purpose which the late Dr. Shedd declared is the true aim of an inaugural discourse: "to justify the existence of a specific professorship, and to magnify the specific discipline which it imparts".<sup>1</sup> I venture, then, to announce as my subject: "Church History as a Science and as a Theological Discipline."

#### I. CHURCH HISTORY AS A SCIENCE

When we try to analyze and define the idea of Church History, the most obvious fact confronting us is that our

<sup>1</sup> Shedd, *The Nature, and Influence, of the Historic Spirit* (*Theological Essays*, 1877, p. 53).

science is a binomial; it has to do with the Church, and it has to do with history. The importance of this consideration appears the moment we undertake, in the way of a scientific methodology, to determine the relation of these two elements to one another in the organism of that body of knowledge to which they conjointly give the distinctive designation. The difficulty involved in this attempt is, of course, only increased by the fact that both terms belong to the most comprehensive words of human speech. There can be no doubt that the unphilosophic treatment to which our science has so often been subjected has been due chiefly to the unjust, because one-sided, emphasis given now to the one and now to the other of the two objective principles represented in the compound name "Church History". Taking this tendency in its extreme forms, there are those who have unduly depressed, not to say ignored, the idea of history, either by reducing the noun to an adjective, or, worse still, by substituting a quite heterogeneous concept. To such our science becomes merely "Historical Theology" or "Ecclesiastical Theology." Doubtless, in the light of sound principles of theological encyclopedia, these characterizations, narrowly looked at, are not as faulty as at first sight they may appear. For the term "theology," as distinguished from "dogmatics," is quite broad enough to embrace everything that may legitimately be taught in a theological seminary, from that department that seeks to make the latest Assyriological researches throw a new radiance upon the page of sacred Scripture, to that which gives the student the best counsels as to how to order his remarks at a funeral or hold a baby at a baptismal font. The fact remains, however, that the words "church" and "ecclesiastical" are not quite synonymous, but come from different roots and have different associations; and further that "history" is something other than, if not greater than, "theology". At least equally mischievous, on the other hand, is the slighting of the idea of the "Church", and the consequent identification of our discipline with general

or universal history. The two sciences, to be sure, are sisters; indeed, they are twin-sisters. But much as they resemble each other in their physical features and their physiological functions, they are quite unlike in what we may call the development of their moral or spiritual character. If they were precisely the same in all respects, we should, to go no further just now, have no adequate explanation of the well known fact that from time immemorial history has belonged, not to one, but to two faculties of instruction, to two circles of science, the theological and the philosophical. The reason for this, we may be sure, can be found only in some necessity lying close to the very heart of the organism of the sciences. Things of this sort do not come at haphazard. Nor is it strange, therefore, that in days like these, when systematic theology herself, once the proud queen of the sciences, has lost not only her throne, but, as at least some would have us believe, even her right to a seat among the sciences, many should be saying that the university and the college can and should teach the history of the Church. This is inevitable, for if one member of the *corpus theologiae sacrae* suffers, all the rest must suffer with it. But neither the pain nor the mutilation due to the radical surgery proves that the operation was either skilful or even necessary. It may be a case of vivisection, as useless as it is pitiable, the wanton dismemberment and destruction of a living organism. We must, therefore, give due attention to the Church also, if we would do justice to that complex idea of which it is a part, the idea of Church History. For if the Church be only a common, an ordinary, a natural historical phenomenon, there is no reason why the study of its history should not be confined to the appropriate department of the college or university curriculum. But if the Church has a supernatural life inseparable from that organism of miraculous, redemptive energies and their authoritative interpretations which is given us in holy Scripture, then the history of the Church, whatever its



connections with general history may prove to be, not only may, but by a principal necessity must belong to that circle of the sciences, namely the theological, whose task it is to apprehend and reflect the knowledge imbedded in this special self-revelation of God.

So then, we have to inquire, in turn: What is the idea of history? What is the idea of the Church? And what, by consequence, is the idea of Church History?

Our word *history* comes to us through the Latin from the Greek *ιστορία*. The primary meaning of this noun, corresponding to that of the verb *ιστορεῖν*, was *learning by investigation*, a usage that still reflected the derivation of the term from *εἰδέναι* to know. A secondary sense naturally arose—the *knowledge thus acquired*. Later still the word came to denote *a narrative, a setting forth in writing of the results of an investigation*. In all three of these senses, therefore, the stress was laid upon the subjective process involved in the ascertainment, the knowledge, and the exhibition or recital of facts. But in our language, *history*, like its equivalent in other modern tongues, has not only a subjective but also an objective sense; it denotes not only a narrative of events but also the events themselves. In German, indeed, the word *Geschichte* has primarily had the latter signification; it means first of all *das Geschehene*, that which has happened. Moreover, just in proportion to the development of history as a science we invariably find that the objective meaning becomes the more important. The reason is not far to seek. For the very right of a science to exist as a separate branch of knowledge depends not upon the method of investigation or its mode of presenting results, but upon its subject-matter. It must, of course, be conceded that historiography as an art has owed much to those French and English writers who have insisted upon treating history as a species of *belles lettres*. Certainly we are all familiar with historical works that would be more valuable as well as more delightful, if they had greater artistic merits. But could

we not say the same even of many volumes dealing with the exact sciences? Do we not prize these in spite of their jejune formulas, their crude wood-cuts and their poor bindings? The fact is that in every science knowledge is the decisive consideration; and if history is to make good its claim as a science, we dare not confound its objective data with any one's description of them. The picture the historical narrative gives is but the reproduction by the author of an image produced in his mind by the historical realities themselves.

What, then, is the subject-matter of history considered as a science? The answer to that question has varied not a little. In accordance with the unlimited scope of the original sense of the word, history at first included all fields of investigation. It undertook to explore the whole domain of human knowledge, to embrace the total wisdom of mankind. From this point of view whatever was was history. History was the ocean which drew to its broad bosom not only the fountains of all our thinking, but also the springs of all our life. In history, thus understood, all the sciences without exception so commingle that their onward progress is but one element in the vast process of the world's development, that being a science to-day which to-morrow will be history.

In the course of time, however, the necessities of the case led to divisions and subdivisions of this domain of science. *Divide et impera* has been the secret of man's conquest of the field of knowledge. The first and most radical distinction was that made between nature and man as objects of investigation. It was found that jointly they represented the phenomenal world in its two chief aspects, but that, though they are not absolutely separable, they nevertheless must be kept apart by the mind that tries to reflect in its consciousness the inherent distinctions observable in the objective data of knowledge. The sphere of nature was seen dominated by a universal law of necessity. The planet kept to its appointed orbit. The



tree was seen budding, blossoming and bearing its fruit year after year by a process that was as uniform as it was involuntary. Even in the brute creation, where life becomes conscious and reveals a measure of intelligence, the bee and the beaver were seen performing their humble tasks in precisely the same fashion as they did hundreds of years ago. It is, therefore, only by courtesy that the word history is now applied to anything pertaining to the sphere of nature as such, that is to the domain governed by the law of necessary or involuntary action.

Now besides nature and man there is only one other object of our possible knowledge, and that is God. Strictly speaking the term history can have no reference to him. For he is lifted above all considerations of time and place. He is without succession or change. He remains eternally the same. Indeed, he can become the object of knowledge, whether scientific or experiential, only as he reveals himself. On *a priori* grounds we might infer that this divine self-disclosure, if made for man's benefit, would come to him, as the alleged record of it in the Bible claims it did, through nature and through human personalities. As such it has, to be sure, its own history, a history that becomes the primary source of theology.

These last considerations, however, only give point to the statement that ordinarily we confine our use of the word history to human events. It has its home in what the Anglo-Saxon called the "world", that is, "the age of man". It deals, in the first instance and immediately, only with our free, self-determined activities, though in a subordinate manner it must constantly take account of our material environment. In its broadest objective sense, therefore, history is the sum of all that *man* has thought and wrought, all that he has dared and suffered and achieved, everything that has befallen him and everything that he has done, from the beginning of his generations until now. It is the total life of the human race, each individual member acting and being acted upon as a rational, voluntary and moral cause of events.

But as in all other sciences, so in history, the subject-matter may be treated with more and ever more of philosophic insight and thoroughness. Facts themselves, indeed, are the mere dross of science; the ideas which interpret them are the precious gold in the ore. It marked an epoch in the development of our science, therefore, when, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, just a few years before Voltaire coined the phrase "the philosophy of history",—a phrase to which his treatise of that name did but scant justice because of its shallow rationalism,—Montesquieu emphasized the truth that the most distinctive trait of every social phenomenon lies in its capacity of continuous evolution or development, and that it can be adequately known only by a study of its consecutive states and of each state in comparison with the co-existing general conditions of society. At about the same time, moreover, Turgot, in a singularly profound and forceful manner, made the idea of progress "the organic principle," as it has been called, of history. Since then, the existence of such a principle in the career of mankind has scarcely been questioned, though views have differed as to its precise nature. The influence of Christianity, as will be seen later, has here been decisive. For the present the statement may suffice that now the most obvious fact in history, as in geography, is that the world is round, that the race is not a mere aggregation of units but an organic unity in which every part is reciprocally means and end; and that the only interpretation which does justice to the phenomena of man-life as known to history is that which presupposes the orderly, causally connected or genetic development of the entire process. It is the organic sequence in the relations of the events that has converted the vastness of this chaos into the vastness of a cosmos. The change wrought in our apprehension of the data of history has been like unto that produced in our knowledge of astronomy, when the planets began to be seen in their organic connections as determined by



the always existing but only then discovered law of gravitation, with the sun instead of the earth as the centre of the system. Henceforth history, like the other worlds open to human investigation, takes its place under the reign of law. The events with which it deals present not only an orderly succession, but an organic evolution, a genetic development in which is unfolded the social, political, industrial, intellectual, moral and spiritual progress of mankind.

Such, then, are the presuppositions of history as a science. It has a definite and distinct body of facts for its subject-matter—the life of humanity in the unity, continuity and multiformity of its genetic development; these facts are capable of a rational interpretation and of a systematic treatment that will give proper generalizations of knowledge; these facts are what they are for scientific purposes because of the organic relations in which they stand to one another.

Such a definition of history as the science of the development of humanity is sufficient for practical needs. Its elasticity is its chief merit. Anything more formal would be less useful. Only let it not be supposed that it is the function of a definition to convey any knowledge of the science itself. Rather is the reverse the case; to understand the definition of a science is not a condition but a consequence of the study of the science. All that the definition can do is to specify the distinctive subject-matter of the science.

This having been done in the case before us, we may briefly show, in passing, how and why history is to be differentiated from certain other sciences with which it is often confounded. Nothing need here be said about chronicles or annals. Their subject-matter is not historic at all in the sense that it presents itself to the observer in relations causally determined by man. This is only another way of saying that this species of narrative is not scientific.

Again, biography is not to be identified with history. In loftiness of moral aim and in thoroughness of investigation the two may have much in common. It may be conceded, too, that there is an oft-neglected truth in that favorite dictum of Carlyle's that the history of mankind is the history of its great men. But on the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the course of history as a whole has been determined much more by general causes, tendencies and movements than by the words or deeds or influences of individuals. In fact, history as the development of human society, will always be something larger than the sum total of all great lives or of all lives whatsoever taken as units; just as a polygon, no matter how many sides it may be given, is always smaller than its circumscribing circle. And not only so, but history as an organic evolution cannot possibly be adequately displayed in the most comprehensive biographical encyclopedia ever published or even conceived. History deals with individuals only as parts of the social organism. Biography deals with the life of the race only as this exists in its distinct and separate units.

The attempt has sometimes been made, notably by classical scholars, to identify philology and history, making it the science of all that has been produced or accomplished by the human spirit and preserved in writing for our information. But though this treatment of the facts may be measurably justified so far as the limited and chiefly literary or at least linguistic sources of our knowledge of the ancient world are concerned, the scheme breaks down the moment we apply it to the immensely vaster and quite heterogeneous sources of mediaeval and especially of modern history. Not only does the historian need other aids besides the philological, but—and this again becomes decisive—the subject-matter of his science is entirely different from that of philology: the latter makes the study of language an end in itself; the former makes it only one of many means to an end—the knowledge of the developing

life of humanity in all its phases, including, of course, that of language and literature. It need only be added that this relation does not deny the mutual helpfulness of both sciences.

The modern science of statistics is often presented as a virtual substitute for history. But at best its tables are only auxiliaries for the use of the historian. They are necessarily static, never dynamic, and frequently too atomistic, too fragmentary or too arbitrary to be of much service. Certainly the most significant facts of history will always have to be read into such mathematical estimates and mechanical summaries.

Of a piece with the last error is the attempt to make history fit the last of the natural sciences. But this does violence to the nature of historical 'facts'; for in this realm, as we have seen, causality is primarily psychical or personal, and only in an incidental way, or at least to a subordinate extent, is it physical or necessary. Historical realities are quite too amorphous to be capable of an adequate treatment by the methods of the exact or even the natural sciences. History must needs acknowledge a heavy debt of gratitude to these sciences, for it was from them that she has learned caution and thoroughness in the use of the inductive method in her own more difficult field. But when in their pride of achievement they strive to reduce her to a species of mechanics, or chemistry, or physiology, or biology, perchance even geography, it is high time to break the yoke of this modern scholasticism.

Prof. Freeman defined history as "the science or knowledge of man in his political character".<sup>2</sup> But among our more celebrated modern historians few could be found who were less philosophical than he. Social or economic conditions, art, religion, morals, the whole world of ideas had little or no interest for him. His own work, so admirable in many respects, is nevertheless the best refutation of his narrow conception of history. Political events

<sup>2</sup> *The Methods of Historical Study*, London, 1886, p. 118.

have often enough, to be sure, been the most important element in a historical development, but they are always only one of many such factors. Politics, or the science of the state, is only a branch of history.

Sociology as a science has scarcely as yet become conscious of herself. All attempted definitions show her to be close of kin to history. Both deal with man in his social relations. But while history traces the continuous organic development of the life of man, sociology investigates the general forms and functions of typical social groups or communities, in order by a comparison of the types to learn the conditions of their existence and in the light of such knowledge to consider in turn the peculiarities of each type. Obviously, history and sociology are mutual auxiliaries, but their tasks are quite different.

Much the same is true of the relation of history to anthropology, with the closely allied but often independently treated sciences of ethnography, ethnology and demography. These all investigate and classify facts pertaining to the life of the race, or portions of the race, from the lowest stages of savagery to the highest levels of civilization. Their contributions to history are many and valuable; but history alone can use these resources, as it uses all others, to exhibit the organic development of the life of the race as a whole.

In this account of the process by which, with ever-increasing precision, the subject-matter of history as a science has been determined, we have had occasion to allude to some of the more important steps in the corresponding development of historiography as an art. This movement, if only we could take time to trace it, would throw many an interesting side-light upon the former. For while the two lines have often run parallel to one another for considerable intervals, they have time and again interacted.

Broadly speaking, the writing of history has passed through three stages.



In the infancy of the science, as best exemplified to this day by Herodotus, "the father of history", it was considered sufficient to give a simple, straightforward, graphic account of things that happened. The good story-teller was the good historian. He must know, above all, how to gratify the national or racial pride, the religious or patriotic aspirations, or perchance even the mere curiosity of his readers. His spirit and aim is much like that of the epic poet. There are those, indeed, who would deny such works a place in the historical section of a modern library. The fact remains, however, that such narratives are truly historical in the sense that they treat of the real matter of history, though from the point of view of the more philosophic handling of the science they rank but little above annals or chronicles, there being no sufficient grounding of the events in human causality.

It was Thucydides among the ancient Greeks, and Cornelius Nepos and Tacitus among the ancient Romans, who have left us the chief classic illustrations of the second kind of historical composition, the practically edifying, or, as Polybius called it, "the pragmatic history". Here the attempt is made in more or less thoroughgoing fashion, to find the reason of events, whether in the motives of the actors engaged, or in the influences of quite complex social, generally political, phenomena. At their best, such works, responding to a deep-seated human desire and need, have a permanent value as instruments of instruction for the general reader and as guides for men charged with the direction of affairs. Too often, however, the historical pragmatist makes an undue, not to say a culpably unworthy use of his freedom in attributing motives to those of whom he writes, interprets great issues in the subdued light of backstairs diplomacy, and neglects—as was notably the case with many medieval writers of this school—the general interests of culture and civilization, as well as the influence of the material environment.

The highest stage in historiography has been attained

only in modern times. Only in the eighteenth century did men begin to see history, as a body of organically connected facts in the life of the race, sweep majestically, like some new-found planet, into their field of vision. And though no science can point for its humble beginnings to a remoter antiquity than can history, its relatively late maturity ought not to occasion any surprise. For on the one hand, history belongs to the mixed sciences, which deal primarily with spiritual aspects of the universe, but must constantly investigate these in their relation to their material surroundings. It thus partakes of the difficulties that beset alike the psychical and the physical sciences. Accordingly, its progress has in large measure been directly dependent upon the cultivation not only of those allied disciplines, with which, as we have seen, it has sometimes been confounded, but also of those that are technically called its auxiliary sciences; palaeography, diplomatics, sphragistics, numismatics, genealogy, and above all—those two “eyes of history”—chronology and geography. As Dr. Shedd, in the discourse from which I quoted at the outset, has well said: “And if we consider the mental qualifications required for its production, the department whose nature and claims we are considering, still upholds its superiority, in regard to universality and comprehensiveness. The historic talent is inclusive of all other talents. The depth of the philosopher, the truthfulness and solemnity of the theologian, the dramatic and imaginative power of the poet, are all necessary to the perfect historian, and would be found in him, at their height of excellence, did such a being exist. For it has been truly said, that we shall sooner see a perfect philosophy, or a perfect poem, than a perfect history.” But on the other hand, the ultimate reason for the late ripening of historic science is to be found, not on its subjective, but on its objective side—in the nature of its facts or data. For, assuming that the historic development of man is an organic process, a considerable period of time must elapse before a sufficient



number of typical, or at least significant features can be evolved. For instance, there is the idea of unity as an essential characteristic of every living organism. But how could a medieval writer, on historic grounds, posit the unity of the race, when half of the planet, with more than half of the world's population, was to him *terra incognita*? Or where could he, within the narrow limits of his monastery or bishopric, find a suitable yardstick to measure the progress of a civilization which he could understand, if at all, only in the light of a context that embraced many centuries and diverse nations? But no organic evolution is intelligible, if the marks of its progress are not discerned. But above all, such progress itself depends chiefly upon the free and full development of the individual members of the organism. And where in those feudal days did the masses of the people ever enter into their divine birthright of freedom? History herself teaches us that it is only in the latest, the most fully developed, the most complex civilizations that the common man has attained his highest individuality and the liberty requisite to function at the maximum of his social efficiency. In fine, world-history could not be satisfactorily apprehended as an organism, until its organic nature had sufficient time to disclose itself.

Long before that modern day dawned, however, the idea of the organic development of humanity had received a classic and forever sacred expression, first in the life and then in the literature, of a peculiar people, a race that was historically constituted in the form of a special divine economy. From the very beginning of the Christian era, therefore, when that holy Scripture was given a universal mode, this idea began to exert its characteristic influence upon the thought and the life of the world, though it has had to wait till our own day for its approximately ecumenical realization. That is why even that medieval historian who was necessarily limited in the understanding of many of his facts, could nevertheless, by his customary



grouping of all events after Christ under the one rubric of "the last age", give the humble story of his monastery the splendor of a certain ideal unity that we seek in vain in the most finished productions of pagan antiquity. That is why St. Augustine, in his *De Civitate Dei*, our first Christian philosophy of history, could write a prophetic sketch of the progress of the race, at the very time that he saw the pillars of the ancient world crashing to their destruction. That is why all through the middle ages there were some quiet evangelical mystics who could shatter the yoke of hierarchical tyranny and enter into the freedom of full-statured manhood. In a word, if an organism is a unitary structure that secures its own vital growth through the ever-developing perfection of its members, then we must conclude, history herself being the witness, that it is to Christianity, more than to all other influences combined, that the human race owes alike the highest realization of itself as an organism and the most adequate knowledge of itself as such.

This fact obviously calls for further consideration. It must be assessed at its real value. We now turn, therefore, to our second preliminary inquiry: What is the idea of the Church?

Like many another word that once came forth clean-cut and shining from some famous royal mint, the term *Church* has long since, through the attritions of use, become so badly worn down, that few who handle that coin to-day have any clear idea as to what sovereign's image was originally stamped upon it, or how its superscription read, or what value it professed to have. But the knowledge of these details has by no means been altogether lost. It needs only to be more generally distributed for the common good. The most obvious thing, at any rate, that may be said about the Church is that it is a fact given in a definite historical context. It is a phenomenon found only on Jewish and Christian soil. And if the most skilful expert in numismatics cannot tell us all we should like to know

about the process of coining this word, the humblest philologist can tell us its original value. Etymology here, too, is our sufficient guide.

Our word *Church*, like its equivalent in all modern Teutonic languages, and likewise in most of the dialects of those Slavic nations that were converted by Greek missionaries, comes, not from any Germanic source, but directly from the biblical Greek, *κυριακός*, "pertaining to the Lord", that is the Lord recognized as such by the Christians. Originally, no doubt, it was the feminine form of the adjective that was used, the noun to be supplied being *οικία*; so that the Church in the first instance was the house of the Lord. Gradually, however, the name was transferred to those who met in this house for worship. The Church became the congregation. In modern Romance languages, however, as also in our own, we find another set of derivatives from another Greek original, *ἐκκλησία*. This is a word which the New Testament greatly ennobled, so that instead of denoting merely the gathering of an assembly, or its place of meeting, it came to mean a company of Christians, that is, persons who believed themselves called by God out of the world of sin unto eternal life through Jesus Christ. Doubtless, our own "ecclesiastic" and "ecclesiasticism," and the like, have been degraded from this lofty plane far below any level of poverty and shame to which even our word "Church" has sometimes been reduced. But taking them in their original strength and beauty, the two expressions emphasize the double truth that is fundamental in this whole discussion: "Church" points to a *κύριος*, the Lord, the head of the body; and "ecclesiastic" points to an *ἐκκλησία*, the members of the body. It is perhaps not altogether without significance, in the light of the religious differences between northern and southern Europe since the Reformation, that the Teutonic nations adopted for their vernacular the word that magnifies the invisible divine head of the Church, while the Romance nations gave the preference to that which directs attention

to the visible human members. But that is by the way. The cardinal fact is that from its earliest history the Church appears as an organism, a body with a head and members, sharing, according to their belief, a common life.

It will have been noticed that in what has just been said, we have had occasion more than once to refer to the faith of the Christian considered as a Church member. Such references have been unavoidable, and the fact of their necessity is too significant to be overlooked. For in the last analysis the Church, as an historical phenomenon, indeed even when viewed as a mere institute exerting a peculiar influence upon the world, must be allowed to possess some sort of transcendent life; in a word, it must somehow be causally related to that special revelation which is the very principle of all theological science. In its inmost essence the idea of the Church is a theological idea.

This by no means denies to philosophy the right she claims of using her own organon for the investigation and interpretation of the facts in regard to the rise and development of the Christian Church. It may freely be granted that many a philosophy of history has been composed upon un-Christian and even anti-Christian principles, which nevertheless has done relative justice to some aspects of the truth so far as the Church is concerned. And certainly whoever has given himself the pleasure and profit of reading the eloquent Phi Beta Kappa Address of the late Prof. Henry Boynton Smith, on "The Problem of the Philosophy of History", will be prepared to admit that such a treatment of the facts will always lead at least some minds to accept as deliverances of philosophy—as conclusions of the unaided reason of man—precisely what the Christian, with the open Bible before him, takes as the presuppositions for all his knowledge alike of the life of the Church and of that new science of theology which that life, as by an inner necessity, was bound to produce. The fact remains, however, that philosophy is prevailingly too

anthropocentric to be sufficiently sympathetic toward the higher problems involved in the religious life of the race; that her conclusions, resting in this case chiefly upon historical data, can never yield more than a certain degree of probability, a defect that needs must grieve the pious heart that craves certitude as to the alleged presence of the Supernatural in human affairs; above all, that her instrument of investigation, man's reason or understanding, is utterly unable, according to the overwhelming if not unanimous testimony of the visible Church herself, to interpret the deeper spiritual realities involved in this historic evolution.

But what philosophy cannot do in that it is weak through the flesh, theology, as the science of the revealed knowledge of God, can and does accomplish, thanks to the regenerating and illuminating power of the Holy Spirit, the true *doctor ecclesiae*. We here come to first principles, which to-day, as much as ever, are and must be accepted by some and rejected by others. This lies in the nature of the central fact in the moral experience of the race—the universal presence of sin and the still limited scope of the palingenesis by which alone the noetic effects of sin can be removed. There is here no room for argument except as between those who start from the same premises. Like every other scientist, the theologian must begin with faith; he must have his presuppositions. These he will not try to prove. For as Dr. Kuyper, arguing this very point, pertinently concludes: "Assurance of faith and demonstration are two entirely heterogeneous things. And he who, in whatever department, still seeks to demonstrate his *principium*, simply shows that he does not know what is to be understood by a *principium*."<sup>8</sup> Such, too, was the view of our fathers of the Reformed faith: As our own Westminster Confession puts the matter—speaking of holy Scripture: "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the

<sup>8</sup> Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*, E. T., 1898, p. 563.



inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts."

Historically, therefore, the decisive fact is that of the divine word itself. Either it is seen shining in its own light or it is not seen at all. This does not imply that if a man is unregenerate and lacks this testimony of the Spirit, he can in no sense contribute to our knowledge of the Church or do other work in the field of theological science; but it is quite clear that his interpretation of the data in their deeper, that is their organic relations, will differ greatly from that of the man who finds in the self-authenticating word of God the seminal principles of the entire development of the Church. In a word, the supernatural revelation, containing as it does among other things, our only information about the origin of the Christian Church, can be made the object of an adequate scientific treatment by the regenerate only. For "except one be born anew"—thus the faith of the Church keeps re-echoing the assurance of her Founder—he not only "cannot enter into" but he even "cannot see"—much less describe—"the kingdom of God."

According, therefore, to the ecumenical Christian consciousness, which alone can be the subject of the science that is competent to deal with the facts here in question, the Church is essentially a supernatural organism implanted within, or grafted upon, the natural life of the race. It is the appropriate self-expression of a new principle of being, a divine germ, lodged in our humanity, namely the special, recreating, enlightening, sustaining, sanctifying, life-transforming grace of God, which makes its partakers "grow up in all things into him, who is the head, even Christ, from whom all the body fitly framed and knit together through that which every joint supplieth, according to the working in due measure of each several part, maketh the increase of the body unto the building up of itself in love". Not as a mere institute dispensing material or even spiritual benefits, but as a life-system perpetually

nourished from its own root; not as a human society but as a divine communion; not as a natural organization but as a supernatural organism, is the Church the house of the living God. Her origin, her nature, her task, her destiny—in short, her history—is intelligible only in the light of her relation to Christ, her head; that incarnate Word that appeared in our humanity as a second, but also as the last Adam.

Not without significance, for instance, is the statement that God sent his Son “when the fulness of the time came”. For in order that the holy Catholic Church, as distinguished from the national economy of the Old Covenant, might appear, two things were necessary: the incarnate and the written Word. That is to say, Christ had to introduce the divine being itself into our race and once for all bring the age-long redemptive work of God to its organic culmination and relative completion, so that the formula, “It is finished”, might always legitimately be applied to it; but further, to secure for the benefit of a permanent and universal Church the knowledge of these redemptive deeds and their significance, an authoritative and trustworthy record was necessary, precisely of the kind given by inspiration of God in the holy Scripture. With redemption and special revelation completed, and with a fixed canon of sacred writings in which the revealed knowledge of God could be organically applied to the whole race in the most permanent, the most universal, the most constant and the purest form possible to man, the Church could confidently enter upon her ecumenical mission.

Again, it is at once obvious that in tracing the history of the Church, we are never at liberty to identify the spiritual principle inherent in Christianity as a comprehensive life-system with any of its partial and imperfect embodiments in concrete institutions. For practical purposes, to be sure, the whole may most conveniently be studied in its parts. But in every true organism, the whole is always something other than, and greater than, the sum

of its parts. We need ever to reckon with the possibility, therefore, that some who are connected with the visible Church are not in vital union with Christ, and contrariwise that some who do not own any branch of the visible Church as their mother nevertheless share the life of God as their Father. Only those called of God and regenerated by his Spirit, whether with or without means, make up the true *ecclesia* that reflects a genuinely supernatural life in its several marks of unity, holiness, universality and permanence. On the other hand, the Church, too, like the individual Christian, bears her treasures of truth and grace in earthen vessels. Her spiritual life is indeed divine, like that of her exalted head from whom it flows into all her members, but, like his, it is a theanthropic life, however much, unlike his, it has ever been and continues to be marred by sin. For regeneration does not destroy the substance of the natural life; it only quickens and energizes it and brings it into new relations, forms and functions, and invests it with higher capacities. Thus at one time the good and at another the evil elements in the complex development of the Church's life must be emphasized, the former being due to the relatively more perfect realization of her divine life, and the latter to the temporary superiority of her incompletely sanctified human life. The wheat and the tares grow side by side in the same field.

The task of the Church, in the light of what has just been said, can be none other than the progressive realization of the true idea of Christianity. The germ of the divine life must be given the most favorable conditions possible in which to grow, blossom and bear its fruit,—a fruit that will yield in turn seed after its own kind. The gospel leaven must be made to permeate human life in all its phases, activities, conditions and circumstances, in every range and region of individual experience and throughout the most complex social institutes. The revealed knowledge of God is to be spread over the earth and applied, not indeed individualistically to every member of the species, but

organically to the race as a whole. The regenerate who have drunk of the water of life must in turn become fountains of living water to other thirsty souls. The Church is, in a word, to make disciples of all the nations, her chief instrument of instruction being that divinely authoritative written word which, by the power of the Holy Spirit, its primary author, makes possible a permanent and universal knowledge of him, the incarnate Word, whom to know is eternal life. The Church as the body of Christ is to promote his dominion over the race, that race which was originally his by the right of creation and was made his anew by the right of redemption, until at the consummation of the age, having received the heathen for his inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession, he will deliver up his mediatorial kingdom to the Father, that God may be all in all.

We have now analyzed, and with sufficient precision defined the idea of history and the idea of the Church. We need only combine the results in order to formulate the idea of Church History. Disregarding for the moment the question of separating the biblical from the post-biblical kingdom of God, we may say that in its widest scope the subject-matter of our science, its determining principle, is the organic evolution of regenerated humanity; or, the genetic development of the supernatural life of the race.

In this statement, then, the Church is conceived as a single, continuous historical economy; existing, indeed, in successive forms and stages—the Adamic, the Patriarchal, the Jewish-National, the Apostolic, and the present Christian Church, but with all its diversity having the unity of a true organism. There will always, therefore, be a measure of logical propriety in the arrangement that obtains in many theological seminaries by which biblical and ecclesiastical history are grouped together as one course or at least under one department of instruction. For in its essence the Church has ever been the same. It never



has been anything but Christian in principle. From of old the name of the Christ has been the only one under heaven given among men for their salvation. It is important, however, to do full justice to the principles of theological encyclopedia here involved. For not only will there have to be a special group of studies dealing with the Scripture itself as the principle of all theological science, but in the organic development of the Church herself there is, as we have seen, a difference of fundamental and perpetual significance between the biblical and the post-biblical periods. Throughout the former her life was always supernatural in a double sense, or, better, in a twofold manner; from the first special revelation to the close of the apostolic period, when the organism of special revelation was completed, there was a series of miraculous interpositions of divine power in the course of human affairs; and then, besides, there was the work of supernatural regeneration and illumination in the sphere of the Church's subjective life. But after the work of redemption was brought to its culmination and relative completion by Christ, and likewise the process of special revelation by him and his apostles, then the life of the Church became, as it has ever since remained, supernatural in only the latter of the two modes we have specified. The physical miracle falls away. It is no longer needed. The rebirth and the enlightening of the Holy Spirit are sufficient. As for the rest, whether Pentecost or the close of the first century is to be made the *terminus a quo* for the course in Church History is a mere matter of detail to be determined by considerations of expediency.

From this chronological starting-point, then, Church History will trace the development of the kingdom of God through the ever-lengthening Christian era to the appointed consummation of the present age. And since temporal succession is the necessary form of all becoming, much attention must be given in all historical studies to the turning points, the epochal stages in the organic evolution.

For only when historic movements are properly bounded in time as well as in space can they be visualized with sufficient distinctness to make possible a life-like reproduction of them in a narrative. On the other hand—and this is the only other remark we shall make on this phase of the subject—no chronological divisions, much less subdivisions, can have a permanently fixed value. For time is always changing the perspective through the addition of new fields of investigation, and historical science can only do justice to the given state of knowledge. Who, for instance, would have supposed six months ago, that the year 1914 would witness events that will in all likelihood necessitate a new major division in world-history since the Reformation of the sixteenth century?

Equally important in practice, though likewise incapable of securing for themselves an absolute value, are the material or topical divisions of Church History. They are necessary for the thorough mastery of the subject-matter as a whole. But just because the historic process is a living unity, it should never be artificially dismembered. Nor ought all the periods to be treated exactly alike, as was unfortunately too often the case with some of those older manuals, that made their readers regard history as a sort of anatomical museum stocked with cabinets of a uniform size and appearance, each shelf accommodating the regulation number of skeletons, the bones being always about as dry as they were numerous. Doubtless there will be some advantage in following in the main the familiar lines of cleavage by which one set of facts is grouped for special consideration as the history of missions, the spread of Christianity amid the favoring influences or the more or less determined hostility of the world; another, as the history of the development of the polity, the government and the discipline of the Church; another, as the history of ecclesiastical worship, with the too often neglected story of Christian art and architecture; and still another, as the history of doctrine and dogma, with special reference to the work

of the constructive theologians, the confessional formulas, and the contemporary philosophies of the various periods. But the final, because the only adequate category for every historical development is that of the human personality taken as a whole. Every man's life is something more than the sum total of his thoughts, words, and deeds. It cannot be known apart from these manifestations of itself, but their highest scientific value to the historian is that of enlarging his capacity to know that life itself in its inmost nature, in its unuttered residuum, in its hidden potentialities as well as in its partial expressions. And *a fortiori* the life of the Church, the history of the kingdom of God, must be studied now from one and now from another of literally countless points of view; now in its quiescent states and now in its varied movements; now in its religious, its devotional, its God-ward aspects, now in its introspective moods, and again in its energizing influence upon every condition, circumstance, relation and activity alike of individuals, families, tribes, nations, states, races, and all social groups whatsoever,—so far as these effects and interactions may be seen to have a bearing upon the organic development of the regenerated life of humanity.

In the light of the foregoing principles, we may now more accurately set forth the relation between ecclesiastical and general history. The former is, in the first instance, a species of the latter. Generically, there is and can be but one science of history. For the human race is a single organism, and in their essence the facts of man-life in this world are all of a piece. For holiness, communion with God, is the original as well as the ultimate history of humanity. When the race fell, it fell as a whole; when it will have been redeemed, it will have been redeemed as a whole: not in the sense that every twig and leaf will have been saved, but in the sense that the life of the tree as such will have been saved. The parts cast off perish as *disjecta membra*; the parts preserved unto life eternal are kept in

organic union with the ever-living root. But because regeneration is only the beginning of a many-sided process that requires nothing short of a life-time to bring its fruits unto perfection, the spiritual man will necessarily retain to the very end of his days many of the relations, forms, and activities—in a word, the sinful elements—of the natural life. And the same is true of the evolution of the race as a whole. Accordingly, history in the subjective sense must reflect this state of affairs, and hence, as regards the entire problem of the methodology of history, there can be only one heuristic, or the science that deals with the nature of the sources of history, including the auxiliaries we have already named,—philology, palaeography, diplomacy, geography, chronology, etc.; only one theory of historical criticism, or the science that determines the value of these sources; only one hermeneutics, or the science that unfolds the valid principles of interpretation; and likewise only one art of historical composition, the synthetic presentation in the form of a written narrative of the results secured by the three processes just named. Moreover, because religion, whether as the love of the Father, or as the love of the world, is ever the deepest concern and the regnant power in every life, even general history is absolutely unintelligible apart from the religious experiences of the race. In the nature of the case, therefore, ecclesiastical and general history will often deal with the very same facts.

But this is not the whole truth concerning the relation of these two branches of knowledge to each other. For on the one hand, so far as even their present development is concerned, they view the same data from different standpoints. General history regards the historic process as the evolution of humanity; ecclesiastical history regards it as the evolution of regenerated humanity. The former contemplates the human agents as men; the latter, as Christian men. The former deals with society as a natural organism; the latter, as a spiritual organism. The



former sees God in human affairs in his providential activity only, if at all; the latter beholds him also in his work of grace for, and in, and through sinners. This of itself leads to a characteristic difference in the valuation of the self-same elements in the historic development. On the other hand, the relation of the two processes of evolution to each other is constantly changing, and this necessitates a continuous readjustment of the boundary lines between ecclesiastical and general history. For the Church, the kingdom of God, Christianity, is conquering the world. The leaven is leavening the whole lump. Rapid as may be the expansion of the natural life of the race in some periods, yet on the whole the development of its spiritual life takes place at a still more rapid and an ever accelerating rate of progress. In nature it is never possible, but in the realm of grace it has often occurred, that a nation is born in a day. And quite apart from the extraordinary Pentecostal seasons of spiritual awakening, we need to remember that redemption is destined to be a cosmic process, transcending the boundaries of the human race itself, so that the history of the Church must one day be the truly universal history. We ought not, therefore, to conceive of the natural and the supernatural development of humanity as two endless parallel lines; nor even as the two foci of an ellipse, from which, so to say, two independent and mutually exclusive evolutionary processes are trying to occupy contiguous or perchance the same territory lying in the one given plane; but rather as two spheres of organic life: one, the Church, the spiritual order, being enclosed within the other, the world-order; each proceeding from the same original centre in the natural and spiritual life of the first head of the race; each expanding and striving, against the opposition of the other, to fill the whole realm of possible human interests; but the final result of the conflict being that "the kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ." More and more, therefore, the very

ground for the distinction between sacred and secular history is destined to vanish. Meanwhile, let it not be forgotten that the only reason that we may regard the entire historic process as a holy one is that the thrice holy God has, in his infinite mercy, made it possible for the race as such to be a partaker of his own holiness by means of the double gift of his grace—a special revelation of redemption, preserved in the holy Scripture, and the regenerating, enlightening and sanctifying Holy Spirit, by whose power, in this present dispensation, the holy Catholic Church is summing up all things in its head, the Lord Jesus Christ. In him, and in him alone, all contradictions are reconciled. In the light of his cross, and there alone, do we find the true principle of an adequate philosophy of history. He is the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end, alike of all creation, of all revelation, and of all redemption. "All things have been created through him, and unto him; and he is before all things; and in him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the church; who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead; that in all things he might have the preëminence. For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in him should all the fulness dwell; and through him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross; through him I say, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens."

Such, then, as we conceive it, is the idea of Church History as a science. The Church being the congregation of saints, the communion of the faithful, the body of Christ, the history of the Church here on earth is the organic evolution in this present world of the spiritual, the supernatural, or the redeemed life of humanity. It is a process, therefore, whose deepest significance is intelligible only in the light of Christian theology—that knowledge of God which has become possible for us through special revelation. It is not enough for the Church historian to

be a theist; for as even the rationalistically inclined Gieseler had to acknowledge: "he cannot penetrate into the internal character of the phenomena of Church history without a Christian religious spirit."<sup>4</sup> In other words, if theology is the science whose special task it is to reflect in our consciousness the revealed knowledge of God, then Church History must needs be a branch of theological science; for outside of the Church, as the society of the regenerate, there is and can be no true theology. In fact, our science is determined in the last analysis by those same three theological factors that determine the entire circle of the theological sciences: the word of God which was in due time recorded in the Scriptures; the Holy Spirit in his regenerating and illuminating work; and the organically connected members of the body of Christ, or the Church. It is not strange, therefore, that Church History has always, as a matter of fact, flourished best in the congenial soil of the theological sciences, and that, among these, it has necessarily held a place of usefulness and honor second to no other.

We turn, therefore, to a brief consideration of the remaining division of our subject.

## II. CHURCH HISTORY AS A THEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE

In trying to characterize the specific discipline inculcated by our science as prosecuted in this and similar institutions of sacred learning, we may consider, first, its distinctively scientific value, and then its other—if the term will not be taken in too narrow a sense—more "practical" benefits.

The strictly scientific uses of Church History can perhaps most advantageously be presented by means of a rapid survey of its relations to the other departments of theological instruction.

According to the customary division of theological studies, there are, besides Church History, three main

<sup>4</sup> Gieseler, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, I § 5.

groups: one dealing with the Scripture as the principle of all theological science, that is, then, the word of God as such; another with dogma, or the content of the word as systematically reflected in the understanding of regenerate humanity; and another with the sacred offices instituted for the maintenance and the propagation of the word. To all these, though to each in a different way, Church History sustains the intimate, vital connections that betoken truly organic relations. Indeed, only in the processes of history can we get a satisfactory view of the way in which every part of the tree of theological science becomes reciprocally a means and an end with respect to every other. But let us particularize.

Logically and chronologically first in the organism of scientific theology is that group of studies which deals with the word of God, more accurately, the Scripture, as such. Of these a considerable number are strictly propædæutic—biblical philology, biblical archæology (including biblical chronology and geography), biblical hermeneutics, and biblical isagogics (including the lower and the higher criticism of the Bible). These need not now detain us. Their importance is due to that to which they lead, and for which they prepare, the student of theology. Inasmuch, however, as they ordinarily flourish only within the realm of ecclesiastical life, Church History, as the narrative of that life, will have occasion to record their progress, call attention to their deficiencies, inspire the necessary efforts for their improvement, and thus render them many incidental benefits. To Church History as a science belongs, in particular, the honor of having inaugurated, as early as the age of the Renaissance, that really critical study of ancient documents which has developed into the exceedingly important science of modern literary criticism. As for biblical canonicity, this is in the main an historical discipline, and its chief materials, so far as the New Testament is concerned, are to be found specifically in the domain of the Church's early history.



But the queen in this sisterhood of biblical studies is that which is often used to give its name to the whole group, exegesis, culminating in biblical theology as the science that exhibits the revelation of God in its organic historical development. In view of what has already been said concerning the "truth and divine authority" of Holy Scripture as the very principle of theological science, it is plain, on the one hand, that Church History will be deeply indebted to these exegetical disciplines. For the great central ideas that organize and animate the biblical consciousness are the very ones that are constantly giving fresh impulses to the development of the spiritual life of the race. In fact, there is no movement of prime significance in this whole sphere that cannot be traced back to some germinant scriptural truth. Moreover, both according to its own claim and according to the witness of history, the Bible is itself the only sufficient test of human life, especially of its moral values, the supreme arbiter of man's character, conduct and destiny. History needs precisely such a criterion, and only the scientific study of the Bible can put this boon into the historian's hands. And above all, biblical theology, just because it sets forth the organic progress of supernatural revelation in the Scripture, presents an invaluable norm for the interpretation of the kindred development that constitutes the subject-matter of Church History—the supernatural life of man begotten of the word and the Spirit of God. For biblical theology, though it deals with an evolution that is somewhat narrowly limited in time, nevertheless, because of the unique and final character of that process, sounds those full and fundamental tones that make up the chord of the dominant in the noblest harmonies that human life has been able to produce ever since it came under the power of the law given by Moses and the grace and truth that came by Jesus Christ. But on the other hand, Church History, in turn, furnishes indispensable aid to the exegetical theologians. Quite apart from the knowledge which it alone

can supply them concerning the history of interpretations, concerning the historic improvements of their scientific methods and tools, and concerning the special needs of their department in their own day, Church History often furnishes the data that make it safe to reject some interpretations as no longer worth trying, or wise to adopt others as probable. Especially in the exegesis of predictive prophecies has many an overconfident subjectivist been put to grief by the stern, hard facts of history. And in general, as in other fields of scientific investigation, so here, the limitations, errors, and dangers attending the exercise of the unquestioned right of private judgment, can be best overcome, or avoided, by the more thorough cultivation of the historic, that is the universal, as distinguished from the individualistic spirit. But above all, history is itself the best commentary on the Bible. Christianity is what it is in history. In history, the ideas of the word realize themselves, and this multiform, continuous process is ever shedding new light upon the meaning of the spiritual energies and potencies stored up in those Scriptures through which we most fully come to know him "in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden". The circle into which our reasoning here falls is a necessary but not a vicious one. For in history the word of God keeps producing its characteristic effects; and these effects in turn explain their cause. Exegetical and historical theology are mutually helpful.

The scientific value of Church History will appear greater still, when we examine its relation to systematic theology (including the introductory and supplementary sciences of apologetics and biblical ethics).

For, in the first place, systematic theology is absolutely dependent upon Church History. This is not to be taken in any anti-Protestant sense, as if the dogmatician makes the historical apprehension of revelation, and not the revelation itself, the subject-matter of his science. The

fact remains, however, that *suo jure* life is always first, antedating all scientific reflection. And in particular, with respect to our truly scientific knowledge of God, there was, and there could be, no theology, until after the Church had been in existence long enough to discern at least some of the organic relations of revealed truth. For the subject of theological science is not the Christian individual but the Church, the communion of the faithful, the society of the regenerate. And as no science can prosper save as it is cultivated by those who stand in organic relations with its subject-matter and with one another, so the theologian, if his work is to be fruitful, must always connect his personal efforts with the results already achieved by those who, as members of the body of Christ, being regenerated and guided by the Spirit, have helped the Church to apprehend the revealed knowledge of God in its organic, that is, its truly scientific character. Commonly, as we know, the dogmatist occupies a definite confessional standpoint, and this position of itself will ordinarily guarantee his vital contact with legitimate and suitable lines of theological construction. He never presumes, if he is a really qualified worker, to perform his arduous task as a system-builder, by trying to lay anew, through an independent study of Scripture, the very foundations of his structure, but rather, like those skilled architects succeeding one another age after age in the common effort to finish some stately old cathedral, he will strive to complete, perchance to restore or to correct, the work of his predecessors. In short, the history of Christian dogma and doctrine will furnish him with his choicest materials, critically sifted and properly estimated as to their scientific value. With these in his possession, he needs must re-examine all his data in the light of the basal principles of his science, the teachings of holy Scripture. He will thus not repeat the error of Scholasticism, which conceived it as its chief business to defend and confirm its historic confession. Nor will he hesitate, in his own use of the Bible, to trust the guidance

of the Holy Spirit as the true *doctor ecclesiae* for the Church of his own, as of every other age. But he will always find the secret both of his genuine scripturality and of his most fruitful theological productivity by entering, with due reverence and humility, but likewise with genial independence, into the labors of the ecumenical Christian spirit as the best aid to his understanding of the inspired mind.

Again, Church History is a necessary supplement to dogmatic theology. For by its very definition, this latter science seeks to know, not what has been or is now held to be true, but only what is ideally true, concerning God and his relations to the world; not what men have believed, but what they ought to believe. Accordingly, dogmatics is essentially a static presentation of the content of Christianity. It is a group of facts, doctrines, principles, concepts, theories, speculations, all reduced, as the phrase is, to a system. For that very reason, however, it can never embrace and reproduce all our knowledge of God, but only our scientific knowledge of God. But this is, always has been and must ever continue to be, but a small part of the great boon which has come to our race through the revelation recorded in the Bible. The fact is that Christianity itself entered the world not as a dogma, but as a historic process, and that from the very beginning, when as yet there was, and could be no theological science, the Church nevertheless had a knowledge of God that was sufficient for all except her purely scientific needs. Moreover, to this day, theological, like all other science, can be the concern of only a relatively small part of mankind. But this other, this more general but likewise more vital, experiential knowledge of God, can and does flow directly from the Bible to all who enter the kingdom of heaven. No doubt the Spirit of God has special blessings to bestow upon the Church through her scientific expositions of the Scripture, but to the praise of the glory of divine grace be it said, he likewise makes not only the

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preaching, but even the reading of the word "an effectual means of convincing and converting sinners and of building them up in holiness and comfort through faith unto salvation". That is to say, even the non-scientific knowledge of God constantly operates to produce the characteristic effects of the divine word. But to trace these in all their organic relations throughout the whole development of the spiritual life of the race is the very task of Church History, a task which dogmatics cannot perform just because it is not an historical but only a normative science. It can, indeed, rationalize the entire historic evolution and abstract therefrom and embody in its system an important series of ideal coefficients. But the real efficiencies of the movement it has no means of presenting. It cannot reproduce in their concrete reality the manifold and multi-form workings of the divine word upon the whole world of human life. The basal importance of all this appears only when we apprehend the deeper significance of the Scripture as the principle of our theological science. Then we can never rest satisfied with the metaphors that make the Bible a mere quarry of limestone or marble, or perchance a mine of gold or precious stones. It is this; but it is much more. It is a dynamic. It is a hammer; it is a sword; it is a fructifying shower; nay, it is a seed; it is living and active; it is spirit and it is life. And, therefore, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of God, we must study the word not only in its states of equilibrium and quiescence, as reflected in a body of divinity; but also in its movements, its salient energies, its germinant accomplishments, its total impact upon the life of man, as these are reflected in ecclesiastical history, the narrative of the age-long evolution of regenerate humanity under the power of the divine word and Spirit. What the dogmatician calls an idea the historian sees at work as a living force. And how much richer and fuller, for example, does my knowledge concerning the doctrine of justification by faith become, when, with all the aid the

systematic theologian can give me by way of defining this truth in a formula, and relating it to the other truths of his system, I see the principle itself take shape in the heroic soul of a Martin Luther, become the inspiration of a great evangelical Church, and bring a whole continent to a new birth first of spiritual and then of civil and political freedom. Only in its action can the divine idea exhibit to the full its "power of an endless life". The glory of the fountain is the volume and might of the majestic river. Not in the least do we detract from the impressive grandeur and magnificence of any of the famous sanctuaries reared by the architectonic genius of the theological system-builder; but to Church History belongs the honor, the unique distinction, of exhibiting the total knowledge of God in the noblest and most comprehensive synthesis possible—a synthesis quite too vast to be embodied in any set of logical formulas, the synthesis of the life which alone is capacious enough to hold all the elements of the Church of God in its world-embracing historical development. In short, it is only through the Church, in the sum of its varied activities, that what Paul calls the manifold, the much-variegated wisdom of God can be made known alike unto us here on earth and "unto the principalities and powers in the heavenly places". Only in a historic narrative, only by means of a dramatic representation, such as the inspired Scripture itself had to make use of, can the knowledge of God in its fulness be reproduced for our contemplation and appropriation. Church History is a necessary supplement to dogmatic theology.

And in the third place, Church History is of inestimable benefit to the systematic theologian because it inculcates in him the right temper for his scientific labors. It delivers him from the temptation which alas! too often has become his besetting sin, the harsh and repellent dogmatism that so readily degenerates into rancor and makes it next to impossible for him to grasp the truth in its ripeness and rotundity. No doubt, Church historians as a class have



been quite too often the victims of the opposite vice, the theological indifferentism and latitudinarianism that makes them color-blind with respect to important phases of doctrinal controversies. In this respect, Eusebius, "the father of Church History", has had altogether too many admirers and imitators. Nevertheless, the historic spirit is the general, the universal, the racial spirit, and as such the truly human and humane spirit. We hear little to-day, and we ought to be duly grateful for the fact, of that dreadful malady with which, for instance, many of the great and good men of the Reformation were so grievously afflicted, the *rabies theologorum*, a disease for which no preventive or antidote was found, until the nineteenth century, with its unprecedented interest in historical science, discovered an efficacious one and gave it a fitting name—historical-mindedness. In the clear dry light of history, men began to see that heresy, if a real error, is only an excrescence, having no abiding place in the organism of theological science; that orthodoxy cannot perish from the earth while a single hidden root retains its hold upon the truth as it is in Jesus Christ; and that so far as the human personalities are concerned, no one on either side lives consistently by the logic of his scientific propositions, but is now better, and now worse, than his creed. History gives theological opinion its proper life-context, and thus enables even the polemic writer to differ in generous and genial fashion from his foe, and to realize the noble apostolic precept of "professing the truth in love."

But if Church History confers such great benefits upon the sciences in the exegetical and dogmatic departments, its service in behalf of the so-called practical theological disciplines is still more important. For it is the peculiarity of all these studies that they have a technical purpose in view. Their problem is that of the effective propagation of the word of God for the maintenance and promotion of the life of the Church in all its phases. The scientific principles which underlie the technique all pertain to the

methods by which these several tasks, in the pastoral office, the work of the pulpit, the instruction of the young, the administration of ecclesiastical affairs, are to be accomplished. But he who asks how a thing can best be done will invariably ask how others have tried to do it. History alone can give the complete answer, with the data for an adequate critique of the various solutions of these practical problems. Commonly enough, to be sure, professors in these departments content themselves with recent history; their own experience is likely to be the chief source from which they draw their counsels and precepts. But the accumulated wisdom of the centuries ought not to be ignored. In fine, an historical knowledge of Christianity is an indispensable prerequisite for the most successful cultivation of the practical theological disciplines. It alone can interpret for them the living present to whose needs they are to minister. It alone can help them to a discovery of their special and peculiar tasks. Above all, the comprehensive empiricism of history will give them their most valuable materials—those that will best illustrate the theoretical principles necessary for the practical guidance of the student.

Even if, therefore, we had nothing more to say concerning the disciplinary value of Church History, these varied, strictly scientific benefits would alone warrant Melancthon's judgment: *Praecipue historia opus est in ecclesia*. History, we may say, gives theological science as a whole its best insight into its own nature—its tasks, its methods, its problems, its prospects. Theology has no greater need to-day than just that of applying in all its branches the sharpened instruments and perfected methods of that historical science which, even in speculative Germany, has acquired the ascendancy over all other sciences, and which, throughout at least the western world, has become in things intellectual the proudest boast of this last century. And especially, therefore, in this new country and this youthful nation of ours, where, just because of



our comparative lack of historic sense, we have too often slighted the solid, well-tested historic realities of other lands, and in consequence have had so much to suffer from all sorts of theological Philistinism, morbid religiosity, pseudo-faiths, and ecclesiastical humbuggery, students for the ministry will do well to remember that history is that science whose special business it is to emphasize the organic character of the truly progressive life of humanity, that among the historical sciences Church History must ever be entitled to the highest place, and that as such it can be second to none among the theological sciences.

But the scientific uses of Church History are not the only, or even the most important benefits of this discipline. We need to remember that the primary function of a theological seminary is the making of "good ministers of Christ Jesus", men who will be "furnished completely unto every good work" in the service of the Church. Important as are the claims of theological learning, they ought never to be magnified in such a way as to relegate to a subordinate position the practical aims for which institutions like this were called into being. We shall not retract or qualify a single statement we have made concerning the need for every theological student in these days of a thoroughly scientific training. But we cannot forget that life is many-sided; that it has other and higher concerns than those of the intellect; that truth is in order to holiness, and that knowledge must lead to service. To know is good; to do well is better; but to be what one ought to be—this is the whole of life. Every student for the ministry should strive to make himself as much of an expert in theological science as possible; but he can do this only by becoming something greater and nobler, like that beloved disciple who leaned on Jesus' bosom and most fully caught the mind of the Savior,—a divine in the highest and holiest sense of the word. And certainly no member of a theological faculty, whatever be his attainments in science, will be satisfied with his service as a teacher, unless he enters

into the blessed work of moral creation and becomes a co-laborer with God in the execution of that glorious primeval purpose: "Let us make man."

Only from this point of view can we discern the highest uses of Church History as a theological discipline—what we may call its more practical benefits. With the bare enumeration of these I shall conclude.

First of all, there is the unique cultural value of this study. For one thing, as history in general has ever been the most comprehensive of the sciences, so among the theological branches, Church History traverses a wider field than any other. Its literature is quite as extensive as that of all the other departments combined. Its subject-matter is as varied as human life itself. It is the least special, and, by that very token, the most liberal of the theological studies. It stands nearest of all to the so-called "humanities," those courses in the college and university which the wisdom of a millennium has preserved as those best adapted to the making of a truly educated man. It breathes the atmosphere of that generous culture which is no less useful to the minister than it is to the lawyer, the juriconsult, the man of affairs, the philosopher, the friend of arts and letters. Moreover, just because the historic spirit is the spirit of humanity as a whole, the influence of our discipline is a valuable corrective of those intellectual vices to which the extreme specialization in scientific labor exposes alike the graduate and the undergraduate student of our day,—the exaggeration, the distortion, and the lopsidedness that spring from the failure to "see life steadily and see it whole". But no one can read history even in a cursory fashion without catching something of the meaning of that underlying unity which here, as in the case of every organic evolution, is as obvious as is the diversity. In this respect the study of history affects the mind in much the same way as does travel in a foreign land; the impressionistic vividness of sight, grasping a multitude of details in a single comprehensive view,

not only promptly dispels many false preconceptions and prejudices, but furnishes the due perspective for an accurate understanding and judicial estimate of the whole. Surely in an age like ours, distraught as it is by its specialism and confused by the disintegrations of its knowledge, Church History, as the narrative of the kingdom of God, can render a unique service by restoring to us the clear perception of the true realm of ends in human character and conduct; by coördinating and harmonizing the divergent and often discordant elements of our culture; in a word, by showing us anew the unity of our thought and life, the beauty of the ordered whole of man's endeavors and experiences.

In the second place, Church History has a high moral value. Its facts have an inalienable ethical significance. If the history of the world is the judgment of the world, much more is the history of the Church the judgment of the Church. One cannot trace the career of man, especially of man as a subject of redemption, without acquiring a new sense of the transcendent moral values of life and without constantly exercising the highest function of the human spirit—that of forming and estimating standards of duty, ideals of character, principles of conduct. History becomes a mighty means of grace. Its endlessly varied message takes quick and strong hold upon life, entering not only by the door of the intellect but, like all the deeper and more vital influences, through the countless avenues that lead into the secret places of the subconscious self. I read the pathetic story of the Church's failure to seize some God-given opportunity, I see her momentary defeat, her shame and misery, and I needs must become more vigilant and zealous in my own Christian stewardship. I get a glimpse of something true or good or beautiful in the most unexpected nooks and corners of history—spring-tide flowers at the doorstep of some squalid hovel—and an ampler charity fills my heart. I hear the oft-repeated cry of a noble army of reformers born out of their due time,

"How long, O Lord, how long?" and as I see the slow delivery of the divine answer, "A thousand years are as one day", the virtue of patience wears a new lustre in my daily routine. I behold empires fall, nations perish, civilizations crumble into nothingness, art and song and the gentler ministries of life being hushed one by one in the silence of the vast desolation, but lo! the Prince of Peace is in the van, leading the age by some strange anabasis into a more spacious and better time; and never again can I be the pessimist I was. After all, Christianity is its own best defence. Its victories are the supreme, the irrefutable analogy of its faith. In a word, if history teaches reverence for the past and moderation and caution with respect to the present, it likewise fires the heart even of the solitary disciple with genial optimism, with indomitable courage, with undying hope, for as nothing else can or does, it reveals God

out of evil, still educing good,  
And better, thence again, and better still  
In infinite progression.

Sixty-five years ago, on the occasion of his induction into the chair of Church History in this Seminary, Dr. James Waddell Alexander said: "To detect the products of this secret life, which has been visibly the same in every age, to recognize it, to love it, and to emulate it, is the delightful work of Church History. Here are the genuine memorials of the fathers; here are the true relics of the saints; not to be registered in calendars and graven on stone, and worshipped as idols, but to be followed, and by grace surpassed. If experience is valuable in our own hearts, then in the hearts of others; if in what is contemporary, then in what is past; if of one age, then of all ages. . . . Next to the study of God's work in Scripture, is the study of God's work in the later Church."

In the third place, Church History can confer inestimable benefits upon the minister of the Gospel in his official work. This is by way of eminence the practical value of this



study—its strictly professional or vocational uses. We have already seen how the history of the Church illumines and illustrates all the scientific principles, that is, the theories, which must underlie the practical theological disciplines. But the pastor's use of this information is quite different from that of the professor who is called upon to teach these subjects. The former deals with the problem in the concrete. It is not a theory but a condition that confronts him. His work in the parish, as a shepherd of souls, as a preacher, an ecclesiastic, an administrator of affairs, an official leader of the Church, constantly requires him to determine practical issues. Now, of course, if he lacks common sense—the sense to see the common things of life in their true relations—not even the most thorough knowledge of history can give him that nice discrimination as to the best course of action under given circumstances, which is the peculiar grace and genius of the man of tact. But granted even a modicum of this native wit, the knowledge of history will be the best means for its cultivation. "The fearless and reverent questionings of the sages of other times" will be for the minister, as for all others dealing with practical measures, "the permitted necromancy", as it has been called, "of the wise". He, too, will find it true: "There is somebody that knows more than anybody and that is everybody." For a broad, strong, efficient and judicious churchmanship, no study is more helpful than that which enables a man not only to avoid methods and expedients that have time and again proved their worthlessness or insufficiency, but also to commend the promises and prophecies of his own program by some sure word of history.

But above all, the minister of the Gospel can and should exploit Church History for his work as a preacher. By this we mean something more than that he ought to be familiar with typical products of the pulpit in the various stages of its development; though it goes without saying that in mastering any art, nothing whatever can take the

place of the study of its acknowledged masters, alike the dead and the living. But here, too, we are concerned not with theory, but with practice; not with homiletics as a discipline, but with preaching as a pastoral service. And therefore, if we have correctly apprehended Church History as the organic evolution of the regenerate life of humanity, we must insist that the history of Christianity is nothing less than the Gospel itself in the richest, the most complete, the most effective mode in which it can be presented. It gives the truth its most vital expression, resembling in this respect the inspired Scripture itself, which always places the revealed knowledge of God in an impressive life-context. Hence the unique value of that homiletic mode which makes a free use of history. Doubtless, there are special difficulties attending the composition and delivery of historical sermons. They demand ample knowledge, the fruit of wide and varied reading; a nimble, penetrating and cultured historical imagination that can readily seize the suggestive details of an incident, a biography, an epoch, and group them in a life-like and moving picture; and an unusual skill in the disposition of the illustrative material and in its adjustment to the practical, the religious, aim of the message. Ordinarily, too, such discourses, because of their abundant narrative and descriptive elements, will require more time than others for their delivery. But even so, the sermon of history has its own incomparable charm and power; while most of its advantages, without any of its drawbacks, may be secured in that type of preaching which, whatever the subject, makes generous use of history for all four of the rhetorical modes by which a theme may be developed and applied—explanation, argument, illustration and persuasion. Not seldom will well selected historical materials perform all these homiletic functions at one and the same time. Precisely here we find the secret of the acknowledged failure of many so-called doctrinal sermons. Theoretically, this is the highest species of the sermonic

art. It certainly ought to form the staple of pulpit work. But as a matter of fact, preachers themselves being the witnesses and the judges, this type of discourse is often the least satisfactory to themselves and the least interesting and edifying to the hearers. The trouble ordinarily is that the message is kept too far aloof from life—the life out of which the sacred text itself grew, and the life in the pew to which that text is supposed to minister. But a new day dawns over many a pulpit—a day of vastly increased power—when the preacher realizes that every truly vital sermon has not only heaven for its father, but also earth for its mother: that the biblical doctrines are all facts imbedded in a historic development: and that it is his duty not merely to conceive the truth as thought but to perceive it as life; not so much to forge long-linked abstractions, addressed to but one faculty of the mind, and that commonly the least trained and the feeblest, the ratiocinative—but rather to use the broader strokes, the pictorial suggestiveness, the impressionistic concreteness by which history, no less than poetry, succeeds in making a truly universal appeal in behalf, largely, of the very same moral and spiritual realities with which the pulpit must deal. To stir the imagination of the speaker and hearers so that it will quickly seize not only the surface value, but the cubical contents, the hidden power of a fact; to awaken memories in his heart and theirs that will smite conscience as with a sabre-stroke, or fill the soul as with the blessed light of childhood's golden morning; to enable him to emotionalize his ideas, that being self-moved, he may move all who see the glow and feel the throb of his own passion for the truth; to help him clothe the dry bones of his homiletic skeletons with the flesh and blood of life that is all the more real because it is historic, so that his incarnated message, like the gospel itself, nay, like that divine Logos who became man in order to be our gospel, may be an ever-living word, instinct with personal power and magnetism,—these are some of the possible ministries

of history to him whose task it is, by the noble art of true preaching, to promote the noblest art of true living.

And now, finally, as the supreme excellence of our discipline, we mention its religious value. Not for its scientific purposes chiefly, nor yet mainly for its varied cultural, ethical and professional benefits ought we to cultivate the knowledge of the history of the Church. For as in all other theological disciplines, so in this, the highest aim is not to be found in ourselves but only in him who has established and promoted the kingdom of heaven in this world for his own holy name's sake. Doctor Freeman closed his celebrated Inaugural Lecture at Oxford, on "The Office of the Historical Professor", by saying: "We shall surely not be less at home in our own generation, if we bear in mind that we are the heirs and scholars of the generations that went before us, if we now and then stop in our own course to thank the memory of those without whom our own course could not have been run, if we are ready, at every fitting moment, to 'praise famous men and our fathers who begat us' ". It is a worthy sentiment, ever true and timely. But surely we have a higher duty and a more blessed privilege; it is that of rising, as from every contemplation of the work and word of God in Scripture, so from all our study of his deeds of grace and messages of mercy in the later history of the Church, with eyes and hearts uplifted in adoring thanksgiving and praise to him, the eternal and all-glorious King of the ages, the Triune God of our creation and redemption, of whom, through whom, and unto whom are all things. That deep word of truth which Hase made the motto of his Church History must be our guide in the realization of the final end of this discipline: "The Lord of the times is God, the turning-point of the times is Christ, the true Spirit of the times is the Holy Spirit." Thus shall we more fully know him who is best known in the congregation of his saints, and more worthily serve him whom to glorify is man's chief end. In fine, Church History



reveals its crowning excellence only when viewed in its organic relations with that branch of human knowledge concerning which the Angelic Doctor of the schools said: "Theologia a Deo docetur, Deum docet, ad Deum ducit."

FATHERS AND BRETHREN, I thank you for your kind attention and patient forbearance. I have detained you too long; but I cherish the hope that you will be gracious enough to look upon the undue length of my remarks as but the defect of a real virtue in your new professor of Church History, his sincere conviction concerning the importance of the work to which you have called him and his earnest desire to magnify the service which he feels you may justly expect him to try to render to this institution of sacred learning and to the Church at large. Never has the task seemed greater, or its responsibilities more onerous, than at this moment. But in humble reliance upon the all-sufficient grace of God, I shall continue, as I trust I have begun, to take heed to this ministry which I have received in the Lord, that I may fulfill it. May his strength be perfected in my weakness, to the end that in him no labor of mine may be in vain, and that the service to-day inaugurated may increasingly redound to the praise and glory of his name.

*Princeton.*

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

# CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE

## INTRODUCTION

### KEYNOTE OF THE ADDRESSES AT THE DEDICATION OF THE GRADUATE COLLEGE

The things said at the Dedication of the Graduate College connected with Princeton University<sup>1</sup> recall an ideal of education that was never wanting to the larger minds of the past, had frequent expression in the old days of the American college, and many instances of notable fulfilment. The old college did not strictly aim at professional results, nor at any highly specialized form of learning. It finished little and ended with a Commencement. It aimed to lay only a foundation of liberal culture which would enable a good student to build to the best advantage any superstructure he might choose in the way of professional proficiency or general enrichment of mind. All the college was for was to lay this foundation, but such as would truly conduce to liberal culture in the largest sense, a culture both intellectual and moral, although the physical man was somewhat neglected.

The course was almost entirely prescribed. It was not determined by a student's special aptitudes or predilections, but by the most general needs of the mind, and the most liberal ideal of culture. Every normal mind was supposed competent to meet, at least with fair success, the demands of the curriculum. Those possessing least aptitude or liking for a given study were often thought to be the ones who needed it most; and it is a familiar fact that many who begin a required study with least interest prove, with good instruction and faithful application, quite capable, sometimes much more.

To effect its purpose the old-time college tried to epitomize

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<sup>1</sup> Oct. 22, 1913. See *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, Oct. 29.

mize the whole field of learning, though spending most time on those studies that make the best instruments of learning, and best fit the student for self-directed work. The languages open up all the humanities, mathematics introduces the physical studies, and philosophy, in its larger sense, makes for the synthesis of all learning, and shows, or ought to show the bearings of all experience on the highest problems of human thought. The old American college, even in its best estate, was poor in the facilities now easily found. Small were its libraries, laboratories and collections, small its faculty; and yet those faculties usually included men who impressed their pupils with high conceptions of character and culture, and turned out a surprising proportion of splendid results. The largest asset in any kind of school is still the personality of the teacher, and the largest equipment without this goes for little. We cannot run through the catalogues of sixty or seventy years ago, or even of our colonial times, without meeting many familiar names of students who, soon after graduation, proved to possess a versatility and range of adaptation to all the higher callings of life, even in the fields of higher learning, unexcelled in our new graduates to-day.

The usual age at graduation in the former time was considerably lower than to-day, but the general preparation for life was not inferior, nor the general foundation for the higher culture. Indeed the education given then in the older group of American colleges was more liberal and less eclectic than in most institutions at the present time. There need be little doubt that comparative biography supports this statement; and the wonder is that so many men of high scholarship, wide interests and practical efficiency were produced by a system now so often viewed as superficial and extremely narrow. As this holds good of results in the three older professions, and other practical occupations entered by the college graduate of other days, so also it holds in the field of general learning, and of the sciences and literatures particularly followed by teachers and the men of



letters. It can hardly be said that in proportion to the greatly enlarged facilities now offered the individual products of college training are better than they were fifty years ago. But it can be said that the pursuit of higher culture by college graduates had then no such encouragements and helps provided in this country as it has to-day in many graduate courses, and especially in the Graduate College of Princeton.

Ample and felicitous expression has been given to the ideals of this new enterprise; but these ideals have already been exemplified in the lives of not a few Princeton scholars of the past, when the effort was more difficult, and perhaps demanded more character to make it. Those luminaries of our history, and pioneers of the culture we inherit, ought not to be forgotten in these days of outward enlargement and much greater academic ease; for some of them are ensamples to us that we cannot too much honor, and may well emulate, though we find it hard to surpass.

These remarks are designed to preface some account of a former Princeton scholar, and his work, in whom the ideals of the Graduate College were preëminently exemplified; and some further consideration of that theme which made the keynote of the addresses at the Dedication. Perhaps what is said may promote a better understanding of the enduring value for scholarship, not only to Princeton, but to the academic world, of the work accomplished by Charles Woodruff Shields.<sup>2</sup>

The keynote of the addresses made at the Dedication of the Graduate College was the Unity of Learning; together with the necessity to the best culture of its practical recognition, and the purpose of the new institution to foster all study in the light of this central postulate and truth. With varied and apt expression nearly every speaker on that mem-

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps also some readers of these lines may be led to write for the *Alumni Weekly* or some other journal, their own appreciations, both of this man and of others, who, in the annals of the university, have conspicuously embodied the ideals of culture it has always fostered.



orable day, presented this large conception of knowledge as constituting in all its range a living unit. In the measure of approximation to truth all knowledge is one, as mankind is one, the world is one, and its eternal ground is one. Full justice can be done to no one branch of knowledge without a full conviction of this truth. Only finite knowledge is possible to a finite mind. The largest learning is but a selection from the whole domain. Bacon who took all knowledge for his province had his limits, like Aristotle, who was called by Dante the master of them that know; and Leibnitz, who, after Aristotle, has been thought the most highly gifted scholar that ever lived; and like Kant, who entered the university as a student of theology, but spent his life there mastering every other science save that one, and of that remaining lamentably ignorant to the end.

The ideal of health or wholeness in the mind may be defined in words which have been applied to the body: "The greatest energy of each part compatible with the greatest energy of the whole." In his inaugural address as rector of Aberdeen University, Feb. 27, 1874, Huxley declared that "the curriculum of the universities of the thirteenth century appealed better to the many sided mind of man, and was better calculated to bring out all the powers of the human intellect than the curriculum of any modern university". This claim gets large corroboration in a volume by the eminent Catholic physician, Dr. James J. Walsh, on *The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries*; and corroboration is plentiful from many hands. In the history of education nothing has done more to destroy the unity, impair the quality and limit the interests of liberal culture than the complete elimination from it of theology as a science in which every other science is concerned. Since the early Christian centuries, there has never been a time when it was not easier to find theologians versed in every kind of learning, and expert in several forms of science, than to find men of science without professional training in theology, who have any proper acquaintance with that subject. There is no one study so well fitted as theology

to universalize a man's interest in all study; and this for reasons that might be easily shown. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many eminent laymen were read deeply in theology; Bacon, Grotius, Milton, Locke, Newton and Leibnitz are examples. President Lowell of Harvard says that "no department of human thought ought to be wholly a sealed book to an educated man". But theology is a sealed book to most educated men to-day, and even among the clergy it has widely become denatured as a science. Its isolation and exclusion from all connection with science at large has been described by an eminent scholar of France as putting out the eye of science. But what the normal connection is of theology to all other learning—this must be discussed in another place.

A scholar must indeed concentrate his resources on some special quest to produce the most practical results (94)<sup>3</sup>. Yet such is "the community of knowledge and general kinship of the sciences" (Patton, 114), that all parts of learning sustain to each other relations that are complemental and corrective; while "the narrowing and isolating effects of detached and specialized inquiry" (Patton, 92) accompany the failure to recognize these relations. Culture and vision are largely proportioned to this recognition. It is indispensable to "that breadth and depth of view which alone constitute intellectual superiority, and which in an age when specialization is imposing itself upon us more and more, are becoming increasingly difficult to possess" (Boutroux, 99). By this means shall academic "training in eminence" (Butler, 99) best be secured, and "the bias and limitations that specialization brings" (Riehl, 96) best be avoided. The "estrangement of special from general knowledge" (West, 94) is a highly characteristic feature and menace of our times, and "the dangers of one sided pursuit of special

<sup>3</sup>The arabic numerals appearing thus in this Introduction refer to pages of the *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, Oct. 29, 1913, where full reports occur of the Addresses at the Dedication. Bracketed names are those of the speakers quoted.



knowledge, with its possible atrophy of the power of perceiving all things in their due proportion" (Taft, 102) the Graduate College is meant to counteract. Its "central idea" is the promotion of "special research" (Hibben, 110), but only under conditions of such "fellowship of learning" (Patton, 93), and "socialization of science" (Sloane, 112) as shall yield "a deeper sympathy and wider vision in reference to the great field of knowledge" (Hibben, 110-11). This whole institution "is a protest against over specialization", against "the segmentation of knowledge"; since "the man himself is one, and the field of knowledge is one, and the struggle is between the unit of men and the unit of knowledge" (Sloane, 113). "A perfect culture of the human spirit ought to be universal" (Boutroux, 120); and if this universality is a dream, it is no less the right ideal to follow. "In the daily fellowship of kindred minds," and "the communion which reveals the unity of knowledge", all separate interests should be harmonized; and the several lines of inquiry should converge upon one truth in which "all separate truths, however seemingly estranged, somehow and somewhere find their reconciliation and unity". This truth is "God, the end of all our knowing, and Christ, the master of the schools" (West, 94).

Thus the keynote of the new enterprise, as President Hibben calls it (111), was sounded clearly by nearly every speaker of the occasion. The chief end of the Graduate College is the promotion of the best culture, and of original research in every kind of knowledge under the ruling idea that all true knowledge is one, reflecting the unity of the world and of its source. Thus would the university apprehend the universe, and the eternal reality of its ground. Thus also, in "a true brotherhood of learning", would it nourish "a higher intellectual vitality" (Peterson, 107), and reconcile "the maintenance of national traditions with the pursuit of universal truth" (Boutroux, 97). Every study would be pursued in the perspective of its total history (Patton, 114-5, Godley, 97, Peterson, 109, Riehl, 117), and in its

natural relation to all other learning. But the best results of the Graduate College can only be secured by meeting four other conditions referred to in the Public Lectures by European scholars; conditions that are only corollaries of what has been said.

(1) The modern emancipation of learning from external control, of which Dr. Arthur Shipley spoke (116), has led men of science to use their own eyes, instead of relying on the testimony of the fathers. This freedom of thought and instruction is still an indispensable condition of adequate research, but does not in the least conflict with due consideration of competent testimony, whether old or new, in any matters of fact that it may cover. Sifted and coördinated testimony is the proximate basis of every experimental, observational and historical science, and such testimony is recognized authority. The scholar is free to interpret all facts as he will, but most of his facts he must take on the testimony of others; and all such testimony is authority. "Ordinary experience differs from science through its lack of completeness and consistency. It is fragmentary and disconnected. Science compensates the inequalities of individual experience by reënforcing it with the aggregate of all other experiences."<sup>4</sup>

No science of experience can exist apart from this use of authority, for no science is built on the individual experience of one man. The utmost liberty of interpretation is conditioned by the facts to be interpreted, and consists with dependence on the testimony or authority of other men. All testimony should be critically sifted, but good testimony has been frequently ignored to the detriment of science. In every science the maximum authority goes with the maximum experience. Hence the emphasis of theology on its primary witnesses, and the need of an historical and classical foundation for all high culture, even culture in the sciences. Such a foundation may be largely ancient tradition, but long discredited traditions get new corroboration every day.

<sup>4</sup>Wm. T. Harris: *Psychological Foundations of Education*, p. 2.



Ancient tradition is not only the background of all modern learning without which nothing is seen in right perspective. Much of it has proved to be valid testimony to matters of fact and invaluable truth, to be coördinated with whatever facts and truths are disclosed to our experience to-day.

Copernicus did not first discover the central position of the sun. He rediscovered a fact that Aristarchus, Plato and Pythagoras had derived from some more ancient oriental source. He read in Cicero that Pythagoras taught a heliocentric system, and he regarded that ancient testimony, which had been long despised, as worthy of reconsideration.

Columbus did not first discover that the earth is round. He rediscovered a fact reported in the most remote traditions, and widely entertained by ancient nations. That even the poems of Homer assume a spherical earth has been plainly proved. And Columbus was led to make his voyage by reconsidering the despised testimony of Marco Polo concerning the lands and nations of the East; testimony long considered fabulous, and left for our own time to corroborate in nearly every particular on its own ground. Simon Newcomb said there was no time in the history of astronomy when the rotundity of the earth was not believed; and the evidence of this belief, with the proof regarding Homer, has been luminously shown by Dr. William F. Warren of Boston University in a book of great learning, cogency and charm.<sup>5</sup>

Kant did not first discover the foundations of knowledge in necessary and self-evident reason. He rediscovered what Aristotle and Plato had in some respects much better said; and had Kant himself been better acquainted than he was with Plato, he might have put the matter in far better fashion than he did, and escaped the gratuitous scepticism of his own ground. In modern philosophy, from Descartes down, Kant was thoroughly read, but in Greek philosophy

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<sup>5</sup> *The Earliest Cosmologies: the Universe as pictured in thought by the ancient Hebrews, Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, Iranians and Indo-Aryans.* New York, Eaton and Mains, 1909.

very inadequately versed; although the foundations of philosophy were laid for all time by the Greeks.

Luther was not the first to discover the sun of the spiritual universe in Christ. Luther rediscovered the neglected testimony of the primary witnesses, then rediscovered Christ for his own soul, and then republished the ancient testimony for the modern world; leaving every man without excuse for not using his own eyes to find Christ.

Thus the testimony of ancient tradition has often been neglected or despised to the immeasurable loss of science and life. There was an ancient tradition that great stones fell out of the sky upon the earth; and scarcely an hundred years have passed since the men of science scorned it as an old wives' tale, only to be suddenly disconcerted by the fact. If the Lord Christ Himself should descend from heaven whenever the end of the present age arrives, He would only fulfil an ancient testimony now despised, though uttered by the most impressive group of witnesses mankind has known. He would find men mocking at the old tradition precisely as it was predicted that they would: "Where is the promise of his coming? For, from the day that the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation" (2 Peter iii. 4). And the effect of that coming upon all human governments and institutions unreconciled to His rule would be like that of the stone in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, "cut out of the mountains without hands, that smote the great image upon his feet, and brake in pieces the iron, the brass, the clay, the silver and the gold" (Daniel ii. 31-45).

(II) Another condition the graduate scholar must meet is indicated by Dr. Godley of Oxford as that of "steering a course between dilettantism and over-specialization" (118). Many a man has been hurt by this dilemma. His culture is wanting in all concentration, or is so concentrated that it ceases to be liberal culture. The problem is resolved by fulfilling the moral requirements of well-directed effort, and the intellectual requirements of proportional distribution in



knowledge. The distribution of knowledge needed for the highest culture involves two further considerations which are mentioned in the lectures of Professor Boutroux and Professor Riehl.

(III) First, "this culture whose object is the perfecting of the human mind ought to be carried on at the same time through the sciences and the humanities" (119). This is no less true when perfecting the mind has ulterior ends in the service of God and man. There have been scholars like the eminent London physician, Sir Henry Holland, who keep up through life an annual rotation of studies, with a perpetual circulation of interest, in both old and new learning, in both the sciences and the humanities. His autobiography may be commended to all students.

There were no men of science in the last century who used their own eyes more effectively than Louis Agassiz and Arnold Guyot, who, born in Switzerland in the same year of 1807 and receiving the largest education Europe could afford, devoted most of their years and lifelong fellowship in this country to original research. They were no worse naturalists for reading Aristotle in his own Greek text, and writing scientific papers in Latin; as indeed was a common practice when they were young. The range of their studies was immense, and their culture in the best sense liberal.<sup>6</sup> Their acquaintance with the humanities enabled them to see, better than any mere specialist in science or literature can, the bearing of their facts on human life, the complementary facts by which physical and moral laws are both limited and completed, with their real significance in the cosmic whole. The greatest specialist who lacks this breadth of view is certain to overestimate the laws he finds, and underestimate the facts and laws of other fields; as in some very conspicuous instances the last century exemplified.

(IV) The last condition to be mentioned here for securing the best results of the Graduate College, is referred to by

<sup>6</sup>For the briefest comparison available read the account of each in Appleton's *Encyclopedia of American Biography*.

Professor Riehl. All knowledge becomes science in reaching a critically organized form, and all science becomes philosophy in seeking the fundamental implications of experience. This, at least, would seem to be the view taken by Aristotle, who first organized the sciences in the interest of philosophy, and regarded philosophy itself as science in its universalized and terminal form. The philosophy that he calls First, because it deals with what is first in the order of being, may as fitly be called Last, because it deals with what is last in the order of knowing. As philosophy, in its largest sense, is an effort to explain the totality of experience in terms of reason, it should be obvious that the first function of philosophy is not to settle the highly advanced question: How do we happen to know anything at all?—but to face the facts that have to be explained in their totality and unity, their natural order and representative proportion. This involves an organization of all the sciences, not only as separate bodies of knowledge, but in their normal relation to each other; such an organization as shall best express the integration of human experience to determine its primary implications as one whole.

As a complete university of learning aims to teach all branches of knowledge, so philosophy should be taught as a synthesis of all knowledge, an expression of its living unity. The unity of knowledge was a cherished conception even in the old American college, and the educational reaction from eclectic programmes which have been so much in vogue of recent years is itself a reaffirmation of the old ideal. Yet it cannot be said that the function of philosophy in uniting all knowledge into a single conspectus of the world was distinctly recognized by all of its teachers, nor is it always recognized to-day. But the unity of all learning in philosophy finds clear expression in the first general introduction to this subject written by an American author, an unjustly forgotten classic of our colonial literature, published on Benjamin Franklin's press in 1752, the *Elementa Philosophica* of Samuel Johnson (1696-1772), who was



American born and bred. It was emphasized in the strongest manner by James Marsh (1794-1842) whose death in the first maturity of his resources was long considered, and may still be considered the largest loss to constructive philosophy this land has suffered. Good evidence may be found for this in his *Memoir and Remains*, where his biographer, Joseph Torrey, speaks of "the instinctive desire of his mind after unity in all his knowledge", and says: "There are some minds which cannot pursue a particular branch of science, without seeking to trace its connections and its relations with everything that can be known." "He aimed to prepare a comprehensive view of all the parts of knowledge as constituting a connected and organic whole, and to understand the relative importance of the several parts." Marsh was not only a man of unusually wide and solid learning, and deep insight, but was probably the first American scholar to combine a large acquaintance at first hand with Greek philosophy and with Kant.<sup>7</sup>

Philosophy must be a theory before it can become an application, and the theory must account for human experience as a whole. All special knowledge of whatever sort culminates in philosophy as its most completely reasoned form, and without philosophy culture cannot attain its best estate. Only philosophy can effect a "synthesis" of those "ideas" (Hibben, 111), which are "the real powers of the spirit" (Riehl, 118), and solvents of the world and life. Only philosophy can show "the unity that lies at the center of all disciplines" (Hibben, 111); and so the place philosophy should hold in the Graduate College becomes evident.

"The question now arises," said Professor Riehl, "how in view of the altered position of science, through the continued advance of specialization, the organization of knowledge is to be attained" (117). To this question the following answer may be offered: The organization Aristotle began must be perfected in an organon of research which shall

<sup>7</sup> *Memoir and Remains of James Marsh*. By Joseph Torrey, Burlington, Vt., 1843. Cf., pp. 44, 35, 112-5, 22-3, 42, 86.

serve as the propædæutic to philosophy, showing in due natural order the salient data of experience and problems for investigation, with the alternative theories proposed, and the methods and criteria to be used.<sup>8</sup> Such an organon was attempted by Bacon and by Whewell and again by Comte. Not merely the *Novum Organum*, but in effect the whole *Instauratio Magna*, is Bacon's unfinished project for a complete organon of research. Cousin describes the want of all synthetic method in the philosophy of the Renaissance, and the beginning of modern philosophy, properly so-called, with treatises on method by Bacon and Descartes.<sup>9</sup>

The Royal Society, and other academies of science for the purpose of uniting the interests of all the sciences, were largely due to the influence of Bacon's *Atlantis* and his *Instauratio*. This beginning has had an immense development. Every division of science has its own association, and in the more comprehensive societies many sciences are represented. In one such organization, The Philosophical Society of Great Britain, or Victoria Institute, Christian Theology is recognized among the sciences, and its data are respected.<sup>10</sup> Not only these societies of scholars, but Dide-

<sup>8</sup> Schwegler says of Aristotle that he "obtains a plurality of coordinated sciences, each of which has its independent foundation, but no highest science which should comprehend all". *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*. Tr. by Stirling, Edinburgh, last edn. p. 97-8.

<sup>9</sup> Cousin: *Modern Philosophy*. Tr. by O. W. Wight in two volumes. New York. D. Appleton. 1852. Vol. I. 75 ff.

<sup>10</sup> As now constituted, the Institute of France was formed in 1795 by the National Convention to replace the four academies abolished in 1793. Its plan reflects the influence of the *Encyclopædia*. A writer in Johnson's *Encyclopædia* says: "The organization of the Institute shows that its founders had a clear sense of the solidarité of knowledge, a unity sometimes lost sight of in our own age, when nearly every savant is a specialist." This writer also quotes Renan as follows: "Many countries have academies which may rival ours by the fame of their members, and by the importance of their works. France only has an Institute where all the efforts of the human mind are bound together in one sheaf; where the historian, the philologist, the critic, the mathematician, the physician, the astronomer, the naturalist, the chemist, the lawyer, the sculptor, the painter and the musician may call themselves comrades." Renan does not mention the theologian.



rot's *Encyclopedia*, and Comte's *Philosophie Positive*, owe their incentive and plan, though not their irreligious spirit, largely to Bacon. The British *Encyclopedia* grew out of the French, and doubtless others published in Germany and elsewhere; and many other attempts to recognize the unity of learning owe primarily to Bacon the direction of their effort. But only in philosophy can the vital connections of all kinds of knowledge be displayed, and philosophy has never needed anything so much as an adequate organon of research.<sup>11</sup>

It is not the function of an organon to elaborate a system of metaphysics, nor a cosmology, but to prepare the way for such construction by showing how best to find the facts and distribution of human experience, of which in its totality and unity metaphysics is the necessary implication and the reasoned explanation. The Princeton "Collège of Discoverers" (93) would seem to lack nothing of equipment if equipped with such an instrument. But the best organon of research the whole history of philosophy can show has been already provided by a scholar of Princeton in the *Philosophia Ultima* of Charles Woodruff Shields, of which, and the principles involved in its construction, some further account is here proposed. Like the *Instauratio Magna*, from which its inspiration was first drawn, this great treatise is unfinished, and lacks the final revision for which its author made much preparation. But doubtless the most important part of the work is in our hands, and, with whatever deficiencies and faults, it exhibits the largest conception of philosophy ever entertained, and the most practicable method ever devised of uniting all science in the service of philosophy, and of bringing to bear on the highest problems of human thought the totality of human experience.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> This want has often found expression, and has been voiced by Prof. John Dewey. See his address at the Centennial of the University of Vermont. Centennial volume, p. 112.

<sup>12</sup> *Philosophia Ultima*. By Charles Woodruff Shields. 8vo., pp. 96. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1861. *Final Philosophy*, 8vo., pp. 609.

## THE MAN AND THE CONDITIONS OF HIS WORK

In his *Psychological Foundations of Education* William T. Harris says: "It is the glory of the higher education that it lays chief stress on the comparative method of study; that it makes philosophy its leading discipline; that it gives an ethical bent to all its branches of study. Higher education seeks as its first goal the unity of human learning. Then,

New York, Charles Scribner, 1877. The same revised as *Philosophia Ultima, or Science of Sciences*, Vol. I, 3d edition, 8vo., pp. 419, 1888. Vol. II, pp. 482, 1889. Vol. III, with Biographical Sketch by William Milligan Sloane, pp. XXXVI, 227. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. The Introduction of Vol. I was first prepared as an Inaugural Address when the author assumed his college chair of instruction. It is only suited to its original purpose, and does not adequately indicate the philosophical character and function of what follows. This part was entirely rewritten before the author's death for the intended new edition. The third volume is a fragment, made up in part of lectures given in the style of direct popular address, unassimilated to the previous volumes, and wanting several chapters. A redistribution was designed for all the material of Part Second, beginning Vol. II, 411. This would have been consolidated with the third volume, and the second volume revised with fresh additions. A somewhat antiquated use of certain terms would have been changed, minor inaccuracies and inconsistencies of the text would have been excluded, and some slips of pen and print corrected. Various other improvements were designed to complete the three volumes, and bring them up to the latest possible date. This much the present writer can infer from a correspondence held with Dr. Shields during the last ten years of his life; and it is supposed that much manuscript material exists, available for a new and better edition should the right man be found to undertake it. Such an undertaking deserves the care of the best scholar the Graduate College can produce, and might be made an inestimable benefit not only to students of philosophy and theology, but students in every large department of research. The *Philosophia Ultima* is not a treatise the value of which can be gathered and gauged in a single perusal. It will reward the best attention that can be given it in the measure of attention. In America no other work in philosophy has been written better fitted than this to stimulate original research, and inspire new construction, among readers who will give it this patient, consecutive and repeated study until they have mastered the author's fundamental position, and the magnificent scope of his thought. The argument is too large to be easily mastered in detail, and does not appear to have been well understood by those reviewers who have handled it in the past; although great admiration has been shown by most of these for



in its second stage, it specializes. It first studies each branch in the light of all the others. It studies each branch in its history" (p. 336). "Specialization should follow a course of study for culture, in which the whole of human learning, and the whole of the soul, has been considered." (p. 324. See whole context.)

It may be safely said that no American writer on education, or on metaphysics, ranks higher than the writer of these words. It can also be said that never were they better exemplified or applied than by Shields of Princeton; although his specialty was the synthesis of all learning. Charles Woodruff Shields was born April 4, 1825 in the state of Indiana, where his grandfather was famous as a jurist, soldier and state founder. He died August 25, 1904, in Newport, Rhode Island, where much of his principal treatise was composed in the spirit of Bishop Berkeley's *Alciphron*, which was also written in that place. He was ordained to the ministry of the Presbyterian church in 1849, and, after a short pastorate in Long Island, he was installed over the Second Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia in 1850, remaining in that position fifteen years. The interest created by his first projection of the *Philosophia Ultima* in a pamphlet of 1861 led to the establishment of a college

many obvious, incidental merits of the discussion. Those who accept the author's main position will recognize the minor importance of such defects and deficiencies as the treatise may present in the absence of a final revision. Its incidental values are alone sufficient to place this work in the very first rank of philosophical production in this country. Its plan and purpose seem to be chiefly influenced by four men, who are Bacon, Butler, Kant and Comte. The place of theology in the author's scheme is a logical extension of Butler; and the chapter on Butler in Vol. III is not only unsurpassed, it is safe to assert, among all critical estimates of the great Bishop as the exponent of a philosophy that is Christian, but this chapter is also the best brief expression we have of its writer's own mind. A beginner in Shields may be advised to begin with this chapter, and to read it again and again, until he has assimilated every page. Then let him do the same in Vol. II with its first 127 pages, where the backbone of the whole work may be found. A reader who will master these brief portions first, will be best prepared for the consecutive study of the three volumes.

chair in Princeton that he occupied from 1865 until his death—a chair devoted to the relations of science and religion.

Besides many separate articles in the journals, he published a Presbyterian Book of Common Prayer in 1864; a volume on Church Unity, called *The United Churches of the United States*, in 1896; and in 1898 an admirable play, called *The Reformer of Geneva*, devoted to the highly dramatic episode of Calvin and Servetus. In this play rare justice is done to both of these characters, based on large historical research, such as marks the author's entire output. Yet this play is so fine a poem that the Shakespearian critic Edward Dowden declared he had sat up all the night to read it through. The problem of church union was never better stated than by Shields; and although his solution of the problem is not acceptable to all, his statement has been very influential in recent discussion, and is one with which all parties to this interest must reckon. His life was devoted to two great ideals, setting them forth in the way that he was best able to pursue. These were a wide federation of all Christian believers into one obvious and organic church of Christ; and the federation of all sciences into one truly Christian philosophy. However impracticable to most persons these two ideals may seem, or either one, no other ideals are more worthy to occupy the mind of a scholar or a Christian; and however far short of their realization men may fall, yet unless these ideals are persistently held up to the contemplation of mankind by those who in their cause must often pass for dreamers, then no approach to their fulfilment ever can be hoped through any initiative supplied by man. But the federation of all churches into one organization, comparable to the political federation of states, requires the consent of all the churches; whereas the unification of all science in philosophy may, conceivably, be affected by any one man, and recognized by other men when they will. Three other books were issued by Shields which have been incorporated in his leading treatise. Of these the most



important is his *Order of the Sciences*, 1882, exhibiting that classification and integration of the sciences in the interest of philosophy which constitutes the central feature of his organon.

In 1844 he was graduated from the College of New Jersey, deeply imbued with the love of letters, the love of wisdom and the love of God. He received a good foundation in the classic tongues. He was taught mathematics by Albert Dod who was equally admired for the charm of his character and the brilliant versatility of his mind.<sup>13</sup> His love of literature was strongly fostered by James W. Alexander, an inspiring teacher of English literature and rhetoric.<sup>14</sup> In physics and biological science young Shields had Joseph Henry and John Torrey, both of whom acquired international fame as the best physicist and best botanist of the time in this country.<sup>15</sup> He learned from President

<sup>13</sup> Among other papers that Prof. Dod published in the *Princeton Review* is a weighty, critical estimate (1845, pp. 505-557) of the famous *Vestiges of Creation* by Robert Chambers (though long anonymous), which volume first appeared in 1844, and prepared the way for Darwin and Spencer. This article constitutes one of the first important discussions by an American writer of the theory of cosmic evolution. It should be compared with another review of the same book, published by Tayler Lewis in the *American Whig Review*, May, 1845. Both papers anticipate much that was written after 1860, and are well worth reading still.

<sup>14</sup> Besides much else from his pen, two posthumous volumes of his own correspondence make a delightful and informing addition to the epistolary literature of this country: *Forty Years' Familiar Letters of James Waddel Alexander, D.D.*, edited by the surviving correspondent John Hall, D.D. (of Trenton, N. J.), New York, 1860. In 1848, Dr. Alexander published in the *Princeton Review* an article on Hegel as a man, based on the biography by Rosenkrantz. It is perhaps the first considerable account of Hegel's personality published on this side the Atlantic, and makes a pleasing portrait, although Hegel's philosophy was neither understood nor approved at that time among us—if it is yet.

<sup>15</sup> Torrey, in 1820, published a *Report on Plants at the Headwaters of the Mississippi and in the Rocky Mountains*, which was the first American treatise using the system of natural affinity. In 1838 this was again employed by Torrey and his celebrated pupil Asa Gray in *The Flora of North America*. Torrey was also a chemist and mineralogist of renown, and taught the elements of those sciences at Princeton. The

Carnahan the Ethics of Butler and the psychology of Locke and Reid. He entered the Theological Seminary to enjoy daily contact with men who not only were learned and effective teachers, but also eminent personalities. Archibald Alexander of noble presence, speech and influence, great in ethics theoretical and applied;<sup>16</sup> his son, Joseph Addison Alexander, the most distinguished Orientalist then of this land; Samuel Miller, of varied learning, whose homiletics appeared in his whole life;<sup>17</sup> and Charles Hodge, whose theology, while he lived, had an ascendancy unsurpassed among the churches, through the influence of his pupils, though first published as a system in 1871-2.<sup>18</sup> It was Hodge, who in 1825 founded the first theological quarterly journal of America, the early volumes of which were republished in England for want of anything there so good. He was one of the early group of American students to attend the universities of Europe, and while there translated for his own journal from the French of Philip Albert Stapfer the first considerable account of Kant's philosophy made

telegraph of which Henry discovered the principle and Morse the alphabet was first operated in the year of Shield's graduation, 1844. It is stated in the Introduction to the *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* that "the principal growth of this country really began with the invention of the telegraph in 1844, which placed in touch the states which were before but provinces, and made thought and sympathy and patriotism national". New York, 1892.

"The posthumous volume of his lectures on Ethics: *Outlines of Moral Science*, New York, 1852, became widely used as a manual of instruction uncommonly efficacious, and still more so as the teaching came from the author's lips, with his whole character behind it. The book was described in the *Westminster Review* of London as "a calm, clear stream of abstract reasoning, flowing from a thoughtful, well instructed mind, without any parade of logic, but with an intuitive simplicity and directness which gives an almost axiomatic force". Dr. Archibald Alexander also left a small volume on Christian experience, drawn from actual experience and wide observation, a volume brief, luminous and valuable still to the psychology of Christianity, and the interpretation of its New Testament statement and norm: *Essays on Religious Experience*. 1840.

"A voluminous writer, of whose published work a Bibliography was printed in the *Princeton Theological Review*, Oct., 1911.

"Charles Scribner, New York.



public in this country. Stapfer, an eminent Swiss protestant professor of philosophy, was among the first to introduce a knowledge of Kant into France. The translation by Hodge was sent from Berlin and published in 1828, covering fifty-two pages, with four of Introductory Remarks by the translator. Dr. Hodge may even be said to have first introduced to American scholars German higher criticism in the form of Herder's *Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, by publishing in 1826-7 translations made by President James Marsh of the University of Vermont.<sup>19</sup> Whatever the opinions entertained at that time by the Princeton theological professors, they were well versed in the theological literature of Europe, and competent as any to make critical estimates.

Shields had among his fellow students several who in different callings became well-known for breadth of culture, among whom may be named his intimate friend James C. Welling, later President of Columbian, now George Washington University; William C. Prime, Archibald A. Hodge, William Henry Green, the most eminent Hebrew scholar of the conservative school of his day, Joseph R. Wilson, theologian and eminent ecclesiastic of the Southern Presbyterian Church, John T. Duffield, for fifty-one years a teacher of mathematics in Princeton College. Among those who shortly preceded or followed his own residence in the college were Parke Godwin, Charles G. Leland, Theodore L. Cuyler, John Craig Biddle, for many years President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, David A. Depue, Judge of New Jersey Supreme Court and Chief Justice of the same, John T. Nixon, U. S. Representative, Judge of the U. S. District Court of New Jersey, Bennett Van Syckel, Judge of Supreme Court of New Jersey for thirty-five years. But not content with these advan-

<sup>19</sup> Completed and published in two volumes, Burlington, 1833. It is said of Herder in Schaff-Herzog that "His writings established the axiom in Biblical exegesis that the Bible is not simply a doctrinal code and dogmatic system, but a whole literature, to be viewed in the light of its time, place and historical surroundings, in order to be understood."

tages Shields took at the Seminary a fourth year of graduate study.

In the year of his college graduation, 1844, two American students of philosophy published books of exceptional value by way of general introduction to that whole domain. Samuel Tyler (1809-1877) of Maryland and Washington, a jurist of national renown, published in Baltimore, *A Discourse of the Baconian Philosophy*, which is one of the best expositions ever made of Bacon, and of the fundamental nature and service of the inductive method in research. This was reprinted two years later, and a third, enlarged edition was published in New York in 1850.<sup>20</sup> Parts of this work had appeared earlier in the *Princeton Review*,<sup>21</sup> and the whole constitutes an original contribution to inductive logic, particularly in the treatment of analogy. Tyler did not call it logic, nor was it common to speak of induction under this term prior to the issue of Mill's work in 1843. Mill's book was not seen by Tyler till his own was out, and was severely critized by him in 1856; although the two men might have profited much from each other.

The appearance of Montague's edition of *Bacon's Complete Works* had widely renewed an interest in the man; and Tyler endeavored, as he says, "in this discourse to exhibit a popular and succinct, but yet a more thoroughly developed exposition of the Baconian philosophy than any which has yet appeared." Sir William Hamilton was so much impressed with this endeavor that, in 1848, he wrote to the author advising him to abandon the practice of law, and devote himself wholly to philosophy. Not only so, but Hamilton, before his death, requested that in the appointment of his own successor the counsel of Tyler should be sought. It is said that Tyler not only recommended Fraser for that post, but that other professors of philosophy in British universities asked and received from Tyler testimonials of their fitness for election.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> 12 mo., pp. 426. Baker & Scribner.

<sup>21</sup> July, 1840, and July, 1843.

<sup>22</sup> In 1858, Tyler published, in Philadelphia, *The Progress of Phi-*

In the same year of 1844, Henry Philip Tappan (1805-1881) who had taught philosophy in New York, and had published three books of large importance on the Will,<sup>23</sup> issued a manual of Logic, which though brief was more comprehensive than any forgoing discussion of the subject in English. Beginning with a Preliminary Essay, on philosophy at large, followed by a weighty chapter on reason, logic is then presented under a threefold division of (I) Primordial, (II) Inductive, (III) Deductive. The first considers the primary categories of thought, and connotes, in effect, a Platonic dialectic of logical antecedents. The second, written before the author had seen the treatises of either Whewell or Mill (as appears in the Preface to a revised edition in 1855) and published only one year after Mill, is the

*philosophy in the Past and in the Future*: and a second enlarged edition ten years later. Besides much authorship in jurisprudence, a volume on *Robert Burns, Poet and Man*, 1848, and a Memoir of Chief Justice Taney, 1872, he has a volume on aesthetics: *The Theory of the Beautiful*, Baltimore, 1873. The two books first named give a critical exposition and defense of British philosophy as represented in its central development by Bacon, Locke, Reid, Hamilton and Mansel. These thinkers are viewed as all members of one school, Baconian, and characteristically British, but mutually supplemental and corrective. Much critical appreciation is expended on their qualities and defects. They are contrasted with all transcendentalists of the continent, defended from the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume, and shown in their relation to all philosophy from the Greeks to the Germans and Cousin. But it is only in British philosophy of the leading traditional school that Tyler appears thoroughly informed; in exhibiting its values, its genetic development, and its relation to physical science, he did good work, displaying a strong sense of history and independent judgment. His most important service to philosophy lies in his interpretation of Bacon, and of Bacon's true relation to all philosophy that undertakes to account for experience. Tyler makes many noteworthy remarks, and among them this, that "A priori principles are discovered a posteriori"—*Progress of Philosophy*, 2d edn., p. 179.

<sup>23</sup> *Review of Edwards' Strict Enquiry*, 1839; *Doctrine of the Will Determined by an Appeal to Consciousness*, 1840; *Doctrine of the Will Applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility*, 1841; New York. In Glasgow, 1857, the three volumes were republished as one, with Corrections, Additions, New Preface, Table of Contents and an Appendix on Edwards and the Necessitarian School, newly composed by the author.



first American treatment of inductive logic explicitly as such. The third division resumes formal logic, and is the least original portion of this manual. But of the book as a whole Cousin said that nothing superior to it in kind existed in Europe.<sup>24</sup> The author belongs to a small but very distinguished group of Americans who are lovers of Plato. He is well acquainted with Coleridge and Cousin, Reid and Kant, Leibnitz and Locke, Bacon, Aristotle, and Plato, but he would probably say that the greatest of these is Plato. So thought James Marsh, R. W. Emerson, Tayler Lewis, Laurens P. Hickok and Benjamin F. Cocker. He agrees with Coleridge that Plato and Bacon are not antagonistic, but strictly complementary. He makes the scope of philosophy cosmic, and defines it as *Scientia Scientiarum*. It is not merely nor chiefly noetics, though the noetic problem must be solved. He says: "A true philosophy, as a system, will account for the universe as a system. Of course, the reason can judge whether the one accounts for the other. We are thus brought back to its simple authority." (Logic, p. 119.) Self-evident and necessary reason is its own authority, and possesses objective validity in the interpretation of experience, but only as the terms of experience are first given. He says "The cardinal aim of philosophy must be to reach the metaphenomenal. If the existence of the metaphenomenal can be demonstrated, then the facts of consciousness, the phenomenal, are accounted for" (p. 31). "To make all our cognitions personal and relative, deriving their characteristics from the individual constitution, is to deny to truth any independent and absolute foundations. Then we are, for aught we know, only entertained with shadows, and without any fixed certainty of reality" (p. 236). His discussion of this great crux is exceedingly able, and also his discussion of causality, both in the Logic, and in the volumes on the Will. In his whole treatment of both Will and Rea-

<sup>24</sup> Allibone quotes Vapereau as follows: "Que M. Cousin regarde comme égal à tout ce qui existe en ce genre en Europe." *Dict. Univ. des Contemp.*, par E. Vapereau. Paris, 1858, 1641.

son, he deals with the very heart of philosophy and deals in a masterly way. His books are far better worth reading than very much that has been published since.<sup>25</sup> On the strength of these books, Henry P. Tappan, who later organized the University of Michigan, was made a corresponding member of the Institute of France; as later Emerson, and William James, and a very few other American scholars have been honored. This was doubtless done on the motion of Cousin, who had become his personal friend. For no good reason, unless that wisdom has begun with us, these American products in philosophy, the writings of Tyler and Tappan, have been forgotten; but belonging to different schools of thought they are strictly complementary to each other, and will yet reward a careful reading. The *Discourse* and the *Logic* may each be viewed as constituting an incomplete organon of research and an introduction to all philosophy. The philosophical writers of this country before the last thirty years are commonly ignored to-day, as if they had no continuing values excepting of an antiquarian sort. But the philosophical development here has had three plainly distinguishable periods, colonial, middle and recent;<sup>26</sup> and at least a dozen

<sup>25</sup> From Preface to the *Logic*: "There must be premises which are not conclusions from other premises, but which arise in some other way. Now a complete and adequate Logic ought to exhibit this other way likewise; it ought to inform us how the most original premises arise, and upon what basis they rest. Other methods indeed have been abroad in the world, but without being systematically propounded as parts of Logic. Thus the Platonic philosophy really contains a logical development of the most original forms of human thought springing out of the intuitive faculty. And the *Novum Organum* contains a logical exposition of the method of establishing first principles through the observation of phenomena. Both Plato and Bacon have had many able disciples and expounders, and both are daily coming into a broader and clearer light, not as opponents, but, to adopt the thought of Coleridge, as the opposite poles of one great and harmonious system. The present attempt therefore is to make out the system of logic under its several departments; and to present it not merely as a method of obtaining inferences from truths, but also as a method of establishing those first truths and general principles which must precede all deduction."

<sup>26</sup> These periods may be approximately indicated by the dates, 1725,



authors might be named prior to this recent period, whose writings in whole or part will reward the best attention still, and deserve to be edited with full apparatus, at the institutions honored by their connection.

It is probable that Tyler and Tappan were both read by Shields not long after he left college, and that they gave some direction to his mind. It is certain that his interest in philosophy grew apace, and evidences his assimilation of the more significant things represented in the publications of these men. In accepting a pastorate in Philadelphia, he was for fifteen years brought into stimulating contact with many persons of distinctive culture in professional and social life; including the arctic explorer Dr. Kane, whose sister he married, and whose funeral he conducted. The rare abilities, enthusiasm, and wide adventures of the celebrated explorer kindled more than ever the scholar's interest in all kinds of research, an interest reflected in the exquisite Dedication of his own great treatise, and in some words near the close of the first volume: "The map of the intellectual, like that of the physical globe, is almost complete, with scarcely a *terra incognita* to be explored; and philosophy might well reach her *ultima thule* in conjunction with geography." (I. 386).<sup>27</sup>

It has been supposed from the title of his treatise, by some who surely cannot have read it, that its author cherished the vain ambition of saying the last word in philosophy;

1829, and 1889. There is, of course, some overlapping. But the second volume of Shields' treatise marks the culmination of the two first periods.

<sup>27</sup> In the *Century Magazine*, August, 1898, is a finely illustrated article on Dr. Kane by Shields. Of Shields himself the *Public Ledger* of Philadelphia says this in a notice of his Paddock Lectures, February 20, 1890: "Laying aside the work of a preacher, which was gaining for him great reputation, Prof. Shields became a Professor at Princeton, and has there given instruction in the subjects forming the successive topics of his book. . . . Here in Philadelphia, where Prof. Shields is affectionately remembered as a pastor, and where ties of relationship and personal friendship are warmly cherished, his book is sure to find many readers." So the philosopher was also a man, distinguished as a preacher, beloved as a pastor and a friend.



whereas he never wished to finish philosophy, but to get it rightly started, by so charting the intellectual world of human experience as to show in their due order and place what all the lesser and greater problems are with which philosophy must deal, and the method by which they ought to be approached, and can be measurably solved. Any cosmic philosophy that may be proposed logically covers all proximate explanations, and is therefore logically final. What is called by Shields *Philosophia Ultima*, and by Aristotle *Prima*, may be viewed as the same thing, only differing as the order of knowledge from the order of reality. Shields says: "Philosophy as the science of sciences can only arise in and through the sciences themselves, after, rather than before their development. And hence the title of this book is not *Philosophia Prima*, but *Philosophia Ultima*." (II. 6). The very title is a stroke of genius, showing at a glance the logical relation to all other sciences, and all special philosophies, of philosophy in its largest and most universal scope.

In the *Princeton Review* of January 1858, shortly after the death of Auguste Comte, Shields published a masterly estimate of the Positive Philosophy, making the initial effort of his own treatise. This was followed four years later, April 1862, by a constructive criticism of Hamilton, entitled "The Philosophy of the Absolute," showing that the Absolute is not so entirely unknowable as Kant and Comte and Hamilton assert. Hamilton and Mansel were in high favor then in Princeton, and this paper was perhaps the most explicit approach to a general metaphysics which had appeared in that journal. Hamilton's "Law of the Conditioned" was refuted by his own pupils, Calderwood and McCosh. But it had been widely accepted by American scholars before its consequences in Huxley and Spencer were disclosed; and its refutation near the same time by Henry B. Smith, Samuel Tyler, William T. Harris, Francis E. Abbot and Shields marked the first formal advance in this country toward a constructive ontology, except in psychology and the old

forms of natural theology, after the colonial essays of Jonathan Edwards and Samuel Johnson, and the approaches made in the *Rational Psychology* and other books of Hickok.<sup>28</sup>

Of all these and other essays in this field, written this side the Atlantic, not one was more notable than the argument of Shields' second paper here mentioned. It is a most interesting example of the dialectic of logical antecedents, mounting from the lowest to the highest terms of knowledge by following up the necessary presuppositions of each term. Perhaps neither Plato nor Hegel has, within the same short space, made better use of dialectic; a form of reason that may vary much in outward structure and in different hands, but of which the essential element is the quest of logical antecedents. Shields considers in turn five questions regarding the Absolute: its conceivability, credibility, cognizability, revealability, and demonstrability. It was pointed out by a reviewer that this argument stops short of at least one important question, namely, What is the Absolute?<sup>29</sup> This in due course is the ontological question, considered by Shields in his second volume. The preliminary questions are all noetic; and, allowing for some expressions that the intended revision would probably have changed, the paper as it now appears in the first volume of the treatise is very strong and very eloquent. Never indeed has philosophy been written with more sustained, restrained and noble eloquence than that which distinguishes this entire work. In a very few

<sup>28</sup> Edwards, *Essay of Being and other Philosophical Fragments*, 1725-1729; not published until the edition of Dwight in 1829, one hundred years after they were written. Johnson, *Elementa Philosophica*, 1752. Not even mentioned by name in Allibone or Moses Coit Tyler, and yet, in philosophy, an American classic. Hickok, *Rational Psychology*, 1849, an American *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. H. B. Smith, *Hamilton's Theory of Knowledge*, *American Theological Review*, January 1861. Shields, 1862. Tyler, also in the *Princeton Review*, 1862. W. T. Harris, *Boston Commonwealth*, Dec. 18, 1863, and *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 1871 and 1883. Francis Ellinwood Abbott, in the *North American Review*, 1864. B. F. Cocker: *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, 1870. Thomas Hill, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* 1874, and others.

<sup>29</sup> See *Princeton Review*, May and July, 1879.



passages it is overwrought, but otherwise the words of a Southern reviewer are just, who says: "If a perfectly luminous style, adorned with flowers of rhetoric that the severest taste cannot condemn; if an enthusiasm for his theme which often bears him aloft into the regions of an impassioned eloquence; and if a comprehensive grasp of the whole subject which indicates the hand of a master, can create a claim to the attention of both theologians and scientific men, the 'Final Philosophy' will command a wide circle of readers."<sup>30</sup>

These two papers together, that on Comte and that on Hamilton, discuss what the author calls "the two poles of modern speculation, toward which with different degrees of divergence, advanced thinkers in all lands are rallying" (I. 315). But these philosophies of Positivism and Absolutism, if once freed from the abuses with which they are encumbered, can only prove normally complementary and indispensable to each other, instead of being mutually hostile. This is only the largest instance of that thesis, antithesis, and needed synthesis which, in fact, marks the entire movement of human thought, as it does the whole structure and argument of Shields' treatise.

Whether we can reach a knowledge of the Absolute or not we must begin with organized experience to find its necessary implications; for the only metaphysics wanted is the metaphysics of experience. This is just as plain on the showing of Kant as it is plain on the showing of Bacon. It is even acknowledged by Hegel, who did not carefully follow his own words. In Aristotle is its most illustrious example. The necessary implications of phenomenal experience adequately shown ought to bring us to the Absolute, and all the self-evident corollaries of this result. But before such implications can be properly shown, experience must be adequately organized; and Shields alone has shown us how to do it.<sup>31</sup> "We are not reduced", says Shields, "to the bare

<sup>30</sup> The *Kentucky Presbyterian*, reviewing the first issue of Vol. I, in 1877.

<sup>31</sup> B. P. Bowne: "All philosophizing must begin with the facts of experience. From these it must proceed as its foundation, and to these



alternatives of omniscience or nescience" (I. 301). "Let him believe who can that the foundations of his consciousness are laid in delusion and imposture" (331). "We may know God at least as certainly as we know the world" (333). "But between the Hegelian universe of bare ideas and the Comtean universe of dead facts, there is, in sooth, as little to choose as between a ghost and a corpse. We shall escape both horrors only when the real and the ideal Absolute are combined in Jehovah, and science, as well as religion, has learned to recognize a living creator inhabiting and controlling his whole creation" (329). And, "as the universe, the totality of existence, acquires intelligibility, becomes a cosmos, instead of a chaos, only when it is viewed as the creation of a Creator, so the sciences can only be resolved into a system by means of theology. The law of their development is precisely the reverse of that maintained by the Comteans, as might be shown both from their structure and from their history" (333-4).

Taking Comte on his own ground this is unanswerably proved by Shields; and yet he admits a sense in which the Comtean law is true, and a sense in which the reverse order is its natural and logical complement. In short, he reconstructs the Comtean law of intellectual advance, and says: "While it may be true that science, in becoming exact, is first theological, then metaphysical and at length positive; yet in becoming complete, it thenceforward reverses the process, and is first positive, then metaphysical, and last theological". (II. 115). The sciences are resolved into a system by being placed in due relation with that science which properly terminates the series of sciences dealing directly with experience. But, as Comte completes his series

it must return for its justification. The essential aim of philosophy is to give an account of experience; that is, to rationalize and organize experience so that our reason may get some insight into it. From this it is plain that we never can affirm anything whatever unrelated to the system of experience. For if we should do so it would thereby become worthless for its proper function." *Kant and Spencer; A Critical Exposition*. Boston, 1912, p. 253-4.

with sociology, Shields carries the whole scheme beyond sociology into theology, on the express ground that theology itself has its foundations in actual experience on its highest plane (II. 116-126). In Shields' scheme the six sciences that best comprehend and represent all others are those of Astronomy, Geology, Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology and Theology.

The characterization of the Hegelian universe quoted from Shields would not be accepted by the best expositors of Hegel as just to him; and Hegel's teaching is one of the rare instances in which the representation made by Shields appears inaccurate or wanting. But elsewhere he shows a better appreciation of Hegel's value, while this very characterization expresses exactly the world-view gathered by many from an imperfect knowledge of Hegel's writings, and found with some of his professed adherents in former years. Shields was describing the spurious conception to which idealism in philosophy has sometimes led, and for which Hegel certainly gave some provocation. As all metaphysics should consist in nothing but the necessary implications of experience, Shields, who was deeply read in Bacon, teaches that before we begin to explain experience in terms of rational implication we must know the experience to be explained; or survey experience in its totality and unity as one whole, and in its natural order, and its salient, or most representative instances. Bacon gave noble though defective expression to the unity of science. He saw the reciprocal relations belonging to all parts of knowledge, and projected a *Globus Intellectualis* which should reflect the universe of man's experience in both its physical and mental parts. He is often misunderstood; but his plan does not exclude mental and social phenomena from induction, nor metaphysics from philosophy. He only places these things in true order, beginning with the outward and physical, ascending to the mental and social, and deferring metaphysics until after phenomena are gathered and generalized



into laws.<sup>32</sup> His plan is incomplete, but far more comprehensive and correct than often is thought. It excludes no plane of experience but one from the consideration of philosophy, that of religion, and the science of Christian theology, which always in the past has organized its specific data.

"What constitutes his real glory is this", says Mme. de Staël, in her chapter on English philosophy, "that he announced his opinion that there was no absolute separation of one science from another; but that general philosophy reunited them all". "Not to know anything of a science but that portion of it which individually belong to us, is to apply the division of labor, inculcated by Smith, to the liberal studies, when it is only adapted to the mechanic arts. When we arrive at that height where every science touches upon all the rest in some particulars, it is then that we approach the region of universal ideas; and the air which breathes from that region gives life to all our thoughts."<sup>33</sup>

Bacon's exclusion of Christian theology from philosophy only perpetuated the scholastic division of all science into

<sup>32</sup>This is quite in accord with Aristotle's order, who says in the *Post Analytics*, Book I, Ch. II, that "it is impossible to investigate universals except through induction, since things that are said to be from abstraction will be known only by induction." Universals come after induction in the order of knowledge, and are not reached without induction; yet they are not the immediate product of induction, which only reaches generals and not universals. Aristotle gets the right order, but does not clearly explain the transition from generals to the universal and necessary truths of rational intuition. Cf. *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*. By B. F. Cocker. New York, 1870, pp. 390-1 and 397.

<sup>33</sup>*Germany*: By Mme. de Staël, with notes and appendices, by O. W. Wight, A.M. Two volumes. Derby and Jackson, New York, 1861. (I, 122-3.) This is an admirable American edition of the work called by Sir James Mackintosh the greatest production of feminine genius; and published first in 1813, by John Murray in London, with an English version a year later. German philosophy, literature and life between the times of Lessing and Schelling, were first brought to the serious attention of British and American readers by this work, the value of which is greatly enhanced by the editing of Wight, to whom also we are indebted for valuable editions of Hamilton, Pascal and Cousin.



secular and sacred; and was not wholly consistent with his own first principles, as will be shown in another place. Comte, who, with far less vision than Bacon, regarded his own work as the completion of Bacon's project, excludes both metaphysics and theology altogether, reduces psychology to biology, a measure rejected by his fellow-empiricist Mill, and makes all philosophy consist in the totalization of experience and its laws, with a view to the social applications. This he undertakes to effect by organizing the sciences into a unitary system culminating in sociology; a system which shall exhibit the successive categories of experience in their natural order, and facilitate the determination of the most general laws, with no inquiry into reality or cause. He believed the phenomenal order, so far as reflected in human experience, to be all that can be known, and such a knowledge of its laws as may enable mankind to improve its conditions to be the only knowledge needed.

But the sciences had been too much pursued in isolation from one another and Comte saw the demand for unity. "The philosophy of the sciences will consist in substituting the point of view of the whole to that of the parts."<sup>34</sup> Herein alone lies the claim of Comte to be considered a philosopher. He perceived the unity of science, though the rational ground of that unity was hid. The whole matter is so well put in the exposition of Comte by Levy-Bruhl that from him a few passages may be quoted: He says:

The human mind is so constituted that the first thing it requires is unity. Understanding is spontaneously systematic. Opinions merely in juxtaposition in the mind, but logically irreconcilable, cannot satisfy it. . . . Whether we know it or not, each of our opinions implies a complexus of connected opinions, all arrived at by the same method as the one in question; and this complexus is itself part of the more considerable whole which finally completes itself in a comprehensive conception of the world given in experience (28). To satisfy the desire for unity, which is its supreme requirement, the human mind demands a conception of the whole which embraces all the orders of phenomena, what Kant calls a totalizing of experience, in a word, philosophy. Now, up to this time the positive mode of thought has

<sup>34</sup> Levy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, authorized translation. New York, George P. Putnam's Sons, 1903. p. 122.

not shown itself in a position to respond to this demand. It has only produced individual sciences. Positive science has been 'special' and fragmentary, always attached to the investigation of a more or less restricted group of phenomena. With a laudable prudence which has been her strength she had applied herself solely to works of analysis and partial synthesis. She has never ventured upon a synthesis of the whole within our reach. Until now theologies and metaphysics alone have made the effort, and this office is, still to-day, the chief reason of their existence; this office must be fulfilled. The human mind is carried by a spontaneous and necessary movement towards the point of view of the universal. Sooner than leave the philosophical problem without an answer, it would remain attached indefinitely to the solutions, chimerical as they are, which theologies and metaphysics offer.

Then asks Levy-Bruhl: "Why should not the positive investigation of the diverse orders of natural phenomena, be reconciled with a theological or metaphysical conception of the universe? Nothing prevents one from conceiving the phenomena as governed by invariable laws, and from seeking at the same time by another method, for the reason which renders nature intelligible" (30-31). But to Comte this seemed impossible. He admitted that hitherto a reconciliation of this kind had seemed indispensable. Theology and metaphysics "have fulfilled a necessary function. Without them positive science could neither have originated nor have been developed. But as she is their heiress she is also their antagonist. Her progress necessarily involves their downfall". "Not that the antagonism between the two modes of thought can be solved by a supreme dialectical struggle in which the theological and metaphysical dogmas would be worsted. It is not thus that dogmas come to an end. They disappear, according to Comte's striking expression, by desuetude, as is the case with forsaken methods" (31). Then further Levy-Bruhl remarks: "Comte has retained Bacon's view on this point, that all scientific knowledge rests upon facts which have been fully observed; and that a system of positive sciences constitutes the indispensable basis for the only philosophy which is within our reach" (58-9).

Now, however strange it may appear, it might be



shown that in this last statement not only do Comte and Bacon agree, but also Kant and Hegel, Aristotle and Shields, whatever inconsistencies in their practice may exist. Such an undertaking as that of Comte, if it does not represent the whole of philosophy, does represent its indispensable point of departure. Positivism disregards the deeper implications of experience; but in its insistence on contingent phenomena, the concrete facts of experience, and their due coördination, as the basis of philosophy, positivism puts first what belongs first in the order of research; and this is its lesson for philosophy. Not only phenomena of this or that particular sort, but all phenomena of whatever sort belonging to the system of the universe, or world-order, must be recognized, classified and organized in the successive categories to which they belong, if we wish to find the larger laws and connections of the whole system. So much the more must this be done if we seek the deeper, metaphysical implications of the world-order. Comte excluded from consideration some large categories of phenomena. But it is only necessary to make good their claim to recognition as properly attested and discriminated facts of actual experience, to determine their place in the cosmic system. When the phenomenal universe of experience is seen plainly to be a universe, and all its parts are seen together in their natural order of relation, then we may hope to discover not only what are called by Comte the encyclopedic laws of its connection, but also the causal implications of these laws.

In Comte's organization of empirical science Shields found the rough model for his own far better organization, which was first projected in a pamphlet of extraordinary scope and vision published in 1861. The metaphysician must indeed say that in the order of reality "All science rests on metaphysics". "Every one of the physical sciences begins with metaphysical conceptions and propositions".<sup>35</sup> But in the order of knowledge, the empirical and historical sciences

<sup>35</sup> Noah Porter: *Human Intellect*, p. 9. New York, Chas. Scribner, 1868.



come first, and furnish the data philosophy must interpret. The theologian also must insist that in the order of reality the attributes of God come before all else, and constitute the foundation of all science. But in the order of knowledge theology also must begin with experienced facts; and Christian theology has its largest fact in Christ, who is at once its highest organ and final criterion of divine revelation, and the central datum of its system.

The real values to philosophy of Comte were first shown in this country by two former Princeton men; first, by the very distinguished jurist, Horace Binney Wallace (A.B., 1835), in a letter to the Rev. Dr. John McClintock, written from Paris in 1852;<sup>36</sup> and then by Shields in 1858, 1861, 1877, 1882 and 1889. The latter's recognition in 1861, of sociology in a cosmic scheme of science for the ends of philosophy was then as novel as his recognition of theology in the same plan; both sciences being regarded by him as susceptible of coördination with all other science on the common ground of attested experience, and by the common use of induction critically applied. The brilliant exposition of Comte by Levy-Bruhl does not show so well as Shields the normal relation of positive science, and its general integration, to metaphysics; still less its relation to theology. It was supposed by Comte that the persistence of theology and metaphysics was mainly due to a want of solidarity in the sciences of experience; and that such a synthesis of all departments of experience as might bring the discovery of its largest laws would satisfy the demand for unity, and smother the demand for supersensible reality. He never saw how an adequate integration of experience, once effected, must make the demand for both more imperative than ever, and supply the very conditions needed for the full recognition of theology and completion of metaphysics. He did not see that the unification of experience can only make more

<sup>36</sup> Published in a posthumous volume entitled: *Art, Scenery and Philosophy in Europe*. Philadelphia, 1856.

urgent than ever the question of the principle of unity; that, indeed "Every approach towards a scientific comprehension and generalization of the facts of the universe must carry us upward toward the higher realities of reason".<sup>37</sup>

What Comte made the whole of philosophy, Aristotle viewed as a secondary philosophy that in the order of knowledge precedes the first; and Edward Caird remarks of Hegel that "Sometimes he seems to forget, what he himself teaches, that science must first have generalized experience, and determined it by definite categories, ere it is possible for philosophy to give its final interpretation."<sup>38</sup> This statement of Caird, and teaching of Hegel, not his practice, indicates precisely the relation of the special sciences to philosophy intended by Bacon and exemplified by Shields. It also vindicates the true primacy of Bacon in modern philosophy, as not only chronologically first, but logically prior to all who follow; as, despite his misunderstanding of Aristotle, the first man after Aristotle to see that a cosmic philosophy must be based on a cosmic induction of experience. But how a cosmic induction for the ends of philosophy is possible, and can be effected, has been shown by Shields alone.

The actual development of modern philosophy on its idealistic side from Locke to Hegel, did certainly have its beginning in Descartes. But as an interpretation of all experience in terms of reason the legitimate development of philosophy has in Bacon its modern point of departure. The opening sentence of the *Novum Organum* shows that the

<sup>37</sup> B. F. Cocker: *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, p. 175. Also, "The attempt of positivism to confine all human knowledge to the observation and classification of phenomena, and arrest and foreclose all inquiry into causes, efficient, final and ultimate [primary] is simply futile and absurd. It were just as easy to arrest the course of the sun in mid-heaven as to prevent the human mind from seeking to pass beyond phenomena, and ascertain the ground and reason and cause of all phenomena. The history of speculative thought clearly attests that in all ages the inquiry after the ultimate cause and reason of all existence, the ἀρχή or first principle of all things, has been the inevitable and necessary tendency of the human mind, to resist which scepticism and positivism have been utterly impotent." *Op. cit.* 172.

<sup>38</sup> *Encycl. Brit.* 9th ed., article "Metaphysics," *ad fin.*

problem of world-order precedes the problem of world-ground: "Man, as the servant and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him; and he neither knows nor is capable of more". All physical phenomena and all mental phenomena are alike comprised by Bacon in the realm of nature, or world-order; and he unmistakably intended the application of induction no less to psychical, social and political phenomena, than to biological, chemical and mechanical facts, as appears in several passages of his writings. The words just quoted, and so often quoted, are almost repeated in the famous saying of Kant that only in experience is truth. Kant accepts the Humian limitation of experience to bodily sense; although his whole analysis of reason in the three *Kritiken* involves intellectual and moral orders of experience wholly distinct from anything found in sensation. His categories and moral law are known to him solely as a conscious experience of this other kind. But to philosophy experience of whatever sort is nothing at all without its rational implications; and Bacon would have us first make sure what the concrete experience is, then generalize and totalize experience, and last, determine its primary implications. Who has ever shown a better order for philosophy than this? The order corresponds with the very constitution of the mind, and the three stages of knowledge known since Plato, followed more or less unwittingly by all men, though seldom consistently in philosophy.<sup>39</sup> "True philosophy", says Bacon, "is that which is the faithful echo of the voice of the world, which is written in some sort under the dictation of things; which adds nothing of itself, which is only the rebound, the reflection of reality."<sup>40</sup> By this he means that philosophy

<sup>39</sup> William T. Harris: "The most important discovery ever made in psychology is this one of the three ascending steps or grades of thought, which any one may take, with due study and meditation. It is attributed to Plato." *Psychological Foundations of Education*, p. 32, ff.

All the writings of W. T. Harris emphasize and illustrate this topic.

<sup>40</sup> *Inst. Magna*.



must stick to the facts, and gather all the facts it can. He does not mean that philosophy should not seek the implications of given facts, even if they should lead us to synthetic judgments a priori. How, Kant asks, are these judgments possible? They are possible as necessary implications of experience, and as logical antecedents of reason. Why should it be any more mysterious, or any less, that reason can find necessary antecedents of given terms than find necessary sequents? And since both alike may be necessary and self-evident why is one result either more or less valid than the other? Bacon was no mere empiricist. Cousin has noticed how Bacon aims to combine the empirical and rational methods, and says in the very Preface to the *Instauratio* that their divorce is fatal to both science and humanity.<sup>41</sup> De Staël says that "Bacon adhered much more than is believed to that ideal philosophy which, from the days of Plato down to our own, has constantly reappeared under different forms".<sup>42</sup> And Coleridge, who was far better read than most in both Bacon and Plato, maintains in *The Friend*, that they are not antagonistic, but strictly complementary to each other.

The phenomenal universe of experience must be surveyed as a universe, in due order and proportion of parts, before any sufficient explanation can be offered in terms of reality, whether absolute or contingent. Hence positive science goes before metaphysics to prepare the material with which metaphysics has to do. And what makes a science positive, is not, as Comte supposed, the absence of the metaphysical factors, but the presence of all the phenomenal facts. Comte has no proprietary rights in the term positive science that he should impose on all men his own conception of its meaning. He did much to illustrate and emphasize its relation to philosophy, but he neither originated the term nor understood its scope. The real founders of modern positivism before Comte, were Bacon, Hobbes and Hume, and Kant

<sup>41</sup> Cousin-Wight: *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, 81.

<sup>42</sup> *Germany*, Vol. II, 124.

himself. H. B. Wallace, already named, has said: "Of the positive method, as applicable to all subjects, Bacon had a perfectly true apprehension. I find scarcely anything in Comte that was not beforehand in Bacon. But Comte, by his profound and perfect exposition of positivism, has enabled us to understand much in Bacon that without him we should probably not have understood. In speaking thus of Bacon, Lord Verulam, I am, of course, aware of the circumstances to which Forster long ago called attention, that much of the doctrine of the *Novum Organum* is to be found in the *Opus Majus* of the elder Bacon". Wallace refers to a reviewer of Comte who thinks Comte mistaken in regarding Bacon as the apostle of positivism, and Wallace replies: "I think that he was so; unless you prefer to call him the inspired prophet of the system of which Comte is the enlightened demonstrator". "From his atheism [that of Comte] I totally dissent. Atheism may be the accident of the individual; it is not a characteristic of the system. In my view, the positive system is a certain and universal method; and religion, the religion revealed to the church and recorded in the inspired Scriptures, is a reality as certain as life itself; and the correct application of the positive method to the subject of religion, so far from upsetting, will verify and demonstrate the Catholic faith. In attempting this application M. Comte has altogether broken down."<sup>48</sup> Ueberweg says of Kant, it was no small part of his service "to vindicate for empirical investigation 'complete independence in the sphere of phenomena'".<sup>44</sup>

Physics itself in its most modern form is inseparable from

<sup>48</sup> *Art, Scenery and Philosophy in Europe*, 1855, pp. 340-1. These words were written by a man whose death is deplored by Comte in the Preface to his *Système de Politique Positive*, as that of an eminent disciple, "destined without doubt to have become one of the chief pillars of positivism." "In him, heart, intellect and character united in so rare combination and harmony, that he would have aided powerfully in advancing the difficult transition through which the 19th Century has to pass."

<sup>44</sup> Ueberweg: *History of Philosophy*. New York, 1874. Vol. II, 135.

metaphysical presuppositions of power, energy and force, even if it pretends that cause is only antecedent, ignores the notion of purpose, and refuses to follow Plato and Aristotle, Bacon and Newton and Agassiz in looking at the laws of nature as ideas in the mind of God, or his habits of action. Yet even by physicists so-called matter is resolved into a phenomenal effect on the human mind of some entirely supersensible force, which is never itself directly observed, but only inferred from these effects. And no kind of experience can be justly excluded from the purview of any philosophy meant to be cosmic. No science possessing foundations in experienced facts can rightly go unrepresented. If psychology and the group of sciences called sociology have any such facts, although this has been frequently denied, they belong to science no less than physics and biology. For science consists in critically organized facts in any department of experience, and for its organization only requires a sufficient variety of well attested facts susceptible of being reduced to law. Moreover, every science of experience must furnish data to philosophy.

The highest plane of experience is that of religion, though a particular form of religion may be debased. The universal assumption of religion is that man is related not merely to his fellow man in a moral and social way, but also to a spiritual world that is, at least ordinarily, concealed from sense. If religion has a well attested phenomenology of any sort, internal or even external, wholly subjective or even objective, the science dealing with these facts ought to be recognized in philosophy. This is what Bacon should have seen. The facts of religion have during many centuries been organized, with their metaphysical implications, in the science of theology. Between the lowest and highest forms of religion there is a long ascent, like the ascent of life from the amoeba to man. As biology deals with the whole ascent of life, but particularly with its most elementary forms, while anthropology deals with its terminal exhibitions in man, so com-



parative theology is concerned with all religion as such, and Christian theology with its highest forms. It does not however follow that religion originates in its lowest forms. Retrogression is as common a phenomenon as upward progress in the scale of life. Many types of life show no recognizable connection of a genetic kind with the types beneath them; and although the first forms of religion may have been extremely simple it does not follow that they were its lowest and its worst. In vegetable and animal life forms among the lowest may still be considered perfectly normal; but the lowest forms of religion are conspicuously abnormal. They bear all the marks of degradation from some better type, and the forms that came first may have been as normal in type as they were simple.

The Christian religion, with its Hebrew original, reaches us to-day primarily through the united testimony of ancient witnesses; and is corroborated in the subsequent experience of those who accept it on its own terms of obedient faith, in the measure of conformity to those terms. These ancient witnesses substantially concur in their report of a divine revelation entering into the actual experience of men, and of the response which it received. They represent religious faith and life as primarily the response and reaction of man to a revelation objective and supernatural in its source. As compared with any form of revelation to be found implied in common experience the Hebrew prophets and apostles report an overt and explicit revelation, transcending common experience, not however contravening it; and exhibiting an obvious, articulate, progressive and cumulative approach of God to man, continued at intervals through many centuries and in different ways, and to be resumed at the conclusion of the present aeon in the divine government of the world. This long continued and varied experience they record, with the sentiments inspired by it. By this experience is governed their whole conception, not only of God, but also of the world and man, nature and history, duty and destiny. If we may believe the record, this revelation,

which is transmitted in the form of written testimony to us, was received by its primary witnesses in the form of a manifold experience which, however manifold, is coherent. All its events and contents appear vitally connected, as if, by laws of their own, they all proceeded from one source, and for one end, the self-preservation of God in order to accomplish both the education and redemption of man.

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On the assumption that the testimony constitutes a valid consensus of trustworthy witnesses to the actual experience of an overt revelation from God to man, whereby God has made Himself more plainly known than would otherwise appear, the data and contents of this revelation have been organized into the science of Christian theology, crowning all other sciences of experience with better means of knowing God, and His relations to the world and man, than any that we otherwise possess. The claims of this testimony to confidence were severely disputed in the first centuries of Christianity, and are so again in the two centuries past. For all who accept the claims, Christian theology, as a science, has ample foundations in a large and rich experience, well attested in the beginning, and well corroborated in all subsequent history to this day; corroborated in a great variety of ways. In the face of all contradiction these claims are still maintained, not only by multitudes of plain believers, who have experienced their power and worth in life, but also by large numbers still of the best equipped scholars to be found, who have given these claims their most critical attention. A Christian theology accepting these claims to an overt revelation can in these days only exist as a science, and perfect its form and strength, by facing persistent and violent contradiction. But this condition is not peculiar to theology, unless in its degree; for every science of experience has matured and perfected its evidence and form by overcoming contradiction. No advance in science was ever made on any other terms. This is an inevitable incident of human life, and knowledge and character upon earth. It is not only inevitable, but indispensable to the perfection of any character and any science.

It is the function and prerogative of philosophy, as the science of sciences, the organizing head of all the sciences, and master of ceremonies in the realm of knowledge, to unite all means of knowledge in all fields of research, and adjust conflicting claims in order, so far as possible, to gain a wholly rational, self-consistent, synthetic and sufficient view of the world and man and God. Shields has shown how the unity of science demands the coördination upon equal terms of Christian theology with all other science, and how philosophy can answer this demand.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Just how he does this must be told elsewhere. Here it may be said of the result that the *Philosophia-Ultima* is the best expression ever given to the unity of science. It is the best attempt hitherto made to exhibit the normal relation to each other of all the sciences based in experience, of theology as such a science to all the rest, and of all special science, with theology included, to philosophy, viewed as at once their initial, terminal and most universal form. It is the best attempt to reflect in a unitary organization of science the integration of human experience; to show how the phenomenal universe must be rightly described before it can be explained in terms of reality and sufficient reason; to put the questions and answers chiefly concerned in acquiring a knowledge of world-order as preliminary to the ulterior problems of philosophy, or knowledge, being, and divine revelation as such. Before these highest problems and their corollaries are considered a cosmic induction must be concentrated on the three leading factors of world-order, the phenomenal origin, course, and goal of things, following the successive planes of experience in their natural ascent, until a just conspectus of the whole is gained. The need of determining by the most impartial review of evidence what in its fundamental features the world-order actually is before proceeding to define its ground, or declare that this cannot be known, involves a function of judicial umpirage in philosophy of which this treatise offers an unsurpassed statement and example.

A comprehensive research conducted by the method of this organon will demonstrate the existence of relations essentially congruous, complementary and proportional between the world-view, found in the Christian canon and the properly accredited data of all science, will prove the supposed want of harmony in these sources to be merely a misunderstanding, and will vindicate, illuminate and greatly enrich the purely Christian conception of God and the world in a synthesis of all truth known to man.



INCIPIT SERMO SANCTI AUGUSTINI EPISCOPI  
DE DILECTIONE DI ET PROXIMI

**D**icturus sum dilectioni uestrae de ipsa dilectione de qua Dominus ait: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota uirtute tua, et diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum.* Hoc enim uoluit quia *In his duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae.* Diliges ergo Dominum Deum tuum et diliges fratrem tuum, quia *qui diligit fratrem suum in lumine manet et scandalum non est in eo.* Nam qui odit [odet MS] fratrem suum in tenebris est usque adhuc, et in tenebris ambulat, et nescit quo eat quoniam tenebrae excecaverunt oculos eius. Noli ergo cum oras male optare inimico tuo qui te forte laesit ut dicas, Deus occide inimicum meum, quia hinc primo ipsi Deo facis iniuriam. Dicendo ei occidi, te facis iudicem et Deum quaeres esse tortorem. Non times ne respondeat tibi Deus et dicat; "Stulte, [Stultue MS] male optando inimico tuo, recessisti ab amicis meis, et factus es mihi per odium inimicus [inimicos MS] qui fuisti per dilectionem amicus [amicos MS]? Audis scripturam dicentem, *Qui fratrem suum odit homicida est.* Ecce occidisti, ecce homicida manes. Si homicidae pepercero, quem occido? Noli me ergo petere quod non uis ut faciam in te. Patiens sum tibi; patiens sum et illi, quia nolo mortem peccantis quam ut reuertatur et vivat." Amate ergo uos, fratres carissimi. Amate amicos. Amate inimicos. Quid inde perdetis unde multos adquiretis? Ipsum Dominum audiamus in euangelio dicentem: *Mandatum nouum do uobis ut uos inuicem diligatis.* In hoc cognoscent omnes [MS. omnis] homines quia uere discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem ueram in inuicem habueritis. Ipse Dominus, qui praecepit ut nos inuicem diligamus, uidete qualiter dilexerit omnes. Dilexit discipulos suos sequentes se ut comites. Dilexit iudaeos persequentes se ut inimicos; praedicauit discipulis regnum caelorum. Audierunt eum et dimissis omnibus secuti sunt eum, et ait illis: *Si feceritis quod Ego mando uobis, iam non dico uos seruos [seruus MS] sed amicos [amicus MS].*

Ergo amici erant qui quod iubebat [iuuebat MS] credentes faciebant. Ibi pro eis orauit ubi ait: *Pater, uolo ut ubi Ego sum ei ipsi sint mecum, et videant gloriam meam quam dedisti mihi ante mundi constitutionem.* Quod dicit [MS. dum] "Pater," quia filius est ostendit; quo [d] dicit "uolo," unam uoluntatem unamque potestatem se et Patrem habere demonstrauit. Sed numquid pro amicis orauit et pro inimicis tacuit? Audi et disce. In ipsa passione sua cum cognosceret Iudaeos frementes, aduer[sus] se saeuientes, undique crucifigendum clamantes, furendo insultantes, clamauit uoce magna ad Patrem, et dixit: *Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quod faciunt.* Tam quam diceret: Excecauit illos malicia sua; ignoscat illis clementia tua. Et tamen non fuit inanis postulatio eius ad Patrem, quia multi Iudaeorum postea crediderunt. Et sanguinem quem fuderunt saeuientes, biberunt credentes. Et facti sunt sequentes, qui fuerant persequentes. Haec uia, qua ambulauit Christus. Ipsum sequamur ut non inaniter Christiani uocemur.

HERE BEGINNETH THE SERMON OF S. AUGUSTINE ON THE LOVE OF GOD AND ONE'S NEIGHBOUR

I am going to tell all of you, who love, of that love of which the Lord said: *Thou shalt love the Lord, Thy God, with all thy heart and with all thy mind and with all thy strength; and thy neighbour as thyself.* He wished this because on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. Thou shalt love, therefore, the Lord thy God; and thou shalt love thy brother, for *he that loveth his brother abideth in the light, and there is no offence in him. But he that hateth his brother is in darkness until now; and walketh in darkness, and knoweth not whither he goeth because the darkness hath blinded his eyes.* Do not therefore, when thou prayest, wish ill to thine enemy who may have injured thee, so that thou sayest: "O God, slay mine enemy." For thereby in the first place thou doest wrong against God Himself. By asking for him to be slain thou

makest thyself the judge, and thou askest God to be the executioner. Art thou not fearful lest God should answer thee and say, "O foolish man, by wishing ill to thine enemy, thou hast left the company of my friends, and by thy hatred thou art become an enemy, who wast formerly a friend? Dost thou not hear the scripture which saith: *He that hateth his brother is a murderer?* Behold, thou hast killed; behold, thou continuest to be a murderer. If I spare a murderer, whom should I slay? Ask me not to do to another what thou dost not wish me to do to thyself. I am patient with thee. I am patient also with him, because I desire not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should return and live."

Therefore, beloved, love your brethren; love your friends; love your enemies. Why use for destruction the means whereby many will be won? Let us hear what the Lord says in the gospel: *A new commandment give I unto you that ye love one another. By this shall all men know that ye are indeed My disciples, if ye have true love one to another.*

The same Lord, who hath commanded us to love one another, behold, how He loved all men! He loved His disciples who followed Him as His companions. He loved the Jews who persecuted Him and were His enemies. He promised His disciples the kingdom of heaven, and when they heard Him, they left all, and followed him. And He said to them: *If ye do what I command you, I call you no longer servants but friends.* Therefore they became His friends, as many as believed and did what He commanded. And for them He prayed when He said: *Father, I will that they may be with Me and behold My glory which Thou gavest Me before the foundation of the world.* In that He said "Father," He showed that He was the Son; in that He said "I will," He showed that He and the Father are one in will and one in power. But did He not pray for His friends, and ask nothing for His enemies? Hear and learn. In His very passion, when He knew the Jews were mad against



Him and were crying everywhere "Crucify Him," and had stripped Him, and mocked Him, He called aloud to the Father and said: *Father, forgive them, because they know not what they do*; as much as to say, "Their malice hath blinded them; but let Thy mercy pardon them." And His request was not in vain; for many of the Jews afterwards believed. And the blood, which they shed in anger, they drank in their new faith; and from being persecutors they became followers.

This is the way in which Christ walked. Let us follow Him, lest we be called Christians without being Christians.

*Oxford, England.*

E. S. BUCHANAN.

A NEW (?) SERMON BY S. AUGUSTINE. In the Library of Mr. Pierpont Morgan, at 33 East 36th St., New York City, there is an ancient yellow vellum manuscript of sixty-seven leaves, containing sermons by S. Augustine. The manuscript is at least twelve hundred years old, and is the record of sermons preached in North Africa fifteen hundred years ago by the world's greatest Doctor of Divinity.

On my second visit to Mr. Morgan's Library on October 20th last I began to decipher the faded Latin text of this the last sermon in the manuscript. My copy is here given with a liberal English translation, in the hope that it may be of especial interest at the present international crisis.

## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*Fries' Lehre von der Ahndung in Ästhetik, Religion und Ethik, unter Berücksichtigung von Kant, Schiller und Jacobi.* Von GEORG WEISS, Lic. theol. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1912. S.vi+191. Geheftet. M.5.

The views of Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) have had an intermittent vitality. The first "Fries'sche Schule" was founded by Ernst F. Apelt (1812-1859) Professor of Philosophy at Jena. The effort did not arouse wide interest and soon ended. After 50 years, Leonard Nelson in 1904 published "Die Kritische Methode und das Verhältnis der Psychologie zur Philosophie" and began the "Neue Fries'sche Schule". Since then Fries' works have been reprinted and many expository and commendatory treatises have been published. The widespread interest in Psychology has undoubtedly made the time ripe for the revival of a "Kantianism psychologized" and the equally wide attempts to find some restatement of religion that will meet the demands, co-called, of modern culture, has also contributed in no small measure. Professor Rudolph Otto has aided the religious development of the School by his application of Fries' thought to the Philosophy of Religion, while Professor Bousset contributes an introduction to the recent reprint of Fries' philosophical romance, "Julius und Evagoras."

The author of the present work is not a "Friesianer." Nevertheless his exposition of the system of Fries in general and the doctrine of "Ahndung" or "presentiment" in particular, occupying the greater part of the book (pages 1-117), is entirely free from bias. It is an exceedingly painstaking and thorough piece of work, the only criticism of which might be that so much attention is paid to the trees, that one is in danger of overlooking the wood. Certainly the reader who is not a "Fachmann" will make little out of it. The remainder of the book is devoted to an equally painstaking criticism of the system, in which the logical attack is pushed with such vigor that the historical value of Fries is in danger of being obscured.

Of most interest to the ordinary reader is the account on pp. 117-126 of how Fries' personality influenced his views: a rather favorite method of approaching philosophy to-day and one that is surely not devoid of value. The father of our philosopher was a Herrnhut divine who for some reason gave his child when five years of age into the keeping of the Brotherhood of Niesky to be cared for and educated. He grew up a lonely, reserved, and imaginative youth, whose favorite studies were Mathematics and Homer; from the former

he acquired clarity of thought: from the latter, a love for the beautiful in nature and art. The pietism of the community palled upon him; he was not attracted by it to "the pale Christ" but rather repelled. From 1792-1795 he studied theology and for the first time came into contact with the culture of the day. He soon became a Deist in religion, reducing his articles of faith to three: God, Freedom, and Immortality. During this period he came under the influence of Jacobi and of Kant and from that time called the True, the Beautiful, and the Good the three fundamental ideas of his life. In 1796 he began his "*Neue Kritik der Vernunft*", a work which was literally his life-work since he elaborated it until his death in 1843. We thus receive the impression of a scholarly, reserved and amiable nature who, finding that his religious needs were not satisfied by his early teachers, set about the task of reconstruction and solved it by a theory of "Ahndung" or presentiment.

To understand this theory we must remember that Fries took over nearly the whole of the Kantian system, but differed in the method of proving the existence of the *a priori* forms of knowledge. Kant's proof is speculative, the forms are logically demanded; Fries' proof is empirical, the forms rest on inner observation. This position he attempts to make good by the elaboration of a faculty psychology: reason grasps the ideas while faith reveals as certain the absolute existence of things. What "mediator" is to be found between these two faculties of the soul? Fries brings in "Ahndung," feeling or presentiment, a faculty by means of which we see the eternal verities in the changing phenomena. Thus when the phenomenon is seen to be the symbol of the eternal, we behold beauty; when the finite is felt to be the symbol of the infinite, there is religion.

Weiss ends his criticism by saying that the presuppositions of Fries, not being above doubt, do not afford an adequate basis for theology. Again, to merge religion in aesthetics is to fail to recognize the special character of the religious consciousness. The two are not alien but neither are they identical. Hence while one may recognize with thankfulness the enrichment of our knowledge of the psychological aspect of religion brought about by Fries and his disciples, nevertheless one cannot but regret that the attempt has been made to put the more inclusive term, religion, under the less, aesthetics.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Plato: Moral and Political Ideals.* By ADELA MARION ADAM, M.A. Lecturer at Girton and Newnham Colleges, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. Pp. viii, 159. 40 cents.

This is No. 69 of "The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature." It was written in answer to the request of the Editor of the series for "a clear account, intelligible to the plain man, of what Plato did in the moral and political sphere". It amply meets these requirements; and there is probably no manual of equal size in any language



that will introduce the beginner so clearly and interestingly to the writings of the most brilliant of Greek thinkers as does the present volume.

The opening chapter traces the development of Greek Ethics and Politics before Socrates. This is followed by a lucid sketch of the moral and political teaching of Socrates. This finishes the introductory matter, and chapter iii begins with the main topic of the book which is then developed with unusual symmetry. There are, as is well known, two extreme views as to the composition of the dialogues. Schleiermacher held that Plato attempted consciously to work out a system and that the differences in the dialogues are intentional; Hermann was of the opinion that Plato wrote with no definite plan so far as the whole is concerned, each dialogue representing the topic in which he was interested at the time. In either view the problem is to determine the order of the dialogues in relation to time and logic. Mrs. Adam's scheme is as follows: first, as usual, come the dialogues of the Socratic period, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, and *Lesser Hippias*. An interesting analysis of each is given to show that, except in the *Laches* and the *Charmides*, Plato does not advance beyond the thought of Socrates that "all judgment and forecasting whether any given action is good in itself and likely to be beneficial in its results, is beyond the province of human reason, so that, if knowledge on such subjects is desired, appeal must be made to the gods, through the art of divination." Mrs. Adam is of the opinion that Plato did not agree with this and that his advance beyond Socrates was due to his desire to replace divination by the "science of the good." This science is explained in the *Charmides* while the *Laches* and the *Euthydemus* already presuppose it. It constitutes virtue; can it be taught? The answer to this question carries us into Plato's views of Education (in the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*) and (in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*) of Educators, the Sophists or Rhetoricians. The *Symposium* and the *Phaedo* portray one who was ideally educated; a true lover of wisdom, and the question naturally arises, is it possible to produce others like him? Yes, provided there be an ideal society. This is described in the *Republic*, a dialogue "the subject of which is the sum of human life in its ethical, political, religious and philosophic interests." The remainder of the book points out in detail many interesting ways in which Plato anticipated later civilization, as in the value attached to education—indeed Mrs. Adam assures us that if his suggestions with reference to the education of young children had been followed out, Froebel and Montessori would have been anticipated by more than 2000 years; in the position of equal opportunity assigned to women; in communism and state regulation, etc.

Perhaps Mrs. Adam has not given enough importance to the effect of the Orphic religion upon Plato's views; again, the emphasis on his moral and political ideals may have obscured other just as salient points

in his system; while of course not all will agree with the placing of the dialogues. Nevertheless these are minor matters compared with the excellences of the book. To all who believe that "depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion" and who desire a plain guide to a first hand knowledge of the great poet-philosopher of Greece, this little volume may be earnestly commended.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

### APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Christianity and the New Age.* By GEORGE PRESTON MAINS. New York, Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern. 1914. 8vo; pp. xi, 364. \$1.50 net.

We have here a series of papers, rightly optimistic in spirit and clear and vigorous and interesting in style, which aim to set forth, specially in view of present day problems and conditions, the foundation rock of our religion or "The Incomprehensible Christ"; the "Factors of Limitation" such as "Rational Readjustments," "Biblical Criticism," "Secularized Education," "Educated Leadership," "Plutocracy" and "Socialism"; and the "Factors Prophetic" such as "Christianity's Leavening Life," "Christian Missions," "The Inworking God," "The Divineness of Man," "Modern Prophets," "Prophetic Vistas" and "The Abiding Church." A selected "Bibliography" and a full "Index" close the volume.

These are instructive and stimulating chapters. That on "Christian Missions" is a splendid chapter. They should all be helpful, as the author intended, to laymen as well as to ministers; and, perhaps, to laymen specially.

We regret that while evidently trying to deal fairly with the capitalist, Dr. Mains has not been able to clear his mind of the error that large wealth is in itself sinful. For example, on page 201, he comes out strongly against "the overgrown private fortune." He declares against it, not on the ground that it has been dishonestly or selfishly acquired, nor yet on the ground that it is being improperly used: but on the grounds, that it is "overgrown", in that it excels "inordinately personal needs"; that it has not been acquired by the owner's unaided exertions; and that there is an "irreversible moral judgment" abroad against it. Who, however, may decide what are the personal needs of another? What would be inconceivable luxury for one would be impossible poverty for someone else. Moreover, if it is right for one to have and to use and to enjoy merely what he has acquired only by his own unaided efforts, then what will it be right for us to have and to hold and to enjoy? Our best blessings have all been given to us, and no man is so self-made that many others have not contributed to his success. And as to an irreversible moral judgment, it is to beg the whole question, to fall back on this until it has been shown that

it is both irreversible and true. To come to the point, has not our author made the common mistake of confusing quantity with quality? A large fortune may be and usually is dangerous to the possessor of it, and that whether he has inherited or earned it; just as height may be dangerous, and is so when one is in a shallow rifle pit: but the danger from size or height is not sinful. We should try to make a big boy good; we certainly should never try to stop his growth; that would be an outrage. And in like manner, instead of endeavoring to cripple the multi-millionaire, we should pray all the more earnestly that God would enable him to recognize and to discharge his stewardship. Nor may it be replied that, on the whole, more good would be effected through many small fortunes than through a few great ones. That is too big a question to discuss now, but it is at least an open one. Ability to amass a vast fortune, or to hold it if inherited, usually and, it would seem, necessarily implies wisdom most effectively to use and distribute it; and after all, is it not God's method in every sphere to work on and elevate and bless the mass through individuals chosen and developed out of the mass? This is the idea which underlies the whole plan of redemption.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Stars not Inhabited.* Scientific and Biblical Points of View. By PROFESSOR L. T. TOWNSEND, D.D., S.T.D., Author of "Credo," "Art of Speech," "Fate of Republics," etc. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham 1914. 8vo, pp. 254. Net \$1.00.

This interesting and almost fascinating book is characterized by the author's well-known wealth of information, his clearness of style and sanity. He takes the view, taken too by no less an authority than Alfred Russell Wallace, that the stars are not inhabited; and he also believes that they find their true and sufficient purpose in their ministry to man's education and delight; and he bases on this position a not inconclusive argument for the supremacy of man in the universe. He infers further, the inspiration of the Bible from the fact that it nowhere teaches or implies that the stars are inhabited, though the trend of opinion, both scientific and theological, as he shows by many and learned citations, has been the other way.

To Professor Townsend's exegesis of Scripture or interpretation of nature we have little exception to take. It does not seem to us, however, that in proving that the stars are not inhabited he has proved that they were necessarily made for the edification of man. It would seem to us more reasonable that they should have been made for the glory of God by the revelation to angels and men of his wisdom and power. Indeed, is not this what the Nineteenth Psalm affirms when it says that "the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork"?

It also seems to us strange that our author has not even raised a question as to the relation of the angels to the stars. In fact we



must reject even his exegesis of Scripture when he says (p. 189) that "the Eighth Psalm is the only passage in the entire Bible on which can be built a theory that there are created intelligences in the universe that are of more importance or that outrank humanity." On the contrary, we are constrained to hold with Dr. Chas. Hodge (Sys. Theol. Vol. I, p. 637) that "if the distance between God and man be infinite, all analogy would prove that the orders of rational creatures between us and God must be inconceivably numerous. As this is in itself probable, it is clearly revealed in the Bible to be true." In view of this it would seem not unlikely that the practically countless and inconceivably magnificent worlds of space should have some reference to the innumerable host of glorious angels. That they should be their temporary, if not their permanent, abodes would not be an improbable conjecture. Nor would this be weakened by our author's contention that physical life, at least as we can conceive of it, would be impossible under the conditions known to obtain on most, at any rate, of the stars. Pure spirits, the angels are independent of physical conditions, though by no means incapable of appreciating them. That they inhabit the stars this does not prove, but it at least opens the way for a theory which in itself would seem to be probable.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Proof of God.* By HAROLD BEGBIE. Author of "Twice Born Men." New York, Chicago, Toronto, London, and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1914. 8vo, pp. 159.

The writer of this "modest book," to quote his own preface, "does but attempt to gather up and present in a companionable summary the discoveries and speculations of those learned men so far in advance of the general host that they have almost forgotten the Doric of humanity". His aim is certainly a worthy one, and his achievement is not wholly unworthy of it. If he has not made a profound subject clear for those who will not think for themselves, he has probably made it clearer for some who are trying to think for themselves. Of special helpfulness are his two letters; one "Concerning the Belief of Men of Science," the other, "Concerning the Tendency of Modern Thought." We agree with him that this tendency is idealistic and toward belief in God. We wish that we were also sure that it is toward belief in God as revealed in Christ.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*A Pilgrim of the Infinite.* By WILLIAM VALENTINE KELLEY. New York, Cincinnati: The Methodist Book Concern. 8vo, pp. 84. 50 cents net.

This attractive booklet is "an argument for personal immortality". The considerations urged are not new; but they are all valid; and they are presented with a richness of style, with a wealth of illustration, and with a fervor of conviction, they are not common, and that make this little volume a tonic needed much and widely in this age of doubt.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Dilemma of the Modern Christian: How Much Can He Accept of Traditional Christianity?* By EDWARD H. EPPENS. Boston: Sherman, French & Co. \$1.20 net.

The subject-matter of this volume is stated in its title. The method is the ever popular one of tearing away all the traditional foundations of the Christian Religion and then seeking to build a more stable and modern faith on the basis of the inner consciousness of the spirit of Jesus revealing to us the Almighty as a God of Love. This new faith is supposed to rest on no shifting interpretation of alleged historical facts but is rather independent of any historical facts. It would, indeed, survive just as surely if it could be proved that Jesus never lived. Mr. Eppens affirms that our present orthodox faith is impossible to the modern man who has little or no respect for theology or theologians and who is filled with the scientific spirit.

Just here lies the fallacy of the whole book. The modern man as here portrayed is not one who has the real scientific spirit—a spirit which is critical yet humble, which forms its theories to suit its facts and not its facts to suit its theories. The spirit of Mr. Eppens' man is that of a follower of modern German philosophy of a certain school. It forms its theory first and then patiently reconstructs all history to suit this theory. The results are what might be expected. We are told that we know nothing of the life of Jesus except a few scattered facts. The Gospels are not history at all but only the glowing interpretations of worshipping followers. The whole Christian Church including those who knew Jesus in the flesh and who founded the Church did not understand what they heard and saw and experienced. It has been left for modern discoverers to unearth a principle of interpretation by which we can see and hear so clearly that we can correct Peter and Matthew, John and Paul, and can make such statements as the following: "It may be stated with the utmost confidence that if there is any one certain result which we owe to the comparative study of the gospel narratives it is the conviction that Jesus did not speak as the fourth gospel reports him to have spoken." The life of our Lord is made to conform to the limits of other human lives. All is simplified and whatever does not agree with the theory of the writer or of his spiritual guides is cast aside as unhistoric. The method used is that of philosophy at its very worst. It is wholly unscientific.

For any truly scientific study of the life and person of Jesus the first step must be to evaluate His present power and authority. It will immediately be found that He stands absolutely alone and absolutely unique. (This the author of course grants.) Then as the immense difference separating Him from all other men begins to develop more and more clearly a really scientific study will turn to the reports of Jesus' earthly life not to find it like all other lives but looking for the exact opposite—expecting to find it far above and beyond them. Jesus Christ is now working miracles of spiritual regeneration and is now recognized as the perfect revelation of God. He is now the great judge of the lives of men. His is now the supreme saving power of

God. And His personality is as inexhaustible now as it has ever been. All these things must be accounted for. They are incontestable.

To one who will begin with these evidences of the present glory of Jesus the fact that His followers reported miracles as occurring during His life will only be natural, for He is in Himself the greatest miracle of all. The resurrection of Jesus will be accepted as certain, for there is overwhelming evidence that He is now alive. His teaching as recorded in the Gospel of John will be joyfully accepted because it so perfectly expresses what the experience of millions of His followers through eighteen centuries has proved to be true.

There is one fact that is becoming more and more clear to all scientific investigators at the present time. It is the complexity of all life and, in truth, of all things. No simple explanation can be final. We are continually learning how little we know. The philosophy of Mr. Eppens and his school is one that seeks to simplify and reduce all to one scheme or type. The task is hopeless. And its most hopeless efforts are those that seek to limit and thus to harmonize the revelations of the Almighty.

Philadelphia.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

*Christ and the Dramas of Doubt.* Studies in the Problem of Evil. By RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham.

The problem of evil is so old and so apparently insoluble that the freshness and clearness of Mr. Flewelling's discussion will come as a surprise and inspiration. Whether one will desire to follow the author in all his opinions or not will make little difference. There is here an abundance of comfort and help for all and especially for any one who has been plagued by the shadow of doubt and who earnestly desires to be free from it. An outline of the contents of this admirable book may well serve as a basis for its review.

In his introduction the author first discusses the causes of doubt. Among them he notes that doubt often arises from culture, from the existence of moral and physical disorder, from the missed aim of happiness, from mental and moral readjustment, from lack of adequate life motive and from the failure of spiritual ideals. Under the latter he writes: "The reason that men are struck with world weariness is because they have wandered through the world of sense and experience with no motive beyond that of self-gratification. Their excursion into the world of learning has been without moral aim. Neither the will to feel nor the will to know is in itself enough. In a moral being they demand a moral purpose." This chapter is so clear and so true that it will amply repay careful study.

Chapter ii deals with the epochs of doubt. These are discussed as they appear in the drama which is "an expression of the problem in its most living form in all lands and ages." The age of Aeschylus, and that of Job, of Hamlet, of Shakespeare, of Goethe, and of Ibsen are especially considered. Thus we are prepared to proceed with the



elaboration of the theme: Doubt and the Problem of Evil and the solutions proposed for it in certain of the greatest human dramas.

Five different statements are chosen, each bringing before us its peculiar problem and offering a solution. The first is that of the struggle with an impossible theology and is portrayed in Prometheus Bound. Then we are asked to consider Job and the struggle with the mystery of pain. Job's friends are accused of defending tradition against light and of joining with Satan in believing in a religion of barter. The solution reached by Job is that joy is better than happiness, that human experience is only partial in its nature, that understanding is not necessary to peace, that doubt cannot be solved intellectually, and that to have God is enough.

Hamlet is concerned in his struggle with the problem "of" an outraged moral order. His doubt is very practical. He has not the resolution to meet it.

Goethe attempts to find a solution to the problem of redemption. Margaret finds redemption through renunciation and confession; Faust, through striving.

In Brand, Ibsen tells the story of one who faced the struggle arising from the failure of spiritual ideals. Brand failed because he sought to love God with all his powers but at the same time "forgot that there was a second commandment to evidence this love for God by loving his neighbor as himself." We turn unsatisfied from all these attempts to solve the problem of evil. They but serve to show us how terrible it is. They are in accord with the philosophy of pessimism now so sadly prevalent.

The book concludes with a survey of modern thought and the only satisfying solution—that given to us in our Lord Jesus Christ. This is found to be personal and practical and not philosophical. It appears in the identification of God with cosmic life and with human achievement. The individual is lifted up to the universal plane. We read: "When the evils of our present life are turned one by one into a new sympathy for men, into a larger striving for the perfect day, the mists that have darkened vision fall before us. . . . We can face the worst that life can bring with the triumphant joy with which Jesus went to the cross. . . . Jesus ever tried to lift the disciples up into this higher order of living in which all mysteries should be solved at last. His practical word of faith to them was this: In the world ye *shall* have tribulation: but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world."

"To face disaster with triumphant soul for the sake of the world around you, to sink your lesser ills in the universal need, to live heroically and to die with one's face to the light—this is the only solution granted to mortals, and it is enough until, speaking in the words of a teacher whom many loved, 'we pass beyond the night and know as we are known.'"

*Philadelphia.*

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

*Christian Science So-Called.* By HENRY C. SHELTON, Professor in Boston University. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham. 50 cents net.

There is an extremely dangerous trait in the character of certain amiable Christians which they like to consider as broadminded toleration but which in reality is the product of lack of conviction and easy-going indifference. It is fashionable not to hold and not to express strong convictions in regard to the truth or falsity of other sects and forms of religion. The presumption seems to be always against any who dare to believe their own faith so strongly that they do not concede to others perfect equality. We fear "personalities" so much that we fear to tell the truth. It was the devout and honorable women at Antioch who were leaders in the persecution against Paul. The presence of kindly and devout persons in any movement of our time should never close our eyes to its real character. Mrs. Eddy's religion of Christian Science illustrates these facts all too well. It cannot flourish among Christian people who really know its character and who are willing to take the trouble to *study their Bibles*. But there is a danger that fear of offending the sensibilities of friends may keep Christian pastors and laymen from telling the truth concerning this ridiculous and un-Christian system.

This book by Prof. Shelton is therefore recommended to the earnest study of Christians. It would be good if it could be circulated in many of our churches. The argument is clear and concise; the style, simple and attractive; the information, exact and reliable.

Philadelphia.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*The Romance of Bible Chronology.* An Exposition of the meaning, and a Demonstration of the Truth, of every Chronological statement contained in the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament. Volume I. The Treatise. Volume II. Chronological Tables. By the REV. MARTIN ANSTEY, B.D., M.A. (London). Marshall Brothers, Ltd., London, Edinburgh and New York. 1913. Pp. 302 and 56. 7 shillings 6 pence net.

The author has bestowed long and patient labor on this work, and has high hopes of its finality. But in this particular he is doomed to disappointment; for, despite the accuracy of his calculations in sections of his system, it is nevertheless in its salient features based on private interpretations of the biblical records and on the questionable theory of interregna. The author also rejects the well-supported chronology of certain periods of the world's history; in one instance, however, without injuriously affecting the integrity of his system as a whole.

I. Private interpretations; for example, in such great matters as the length of the actual sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt and the period



of the judges, and in minor matters like Gen. xi. 10. The interpretations are private, not as being novelties, but in that the author has often adopted for himself one of two or more equally possible meanings to the exclusion of the others. He may have made the right choice every time, hit upon the right meaning; but it is questionable whether he has. This doubt, therefore, clings to the scheme and renders its finality uncertain.

2. Assumed interregna: namely three, an interregnum of eleven years between Amaziah and Uzziah, one of twenty-two years between Jeroboam the second and Zechariah, and one of eight years between Pekah and Hoshea (ii. 26, 27). These intervals of anarchy are assumed as a ready means of adjusting certain synchronisms mentioned in the biblical text. But that is the only reason, and it is beset with difficulties. The history of Israel does not call for these kingless periods, the records of contemporary peoples regarding the affairs of Israel do not suggest them. Mr. Anstey assumes that in the Assyrian eponym canon, from 833 to 783 B.C. inclusive, a gap of fifty-one years occurs (ii. 25). It is, however, mainly his hypothesis of interregna in Israel which demands this blank of fifty-one years in the recorded history of Assyria, his interregna accounting for forty-one of the fifty-one years. One bold step required another.

3. Attack upon Ptolemy's canon and the later Greek and Roman historians of the Persian period. The author's mistrust of the Assyrian eponym canon has been mentioned. His fundamental objection to Ptolemy's work seems to be his interpretation of Dan. ix. 25-27 (i. 20). As four other theories regarding the particular decree which is intended by the prophecy (verse 25) are also entertained by sincere students of the Scriptures, it seems rather adventurous amid these possibilities for the author to reject Ptolemy's canon in the interest of his own preference for one interpretation of Daniel's prophecy. In regard to Ptolemy's work the author contends that Ptolemy "is the only authority for the chronology of this period [between Darius Hystaspis and Alexander the Great, 485 to 331 B.C.]. He is not corroborated. He is contradicted both by the Persian National Traditions preserved in *Firdusi* A.D. 931-1020, by the Jewish National Traditions preserved in the *Sedar Olam*, and by the writings of *Josephus*" (i. 19). These statements of Mr. Anstey's are astounding. Ptolemy is not contradicted by Josephus. After mentioning each of the Persian kings from Cyrus to Xerxes and Artaxerxes (*Antiq.* xi. 2, 1; 3, 1; 5, 1; 6, 1), the Jewish historian alludes to another Artaxerxes, and quite correctly says that Darius was the last king (xi. 7, 1 and 2). And instead of being "not corroborated", Ptolemy's statements are abundantly corroborated by documents written by contemporaries of the kings or prepared shortly after the reigns. Thus, Ptolemy assigns 21 regnal years to Xerxes, 41 to Artaxerxes I., and 19 to Darius II. Thucydides lived during this period; and he states, that from the battle of Marathon in the 7th year of Xerxes (Herodotus, vii. 7 and 20) to the



commencement of the Peloponnesian War was "a period of about fifty years" (Thucydides, i. 118); that King Artaxerxes died about the 7th year of this war (iv. 50, 51); and that the 13th regnal year of Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, was the 20th year of the war (viii. 58 and 60; comp. 5). So that from the accession of Xerxes to the death of Artaxerxes there elapsed about sixty-three years according to Thucydides, sixty-two or sixty-three according to Ptolemy; and from the same starting point to the 13th year of Darius there was an interval of about seventy-six years according to Thucydides, and according to Ptolemy at least seventy-five years. The contemporary business documents of Babylonia afford good attestation of the regnal years of Xerxes and Artaxerxes (tablet 186 in *Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler*, vi., has not been overlooked). Important is a tablet which gives a date and two names by which Artaxerxes II. was known, mentioning "the 26th year of Arshu, who is Artakshatshu" (Strassmaier in *ZA.* vii. 223, note). Thus from the accession of Xerxes to Alexander the Great one hundred and one years are accounted for, which already exceed by about thirty-one years the limit fixed by Mr. Anstey's theory. But to continue, Ptolemy's canon gives to Darius II. 19 years, to Artaxerxes II. 46 years, to Ochus 21 years, and to Darius III. 4 years. A tablet published in the *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, vii. 199 indicates four periods of eighteen years each, or seventy-two years, from the 19th year of Darius II. to the 3rd year of Darius III; and in other particulars agrees with a tablet published in the same *Zeitschrift* (*ZA.* vii. 170 and x. 64) which records 46 years for the reign of Artaxerxes II., 21 years for that of Umashu, 2 years for Artaxerxes, and 5 years for Darius. Thus the correctness of Ptolemy's canon for this period is confirmed by ancient records.

The rejection of Ptolemy's authority, however, does not vitiate Mr. Anstey's work, for his system ends in the reign of Darius the Great. It is an entity which can be advanced or moved back according to the date which one is constrained to assign to Darius. Furthermore, in his tables, in indicating dates in the terms of B.C., Mr. Anstey has wisely adhered to the Ptolemaic canon, seeing that it is the basis in common use among chronologists.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

*The Song of Songs.* Edited as a Dramatic Poem, with Introduction, Revised Translation and Excursuses, by WILLIAM WALTER CANNON. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1913. Pp. viii, 158. Price \$2.50 net.

The author disclaims in his preface the intention of furnishing any original key to this much discussed book. His purpose is rather to supply the English reader with "a short compilation from some of the best available sources". In this he has been successful. He adopts the general type of interpretation of Ewald, as modified by Oettli. But those who prefer the theory of Budde and Siegfried will find it fairly

stated, and may judge for themselves the strength of the arguments adduced for and against it. From the standpoint of a conservative critic the best features of the book are its sturdy defense of the unity of the Song, and its exhibition of the extravagances of the Syrian Wedding theory. Yet while this interpreter has avoided some of the extravagances of his predecessors, he is himself open to the same criticism as has befallen the positive construction of everyone who has built on the same lines as he—on the lines, namely, of a drama, which, whether meant for stage-representation or not, presupposes an elaborate story that simply does not appear in the Song itself. And on the other hand it is open to question whether the author has done justice to the possibilities of interpretation along the lines suggested by Moulton. For Moulton's "Suite of Seven Idyls" is by no means bound up with the Syrian Wedding theory, though more nearly akin to the *wasf* than to the drama.

We cannot but feel that the ill-success of each positive construction advanced by one critic after another is evidence that the key to Solomon's Song is yet to be found. May it not lie in some forgotten chapter in the remarkable career of Abishag (1 Kings i., ii.)? Our author contents himself with saying, "Surely if the poem had been written about Abishag, her name would have been given". But his criticism of this association of Abishag with the Song is confined to a criticism of the use that has been made of it by the equally erroneous views of Budde and of Rothstein (in Hastings D B); with those views it is not necessarily bound up. The positive results of Cannon's investigations as to the authorship and date of the Song certainly favor such an association. Briefly his result is this: the Song was composed in Northern Israel between the first and the twelfth years of the reign of Baasha, that is, according to Kittel's chronology, between 914 and 902 B.C.

It will be seen from this that Mr. Cannon, though rejecting as emphatically as any other critic the traditional Solomonic authorship, is at the opposite pole from those who of late years with increasing confidence have relegated it to an age long subsequent to the exile. Such indications as the mention of Tirzah, the capital of the Northern Kingdom prior to the building of Samaria, which points to a date earlier than the beginning of the ninth century, are for our author real proofs of early origin, not the results of archaeological excavations (Budde actually uses the words "dig up" of the process) on the part of a learned Jewish poet. Of the linguistic evidence for late origin he gives an admirable discussion in an excursus, with the conclusion that "the linguistic proofs adduced are far too precarious to outweigh the indications of date found in the matter of the poem". He is also to be commended for the wise attitude he has adopted toward the wholesale emendation of the text proposed by several modern critics; a long and valuable excursus discusses the absurdities and subjectivism of those who have thus rewritten the book they profess to interpret. Taking

his stand with Ewald and Delitzsch, Mr. Cannon has given us one more attempt to interpret the book as it has come down to us. It will rest with the individual reader to judge whether or not he has put upon his key-passages a stress greater than they were intended or are able to bear: is viii. 6, 7 the "grand ethical climax" of the poem? and is the refrain in ii. 7, iii. 5 and viii. 4 the mark of the close of the several cantos (acts), intended to "reflect upon and point the moral of the section which they close"? In other words, is the theme of the writer the praise of virtuous devotion in a woman whom all of Solomon's arts cannot render disloyal? or is this a mistake?

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

*The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament.* By H. WHEELER ROBINSON, M.A. Tutor in Rawdon College. Sometime Senior Kennicott Scholar in the University of Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913. 12 mo. pp. 245 (Studies in Theology, 75 cents net per vol.)

This book is exceedingly well written, so well indeed, that one cannot help regretting that it is inspired by the Wellhausenian theory of the history of Israel's religion. It is one of the best succinct expositions of this theory that we have seen and exhibits to an unusual degree the fascination which in virtue of its great unifying sweep the latter is apt to exert. To be sure the author's standpoint is that of a moderated Wellhausenianism. This shows itself in two respects. On the one hand he places greater emphasis upon the redemptive element in Israel's experience and does not so one-sidedly as the extreme advocates of the theory are accustomed to do represent the ethical Monotheism as the exclusively valuable product of the development. On the other hand the ethical nucleus in the conception of God is traced far back beyond the age of the great writing prophets, via Elijah and Nathan to the time of the exodus. While this, of course, breaks up to some extent the coherence of the scheme, it brings the position somewhat nearer to the traditional view. But so far as the time of Moses is concerned the incipient ethicizing of the conception of God made out to exist is more apparent than real, amounting to no more than the fact that Yahveh and Israel were joined together by a free choice. How this implies the ethical character of the relationship, unless it can be shown that the choice was inspired by moral motives, are unable to see. As to the other approach to the conservative position, the greater emphasis thrown on grace and redemption, this also falls short of a solid recognition of the redemptive backbone of Old Testament in the old accepted sense. All grace is free grace; juristic conception of God is rejected on principle; no satisfaction the divine righteousness by penal suffering allowed, either as entered into the ritual of sacrifice or into the teaching of prophecy. Even here, as in Isa. liii, the presence of the idea of a "vicarious" suffering on the part of Israel for the Gentiles is recognized and at each point where the exposition might seem to approach such an idea, the



author takes special pains to warn the reader against identifying this teaching with the forensic conception of the Protestant theology. Of the reaction which has lately set in against the Wellhausenian construction in the critical sphere the author does not seem to have felt the influence. In his sketch of the Old Testament eschatology, while admitting Gressmann's assumption of the preprophetic date and popular character of the ancient hope of Israel, yet the figure of the Messiah is represented as the reflex-product of the experience of Israel with the kingship.

The main fault we have to find with the book is that it entirely subjectivizes the process of revelation: all truth is the result of historical experience, collective or individual. It is not the object of communication on the part of God, but the precipitate of faith and vision on the part of man. The objections which from the point of view of the philosophy of revelation must suggest themselves against this standpoint appear to be clearly felt and are admirably stated in the concluding chapter by the author himself, who here as elsewhere shows himself capable of clear theological thinking. The considerations by which he seeks to invalidate them will hardly satisfy the orthodox reader. If revelation is in its whole compass subjective, and at the same time through its subjective emergence acquires the character of relativity and fallibleness, no objective norm remains by which its actual provenience from the mind of God and its degree of authoritativeness can be tested. To say that all truth inherently commends itself is no solution for a mind conscious of its own spiritual inadequacy through sin in the noetic sphere. Nor do we think it in accordance with the facts of the prophetic consciousness thus to subjectivize the reception of truth. The author is fair enough to state these facts correctly, but then refuses to be bound by the prophets' own perception of them, and substitutes his own subjectivizing psychological interpretation. It is significant that in the bibliography at the close of the volume König's *Offenbarungsbegriff*, which upholds the objectivity of revelation, to be sure in an extreme sense, is not included, whilst the much briefer and more shallow treatise of Giesebrecht on the *Berufsbegabung* of the prophets is named.

We wish the author could have spared the reader the hackneyed assurance that through the new critical treatment and its conclusions the Old Testament has not lost but gained in religious grandeur and beauty. This may be so from the author's own standpoint, but the assurance is hardly necessary or intended for that. It is obviously offered to allay the fears of the conservative reader. For this, however, it is entirely beside the purpose. The conservative attitude toward the Old Testament expects from it and finds in it something different and something more than the modern religious consciousness. And because the demands on our side are different, in a sense higher, the concern about critical procedures and their results is differently affected and far more easily aroused. From the writer's subjectivizing point of view the genealogy of truth becomes a matter of minor importance and

an attitude of unconcern in regard to criticism quite easy of attainment. It is different with those who are accustomed vividly to conceive of God as standing with his personal authority back of the whole process of revelation at every step. With all their historical sense and psychological insight the critics might make a little more effort to project themselves into the conservative position. Probably the reason why it is so difficult for them to do this, is that they cannot conceive of the old view about the inspired Bible in any other way than as an antiquated position, which has lost all vitality in the sphere of practical religion. But surely in this they are mistaken.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

*The Theology of the Gospels.* By JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt. Yates Professor of New Testament Greek and Exegesis Mansfield College, Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913. Pp. xii, 220. 75 cents net.

Dr. Moffatt at the outset finds it necessary to justify his use of the term theology in connection with the Gospels, which so many at present consider a refuge from all theology. He has sympathy with this frame of mind and half apologizes to it for the scientific compulsion he feels under to recognize in the Gospels the presence of this unpopular ingredient. It is amusing that after some rather hard words about the scholastic type of theology, he borrows from the greatest of the schoolmen his characterization of what the ideal of theology should be. The existence of theology in the Gospels is based on the principle that the personal belief in Christ voiced in them carries with it convictions of the early believers' relations to God and the world, convictions which are organic to the religious experience. For this theology a distinction is to be drawn between what was time-conditioned and accidental and what was classical and fundamental, and this applies not merely to the Gospel-tradition and the Evangelists but equally much to Jesus Himself. There are elements even in Jesus' teaching that cannot be incorporated into our world view and as such the demonology and eschatology are specified. What the norm is for distinguishing between the accidental and the fundamental does not become clear. The divine revelation made through Jesus Christ lies back of the theology of the Gospels, but the term revelation receives a very subjective coloring being made to consist in "the character and purpose of Christ, His personality, His disclosure of the divine nature in word and deed, the experiences to which His Spirit gave rise." But while this was undoubtedly essential to the theology of the Apostolic age, it remains an open question whether Troeltsch is not correct in maintaining that from the standpoint of modern theology Christocentric views may be as logically superseded as geocentric conceptions in cosmology or anthropocentric ideas in metaphysics. It all amounts to this that the theology of the Gospels, even of Jesus, is not the norm, but the reflection of religion and no objective standard remains by which to regulate the religious consciousness.



Much more satisfactory than this introductory chapter are the four succeeding ones dealing successively with the Eschatology of the Gospels, the God of Jesus, the Person of Jesus, the Spirit of Jesus. Here the author is on exegetical and historic ground. The authenticity of the eschatological element in the teaching of Jesus is fully recognized. At the same time it is maintained that Jesus' conception of God and His own Person and the Kingdom involve a religious attitude towards the future which did not find congenial or complete expression in the apocalyptic categories of the age. With this we heartily agree if the implied conflict be found merely between the Jewish Apocalyptic and the teaching of Jesus. The Jewish Apocalyptic knew nothing of any gradual preparation for or anticipation of the eschatological order of things. And Dr. Moffatt most admirably shows that the idea of a present, gradually coming Kingdom cannot be eliminated from the Gospels. But if the conflict between the catastrophic and the gradual is conceived as immanent in the mind and teaching of Jesus Himself, we must beg leave to dissent. Where is the proof that the eschatological statements exclude the presence in Jesus' mind of any antecedent gradual development? That in their sublime absolutism they treat this element as for the moment negligible affords no proof of its absence from the mind of the Speaker in its larger compass. The only proof available for this purpose would have to lie in the alleged affirmations of the immediate nearness of the eschatological catastrophe as excluding time for preparatory development, but even if the reference of such passages to eschatology proper is not challenged and the point of chronology pressed to the utmost, it hardly follows that Jesus must have deemed the intervening period too brief to find room in it for the developments which the present Kingdom requires. On the other hand the present Kingdom is never so represented as to preclude the idea of a catastrophe at the end. It is scarcely correct to say on the basis of the parable of the imperceptibly growing seed that the denouement is "the end of an inward development". The parable itself does not represent the harvest as the organic uncatastrophic result of the ripening process but reads: "As the fruit is ripe, he putteth forth the sickle because the harvest is come", and these latter words leave room for all the eschatology of the other class of sayings. Nor can it be claimed that the ethical teaching of Jesus, simply because it is not in each instance correlated with the eschatological hope, is for that reason internally detached from or indifferent to such hope. The two had their higher unity in Jesus' insistence upon the glory of God as the supreme end of His mission. Precisely because He was an ethical teacher in the service of God, and an eschatological enthusiast for the sake of God, these two motives could not clash in His mind. Had He been an eschatologist for the sake of eschatology, as Schweitzer and others make Him out, the case would have been different. But Dr. Moffatt admirably brings out the supremacy which the idea of God held in Jesus' mind with references to both poles of His teaching.



"It is His conception of God (which) renders it impossible for us to believe that His teaching upon character and conduct was transitory and subordinate in principle to the eschatological hope of the coming Kingdom."

In the chapter on God the writer falls into the modern fault of one-sidedly emphasizing the benevolent, paternal aspect of Jesus' conception of God. This is done not merely to the neglect of the opposite side, the sovereign, authoritative, retributive character everywhere ascribed by Jesus to God, but even to the point of denial of the retributive element, when this is represented as merely another form of God's paternal attitude, thus reducing all punishment to the category of fatherly discipline. It is, of course, easy enough to subsume authority in general under the idea of fatherhood, but when the authority expresses itself in the infliction of eternal punishment the category of fatherhood has plainly been transcended.

In the chapter on the Person of Jesus the ultimate dependence of the Messianic consciousness on the consciousness of Sonship is duly insisted upon. We doubt, however, whether it is in accord with the Gospels to call the former a mere modification of the latter, as is done on p. 131. The two remain distinct relationships and only objectively, not subjectively, psychologically, is the official relation represented as resting on the more fundamental one. We are glad to see that the author gives to the Sonship which lies back of the Messianic vocation a deeper, more solid content than that of a perfect ethico-religious communion with God. It is something unique not merely in degree but in principle. "It is not inaccurate to state", the writer says, quoting Dalman's words, "that nowhere, even in the synoptic tradition, do we find that Jesus called Himself the Son of God in such a sense as to suggest a merely religious and ethical relation to God—a relation which others also actually possessed, or which they were capable of attaining or destined to acquire". But this falls still short of the recognition that the Sonship of Jesus transcends the sphere of the vocational and lies in the region of the ontological. According to Dr. Moffatt the Sonship is in itself a relation pertaining to the sphere of function, at least on p. 130 the consciousness of it is described as a consciousness of purpose, a consciousness of being sent to fulfil the ends of God on earth. While, therefore, differing from the Messiahship in content, it would not seem to differ from it in the general plane on which it moves, and it is not clear, what greater depth and richness imparted to the consciousness of Jesus, by making it center in Sonship than in Messiahship. It would be difficult to show that Jesus' conception of Messiahship was not sufficient to cover even the highest that is subsumed under the filial relationship if the latter be defined in terms of being, but of vocation and purpose.

The concluding chapter on the Spirit of Jesus largely deals with the Fourth Gospel. The writer, while not recognizing the authentic character of the discourses in John, seeks to bring out the continuity that exists from a religious point of view between the historical sig-

nificance of Jesus viewed under other categories and the ideas here developed under the category of the Spirit. The historical Jesus promises the Spirit "not as the principle of a new life, but as a special equipment for emergencies." It is quoted as proof of the authenticity of the synoptic tradition in general, that it does not follow Paul in grouping the whole ethico-religious content of the Christian life under the Spirit.

There are some things in Dr. Moffatt's book with which we find ourselves unable to agree. But we are in full accord with his ideas so far as they are the legitimate elaboration of the view stated in the concluding sentences: "There are methods of treating the religious ideas of the Gospels, within as well as outside of the church, which render them practically a blank page for faith. One is the tendency to explain the Christian ideas independently of a historical Jesus, or to minimize the cardinal and creative significance of His personality for the beliefs which are associated with His name. Another is to confine His religion to a literal, historical reproduction of what He said and did on earth, identifying Him with some eschatological or humanitarian propaganda of His own age. Such methods by minimizing or exaggerating the historical significance of Jesus, are untrue to the standpoint of religious faith from which the four Gospels are written, faith in the Living Lord, who said according to the Fourth (xvii, 26), *I have made known to them thy name, and I will make it known*. Theologies can be got from other standpoints, but none of them will be a theology of the Gospels, and it is very doubtful if any of them will prove to be much of a gospel at all."

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

*The Psychology of the New Testament.* By M. SCOTT FLETCHER, M.A. (Sydney), B.Litt. (Oxon.), formerly tutor in Greek New Testament in Newington Theological College, Sydney. Interdenominational Lecturer (1908) in New Testament Ethics in St. Andrew's College, University of Sydney; with an Introduction by HASTINGS RASHDALL, D.C.L., D.Litt., F.B.A., Fellow and Lecturer, New College, Oxford; Canon of Hereford. Hodder and Stoughton: New York and London. Pp. xii., 332. Price \$1.50 net. (No date.)

To admit in a scientific handbook of the present day that there is a supernatural factor in religious experience, is to risk a rebuke similar to that administered to the woman who "got religion" and was "happy" in the Methodist sense within the portals of a cathedral: "My good woman, this is no place for that sort of thing." In an age when it is fashionable to analyze religious experience into psychical elements, and to refer these elements to their physiological concomitant; when the odor of sanctity has been reduced to a chemical formula, and when "photisms", "hypnotisms" and "dissociations" are made to do the work of Divine grace, it is refreshing to read a treatise, modern in outlook and in phraseology, and yet recognizing the sinfulness of sin, the need of regeneration and the power of God's grace.



The purpose of the book, we are told, is "to arrive at a knowledge of the psychological conceptions of the New Testament writers, by an inductive study of their teachings, looked at from their standpoint, but interpreted in terms of present-day psychology". For such a study there is need of a two-fold equipment, on the psychological and on the exegetical side, and Mr. Fletcher is equal to the task. He first examines thoroughly the N. T. use of the terms Soul, Spirit, Heart and Flesh; then treats the consciousness of Jesus (briefly), the conversion of Paul and N. T. conversion in general; and finally compares the Christian conception of personality with the Jewish and Greek, with a glance at some modern philosophical theories. The outcome of the discussion is to show the essential harmony between Scripture and the facts of human nature, and the adaptation of Christianity to human need.

A reverent and scientific study such as this may supply a corrective to theories which substitute the subconscious for the supernatural, or explain the origin and progress of religious experience as an effect of the emotional disturbance of adolescence, or as a response to a social environment of finite selves. We read: "The N. T. nowhere teaches that man can save himself from sin. If Jesus made men feel their sin, he made them feel at the same time that God was imparting to them salvation from sin in the person and work of His Messiah." (200, 201). "Side by side with this consciousness of sin there is this consciousness of something 'given' to actually save man from evil, supernatural in origin, coming from God, and manifested in the person and saving work of Christ." (This alike whether conversion is sudden or gradual.) "The self, according to the N. T., is not merely a social self developing in a community of other finite selves; it is a divine self realizing its ideal powers of service and fulfilling its destiny only in a fellowship 'with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ'." (245)

Readers of Mr. Fletcher's work will agree with his sponsor, Dr. Rashdall, that the book, originally written as a thesis, is well worthy of publication.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

*Buddhistische und Neutestamentliche Erzählungen.* Das Problem ihrer gegenseitigen Beeinflussung untersucht, von GEORG FABER, Dr. phil. Leipzig. J. C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung, 1913. Pp. 69. Mk. 2.50 geb. 3.50 (Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament herausgegeben von Hans Windisch, Heft 4)

This treatise investigates the hypothesis first advocated by Rudolf del and more recently renewed in a considerably moderated form the Dutch scholar van den Bergh van Eysinga, that the Gospel-narratives were influenced by Buddhistic stories. The author adopts three methodological principles laid down by Clemen for this kind of investigation, viz. (1) that to warrant the assumption of a reign source for any New Testament material it must be shown



that such material cannot by any possibility be explained from indigenous primitive Christian ideas; (2) that the presence of ideas derived from a foreign source within the milieu whence they are supposed to have come should be clearly demonstrated; (3) that it should be made intelligible how an actual transmigration could have taken place. With this third requirement in mind the author first takes a thorough survey of the intercommunications that have existed in historical times between India and the nearer Orient and Occident up to the date of composition of the New Testament narratives. In the contact with the Babylonian civilization which is proven to have existed from the seventh century B.C. onward, India appears to have played a purely receptive part. Through the Persian occupation of the Indus valley the possibility of India influencing the West was undoubtedly given, but no proofs can be furnished that such a result actually followed. Even the expeditions of Alexander the Great are declared to have remained of small importance for the intercourse between India and the West. As concerns Buddhism in particular this was not at the time existent in Taxila, which was the center of all Brahmanic Indian learning and where the campaign of Alexander reached its limit. The region where Buddhism at that time flourished lay far to the East. After the death of Alexander a Greek embassy from the Seleucidian ruler was established at the court of Chandragupta at Pataliputra, but Megasthenes, the first ambassador, does not so much as mention the name of the Buddhists in his "Indica". While the Orientals showed in various ways their interest in Greek ideas, the West seems to have been entirely engrossed in its material relations with India. The first likelihood of the absorption of Buddhistic ideas arose through the intercourse established with the Indian court by Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt. This has a special bearing on the subject of enquiry, because in the commerce thus created Jews of Alexandria cannot have failed to participate. It was just at this time also that the ruler of Pataliputra became hospitable to the influence of Buddhism, which had meanwhile found its great Apostle in Asoka and developed an intense missionary propaganda. Notwithstanding all this the author thinks that at this juncture there is no sufficient ground to assume the entrance of Buddhistic legend or doctrine into the West, because Asoka's interest was centered upon the propagation of the practical rules of Buddhistic piety, and even in this latter respect his missionary efforts are claimed to have made no impression. More value is attached to the campaigns of Antiochus the Great, who also, it will be remembered, had considerable dealings with the Jews in the Western part of his dominions. Of the greatest importance, however, were the (re-)discovery of the Southwest Monsoun, shortly before the opening of the Christian era and the acquisition of Egypt by the Romans, both of which gave a new vigorous life to the trade between the West and India, and assured the extensive participation of Jews in this commercial movement. But as this trade lay almost entirely in the hands of the westerners the

author draws the conclusion that in whatever movement of religious ideas took place India was the receptive party. While not denying the possibility of the opposite he is only inclined to assume during this period the migration of Christian stories to Southern India. He also gives credence to the ancient accounts of the activity of "the Apostle Thomas" i.e. some early Christian missionary in Northwestern India. The much later stories about a similar work attributed to Thomas in Southern India he holds to be entirely without historical foundation.

From the above survey it will be seen that in Dr. Faber's opinion the successive historical situations were more favorable for an influence exerted from the West upon the East, from Christianity upon Buddhism, than for the reverse. Still the possibility of the latter is not denied. Whether it is more than a possibility the author proceeds to test by a careful inquiry into ten subjects in regard to which Buddhistic influence upon the New Testament representation has been alleged. These are: (1) the supernatural birth; (2) the prophecy of Simeon regarding the infant Jesus; (3) the visit of the boy Jesus to the temple at the age of twelve; (4) the baptism of Jesus; (5) the temptation; (6) the blessing pronounced by a woman upon the mother of Jesus; (7) the mite of the widow; (8) Peter's walking on the sea; (9) the Samaritan woman; (10) the eschatological world-conflagration. In close adherence to the first two canons above laid down the author shows that the idea of the supernatural birth is fully explainable from Old Testament representations even as to its very form of expression, and that on the other hand Buddhism does not actually teach a virgin-birth of the Buddha. As to the parallel between Simeon in the temple and the prophecy of Asita concerning the infant Buddha, it is pointed out that the resemblances are superficial and so far outweighed by the difference that all interdependence must be denied, and on both sides the differently oriented stories can be explained each from its own milieu to full satisfaction. The boy Jesus in the temple conversing with the Rabbis is again *toto genere* different from the young Buddha falling into a trance under the rose-apple tree, and the search of his parents for the former bears no particular similarity to the summons of the Buddha's father to find and fetch his absent son. The slight trace of Buddhistic influence which van den Bergh van Eysinga has discovered in the synoptical narrative of the baptism of Jesus depends on an arbitrary combination of part of the text of Matthew with the well-known fragment of the Gospel according to the Hebrews in which Jesus admits the possibility of ignorance in regard to his own sinlessness. Even if the combination could be allowed it is clear that Matt. iii. 15 does not fit into the situation thus created, because it implies the most absolute consciousness of sinlessness. Thus all the parallelism with the story of the carrying of the infant Buddha to the temple and his expression on that occasion of superiority to all the gods, and resolve to conform nevertheless to the custom of the world,



disappears. The temptation of the Buddha by Mara is essentially a temptation to abandon the life of asceticism. Insofar it differs fundamentally, from the principle at stake in the temptation of Jesus, and the six external resemblances adduced prove on closer investigation either unreal or valueless for historical comparison. The beatification of the mother of Jesus (Lk. xi, 27) is compared to a similar blessing reported to have been publicly pronounced on the relations of the Buddha by a rich young woman. There is, however, nothing unusual in this mode of expressing admiration for some extraordinary person, for which other parallels can be easily adduced, nor does the coincidence in the outward concrete circumstances under which it takes place or the way in which in both cases it is received compel us to assume historical dependence of one on the other. The story of the widow's mite likewise illustrates a widely-spread idea, at the coincident appearance of which in Buddhistic lore no one need wonder. That in both instances two pieces of money figure in the transaction might at first seem to prove interdependence, but this is only apparently so, because the "two mills" (lepta), represent in the Gospel-narrative, not two separate pieces of money, but one quadrans, the smallest piece of coin at that time in circulation. Hence Bengel's ingenious explanation that the introduction of the number two serves to enhance the completeness of the sacrifice of the woman, because she could have kept one, no less than the (unfounded) assumption of Plummer that it was not lawful to offer less than two seems to be beside the point. The very fact that the number two is thus naturally explained in the Gospel-situation and finds no explanation in the Buddhistic narrative leads the author to assume in this case an influence from the former upon the latter. The next parallelism concerns Peter's walking upon the sea. It is related of a Buddhist lay-brother that in a trance he began to cross a river walking upon the water, but that in the middle of the stream, when his thoughts were deflected from their trance concentration, he began to sink. Surely, faith as illustrated in the Gospel-account and the trance condition as illustrated in the Buddhistic story are states too dissimilar to allow any connection between the two narratives. The story of the Samaritan woman is found paralleled in the account of the meeting of Ananda, the favorite disciple of the Buddha, with a maiden from the despised caste of the Candala. The maiden on being asked for a drink of water warns Ananda of the defilement he incurs by coming in contact with her. Here again, it will be perceived, there is a very real difference between the motive which in each case underlies the situation, caste-distinction in the one case, national and religious antipathy in the other. Finally the eschatological world-conflagration (2 Pet. iii. 10) is rather unlike the fiery destruction of the present world-cycle predicted in the Buddhistic tradition as coming after 100,000 years. The latter rests on the idea of a ceaseless rotation of birth and death to which every world-order is subject. On the other hand the last day with its world-crisis of the Christian eschatology is absolute and in-



capable of repetition. And the admonition which is appended in each account to the prediction shows equally great difference. On the one side it consists of the demand for holiness and perfection, that the Christian may not perish with the collapsing world but have his part in the world to come; on the other side it is a call to the exercise of the Buddhistic virtues of piety, sympathy, equanimity, reverence, etc., a call which moreover, sustains no perceptible casual relation on Buddhistic premises to the predicted world-catastrophe. Hence at this point again Dr. Faber is led to surmise that a specific Christian idea has strayed into a Buddhistic context.

If we may place reliance on the careful reasoning and the cautious conclusions of this treatise the originality of the Gospel-narrative is in no immediate danger from the hypothesis of Buddhistic provenience.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

*The Four Gospels from the Irish Codex Harleianus numbered Harl. 1023 in the British Museum Library.* Now first edited with an introduction descriptive of the MS. and its correctors by E. S. BUCHANAN, M.A., B.Sc., Editor of *Old-Latin Biblical Texts*, Nos. V and VI; *Sacred Latin Texts*: Nos. I and II, etc. with two collotype facsimiles. *Sacred Latin Texts*: No. III. Heath Cranton & Ouseley, Ltd. Fleet Lane, London, E.C., 1914, pp. xxxii, 88.

The editor of *Old-Latin Biblical Texts V* and *VI* and of the series *Sacred Latin Texts*, of which the present volume is the third, is well known and esteemed for the accuracy of his work and for the contributions he has made to the history of the Latin Version of the New Testament. This edition of the Codex Harleianus 1023 reproduces the text of the manuscript word for word and line for line, except that certain compendia are resolved. Two collotype reproductions show the character of the script and illustrate the work of revision by correctors. The introductory discussion contains an account of the manuscript, its relation to Harl. 1802 and the Book of Armagh, its correctors, spelling, the scribes and their archetype, the character of the text—adducing a number of extremely interesting variants, and concludes with a statement concerning the plan of the present edition. The editor traces the text preserved in this representative of the Old Latin to very early times and thinks that its readings in several instances explain and therefore are prior to certain variants in the other representatives of the Old Latin. His view of the early origin of Western variants is not new; but the evidence adduced for their very high antiquity will require careful testing, while the final judgment concerning their quality can only be reached on the basis of principles which must find their adequate grounding in a comprehensive theory of the history of the New Testament text.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*De Leer der Versoening in de Amerikaansche Theologie.* Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van den Graad van Doctor in de Heilige Godgeleerdheid . . . door IJMEN PIETER DE JONG. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans-Sevensma Co. [1913]. 8vo; pp. xvi, 302 + [6].

*Enkele Beschouwingen over Christus in de Nieuwere Amerikaansche Theologie.* Door REV. Y. P. DE JONG, D.D., Predikant bij de Chr. Geref. Kerk van Coldbrook, Grand Rapids, Mich. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans-Sevensma Co. 1914. 8vo; pp. 27.

In the former of these two interesting studies a survey is given of the doctrine of the Atonement in American theological thought, or at least in one, and that a very influential, section of American theological thought. Dr. de Jong describes his purpose thus: "We propose in this study to sketch the development of the doctrine of the Atonement in American theology. Of course we do not bring into review all those who have written on this doctrine, but only those in whose theology there is really offered material for a history of this doctrine, that is to say more precisely the Edwardean theologians, whose views are known as the New England theology. We shall see that the history reduces to this: that the Old Protestant or Reformation conception gradually makes way for the Governmental and this in its turn for the Moral Influence theory" (p. 5). Dr. de Jong's study thus takes the form of an exposition of the deterioration of the New England theology in its conception of the Atonement, of the rise and dominance in it of the Government theory and its ultimate breaking down into the Moral Influence theory. His study appropriately closes therefore with a searching criticism of the fundamental points of view of these two theories, the basal fault of which he finds in a tendency to forget the righteousness of God in a one-sided emphasis of what is called His love. Under the influence of this tendency speculation ran naturally on lines which ended at length in purely Socinian and Pelagian conclusions. A divine Christ is scarcely needed to influence men; and if the whole function of Christ is to influence men, then the issues of life or death lie in the hands of men and they must be held capable of meeting them. "And now", Dr. de Jong solidly reasons (p. 288), "there is but one alternative: either Christ has *procured* the whole of salvation, and in that case faith is the *fruit* of the cross and the *gift* of His Spirit, or He has only made salvation *possible*, and in that case faith can not depend on Him alone but must become a condition by which the possibility opened by Christ is made a reality". This is well said; and this said all is said. The ways part here, as Dr. de Jong clearly sees and makes clear to his readers, which lead ultimately to the two utterly different religions illustrated for all time by our Lord's pungent parable of the Pharisee and Publican praying in the Temple.

The disposition of the matter in Dr. de Jong's dissertation is as

follows. After a short historical introduction the "older New England school"—Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins—is first discussed; then the "later New England school",—West, Smalley and the younger Edwards—on whom the influence of Universalism is traced; then, the "New Haven Theology"—Emmons, Griffin and Taylor—concerning the last of whom the remark is made that though he meant to keep in accord with Edwards, yet in point of fact a comparison of the two shows unambiguously "that the Edwardean theology ended with Dr. N. W. Taylor of New Haven in Pelagianism" (p. 149); and this part of the survey comes to an end in an exposition of the doctrine of the Atonement taught by Park of Andover, and of the "newer conceptions" of F. H. Foster and L. W. Stearns. So far it is the Governmental theory of the Atonement in its development among the American Congregationalists which is under investigation. A new start is now made with Horace Bushnell, "the father of the moral theory of the Atonement in America" (p. 190), and after him the theories of the Atonement taught in *Progressive Orthodoxy*, by W. N. Clarke, and G. B. Stevens are expounded. The whole is closed by a clearly worded general criticism of the two theories which have engaged the attention of the reader throughout the book: the Governmental and Moral-influence.

The second study which we have placed at the head of this notice is in the form of an address on lecture delivered to a theological society maintained by the students of the Christian-Reformed School of Theology at Grand Rapids. It surveys rapidly a rather broader field than the first, and undertakes to review the teaching as to Christ which has been in vogue during the last thirty years among the American Methodists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Baptists in turn. The Methodists are the most slightly treated; the Congregationalists most at length,—with *Progressive Orthodoxy* as the chief text. The Christological views of William Adams Brown are most dwelt upon in the section on the Presbyterians; and those of W. N. Clarke and G. B. Foster in that on the Baptists. Beyond Foster, Dr. de Jong thinks the degeneration of the doctrine of Christ's person can scarcely go; "his conception", he points out, "offers us a Jesus who was nothing more than a common man, who could actually err, and who at the best could be only an example to us in His ethical life". Here is truly, he adds, "a Christianity without Christ" (p. 23). The historical development, Dr. de Jong finds to have proceeded in this locus too on much the same lines as in that on the Atonement. "The development of theological science," he remarks, indeed, in general of American theology (p. 26) "is here, in accordance with its history, in its second period. The first was that of Calvinism, as it lies in the Westminster Confession. We saw the decay of this in the Edwardean theology and what was left of it. The second began with the rise of Horace Bushnell; it obtained a broader platform in *Progressive Orthodoxy*; and became a wide stream under the more direct influence of the identity-philosophy of Hegel and the Mediating



Theology of Schleiermacher and his followers." The address closes with some ringing words summoning its hearers to faithful testimony to the truth as it has once for all been delivered to the Church.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

*Calomnies Anti-Protestantes.* Tome I: *Contre Calvin.* Par E. DOUMERGUE, Doyen de la Faculté Libre de Théologie de Montauban. Paris: Bureaux de *Foi et Vie*; Lausanne: Georges Bridel et Cie. 1912. 12mo; pp. 204.

On the back of the title-page stands this note: "This volume may be considered a second edition of *Une poignée de faux*. But the matter has been more than doubled and differently arranged." *Une poignée de faux* appeared in 1900 and bore the secondary title of "The death of Calvin and the Jesuits". The subject of the death of Calvin occupies some fifty pages of the present volume though some of the topics treated in its predecessor are given a separate place here. The volume is to be followed by another which will deal with the *Calumnies Against Luther*; doubtless, that is, with instructive examples of the calumnies which have been put in circulation against that Reformer. For Dr. Doumergue does not pretend to have gathered and answered here all the calumnies against Calvin. That, he gives us to understand, would be an endless task. New calumnies will always be found and the work of refutation will never be completed. "What is essential", he says, "is to demonstrate that the calumniators have a wrong mentality, that they see badly, that they judge badly, that their mentality is, like their method, from the critical, historical point of view entirely disqualified. Whether it is their fault or not, how far they are responsible for their mentality and their method, are other questions. Their historical work is altogether null and void".

The Preface from which this exposition of Dr. Doumergue's purpose in writing this little book is quoted, though brief, is itself an illuminating document. In it he tells of the constancy of the attacks made by Romanists on Protestantism, and of the appeals made to him for aid in meeting them; of the facility with which attacks may be made, and of the difficulty of response—requiring that long and wearying labor should be expended on matters intrinsically trivial; and of the depressing effects of long engagement with such calumnies. "Response is always a difficult matter, demanding much time and learning, if not science. . . . This is true in all domains. A calumny, a negation, is easily launched. The proof of the error is a matter of prolonged labor, sometimes very prolonged. And this is particularly true of historical calumnies. . . . And when a week has been spent in the company of these calumniators, you can scarcely know where you are. These hundreds and hundreds of calumnies give you a kind of vertigo. You end by being fairly suffocated by the number of inaccuracies which you uncover, wrong citations, wrong indications, wrong translations, and so forth. It is an atmosphere in which breathing becomes labored".

It is no easy or pleasant task which Dr. Doumergue has set himself therefore in tracing down this representative body of calumnies against Calvin; as we admire the neatness and dispatch with which he executes justice on them, let us be grateful to him for the service he is rendering the cause of truth.

There is no single section of the book that has interested us more than that entitled, "With regard to the execution of Michael Servetus" (pp. 80-110). No better test of the competency of a writer on Calvin could easily be devised than is furnished by his mode of dealing with this matter. If he says "Calvin burned Servetus", there is no earthly use in reading further: he is either too blindly prejudiced or too grossly ignorant to waste time upon. Dr. Doumergue does not attempt to treat the question of Calvin's relation to Servetus here; he only undertakes to indicate the precise terms in which it must be posed. That Calvin was convinced, in accordance with the general judgment of his times, that it was the duty of the State to punish certain heresies with death; and that, when Servetus came to Geneva, he did his best as a good citizen to bring him to the punishment he held to be his due, is true. All the rest is calumny. Calvin did not in point of fact denounce Servetus to the tribunal at Vienne. He did not instigate de Trie to denounce him. He did not betray Servetus' confidence. So far from "burning" Servetus, he earnestly sought to save him from that "atrocious punishment", as he himself calls it. "Therefore", as Dr. Doumergue sums it up, "there is nothing left of the charge against Calvin except this single fact,—Calvin desired Servetus' death. There is nothing more at all". Dr. Doumergue is far from contending that Calvin is not to be blamed for sharing the general view of his day as to the amenability of heretics to civil process. So far is he from this that it was at his instance that there was erected at Geneva in 1903 the already famous "Expiatory Monument", confessing Calvin's fault as the fault of his age; and he here appeals to the erection of this monument as the sufficient proof of the regret felt by Calvin's "respectful and grateful children" for his fault. We have never thought this was the right way to express our regret, and we are not surprised to learn that certain difficulties have been raised by it since, and that perhaps it has exerted some provocative influence in the erection since of monuments elsewhere to Servetus. We cannot profess to be an admirer of Servetus, and we regret that such a man should be thrown into such undeserved prominence. Meanwhile it is of course true that there is a great difference between confessing the faults of those we love and proclaiming the faults of those we hate; and there is a greater difference still between respectfully acknowledging that faults which we hate still cling to those we love, and violently charging as faults against those we hate what we cling to as virtues in ourselves. And Dr. Doumergue has no difficulty in showing that the latter is precisely what the Romish controversialists do when they charge

Calvin with brutal intolerance when he "burned Servetus". The right and duty of punishing heresy by civil penalties is proclaimed to-day by the Roman church and the quotations, proclaiming that right, drawn from recent Roman authors, which Dr. Doumergue gives, make lurid reading for the twentieth century. "All this", he concludes, "is not probable, but is true; it is all incredible,—but here are the documents and facts."

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

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### SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*The Problem of the Atonement.* By W. ARTER WRIGHT, Ph.D., D.D.  
S. F. Harriman: Columbus, Ohio. 1913. Pp. 291.

Dr. Wright has written this volume on the Atonement with a two-fold purpose: viz. to attack the satisfaction doctrine held by the Christian Church, and to propound and defend a Moral Influence theory of the Atonement. He says, in somewhat colloquial language, that one cannot read far into the literature of the subject without getting the impression that the ideas of the imputation of guilt and of Christ as the sinner's substitute are "a sort of frame-up" (p. 10).

In order to prove this assertion he defines guilt as moral ill-desert, and then triumphantly shows that since Jesus was sinless, He had no moral ill-desert, and consequently could have had no guilt in any sense. This argument will convince only one who accepts Dr. Wright's definition of guilt. It cannot, however, be said that he assumes his definition of guilt with no attempt at proof. It would be a mistake, therefore, to say that his argument rests on a bare assumption. It does, we think, rest on an unproven assumption. For in order to prove that there is no guilt in the sense of liability to punishment, which could be transferred or imputed to Christ from the sinner, Dr. Wright argues that there is no such attribute of God as retributive Justice. And if we look for proof of this assertion, we find only such so-called arguments as the following: that God is not a "vindictive" God who cherishes "resentful feeling" in His "heart", which "resentful feeling" must be "satisfied" (p. 132). If, Dr. Wright continues to argue, God is resentful and spiteful and hates the sinner, He never would have sent Christ to save sinners, and so there could have been no Atonement or reconciliation. Moreover if this is a true idea of God, Dr. Wright continues, then Christ, who loves sinners, is at variance with God who hates them, and we are forced into Tri-theism instead of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. This most astonishing mode of argument is capped to a fitting climax by the unproven and gratuitous assumption, no shadow of evidence being given in its support, that in the New Testament



Fatherhood expresses, not a soteriological conception, but God's essential and practically His only relation to all men. This last is an unproven assumption, no shadow of evidence being given in its support, and the entire teaching of Jesus and of Paul to the contrary being totally neglected.

The writer of this notice feels as if such a "refutation" of the Satisfaction doctrine of the Atonement scarcely merits a reply, and as if he would be offering an insult to the intelligence of his readers if he presumed to inform them that the above is a grossly ignorant, if not an intentional, caricature of the Biblical doctrine of the Satisfaction of Christ, confessed by the Christian Church. It is not, then, for the purpose of giving such apparently needless information, but in the interest of the precious truth that Christ "bore our sins in His own body on the tree" (1 Peter ii. 24),—where Peter has in mind the 53rd chapter of Isaiah where the ideas of substitution and of imputation are unmistakably stated—it is, we say, to defend this great truth that we repeat that Dr. Wright has most grossly misunderstood, or misrepresented and caricatured the Satisfaction doctrine. This doctrine asserts that God so loved sinners that He sent His Son to bear their punishment and to work out for them a perfect righteousness on the basis of which He may be just and yet justify the believer in Jesus. God's Justice is no spiteful or resentful feeling, but is that Divine attribute which makes it necessary that God should punish sin and reward righteousness.

To show, however, that this is a Biblical idea, no less than the only adequately moral conception of God; to point to the sacrificial system of the Old Testament, the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, the opening chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, the teaching of Peter, and of our Lord Himself—all this would be quite unconvincing to the author as a reply to his book, because he says that our ideas of the Atonement should not be drawn from the Scripture so much as from what he terms "modern criminology". This latter, he says, proceeds upon the assumption that punishment is solely for the purpose of the reformation of the criminal. If this is true—and we do not think it is—it is very difficult to understand how "modern criminology" is going to defend capital punishment. Dr. Wright does not inform us on this point, and it does not greatly interest us. The fundamental question is whether we are to derive our ideas of the nature of the Atonement from our own speculation or from the Scripture teaching. On this point Dr. Wright leaves us in uncertainty. For the most part the Scripture seems to have little authority for him, and yet in a few places in the book we find him struggling to show that the Christian Church has misunderstood the Bible. For example, when Paul says (2 Cor. v. 21) that God made Christ to be sin for us, Dr. Wright says that this means simply that God allowed Jesus to suffer the inevitable results of coming into such a wicked world! Dr. Wright argues that Paul can not mean what he plainly states because the Apostle says that Jesus knew

no sin, and that therefore there is nothing else that Paul could have meant except his own interpretation just stated. This, of course, is not exegesis. It is an absolutely arbitrary way of dealing with Scripture. But, speaking of exegesis, one can scarcely take Dr. Wright's exegesis seriously, for he distinctly states (p. 194) that if an exegete refuses to come to his task with certain *a priori* "ethical considerations", he will find Paul a hindrance rather than a help in his religious thinking, and that Paul is tainted by rabbinical modes of thought. It is difficult to understand why, upon this view of Paul's teaching, Dr. Wright should take such pains to read his own opinions into those clear statements of the Apostle which simply refuse, upon all sound exegetical grounds, to be tortured into teaching Dr. Wright's "ethical" views. Having thus plainly repudiated the authority of Paul, Dr. Wright might better have passed him by. If his own views are less tainted and more moral than Paul's, why trouble about the Apostle?

Probably enough has been said to show the worthlessness and groundlessness of this supposed refutation of the Satisfaction doctrine. What is Dr. Wright's view of the nature of the Atonement? It is simply the Moral Influence theory. Atonement, he says, is re-established fellowship with God. For the sinner this implies the pardon of sin. God may forgive sin on two conditions: 1st, repentance on the part of the sinner; 2nd, the "acceptance of a new nature" which brings the sinner into harmony with God's will. Christ suffered and died to lead men to repent and to allow God to sanctify them. His death is simply the result of His whole work of "vicarious suffering" i.e. the pain which love and sympathy must always endure. It melts the hard heart of the sinner, and that is all that stands in the way of "re-established fellowship" with God, or, in other words, of Atonement.

Those who have read John Young's *Life and Light of Men*, and Bushnell's first theory in his earlier book, *Vicarious Sacrifice*, will be perfectly familiar with this line of thought. But Dr. Wright is bolder than Bushnell. The latter was forced to admit that the language of the altar and sacrifice must be adopted if any effect upon the sinner is to be produced. Not so, however, is it with Dr. Wright. The sinner, who, according to Dr. Wright, is at least dead enough in sin to be able only to "accept" a new nature from God, is nevertheless supposed to be alive enough to have his hard heart melted by Christ's suffering love. But how a sinner, even as much alive spiritually as Dr. Wright, in contradiction to the Scripture, seems to suppose him to be, can be thus turned to God, or why God could not, in giving a new nature, have given a good enough one to make the sinner turn back to Him without sending Christ to die, or how, upon the presuppositions of this theory, Christ's being put to a violent death manifests the love of God, or how sufferings partly physical and positively inflicted can be called sympathetic, or what is the relation of the death of Christ to man's sin,—these are questions which Dr.

Wright does not answer, and to all of which except the last we think there is no conceivable answer possible, and to the last of which none is possible upon Dr. Wright's presuppositions and theory. To the question as to how the sinner's repentance can atone for his past, Dr. Wright would reply that the sinner's past is not an element in the problem, no atonement for it being required. Thus he sets himself against the natural conscience, the awakened conscience, and the Scripture.

That Jesus died once for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous to bring us to God, is one of the essential truths of the Gospel which is being attacked now, as it has always been. But it is just this great truth, and that of the imputation of His righteousness, which render the Gospel "the power of God unto salvation."

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*The Enlarging Conception of God.* By HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ, Professor of Christian Theology, Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. 199.

It is not easy to give a concise statement of the contents of this little volume, because it consists in a series of Essays which, with two exceptions, as the author says in the Preface, were not originally designed to form the chapters of a book. There is consequently much repetition throughout the successive chapters, which, as the author also tells us, was almost inevitable. Chapter I, which bears the same title as the volume itself, is an Address which was delivered before the New York State Conference of Religions. Chapter II on theological method, and Chapter V entitled "The Perils of a Safe Theology", were published as articles in the *Harvard Theological Review*. Chapter VI, the final chapter, is a sermon which was preached to the students of Auburn Theological Seminary; while Chapters III and IV, which continue the discussion of theological method begun in Chapter II, are the only ones especially prepared for this volume.

Accordingly we can gain a better idea of the author's views and of the contents of the book, by stating the views on the topics dealt with, and by gathering information on these subjects from all the chapters rather than by an attempt to outline each chapter separately.

The main idea seems to be that feeling precedes thought, that life precedes doctrine, that all theological thought is relative and but an interpretation of feeling and life in the form of symbols. The treatment is popular and untechnical, but anyone acquainted with modern theology will recognize in this book a striking resemblance to the *Symbolo-Fidélisme* of the French theologians Sabatier and Ménégoz.

It is the business of theology, then, according to Professor Youtz, to "interpret" religious life by clothing it in the "garments" of thought. And, though the fashions of such garments are continually changing, indeed changing so rapidly that the reader is led to suspect that



they may not always thus be dictated from Paris, nevertheless this theological task is one which Dr. Youtz regards as of great importance. For to make religion intelligible to each age, and a living force, religious life must not be allowed to go about naked.

What, then, are the prevailing styles, or, to drop the figure, what are the ideas of our modern world which are to make religion and theology a living force to the man of to-day? Briefly they are, according to Professor Youtz,—the denial of Supernaturalism in the sense of any direct activity of God apart from second causes; the substitution of an "inner" "experiential" authority for an "external" authority in religious knowledge; the idea of revelation as man's developing experience of and search for God, rather than God's self-revelation to man in a supernatural manner; the immanence of God, pressed in modern fashion almost if not wholly to the exclusion of His transcendence; the idea that the Bible is authoritative only as a record of the Christian experience of those who stood near in time to Christ, and that the Inspiration of the Bible means that it was written by men of religious genius and intuitive insight.

These ideas concerning the nature of doctrine, the relation of God to the world, the task of Theology, and the nature of Revelation and of the Bible, are all very familiar to the student of modern theology. All that is peculiar to this presentation of them is that they seem to be taken for granted as not only modern, but also as true in the only sense in which Professor Youtz can admit anything to be true, i.e. true for our "modern consciousness", though it is difficult to see how one can raise the question of truth and error upon the principles of Dr. Youtz's epistemology and his view as to the relation of feeling to thought.

Dr. Youtz has not adequately grounded his views. We do not believe that they are capable of such grounding. Feeling, as bare feeling, has no quality that can justify us in calling it religious. Its specific character is determined by a thought content of consciousness which determines the specific nature of feeling. Religious feeling or experience is determined by a conception of God, and Christian experience by the Christian revelation. This revelation contains doctrines or truths, and it claims to be supernatural and final. These claims must be tested. If we believe in God, the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the Universe, these claims may be true. The evidence put forward in their behalf should, therefore, be examined strictly and impartially. If they are finally rejected, we have only our unaided reason to guide us. But if Dr. Youtz's view of the relation of feeling and thought is true, reason itself is a blind guide; for we would be obliged to regard all doctrine as relative and merely symbolical, and could not speak of such a thing as truth. Utter skepticism is the only possible result of this epistemology.

It is an interesting question to ask what this theology can do with

Jesus. For religious feeling, as Dr. Youtz admits, places Jesus with God rather than among men.

The Church's doctrines of the Deity of Christ and of the Two Natures, would seem to be the only adequate "interpretation" of these religious emotions of adoration of Jesus. But these doctrines are an outgrown fashion of thought, according to Dr. Youtz. It would seem, then, that theological thought, instead of interpreting these feelings toward Jesus, must abandon its interpretative function, and correct these feelings. Dr. Youtz, of course, would not affirm this, and yet he plainly says that Jesus must take His place on man's side, and not with God. Dr. Youtz would cling to the Deity of Christ, but not as what he terms a "surplusage" to His humanity, i.e. not a real Divine Nature along with a human nature. Rather, he says, we must regard Christ as a man in and through whom God manifests Himself more perfectly than anywhere else. In a word, and put plainly, Christ is a man, and only a man—but a man indwelt by God. I venture to say that most Christians, whatever be their theological views, would regard this as a correction rather than as an "interpretation" of their feelings toward their Lord. This merely human Christ, moreover, is not the Christ of the only sources of information concerning Jesus which we possess; it is not the Christ of the Christian Church; it is not a Christ of whose existence we have any valid evidence whatever. It is an imaginary picture, the product of emotion and fancy and of a naturalistic philosophy of immanence.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*The Ethics of Jesus and Social Progress.* By CHARLES S. GARDNER, Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. New York: George H. Doran Company, Hodder & Stoughton. 1914. 8vo, pp. 361.

This book is based on "the conviction that the more definitely the goal of social evolution is worked out by the students of social science, and the more adequately the concept of the kingdom of God is grasped by the students of the Gospel, the more nearly they will be found to correspond". The work consists of two parts: Part First, "Fundamental Principles", and Part Second, "Application of Principles".

The "Fundamental Principles" are, that "the Kingdom of God, though beginning primarily as a subjective state of individuals, is essentially "a social concept"; that the aim and work of the Kingdom are to "reconstruct" "the world" or temporal social order and, hence, primarily to evangelize individuals, inasmuch as it is only then that the social order can be reconstructed and the Kingdom be fully realized; that Jesus put on the individual personality an emphasis that was never equalled before and has never been exceeded since, regarding as "the supreme and intrinsic good personality moving toward the goal of perfection and attaining ever to a higher capacity for self-direction and to an increasingly free and harmonious adjustment to the central reality of the universe"; that while inequality of ability is a



fact that may not be questioned, "the measure of ability is the measure of the obligation to serve", and this principle will, when understood and appreciated, rule out all conflict, and even all competition save in service; and that true "self-realization" can be achieved only through "self-denial".

"Part Second" gives the application of these principles to "Wealth", to "Poverty and Equitable Distribution", to "the Family", to "the Children" and to "the State".

That the book thus inadequately outlined is careful, penetrating, always suggestive, and often helpful, does not admit of doubt. It takes high rank among, perhaps it ranks with the highest of, the works of its class. All this and more the reviewer is glad to say as he commends it heartily to the reading public. Yet in doing so, and just because he does so, he is constrained to call attention to two, as it seems to him, not unimportant blemishes.

1. The writer fails to grasp the relation of the moral to the economic sphere. Of course, it is not the case, as he says that many teach, that, because the economic sphere is a part of the material order in which natural forces operate, therefore, "there is no ethical problem of economics and political life". Every economic question is also an ethical question in the sense that it gives rise to an ethical question. When the demand for labor becomes so small that the laborer can not earn a living wage, this situation at once presses on all who have more than a decent living the inquiry, What ought I to do about it? just as when the law of gravity causes a workman, though careful, to fall from a high scaffold, his employer at once becomes bound to consider the problem of compensation. On the other hand, however, the economic question is not, as the writer would seem to hold, only a moral question. The problem of poverty is not solved by making the rich man generous enough to pay a living wage to the poor man when, because of incompetency or hard times, he is not competent to earn a living wage. When the employer does so, he acts a lie by giving *as a wage* what has not been earned; he adopts a principle which, if persisted in, will so deplete his business as to make him incapable of paying even a starvation wage; in the end he injures the poor man most of all by leading him to suppose that he is worth economically what he is not worth. In a word, economic laws must be reckoned with just as physical laws must be reckoned with. They are both the laws of God, and to attempt to override either is immoral. Just because both give rise to a moral question must they themselves be heeded and obeyed. This is the lesson which, perhaps more than any other, the social reformers of our day need to learn.

2. Justice is confused with benevolence, and the function of the state is, consequently, misunderstood. Justice is held to be "benevolence guided by wisdom", and the state is the reformatory institution. Neither of these positions, however, is Scriptural. The Bible teaches that the soul that sinneth shall and must die, if not itself, yet in its substitute. Why? Certainly not to reform it. Death is the one



thing that excludes all possibility of reformation. Moreover, Paul tells us that the civil ruler "is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil" (Rom. xiii. 5). The barbaric punishments of antiquity and of the modern heathen, that our author rightly rejects, ought to be done away with, not because of their severity but because of their injustice, not because they rule out benevolence but because they are inequitable. The general tendency to soften justice into benevolence and to conceive of the state after the analogy of the family is the vice of our sociology. And this does not mean that love should not always and everywhere be present. It does mean that it should not be confounded with that sense of justice by which alone even love can be kept true and can continue beneficent.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Sovereign People.* By DANIEL DORCHESTER, JR. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1914. 8vo; pp. 243. \$1.00 net.

"This is a study in sociological progress—historical, critical, and constructive. The treatment, vigorous, vivid, and vital in style, is entirely fair to all interests involved. The author portrays the conditions of human society prior to the emergence of the humanitarian feeling and shows how through the centuries there has been a new evaluation of man as such. The evils of the ancient and modern social system are clearly and strongly presented, and a constructive program for the future is offered."

This description and estimate by the publishers is both true and complete. Mr. Dorchester's work is one of the best of the many sociological discussions and treatises that are appearing almost daily, good, indifferent, bad, and, in cases not a few, very bad.

With the author's main position, that those who will to stand together for their natural rights constitute a nation; that this nation is an organism both distinguishable from and more than the individuals who compose it; that the Spirit of God prevades it and manifests Himself through it, so that the voice of the people, though not always the voice of God, is more likely to be so than the voice of any individual—with all this and much else in the volume the reviewer finds himself in heartiest accord. What he regrets is the tendency, not nearly so pronounced, it is true, as in most of the sociological writers of today—the tendency to make the nation rather than the individual the source and agent and end of social reform. Is not the body politic more like the human body than most modern writers would seem to admit? The latter is distinguishable from and more than the individual cells of which it consists. Yet is not its vigor promoted in proportion as they are nourished; and must not any treatment fail of good results which does not aim to secure first and always their activity and consequent development? Hence it is that we cannot sound too frequently and too earnestly a note of warning. Governmental control and even governmental initiative are taking the place of self-control

and of individual initiative. We are told that this is the inevitable trend of social evolution. If so, then social evolution is devolution. It is downward and backward, and its only possible outcome is social death.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Seventh Day Adventism. A False System.* By WILLIAM SICKELS. New York: Charles C. Cook, 150 Nassau Street. Pamp., pp. 45. 10 cents.

This is a presentation and refutation of the doctrines of Seventh Day Adventism, including, of course, its peculiar doctrine of the Sabbath. The reasoning in general is clear and conclusive. In the case of the Fourth Commandment, however, it aims to prove, in the judgment of the reviewer, far too much. It not only undertakes to show that there is an element in the Sabbath law which is positive and so may be variable; *viz.*, which one of the seven days of the week should be kept holy: but it would establish also that the Fourth Commandment itself, unlike all the other nine, is positive; that is, a mere by-law which in some way or other has crept into the constitution. This is an error even more serious than that of the Seventh Day Adventists themselves.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*The Broader Vision.* By the REVEREND RICHARD SILL HOLMES, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 232. \$1.00, postage 8 cents extra.

A true service has been rendered by Miss Mabel Dodge Holmes in preparing this collection of the writings of her father. It is prefaced by a sketch of his worthy and influential career as a teacher, lecturer, preacher, editor, friend of men and of God. Following this "story of a full life" appear twenty-five articles which were prepared as editorials for "The Westminster" and "The Continent." An equal amount of space is then devoted to fugitive poems, grouped as "Life Lyrics," "Holiday and Anniversary Poems" and "Sonnets." To these are appended some twenty pages of Epigrams and other brief, pithy sayings. The collection will serve to perpetuate the fragrant memory of a life characterized by peculiar beauty, purity, courage, helpfulness and strength.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Religion in College Life.* By MARTYN SUMMERBELL, D.D., LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 215. \$1.00 net.

This collection of sermons and addresses delivered before college audiences by one who has been connected with students all his life,



reveals a strong evangelical faith and a confidence in the power of Christ. The author expresses his belief that the more definite and scriptural the religious convictions of a student may be, the riper will be his mental product, and the greater his usefulness in the world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Sevenfold "I Am."* By the REV. THOMAS MARJORIBANKS, D.D. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 147. 60 cents net.

This volume of "The Short Course Series" presents a brief devotional treatment of the seven familiar phrases from the Gospel of John in which Christ declares himself to be "The Light of the World," "The Door," "The Way, the Truth, and the Life," "The Good Shepherd," "The Bread of Life," "The Vine," "The Resurrection and the Life."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Evangelism and Social Service.* By JOHN MARVIN DEAN. Griffith and Rowland Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 71. 29 cents postpaid.

This brief discussion of the relation of the Church to modern social problems comes from the pen of one of the leaders of the recent "Men and Religion Forward Movement." The sound principle is assumed and defended that the salvation of the individuals which compose society must precede and underlie every effort for social betterment; but that the acceptance of the full Gospel of Christ will lead to service in every sphere of social need. The author contends that "Social Service and Evangelism are indivisible."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Shall We Do Without Jesus?* By ARTHUR C. HILL, Minister of New Court Congregational Church. New York: George H. Doran. Cloth, crown 8vo; pp. 304. \$1.50 net.

This book is dedicated to those who are asking whether Jesus interpret the meaning of life, and to this question it gives an impressive and convincing affirmative. It deals wholly with the things of Jesus, and these in their more general aspects. There is no study of the words of our Lord; such study is evidently pre-supposed; what the Master teaches is assumed as known, and the writer considers the relation which the great principles enunciated by Christ sustain to modern philosophies, and to the pressing problems of life.

The reader who believes that the Person of Christ and the Work of Christ, bring us nearer to the heart of Christianity than any abstract consideration of his teachings, and that it is only in connection with the former that the latter can be understood, will probably be conscious of a feeling of disappointment, and dissatisfaction, in that which is essential is passed unnoticed, and that which would illuminate is omitted; nevertheless he will be impressed anew with



the wide range of human interests which is covered by the teachings of Christ, and will hope that many who have questioned his authority will be led by such a thoughtful consideration of his precepts to accept him as Saviour and submit to him as divine Master and Lord.

The writer considers, first of all, the relation of the teachings of Jesus to the present world-conditions of "ridicule", "weariness" and "false interpretation". He then shows what these teachings have to suggest as to "the value and the norm of human life", to "the spirit of wonder", "the idea of beauty", to "human affections" and "the child". Parts three and four of the volume are termed "Theological" and "Evangelical", and deal with "agnosticism", "the revelation of God", "religious intuitions", "religious authority", "the interpretation of the world"; with "sin", "spiritual dynamic", "the human will", and "the world's pain". Part five is "Social", and treats such subjects as ideals of social conduct, liberty, social justice, the place of woman, and "the church of the people". The style of the writer is interesting and reveals thoughtfulness, moral earnestness and an intelligent acquaintance with a very wide field of modern literature.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Almighty Magnet.* By REV. D. S. HAMILTON, Symington, Glasgow: Pickering and Inglis. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 142. 2s.

The first of this collection of brief sermons gives the title to the volume in which they are printed. Each one has as its subject some scripture symbol. Thus in the first "the magnet" is the cross (Jn. xii. 31), in the second faith is "the telescope" (Heb. xi. 1), in the third love is "the microscope", in the fourth hope is "the anchor" (Heb. vi. 19); and later we find "The Tree", "The Race", "The Spider's Web", "The Riddle", "The Touchstone", etc., all used to impress moral and spiritual truth. The sermons are thus vivid and picturesque, well adapted to arouse interest, and may be considered as particularly calculated to attract and instruct the young.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Studies of Missionary Leadership.* By ROBERT E. SPEER. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 16mo; pp. 283. Cloth. \$1.50.

This volume, which comprises the Smyth Lectures for 1913 delivered before the Columbia Theological Seminary, Columbia, South Carolina, contains no mere miscellany of missionary biographies, but careful studies of six notable lives selected to illustrate various phases of the great problem of world-wide evangelization. The lives of these heroes suggest how this problem is being solved by the Christian Church. Three of these show how it is being met by the missionary organizations from the base of the church at home; and three show how the task is faced on the foreign field.

The lives of Walter Lowrie, for thirty-two years secretary of the Presbyterian Board, and of Jeremiah Evarts, for twenty years first treasurer and then secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, picture the founding of the missionary

enterprise in America, and the early problems which emerged; while Rufus Anderson, for forty-four years an active official of the American Board, is presented as the "foremost American administrator", the "most original, the most constructive, and the most courageous student of missionary policy whom this country has produced".

The solution of the problem of the independent national church is found in the career of a Japanese, Paul Sawayama; the relation of western forms of Christian experience to the Indian mind is studied in the pathetic career of a Hindu, Nehemiah Goreh; and the difficult questions—relative to foreign communities and religious liberty—are treated in connection with the heroic work of an American, David Trumbull, "the friend of Chile".

Thus we are concerned, in these six striking studies, not so much with methods as with men, and not merely with biographical facts, but with "lessons of character and ideal". We are brought face to face with the central questions of the life of the church; and these are presented as living issues of our own land, and our own time, and our own lives.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Twelve Gemmed Crown.* By SAMUEL JUDSON PORTER. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 165. \$1.20 net.

This volume contains a series of studies in the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the course of the Epistle the writer finds ascribed to Christ twelve striking titles arranged in three groups, each containing two couplets as follows: (1) "Son and Heir", "Effulgence of His Glory", and "Image of His Substance"; (2) "Apostle and High Priest", and "Mediator and Minister"; (3) "Author and Perfecter" and "Forerunner and Shepherd". The titles of the first group are shown to define the relation of Christ to the Father, those of the second to outline his place in the plan of redemption, and those of the third to express the relations between Christ and the believer. In their combination these titles are set forth as comprehending much of the teaching of the Epistle in which they are found, but more particularly as portraying the beauty and splendor of the character of Christ, our Great High Priest, who is one with the Father, who once-for-all made atonement for our sins, and who can save to the uttermost as he ever lives to make intercession for us.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Planting The Outposts.* By ROBERT FREDERICK SULZER. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 128. 50 cents, postage 8 cents extra.

The author of this sketch is the successful District Superintendent of Presbyterian Sunday-School Missions for Minnesota and North Dakota. He here describes his thirty-five years of experience as a Sunday School missionary "among the children of the plains". As a biography it is vivid and interesting, and indicates, as the author modestly insists, that the Lord can use men of limited education, but



who are consecrated and possess common sense, to accomplish some of the work to be done in saving children. The even more obvious message of the book is the importance of the great work being done, in various parts of our land, by the unselfish and courageous men who are serving under our various boards and societies as pioneers in the field of Sabbath School missions.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Working Church.* By CHARLES F. THWING, D.D., LL.D. President of Western Reserve University. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 189. 60 cents.

A book which first appeared more than twenty-five years ago would hardly be revised and republished to-day unless it possessed elements of abiding worth. In the case of this handbook for pastors, these elements are found in the definite suggestions of methods by which the members of a church can be enlisted, under the leadership of the pastor, in definite Christian service. As already intimated, these suggestions are by no means novel; but they cover a large number of possible spheres of activity, "among the children", "among the young", "among business men", in relation to church finance and benevolences, in the treatment of strangers, in reaching the unchurched, in strengthening the Sabbath School and the mid-week service, in adjusting the local church to a changing environment. The volume closes with a chapter which has been entirely rewritten on "The Rewards of Christian Work". It constitutes an attractive appeal to young men of ability to enlist in that form of Christian service, in the interests of which the previous chapters were penned.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Story of Joseph.* By ADAM C. WELCH, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh.

*The Divine Drama of Job.* By CHARLES F. AKED, D.D.

*The Mirror of the Soul.* By THE REV. JOHN VAUGHAN, M.A., Canon residentiary of Winchester.

*In The Upper Room.* By THE REV. DAVID JAMES BURRELL, D.D., LL.D., Pastor of the Marble Collegiate Church, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 125, 143, 141, 145. 60 cents each.

These four volumes form a part of "The Short Course Series" of Biblical expositions. As the name indicates, the series is intended to stimulate and aid in the preparation, not of the long courses of expository lectures which were once popular, but of such brief series of six or eight connected studies on one definite theme, as are now regarded essential to the programme of a teaching pastorate. The value of the series, however, is by no means limited to preachers, but its volumes will be found of help to all who desire brief, scholarly, practical interpretations of Bible history and doctrine.

*The Story of Joseph* appears in its true significance, as it is related and illumined by Doctor Welch. The reader is impressed, not merely



with the deep human interest of the narrative, but with the far-reaching divine purpose, revealed in the life of the ancient hero. The story is shown to portray a character of singular beauty and a career of unusual interest, but much more to relate the origin of the ideals, and to record the providences, by which the nation of Israel came into being. The reader realizes anew the moral values and practical applications of the story, but still more the important place it holds in the history of the people of God.

Dr. Aked renders a helpful service in reminding his readers of the perennial interest, the profound wisdom, and the practical values of *The Divine Drama of Job*. He traces with distinctness the course of the debate between the patriarch and his three friends, interprets sympathetically the difficult speech of Elihu, and shows the significance of the answer of Jehovah. The successive chapters deal with "The Insurrection of Doubt", "The Restoration of Faith", "Satan in Literature and in Life", "Eliphaz the Seer", "Bildad the Sage", "Zophar the Ordinary Soul", "The Intervention of Elihu", "The Speeches of Jehovah". The discussions are necessarily brief, but they can hardly fail to stimulate a fresh study of this masterpiece of Hebrew poetic genius.

It was St. Athanasius who described the Book of Psalms as *A Mirror of the Soul*; and it is this phrase which the Rev. John Vaughan has selected as a title for his "Short studies in the Psalter". The very phrase suggests the first characteristic of the Psalms upon which the author dwells, namely their remarkable "diversity", and the extraordinary variety of subject, reflecting every mood and experience of humanity, and making it possible for these Psalms to form a hymn-book for the whole church, a devotional handbook for the world.

But the chief aspect of the Psalter, the one which the writer next describes, and that too most impressively, is the deep sense which it evinces of "communion with God". As Dean Stanley declared, this is "the crowning-glory".

Closely related to this is a third feature to which reference is made, "the grace of meditation";—a grace recognized by pagan philosophers, but specially characteristic of the Hebrew mind, and notably conspicuous in the practice of the most saintly followers of Christ during all the ages. After dealing with the deep "appreciation of nature" that runs throughout the whole Psalter, the writer shows how strikingly the various Psalms prolong the two notes of "praise" and "thanksgiving" which should continually sound in the hearts of the people of God.

Last of all it is shown that even the knowledge of God and his grace which the Psalms reveal needed to be perfected by the fuller revelation which came through Christ.

The passage of Scripture assigned to Doctor Burrell is commonly regarded as the very holy of holies of the New Testament, namely John xiii.-xvii. These chapters receive a reverent and thoughtful treatment in the volume entitled *In the Upper Room*. To this exposition, the characteristic style of Dr. Burrell is well adapted. Clear,

concise, simple sentences set forth the unquestioning faith of the writer in the great Christian verities which these chapters embody. The institution of the Lord's Supper, the lesson of service, the personality and work of the Holy Spirit, the condition of fruitfulness, the personal return of Christ, His high-priestly prayer, "the closing hymn" are all so treated as to strengthen faith, and to encourage an effort for a fuller knowledge of Christ and a truer devotion to His service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Continuation Committee Conferences in Asia 1912-1913.* Published by the Chairman of the Continuation Committee. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 600 Lexington Ave. Full octavo, pp. 488. Price, \$2.00.

The unique character of the World's Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh in 1910, was not confined to the careful preparation which had been made by its eight Commissions, nor to the personnel of its delegates, but was seen particularly in its consciousness of being intended to express a spirit and to perpetuate a work which should not end with its sessions. The distinctive feature was its creation of a Continuation Committee, which was appointed to perfect the investigations begun by the Commissions and to extend the work of the Conference. This Committee is composed of some forty leaders of the Missionary forces of the world. Immediately upon the adjournment of the Conference it met for organization, and has held three subsequent meetings for the consideration of the most serious problems which concern the missionary enterprise. At its meeting in 1911, it requested Dr. John R. Mott, its chairman, to devote a considerable portion of his time to the work of the Committee; more particularly in visiting mission fields, acquainting missionary leaders with the work and plans of the Continuation Committee, studying the problems and assisting in the unifying of missionary efforts. In accordance with this request Dr. Mott devoted several months in preparation for a visit to the Orient, and then spent the time from October, 1912, to May, 1913, in an extended tour through the principal mission lands of Asia.

The field was divided into a number of areas, and in each one of these a conference of leaders was held. In addition to eighteen of these sectional conferences, national conferences were held in India, China and Japan. To each one of the sectional conferences some fifty persons were invited as representatives of the various missions, churches, and also of the various phases of missionary work. These delegates were prepared for the conferences by the previous study of a series of important questions submitted to them in advance by the Chairman of the Continuation Committee. Some of the leaders presented papers on the various topics which these questions suggested, but most of the time was spent, at each of the conferences, in free discussions, in order to secure the widest expression of opinion from



those who were present. At the close of each conference a Committee on Findings, which had previously been appointed, offered a report embodying the general conclusions which had been reached. This report was debated, and amended and finally approved by the Conference. The volume which has been prepared, with the title above mentioned, is composed of the findings of these different conferences together with a list of their members. The report of each committee is arranged under a series of uniform headings, the mention of which will suggest the important themes which were under discussion. Among them may be mentioned "Occupation of the Fields"; "Evangelization"; "The Christian Church"; "The Christian Leadership"; "The Training of Missionaries"; "Christian Education"; "Christian Literature"; "Coöperation"; "Medical Work"; "Women's Work".

No comments or expressions are added by Dr. Mott, the author of the volume, aside from a brief introduction which summarizes the facts above mentioned. The reports may be disappointing to some who expect novelty of theme or diversity of views. What is expressed is a remarkable consensus of opinion of the missionary leaders of the Orient upon all the great problems of their work. The volume forms in fact an admirable supplement to the Reports of the World's Missionary Conference. What is surprising is the absolute unanimity of thought upon questions which are so difficult and important. The Table of Contents, which has been provided, enables one to turn with rapidity to the conclusions, upon any one topic, reached by all the conferences. They indicate the pressing need of an immediate provision for the unoccupied portions of what are known as Mission Lands; for a great enlargement of the work in every department; for a more scientific and specialized training of missionaries; for the provision of an adequate Christian literature in the language of the various peoples; and for wider coöperation among the missionary societies and organizations. The volume will be of great service to members of Mission Boards, and to all who are seeking light on the existing condition of missionary activities in the far East.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Relations of the Christian Churches.* By the REV. ROBERT CAMPBELL, D.D. Toronto: William Briggs. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 337. \$1.50.

Wide interest has been awakened throughout the Christian world by the movement toward organic union which for more than a decade has engaged the Presbyterian, Congregational and Methodist Churches of Canada. This interest has been due to the relation such a movement has been thought to sustain to the larger dreams of a "reunion of Christendom". It is this latter suggestion which gives significance to this present volume and makes it of value even to Christians who have no relation to Canada, or to the three denominations concerned. Of course its first message will be to Presbyterians and particularly to those who are facing the serious problems which occasioned the volume; for the writer aims to show the difficulty, the possible peril, of at-



tempting to unite the church he represents with the two sister churches on the proposed "Basis of Union". However, the principles involved are of far wider application than the limits of his immediate discussion; and while he places himself on the side which is at the present day manifestly unpopular, his spirit is so irenic as to conciliate those who differ decidedly from his conclusions. His method is not speculative but historical. He sets forth what he regards to be the origin and essential characteristics of the great churches in question, and shows what would be lost by the proposed organic union of these churches. The general conclusion arrived at is that the proposal involves a possible sacrifice of sacred truth, and that a union, at such a price, would be too dearly bought. Obviously many will dissent from the general position of the author, but in these days of superficial thinking on the subject of church unity, when many advocates of corporate union are unconsciously influenced by ignorance of historic facts and indifference to religious truths, there is great need of such conservative discussions, to remind us that no desirable movement can be advanced by ignoring realities nor by the sacrifice of principle. No reunion of Christendom would be welcome which was born of blind sentiment or produced by force. An intelligent understanding of denominational differences can meanwhile deepen the sympathy and forward the coöperation which the author advocates and seeks to secure.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Religion as Life.* By HENRY CHURCHILL KING, D.D., LL.D., President of Oberlin College. New York: The Macmillan Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 194. \$1.00 net.

It is the helpful contention of the writer that religion, and religion alone, can give to man life—"large and rich and free, increasing, inexhaustible life". The "choice of life", however, must be heroic and must triumph over "the peril of the lesser good". "The method of life" must be that of "mental and spiritual fellowship, as well as of mental and spiritual independence". Then too "the realities of life" must be faced—the sense of beauty, truth and duty; human responsibility, the capacity for growth, sin, love, death and immortality. "The sources of life" will be found "in the life and spirit of Jesus". "The enemies of life" are shown to consist largely in such "opposing personalities" as appeared to confront "the work of Jesus". The very "essence of life" is doing the will of God.

While, in the six chapters thus summarized, there is much to interest, and even to inspire to higher living, one misses the characteristic notes of supernatural Christianity. A chief place is given among human leaders to "the personality of Jesus", but it is not suggested that he differs in essence from them, nor yet that our relation to Him must differ vitally from that which we sustain to other men. There is no clear, courageous, convincing presentation of the divine, omnipotent indwelling Christ, "who is our life". While the brief discussion moves

in the realm of familiar moral and religious truth and is marked by sanity and earnestness, it hardly attains the level which might be assumed by one who accepts the New Testament revelation and the sublime realities of the Christian faith.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Sunday-School at Work.* Edited by the REV. JOHN T. FARIS, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 259. \$1.25.

The Presbyterian Board of Publication has rendered the Sunday-School world a very true service in issuing a series of brief manuals dealing with many distinct phases of Sunday-School work. The present volume gathers, in a more permanent form, a number of these manuals, but adds much new material which will be of interest and value to all who desire information as to approved and tested methods of Sunday-School work. The subjects and authors of the successive chapters will sufficiently indicate their scope and worth. These are as follows: "The Superintendent and His Associates", by Philip E. Howard, "The Secretary and His Assistants", by the Rev. A. H. McKinney, Ph.D., "The Treasurer and the Librarian", by Amos R. Wells, "The Sunday-School Graded", by the Rev. A. H. McKinney, Ph.D., "The Graded Lessons", by the Rev. E. Morris Fergusson, "The Adult Class", by W. C. Pearce, "The Teacher-Training Class", by the Rev. Franklin McElfresh, Ph.D., "The Home Department", by the Rev. E. Morris Fergusson, "How to Increase Attendance", by the Rev. Jay S. Stowell, "Missionary Education in the Sunday-School", by Ralph E. Diffendorfer, "Bringing the Pupil to a Decision for Christ", by the Rev. George Gordon Mahy.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Westminster Superintendent's Service Book.* By E. MORRIS FERGUSSON. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 71. 35 cents.

This little hand-book aims to help the Sunday-School Superintendent in his preparation for the conduct of the regular sessions of the school. It suggests the various causes and agencies of Christian work which should be specially emphasized, and the hymns and scripture lessons which may be appropriate for these, and also for the various special days of the Sunday-School year.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Ten Don'ts for Sunday-School Teachers.* By AMOS R. WELLS. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 24mo; pp. 74. 25 cents.

An experienced Sunday-School worker here gives wise precautions relative to the spirit and temper which must characterize the successful teacher.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.



*Silver Chimes in Syria.* By the REV. WILLIAM S. NELSON, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 174. 75 cents.

These "Glimpses of a Missionary's Experience", by the author of "Habeeb the Beloved", afford an interesting and vivid insight into the actual life and work and surroundings of the Christian evangelist in Syria. The sketches are autobiographical, and cannot fail to deepen sympathy with the missionaries and their work.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Character and Religion.* By the REV. THE HON. EDWARD LYTTLETON, M.A., B.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 237. \$1.50 net.

The Headmaster of Eton College has presented in this volume a discussion indicative of broad culture, serious thought, and strong conviction. The main contention concerns the popular problem of the true basis for character, and affirms that it is not to be found in mere morality or a sense of duty but in a "strong clear belief in Christ as God, and in His redeeming work". In the consideration of character, all its component elements are not passed in review, but the attention is centered upon "humility", as a typical virtue, and this is regarded, furthermore, as a convenient title for a group of such qualities "as self-forgetfulness, lack of self-assertiveness, humble estimate of self". It is suggested that hopefulness, perseverance or charity might equally be used as illustrative of the principle under discussion. The treatise is intended to be a contribution to the question how far we are justified in believing that character can be trained on moral principles alone. The writer sets forth his belief that "all that is noble and satisfying and fruitful in human life is not only God's gift, but lives and grows in proportion as a man recognizes that it is His gift".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The God We Trust.* By THE REV. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS, Professor of Homiletics, Union Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 203. \$1.25 net.

These studies in the devotional use of the Apostles' Creed comprised the Cole Lectures for 1913 delivered before Vanderbilt University. They are characterized by a charming literary style, clearness of statement, and independence of thought. It is not improbable that many readers will have found in some of the articles of the Creed meanings other than those here advanced; yet none can fail to realize anew the deep significance of its unique content, or to be aided in its use as an instrument of devotion. The last was in fact the real purpose of the lecturer. His design was not academic, but practical, to meet a need for more "order and system in our religious belief", and still more definitely, not to find in the creed a statement of dogmatic opinions but an expression of self-entrustment to God. The lecturer contended that the Creed can be used devotionally even by those who cannot accept all its articles in the sense in which they were



originally intended. Whether such a use is morally justifiable it was the purpose of the lecturer to show. He defends his belief that such a devotional use of the Creed is both possible and desirable.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Book of God's Providence.* By JOHN T. FARIS, D.D., Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. New York: George H. Doran Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 278. \$1.00 net.

It is very evident that to the mind of the author the Book of God's Providence is none other than the book of life, and that too of every life, however obscure. In more than sixty brief chapters incidents are related, drawn in most instances from the usual walks of daily experience but showing how the most commonplace events are dignified by the belief that they are under the control of a divine hand, and form important parts in a plan of infinite love and grace. The very simplicity of the narratives emphasizes the wisdom of a child-like trust in the unfailing care and providence of God.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Crumbs.* By C. M. ZORN. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 436. \$1.00, postpaid.

This is a book of short devotions for every day of the year. It has been rewritten in English from the German original which was published under the similar title of *Brosamlein*. The "devotions" follow the calendar of the church year; each one consists of a meditation upon a selected portion of Scripture followed by a brief prayer; they are divided into three main parts, the first "The Festival Season", the second "Catechism Lessons", the third "The Christian's Life and Death". They reflect the distinctive views of the church and the sacraments which are held by the branch of the Lutheran Church for the use of which they are specially intended, but would be found helpful as an aid to devotion by Christians of any denomination.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Telepathy of the Celestial World.* By HORACE C. STANTON, D.D., S.T.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 473. \$1.50 net.

As stated on the title-page of this volume the purpose of the author is to show that "Psychic phenomena here are but foreshadowings of our transcendent faculties hereafter" and to prove by "evidences from psychology and Scripture that the celestials can instantaneously and freely communicate across distance infinitely great".

The reality of mental telepathy, the writer assumes as unquestionable, and attempts to substantiate his belief by a marvellous series of stories taken largely from the reports of the Society for Psychical Research. He accepts the truth of the sacred Scriptures, and as a devout believer

in evangelical Christianity, he seeks to illuminate the inspired revelation by the facts of science, and to enlarge the horizon of the Christian hope. In brief he aims to show "what Science and Scripture indicate about our transcendent psychical powers, privileges and possibilities in the future state".

To the author, telepathy includes the transmission of ideas, and feelings and motor impulses, not only between living human beings far separated in space, but between the Persons of the Godhead, between disembodied spirits, between God and men, between the living and dead. Such telepathic communication and the associated power of clairvoyance are supposed to explain many recorded mysteries of Scripture, even the appearance of Moses on the Mount of Transfiguration, and the visions of Christ by Stephen and by Saul. They are taken as assurances that in the future state our powers of telepathic intercourse will be illimitable even when far separated as we "range through all the iris-coloured systems astronomy reveals".

All this is intensely interesting if true; but many if not most modern psychologists deny the fundamental assumption of the book, and declare that the transference of thought without physical media is still unproven; and, even granting that such communication is possible between mortals in this present state, modern science is still less inclined to believe in communications from disembodied spirits, notwithstanding all that has been said by the authorities to which the writer refers. Least of all does Scripture seem to warrant any explicit affirmations as to the present activities of the blessed dead or as to their means of communication when clothed upon by their spiritual and immortal bodies. It may, however, be of help and inspiration to some inquiring minds to be assured that the unquestioned expansion of psychic powers will lie in part along the line which the word telepathy now suggests.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*"The Greatest of These".* By ROBERT D. LAWTON, Professor of English in Lander College, Greenwood, South Carolina. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 90. \$1.00 net.

These essays reveal a high moral purpose, lofty ideals, and confident Christian faith. Their extreme brevity is suggested by the sub-title of the volume, "A Book of Five to Twenty Minute Essays". The thoughts move largely in the sphere of the familiar and obvious, but are stated tersely and with a certain poetic charm.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Teaching of the Lesson.* By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. New York: George H. Doran Company. Cloth. 24mo; pp. 157. 25 cents.

This pocket commentary on the international Sunday-School Lessons, contains the full text for each week, followed by an explanation of



"the narrative" and a brief practical application of "the teaching". The comments are concise, clear, evangelical, spiritual, stimulating.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Supreme Need.* By FRANCIS B. DENIO, Professor in Bangor Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 238. \$1.25.

There is no doubt that "the supreme need" of the church is that of a fuller manifestation of the presence and power of the Holy Spirit nor can there be any question that the earnest purpose of the writer is to secure, on the part of Christians, obedience to the command, "Be ye filled with the Spirit", which is described as "a duty, and not a counsel of perfection". If, however, there is a failure in achieving this purpose it may possibly be due to the emphasis which is laid by the author upon the Spirit in his cosmic relations, of which the New Testament has nothing to say, and because so little is made of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the divine, risen, glorified Christ, which appears to be the very essence of the New Testament teaching. The vital defect of the volume seems to lie in a failure to realize the significance of the supreme word: "He shall glorify me." In this connection, whatever the meaning of the author, the implications are most unfortunate in such a sentence as the following: "It must be remembered that Jesus Christ Himself was an Old Testament saint. He taught the Fatherhood of God, but . . . it is the ministration of the Holy Spirit since the days of Jesus which has brought men to an adequate conception of these truths".

The general teaching of the book is, however, sane, rational, and calculated to enlist the interest of modern thinkers. The design of the writer was not so much to present the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as to apply the doctrine to the Christian life. The practical purpose is therefore evidenced both in the themes selected and in their treatment throughout the various chapters of the book. Among these themes may be mentioned: "The Necessity of the Spirit for Effective Service", "The Necessity of the Holy Spirit for Leading a Christian Life", "The Spirit as Guide to the Truth", "The Natural Powers and the Fruits of the Spirit", "Conditions of Receiving the Spirit in One's Life", "Besetting Perils". The volume closes with an extended Bibliography.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*A Man's Reach.* By CHARLES EDWARD LOCKE. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 278. \$1.00 net.

It is the familiar phrase of Browning's which furnishes the title for these studies: *A man's reach* should exceed his grasp, Or what's a heaven for? In the successive chapters the author sets before us some of those ideals towards which we must strive if we are to attain that which is worthy in life and character. Among the titles of these chapters are the following: "Ideals and what they cost";



"Heroism in every-day life"; "The cure of doubt"; "Self-Mastery"; "Sympathy"; "Reverence"; "Appreciation"; "The Gospel of Rest and Health". While the chapters are not connected the ideal of self-forgetful service runs like a motif in music through all these studies in which the writer defines character as "the fine art of giving up". The discussions are illuminated by quotations from a wide field of literature, and are characterized by a joyful optimism, a kindly sympathy, and a confident Christian faith.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Stewardship Among Baptists.* By ALBERT L. VAIL. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 140. 50 cents net, postage extra.

This is a strictly denominational discussion of the great theme of Christian stewardship; but it contains much that is of interest and value to every follower of Christ, whatever his church affiliation may be.

Of the three chapters which comprise the volume, the first is "Historical", and brings in review what American Baptists have believed and practiced in the matter of benevolences, both in their support of missions and education, and in their advocacy of various percentage plans.

The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of "Tithing", more particularly in relation to its alleged Scriptural basis; and the author shows that while "giving" should be systematic, and on the basis of some flexible percentage, it is impossible to prove that the tithe is obligatory upon the Christian.

The most valuable section of the book for readers of all denominations is its last chapter in which are formulated the "New Testament Principles" of Christian Stewardship. These are first defined, then applied critically, and lastly applied constructively. They include (1) Totality: the Christian belongs to the Lord, and all that he has. (2) Personality: the man is more important than his money, and cannot substitute a gift for personal service. (3) Respectability. Personal equipment for the Lord's service is necessary and to be made in accordance with proper human standards. (4) Prosperity. Giving must not be inspired by the hope of financial reward, yet must be proportionate to financial ability. (5) System. This is the part of wisdom, although the supposed New Testament references are open to question. (6) Simplicity. All ostentation must be avoided. (7) Spontaneity. "God loves a cheerful giver". (8) Symmetry, or the spiritual growth of the giver. (9) Equality. All financial burdens should be equalized among associated Christian stewards.

As one reads the discussions of these principles, it becomes more and more evident that the New Testament contains a wide range of practical instructions relative to this problem which is of such vital importance to every follower of Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Teaching of Christ.* By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D., author of "The Crises of the Christ", "The Analyzed Bible", etc. Fleming H. Revell Company. 1913. 8vo; pp. vi, 333. \$1.50 net.

In this companion volume to *The Crises of the Christ*, Dr. Morgan sets forth the teaching of our Lord by grouping the material under three main heads: Personalities (God, Himself, the Spirit, Angels, Satan and Demons, Man); Sin and Salvation (Sin, Salvation, His Saving Mission, Human Responsibility, Sanctity); The Kingdom of God (The Fundamental Conception, Different Phases of the One Fact, The Existing Anarchy, The Redemptive Processes, The Crisis, An Individual Application). The treatment of the subject is well-proportioned and fairly comprehensive, and, like all the author's expository work, is marked by keen insight into the deeper meanings of familiar texts, by fresh, often strikingly original methods of handling related passages, and by an engaging simplicity and directness of style. The book will no doubt commend itself to many pastors and Bible students as a helpful guide for the systematic study of the teaching of Christ.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*The Church, the People, and the Age.* Edited by ROBERT SCOTT and GEORGE WILLIAM GILMORE, Editors of *The Homiletic Review*. Analysis and Summary by CLARENCE AUGUSTINE BECKWITH, Professor of Systematic Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1914. 8vo; pp. xxi, 571. \$3.00 net.

Convinced that "there appeared to be a widespread indifference to the claims of the Church", and that "there were many who might easily be numbered as having the interests of the Kingdom of God at heart yet were not enrolled members of the organized Church", Editors of *The Homiletic Review* addressed a letter of inquiry to "leaders of thought in Europe and America to ascertain their views concerning the indifference of a considerable number to the organized Church and also as to the basis and direction for a fundamental theology of the Church for the age in which we live". The questioners evidently supposed that "the great majority of people" are asked, when they would unite themselves to some church, "to subscribe to statements that deal with debated and controversial questions". The contributors were therefore invited to express themselves with special reference to Abraham Lincoln's dictum on this subject: "I have never united myself to any church because I have found difficulty in giving assent without mental reservation to the long complicated statements of Christian doctrine which characterize their Articles of Belief and Confession of Faith. Whenever any church will inscribe over its altar, as its sole qualification for membership, the Savior's condensed statement of the substance of both Law and Gospel, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself', that Church I will join with all my heart and all my soul".



Responses were received from some one hundred and five men of light and leading in the fields of religion, theology, science, philosophy and literature. The Editors have arranged these contributions in three groups. "Occasionally", as we can readily believe, they came across "a manuscript that was difficult to classify." For alike in form and in content the answers present a baffling array of divergencies. According to their own interpretation of their letter, the Editors submitted a double question. Many of their correspondents, however, took up only one half of the problem; some found three, others even four, chief inquiries, while a considerable number said their say without regard to the specific form of the circular.

Some of the articles contain suggested formulas, either for credal purposes or for admission to church membership. These statements are gathered together on pages 547 to 552. They are preceded (pp. 531-546) by a series of "Established Forms for Reception of Members", which is fairly representative of the methods in use in our various Protestant Churches. To show the "importance that the theologians of an era now gone put upon formulated statements", the "Oecumenical Creeds" are set forth and likewise some of the salient data concerning the post-Reformation symbols (511-530).

We have sampled various specimens in the three groups of contributions. One thing is clear: there are about as many diagnoses of the patient's condition as there are specialists called in for consultation in regard to his confessedly desperate plight. The differences of opinion have made it quite impossible for Dr. Beckwith to do justice to them all in his twenty-five page "Analysis and Summary". As was to be expected, Lincoln's famous declaration is anything but a unifying principle for our Protestant Churches. The statements in regard to it vary all the way from unqualified approval to total rejection. It goes without saying that all who are interested in the problems of the Church of to-day will find something to their taste in these pages, while probably no one article states the points at issue in a way to satisfy all readers.

An attractive feature of the volume are the ninety portraits in nine full-page groups.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*What must the Church do to be Saved?* By P. MARION SIMMS.  
Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo, cloth. \$1.50 net.

This may be called an impassioned plea for church unity; somewhat too impassioned to be persuasive. The headings of the chapters give some idea of the point of view and method of discussion:

I. The Unchristian Divisions

II. The Appalling Situation of the Country Church

III. The Absurdity of Creed Subscription

IV. The Abuse of Ecclesiastical Authority

These are fair samples. Under these general heads are many subdivisions equally pessimistic and censorious; for example, Present Divi-



sions Indefensible, The Utter Failure of Denominationalism, The Impracticability of Discipline in Matters of Morals, Some Evils of Heresy Trials, The Want of Liberty of Expression. These themes are discussed in the same spirit as their titles indicate. The author fairly runs amuck and strikes hard blows at pretty much everything in sight, from creed subscription to the Sunday School. The course of study required in theological seminaries is particularly unsatisfactory to him. All this is to be reformed and perfected by the organic union of all Protestant churches.

We fail to see just how church union is going to effect any of these reforms, and should be very sorry if some of them were effected. We are glad that we cannot assent to the picture he draws as a correct likeness of the church. But we cordially assent to his main proposition that the union of Protestantism is a consummation devoutly to be wished. It would be worth a great deal, but still it is possible to purchase even a very good thing at too high a price.

Easton, Pa.

S. A. MARTIN.

*The Life Efficient.* By GEORGE A. MILLER. Methodist Book Concern. 12mo, pp. 250, cloth. \$1.00 net.

A volume of pleasant essays on religious themes.

Easton, Pa.

S. A. MARTIN.

*Plain Thoughts on Faith and Life.* By WELLESLEY P. CODDINGTON. Methodist Book Concern, 12mo, cloth. \$1.00 net.

This is one of that useful class of books that refresh and quicken our zeal and hope. It is a collection of good, bright, helpful thought on practical religion. It is cheerful and cheering, a book to be commended to the members of your church—especially to thoughtful young people.

Easton, Pa.

S. A. MARTIN.

*Sermons of a New Englander.* By REV. OSCAR BISSELL. Privately printed.

This little volume contains five sermons of sturdy Evangelical Christianity forcefully preached. It is the fitting memorial of a devoted and efficient ministry. Edited and published by Mr. William Bissell.

Easton, Pa.

S. A. MARTIN.

*A Onesided Biography, Containing the Story of My Intellectual Life.* By OSCAR KUENS. Methodist Book Concern. 12mo, cloth, pp. 236. \$1.00 net.

This is a pleasant volume of reminiscences of a scholar. It is composed chiefly of his judgments on books and reading, based on the influence they exerted on his life and thought. The chapter on Poetry and Poets is particularly good.

Easton, Pa.

S. A. MARTIN.

*Bonheur et Mariage. Troisième édition revue.* Par FRANK THOMAS, Genève. J. H. Jeheber, Libraire-Editeur, 28, rue de Marché. Pp. 110. Fr. 1.50.

*La Souffrance.* ditto. Pp. 101. Fr. 1.50.

These two little books, attractively written and beautifully printed, contain much wholesome instruction. The first treats of two topics: "Happiness in the Family" and "Marriage". While the author has, primarily, French social manners and customs in view (as for instance, that the marriage is "arranged" not by the contracting pair themselves) the American reader cannot fail to be interested and instructed by the arguments for improvement offered and the conclusions reached. The second asks two questions, "Does suffering come from God?" and "If not, then whence does it come?" and concludes with the exposition of "The victory over and by means of suffering". The closing words are worth quoting, "L'exemple de Jésus amené à la perfection par les choses qu'il a souffertes est de nature à nous calmer dans la souffrance, puis à nous conduire à l'abdication de notre être devant Dieu, pour que nous devenions vainqueurs par lui, puis parfaits comme lui".

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*The Standard of Pitch in Religion.* By THOMAS A. SMOOT. New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls. June 1914. \$1.00 net.

Mr. Smoot has not been able to carry the reader through with a zest, not that the material is not good in the main, not that the subject is not a splendid one, but in the hands of our author it does not have sufficient momentum because the matter does not crystalize about the subject. The subject is taken from the mechanics of music and adopted for the purpose of organizing morality and religion. Jesus is accepted as "the norm of human life, the fundamental tone for all moral conduct, the standard of pitch for all time and for all men, as pertains to morality and religion" (11). The point of greatest defect is found not in the method nor in the material so much as in inability in keen analysis. Our author takes Jesus as "the standard of pitch of all activities among men" but fails to strike the key note of the standard of Jesus and so never gets quite out into the clear. The real philosophy of life as presented in the book (see the last chapter) is self-realization which means self-ruination when pursued as an end. Here is where a bit of insight into the life and teaching of Jesus would have helped tremendously.

The assumption upon which the book proceeds is that life—even the life of the universe—is a great harmony wherein are myriads of temperaments or voices (see publisher's note). These are to be attuned so there shall be no discords. It is a case of gathering up the stray tones and retuning. As to the method the basal assumption seems to be that every one has a genius for one particular thing. In this there is much truth though put too strongly. The inference that there is no special fitness nor adaptability for any other particular thing has recently been disproved by a series of experiments in a western

university. Aside from the defects indicated there are those common to an overworked illustration for this is what the book is. For instance, taking one of the author's illustrations, let us ask how shall we establish orphans' homes enough that all the unlikely women, who might find their "fundamental" in kissing away orphans' tears, may find orphans' homes in which to organize and develop their lives? Our author seems to realize, in part at least, that ministry is the method, but he seems to have missed the value of motive—to have failed to distinguish between morality and religion. In page 20 when the phrase "whosoever loseth his life for my sake" is quoted it is interpreted to mean "for the sake of the Great Mind of the universe". Thus when there was a fine chance to get on the right track as far as motive is concerned, we discover that our author has not only missed the standard of Jesus but that something of the person of Jesus has escaped him, and before we reach the end of the chapter we see that his religious psychology is inverted. An intellectual activity is indicated which is suggestive of the frantic gyrations of Mrs. Jane Lane's Maria in "According to Maria". We cannot see that "all thought is literally governed by the fundamental note, religion" (22), which makes religion coextensive with mental action. To think in terms of Being (Christ) (21) may make the Christian mighty, but it is not quite clear that it "caused him to become re-born" (21). Here we see as on so many pages a lack of distinction between fine Christian ideals, processes and possibilities, and the initial religious experience. In the chapter "As a Man Thinketh", wherein it is sought to define the author's type of idealism, though he confesses himself a dualist, we read (68) "He is what he thinketh, for there is really no more to him", and a bit farther on instead of accepting Descartes' "thinking" as an evidence of being thinking is regarded as causal. The "fusion" of the spirit of man with the spirit of God (158) is confusing.

There is much fine material in the book and the purpose of the author throughout is commendable; the chapter subjects are well chosen marking a steady development and the work in some of the chapters is splendid. Though the book is greatly over wrought, due to undue expansion of the real message, it is full of meditative and sermonic suggestiveness. The reviewer wishes the writer had not worn the thought to a "frazzle" in so many places.

Princeton.

CHARLES MCKEE CANTRALL.

*The Christian Reconstruction of Modern Life.* By CHARLES HENRY DICKINSON. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. 316. \$1.50.

This is a disappointing book from whatever angle it may be viewed. It misinterprets history and maligns Christianity. The most extreme adverse criticism of the New Testament is accepted. The Biblical interpretations are often fanciful. A certain type of idealism is constant throughout the book. The treatment leaves nothing "Christian"



in Christianity and nothing of fixed value in history. The "Reconstructions" are not "Christian" and the activities of "Modern Life" whether professedly "Christian" or non-Christian are scarcely noticed.

Jesus is of consequence largely because "He discovered the individual soul" (p. 296). The fact of the life of Jesus, "His historic humanity" (p. 222), and the manner of His death are accepted as historic, but aside from these the intelligent layman, unless he has kept abreast of critical discussion, will find little else familiar. A few references dealing with Jesus and His work will suffice. As to His office work we read "The Jewish Messianic consciousness was forced upon Jesus" (272), but we are left without guidance in making the necessary inference that either He must have been duped or consciously have become an impostor. The necessity of the inference is ignored. As an object of faith Jesus is worthy only in the social aspect. "Faith in Jesus sinks to an empty sentiment, a hollow phrase, an extraneous and irrational condition of salvation, except when Jesus is received as the consummate power of social manhood" (p. 308). Mr. Dickinson's ultimate phrasing of the message of Jesus is "Jesus' personal-social Gospel" (p. 300). "Jesus is the social man and the central energy of the social redemption of the social God" (p. 291).

The real basis of our author's thinking about Jesus in our relation to Him is that of "Example". After attempting to eliminate some of the elements connoted by the word "example" he declares that any "earnest approach to Jesus ends by entering His vitalizing power". Then follows what may be regarded at once as his definition of the "Example" of Jesus and the process by which the energy of Jesus is transferred and transforms. "When my worship of a noble soul's example becomes aware that all he does and attains is his toil and strife; when into that interminable struggle of his I am taken; when the powers of his overcoming become mine, that I may overcome, and my life which I had fondly thought might externally resemble his, flows from his into forms like his, but power to transform that which I, in my different time and place, must subdue, then I begin to see how Jesus may be source and center of the supreme task for myself and for all men" (p. 220-221).

The purpose of the book is said to be "the spiritualizing of the social Gospel" and presumably it is written in "words not too hard" (preface). The reviewer feels there has been failure in both particulars. Surely the subject may be treated in more readable language. Lack of perspicuity mars nearly every page. Doctor Moulton of Chicago University gives a series of lectures dealing with the same material with which our author starts—Aryan culture and Semitic religious influence—which are illuminating and inspiring. This book suffers in contrast.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES MCKEE CANTRALL.

*The Inside of the Cup Examined.* By REV. CHARLES C. COOK. New York: Charles C. Cook, 150 Nassau St. Pamp., pp. 12.

This is a searching and severe but not unjust arraignment of a book which has been widely read and has done much harm. Its chief service is in pointing the difference between Christianity as Winston Churchill understands it and Christianity as the New Testament portrays it and the Holy Spirit produces it.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The President and the "Pan-American" Political Thanksgiving Mass.* By PROF. W. RUSSELL COLLINS, D.D. New York, N. Y.: Charles C. Cook, 150 Nassau St. Pamp., pp. 16.

The reviewer would be glad to see this pamphlet distributed throughout our land. Its criticism is both as informing and as just as it is severe, and it is high time that our whole people were aroused to the intrigues of Romanism against our free institutions.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

#### GENERAL LITERATURE

*The New Map of Europe (1911-1914).* The story of the recent European Diplomatic Crises and Wars, and of Europe's present Catastrophe. By HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, Ph.D., author of *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: The Century Company. 1914. Pp. xi, 412.

The title quite accurately sets forth the purpose and defines the scope of Dr. Gibbons' work. He passes in review the salient political and diplomatic activities, especially during the last few years, of the European Powers now engaged in war as Allies or Enemies; and he does this with a view to aiding his readers in their struggles to form intelligent opinions as to the war's causes, occasion and possible or probable results. These results give to the book the title, "A new map of Europe". What Dr. Gibbons has to say on this difficult and complex subject is distributed into twenty-one chapters with the following headings: 1. Germany in Alsace and Lorraine, 2. The *Weltpolitik* of Germany, 3. The *Bagdadbahn*, 4. Algeciras and Agadir, 5. The Passing of Persia, 6. The Partitioners and their Poles, 7. Italia Irredenta, 8. The Danube and the Dardanelles, 9. Austria-Hungary and her South Slavs, 10. Racial Rivalries in Macedonia, 11. The Young Turk régime in the Ottoman Empire, 12. Crete and European Diplomacy, 13. The War between Italy and Turkey, 14. The War between the Balkan States and Turkey, 15. The Rupture between the [Balkan] Allies, 16. The War between the Balkan Allies, 17. The Treaty of Bukarest, 18. The Albanian Fiasco, 19. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Servia, 20. Germany forces War upon Russia and France, 21. Great Britain enters the War.

This programme certainly betrays no lack in either ambition or



variety. But so far as I am capable of judging his work, Dr. Gibbons has carried through his programme with marked ability, large and special knowledge and candor, in a temper more nearly judicial than that exhibited by the most of us when discussing the war, has fused his separate and differing details into a real literary unity, and so has produced a most timely and informing, and, to the present writer, at least, exceptionally interesting volume. So far as the war's causes are the ambitions, intrigues, contracts, quarrels, and compromises issuing out of the interests whether common or conflicting of the great and the small European Powers in relation especially to the East of Europe and the West of Asia, this book is by far the most nearly satisfactory explanation and the most interesting story of the genesis of the war, I have read.

Princeton.

JOHN DEWITT.

*Initiation into Literature.* By EMILE FAGUET. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Readers of the author's interesting volume "Initiation Into Philosophy" will readily understand the primary purpose of the book before us, "to show the way" as the author states in his Preface "to the beginner . . . to excite his initial curiosity". Inasmuch, moreover, as the history of literature and the history of philosophy touch one another at many points, the study of the one, initial or progressive, involves in a true sense the study of the other.

Beginning with the literature of India, of Palestine, Greece and Rome, he passes on to that of the Middle Ages, as expressed in France, England, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Extending his survey through the sixteenth and succeeding centuries in these respective countries, he concludes his study with an examination of Slavonic Letters as illustrated in Russia and Poland. Evidently it is no part of the author's purpose to give his readers anything like an introspective and exhaustive presentation of literature, but rather so to sketch in rapid, historical outline, the salient features of the world's authorship as to awaken the student's interest and induce him to pursue the study on more intensive and critical lines. In this specific purpose he has succeeded and the volume finds its fitting place among what are now called, *Introductions to Literature*, after which the reader is left to himself to pass from a merely formal acquaintance with authors to a personal and intimate companionship.

In so far as English Literature is concerned, the author begins his survey in Old and Middle English days, and passes down by regular historical sequence to Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Swift, Byron, Macaulay and Carlyle on to the borders of the present era. The material especially prepared for the English edition enhances the value of the volume.

Though the English translation is well executed, students familiar with French will find it advisable to read it in the original.

The contents are so condensed and so clearly arranged that the book



might be used to advantage as a literary manual in our secondary schools, preparing the way for a more advanced study of literature as pursued in our colleges and universities.  
Princeton.

T. W. HUNT.

*The Question of Alcohol.* By EDWARD HUNTINGTON WILLIAMS, M.D., formerly Associate Professor of Pathology, State University of Iowa, and Assistant Physician in the New York State Hospital Service; Author of "The Walled City", "Increasing Your Mental Efficiency", etc., and Joint Author of "The Wonders of Science in Modern Life". New York: The Goodhue Company. 1914. 8vo, pp. viii, 121.

The papers presented in this book are the result of an investigation undertaken for the *Medical Record*. They cover the following subjects. "The Drug Habit Menace", "Temperance Instruction in Public Schools and its Results", "Liquor Legislation and Insanity", "The Liquor Question in Medicine", and "What shall we do about it?"

The aim of all these papers is to point out "the evils that have been accentuated by ill-advised temperance propaganda"; and the measures of reform suggested will, the reviewer believes, commend themselves to the large number of persons who do not make the mistake of confounding temperance with prohibition. We regret that the writer has fallen into the mistake of so many physicians of regarding drunkenness as a disease only. It is a disease, but it is a sinful disease; and while it should be treated as a disease, such treatment must involve dependence on the grace of God.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Series xxxii. No. 3. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science* under the Direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy, and Political Science. *Colonial Trade of Maryland 1689-1715.* By MARGARET SHOVE MORRISS, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History, Mount Holyoke College. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1914. Pamp.; pp. viii, 157.

This is an exhaustive and interesting presentation, fully up to the high standard of these series.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The People's Law.* By WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN. New York and London: Funk & Wagnall's Company. 1914. 8vo, pp. 64.

"The People's Law is an address that was delivered by invitation before the Constitutional Convention at Columbus, Ohio, on March 2, 1912." It is written in Mr. Bryan's well known clear and vigorous style. A stronger presentation of the "People's Law" can scarcely be conceived; and yet, after reading it carefully, the reviewer is constrained to ask, Is this representative government?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, October: RUDOLPH KNOPF, Paul and Hellenism; GERALD B. SMITH, The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History; EDWIN D. HARDEN, Nietzsche's Service to Christianity; DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, The New Christianity and World-Conversion (concluded); ERNEST D. BURTON, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh in Greek Writers from Epicurus to Arius Didymus.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oberlin, October: G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, Present Aspects of the Relations between Science and Revelation; CHARLES W. SUPER, Should a Teacher also be an Investigator?; A. A. BERLE, The Colorado Mine War; GEO. W. HAZELTON, The Book of Job—Who Wrote it?; FRANK FOX, Law and Gospel of Giving; HAROLD M. WIENER, Historical Criticism of Pentateuch; WILLIAM H. SPENCE and KARL F. GEISER, The Clergyman in Politics; ED. KOENIG, Modern Pentateuchal Criticism.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, October: ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, Nature Miracles and the Virgin Birth; C. E. GRIFFINHOOF, Benjamin Webb and St. Andrews, Wells Street; FREDERICK KENYON, Von Soden's edition of the New Testament; H. A. STRONG, Religion Juventutis; C. R. NORCOCK, St. Gaudentius of Brescia; H. D. OAKELEY, German Thought; The Real Conflict; H. H. HENSON, Christianity and the War; F. B. JEVONS, Magic and Religion; The Outbreak of War.

*Constructive Quarterly*, New York, December: FREDERICK VON HÜGEL, Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity Studied in Connection with Works of Prof. Ernst Troelstch; SHAILER MATHEWS, Generic Christianity; H. T. OBBINK, Personal Faith; FRIEDRICH LOOFS, Lutheranism and Mysticism; EDWARD A. PACE, Philosophy and Belief; D. M. KAY, Value of Old Testament to the Church; ADOLPH DEISSMANN, International and Interdenominational Research of the New Testament; BISHOP GUERRY, Progress a Permanent Element in Religion; EDWARD T. DEVINE, Social Work in America; H. SYMONDS, War and the Need of a Higher Nationalism; EUGÈNE TAVERNIER, Independent Teaching in France; BISHOP LAWRENCE, Religious Liberty and Religious Education; MONSIGNOR BONOMELLI, Late Bishop of Cremona's Last Letter to this Journal; BOYD CARPENTER, John Tauler.

*East & West*, London, October: E. W. G. MASTERMAN, The Anglican Bishopric in Jerusalem: its History and Possibilities; BISHOP GIBSON, The South African Church and the Church at Home: A. C. MOULE, Failure of Early Christian Missions to China; C. F. ANDREWS, Race within the Church; G. CURRIE MARTIN, Study of the History of Missions—Its Value and Method; J. ROSCOE, The Native Pastorate and Lay-agency in Uganda; J. HEYWOOD HORSBURGH, The Plain Man and Foreign Missions; C. W. FARQUHAR, Black and White in the Church.

*Expositor*, London, October: B. W. BACON, Will the Son of Man find Faith on the Earth?; B. D. EERDMANS, Pharisees and Sadducees; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology. 9 The Life Everlasting; JOHN A. HUTTON, Sense of Sin in Great Literature. 4 Re-

demption of our Solitude; J. A. S. WILSON, Jerusalem Visits of Jesus; ALEX. SOUTER, Freer MS. of the Gospels; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel. The Arrest, Trials and Crucifixion; JAMES MOFFATT, Literary Illustrations of Book of Ecclesiastes. *The Same*, November; JAMES STALKER, Religion of our Classics and the Classics of our Religion; B. W. BACON, The Christ-Party at Corinth; DOUGLAS S. SHARP, Resemblances between the Discourses of Epictetus and the New Testament; JOHN A. HUTTON, Sense of Sin in Great Literature. 5 Here and There; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel. The Resurrection—the Appendix; MAURICE JONES, Integrity of the Epistle to the Philippians; JAMES MOFFATT, Literary Illustrations of Philippians.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, October: J. G. JAMES, Theology of Paul and Teaching of Jesus; W. T. WHITLEY, Fulfilment of the Law; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical Archaeology; MARGARET D. GIBSON, Arabic Christian Literature; G. A. FRANK KNIGHT, Illustrations of Spiritual Truths from Gibbon's 'Decline and Fall.' *The Same*, November: R. H. CHARLES, Solution of Chief Difficulties in Revelation 20-22; MARGARET D. GIBSON, Arabic Christian Literature; A. D. MARTIN, Book of Job; JOHN R. LEGGE, Place of Prayer in the Christian Life; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical Archaeology.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, October: FRANCIS G. PEABODY, Mysticism and Modern Life; WARNER FITE, Motive of Individualism in Religion; ROBERT A. WOODS, Drunkenness; EDWARD S. DROWN, Growth of the Incarnation; WILLIAM LAWRENCE, Pensions for the Clergy; BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, Essence of Christianity and the Cross of Christ.

*Hindustan Review*, Allahabad, Oct.-Nov.; W. A. COURTNEY, Deeper Causes of the Great War; FREDERIC HARRISON's Prophecy about the European War; E. H. M. WALLER, Meeting of the East and West in First Century, A. D.; N. SUBRAMANIA Aiyer, Caste and the Coming Social Ideal; R. KRISHNA SWAMI, Literary Excellence and Political Well-being; S. SATYAMURTI, Our Outlook in Life; K. M. MUNSHI, Where the Spirits Meet; HIRA LAL CHAUDHRI, The Hindu Temples; RAKHAL RAJ DE, A Serious Problem; Indians and the War.

*International Journal of Ethics*, Concord, October: ROSCOE POUND, Feudal Principle in Modern Law; JOHN DEWEY, Nature and Reason in Law; H. O. MEREDITH, Class Distinctions; C. G. SHAW, Emerson the Nihilist; E. S. P. HAYNES, Divorce and Morality; Second Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy.

*Interpreter*, London, October: Our Prayers in War; S. C. CARPENTER, Tempore Belli; W. EMERY BARNES, Prayer in Time of War; CANON KENNETT, Satan; ALFRED E. GARVIE, The Fall and Original Sin; J. E. SYMES, Q. or Q's; A. G. JAYNE, Book of Esther; JAMES B. GRANT, Rabbi Jesus-Jesus Anarchist; J. E. H. THOMPSON, Did Jesus Speak Greek or Aramaic?; J. B. GARDINER, Beside the Still Waters; A. T. BURBRIDGE, Autobiographic Element in the Psalms.

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin, October: JAMES McCaffrey, Pontificate of Pius X; J. KELLEHER, Market Prices; HUGH POPE,



Jerome's Latin Text of Paul's Epistles; STEPHEN J. BROWN, The Realization of God.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, October: MAYER SULZBERGER, Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide; SAMUEL SCHULMAN, Chamberlain's 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century' and the Claims of Judaism; M. H. SEGAL, Studies in the Book of Samuel; J. N. EPSTEIN, Notes on Post-Talmudic-Aramaic Lexicography.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, October: E. VON DOBSCHUTZ, A Collection of Old Latin Bible Quotations—Somnium Neronis; MARTIN RULE, Queen of Sheba's 'Gelasian Sacramentary.' IV; C. H. TURNER, Notes on the *Apostolic Constitutions*. I The Compiler an Arian; F. C. BURKITT, Psalm of Habakkuk; F. H. COLSON, Triangular Numbers in the New Testament; J. W. HUNKIN, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs; R. L. POOLE, Monastic Star Time Table of the Eleventh Century.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, October: W. T. DAVISON, Dante as a Spiritual Teacher; JOHN MASSON, A May Morning in the Louvre; SAINT NIHAL SINGH, The Panama Canal: Its Importance and Possibilities; ALFRED E. GARVIE, Evangelical Presentation of Christianity; SAIDÉE KIRTLAN, Irish Poets and Poetry; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, The Christian Ministry; T. H. S. ESCOTT, The Home and the School; JOHN TELFORD, A Fine English Gentleman.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, October: H. OFFERMAN, Von Soden's Text of the New Testament; H. E. JACOBS, Constructive Principle of Theology; J. W. EARLY, Autobiography of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg; PAUL Z. STRODACH, Meditation for Pastor's Week, 1914; G. H. TRABERT, The Great Reformation: Its Historical Significance; ALBERT T. W. STEINHAEUSER, Luther's Correspondence; WALTER KRUMWIEDE, Martin Luther and his Doctrine of Predestination; THEODORE E. SCHMAUK, Ineffective Lutheranism; PAUL H. HEISY, Philosophy of Rudolph Eucken; P. M. MAGNUSSON, Place of the Denominational College in Our Educational System.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, October: W. H. WYNN, Bergson, Sage of the Age; A. W. HILDEBRANDT, The Luther Family at Breklum; LUTHER DE YOE, Harvey W. McKnight; FELICIAN FRITZLER, Evangelical Congregations of the Russian Empire; U. A. HANKEY, Third Gospel in Lent; CHARLES W. SUPER, The Jew in History; PAUL H. HEISEY, The Lutheran Church and the Rural Problem.

*Methodist Review*, New York, November-December: A. C. ARMSTRONG, Philosophy of Bergson; S. G. AYRES, Sarah F. Adams—one of the Early Friends of Browning; A. J. LOCKHART, Phases of Robert Burns; WALTER H. SMITH, Manhood Winning an Apocalypse; H. E. WARK, Influence of Foreign Missions on Theology, or the New Catholicity; E. W. BOWEN, Walter Baghot, A Literary Banker; A. E. DAY, Björnstjerne Björnson; A. W. CRAWFORD, Andrea del Sarto and His Wife; MARY B. HOUSEL, The Magic Melody.

*Methodist Review Quarterly*, Nashville, October: P. T. FORSYTH, Regeneration, Creation, and Miracle; T. H. LEWIS, Methodist Union:

Why not and Why; HENRY W. CLARK, The Strength and Weakness of Eucken's Philosophy; WATSON B. DUNCAN, Church Union the Hope of Christianity; JAMES C. BAKER, The Church and the State University; LYNN H. HOUGH, The Quest for Wonder; J. C. GRANBERY, Primacy of Life; W. Y. BELL, Mohammed and Mohammedanism; OWEN R. LOVEJOY, Child Labor and the Church; ARCH C. CREE, The New Day in the Rural Life of the South; JAMES A. BURROW, "A Question of Orders"; CHARLES ZUEBLIN, Women with "No Occupation."

*Monist*, Chicago, October: RICHARD GARBE, Buddhist Influence of the Gospels; ARTHUR S. WHITE, Unity of World-Conception; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Principles of Mechanics with Newton from 1679 to 1687; DAISETZ T. SUZUKI, Development of Mahayana Buddhism; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Definitions and Methodological Principles in Theory of Knowledge; HUGO DE VRIES, Probable Origin of *Oenothera lamarckiana* Ser.; WILLIAM B. SMITH, Latest Lights and Shadows on the Jesus-Question.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, October: A. LANG, Present State of Theological Thought in Germany; A. LANG, Calvinism in Present-Day Germany; A. LANG, Discourse at the Three Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Heidelberg Catechism at Lancaster, May 13, 1914; A. LANG, Religious and Theological Character of the Heidelberg Catechism; W. HADORN, Influence of the Heidelberg Catechism on the Religious and Church Life and Piety of the People of Bern; JAMES I. GOOD, "What Mean Ye by These Stones?"; C. E. CREITZ, The Pastor and the Catechumen; A. S. ZERBE, Is Reconstruction of Christian (Reformed Church) Doctrine, a Present Possibility?; GEORGE W. RICHARDS, Necessity of Theological Reconstruction.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, October: J. E. WALTER, Morality and Religion; G. KITTEL, Influence of Christian Water-Baptism according to the New Testament; W. W. EVERTS, Rise and Spread of Socinianism; E. Y. MULLINS, Practical Value of Poetry; W. W. EVERTS, Men and Books; C. S. GARDINER, Psychology of Belief.

*Union Seminary Magazine*, Richmond, October: R. C. REED, The General Assembly; ANDREW W. BLACKWOOD, Social Message of Micah; PARKE P. FLOURNOY, Present Trend of Old Testament Criticism; H. B. SEARIGHT, The Old is Better; CHARLES W. SOMMERVILLE, John Reuchlin and the Reciprocal Influence of Hebrew Study on the Reformation; HOMER McMILLAN, Home Missions and Immigration.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, October: ROBERT BROWNING, Two Unpublished Poems; BLISS PERRY, The American Reviewer; WILLIAM H. TAFT, Power of the President; JOHN BURROUGHS, Life as the Scientist Sees It; GEORGE MCANENY, Municipal Citizenship; HUGH WALKER, Enigma of Genius; CHARLTON M. LEWIS, Francis Thompson; HENRY S. CANBY, Teaching English; ELIOTT P. FROST, Habit Formation and Reformation; EDWIN PEARS, The Future of Turkey.

*Bilychnis*, Roma, Novembre. T. NEAL, Maine De Biran; GIOVANNI COSTA, Mitra e Diocleziano; UGO JANNI, Le varie dottrine circa l'Essenza della Religiosità; ROLAND G. SAWYER, La sociologia di Gesù;

L. RAGAZ, Cristianesimo e patria; J. DEJARNAC, Per la lettura dei Salmi; per l'Unione delle Chiese cristiane. Schiarimento; P. GRIGNONI, Replica.

*Lo Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid, Noviembre-Diciembre: FRANCISCO MARIN-SOLÁ, La homogeneidad de la doctrina católica; NORBERTO DEL PRADO, Escota y Santo Tomás; E. COLUNGA, Intelectualistas y místicos en la Teología española del siglo XVI; J. G. ARINTERO, Cuestiones místicas.

*Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Heusden, November: A. G. HONIG, Schleiermacher's worseling voor de Nationale herleving van Pruisen; D. J. VAN KATWIJK, Exegetica; F. W. GROSHUDE, Het tekst-kritisch systeem van H. von Soden, III.

*Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses*, Montauban; Juillet-Septembre; J. ALFRED PORRET, Le Christ, d'après Jésus; CH. BRUSTON, Sagesse, Justice et Sanctification et Redemption (?); HENRI BOIS, La Sociologie et l'Obligation; CH. BRUSTON, Fantaisies exégétiques et critiques.

*zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, Innsbruck, XXXVIII, 4: MICHAEL HOFMANN, Papst Pius X; ANDREAS EBERHARTER, Die neueren Hypothesen über die hebräischen Patriarchen Abraham, Isaak u. Jakob; KARL SIX, Die Gottesbeweise Descartes' in der Kritik seiner Zeitgenossen; AUGUSTUS ARNDT, Die Sekten der russischen Kirche, II.



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## THE CONTINUITY OF THE KYRIOS-TITLE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

In one sense or another the title Kyrios is applied to Christ throughout the New Testament. It occurs in all the documents with the exception of the Epistle to Titus.<sup>1</sup> And this literary phenomenon means to be expressive of a true historical continuity. It claims to exist not merely in the minds of the various writers, but to reflect the actual usage of the successive periods of our Lord's life and of New Testament history. It has been commonly assumed that this claim is in accord with the facts, that from the beginning onward and uninterruptedly ever after Jesus called Himself or was called Kyrios. Besides this it has also been commonly believed that the continuity observable was more than a mere chronological one. The usage in the days of our Lord's flesh was taken to have prepared the way for the usage in the mother-church after the resurrection, and this again to have given rise to the Pauline usage. An unbroken line of development according to the generally accepted view connects the earliest with the latest use made of the title within the New Testament period.

Bousset in his recent book entitled *Kyrios Christos* calls this continuity in question.<sup>2</sup> Though not the first one to take this view,<sup>3</sup> Bousset for the first time has made the

<sup>1</sup> Its absence here seems to be due to the pointed preference for Soter as a title of Christ, i. 4; ii. 13; iii. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the notice of Bousset's book in this *Review*, 1914 (xii), pp. 636-645.

<sup>3</sup> Predecessors of Bousset in this assumption were Heitmüller, *Zum Problem Paulus und Jesus* in ZNTW, 1912 (xiii), pp. 320-327, and Böhlig, *Zum Begriff Kyrios bei Paulus* in ZNTW, 1913 (xiv), pp. 23-37; cp. also the review of Bousset's work by Brückner in *Theol. Rundschau*, 1914 (xvii), pp. 169-182.



attempt to carry it through consistently as the basis for a broad construction of the origin and development of New Testament Christology and the early Christian faith in general. According to him the title is pre-Pauline. But it did not originate in the Palestinian mother-church, much less during the historical life of Jesus. It is one of the products of that intermediate Hellenistic stage of development, which he and others would insert between the earliest Palestinian Christianity and Paul, and which is believed to have had its center at Antioch. From this development Paul derived several important elements in his teaching, which formerly were considered either specifically Pauline or primitively Palestinian in their origin.

Paul after his conversion simply accepted the type of Christianity that had grown up in this Hellenistic *milieu*. The Hellenistic element in his teaching is to a far smaller extent than was once believed the result of the Apostle's own Hellenizing tendency. Much of it was taken over from the circle of Christians with whom he first associated. Chief among the elements thus adopted was the Kyrios-title. The early Syrian Christians came to give this title to Jesus because in the pagan cults of Syria with which they were familiar the deity or cult-heros was so designated, as was also the custom in Asia Minor and Egypt. It was in analogy with this that the Christians in that region spoke of Jesus, their cult-heros, as "the Lord". He was to them what the Dea Syria, Atargatis and other divinities or semi-divinities were to their worshippers. The elevation of Jesus to this rank did not, however, take place as a conscious deliberate act, but as a result of unconscious assimilation to a paganistic custom on the part of the church. Paul found it existing, made it his own and further developed it in harmony with his own peculiar (pneumatic) Christology.

This hypothesis carries with it certain important assumptions as to the occurrence of Kyrios in the Gospels and in the earlier chapters of Acts. With regard to Acts Bousset's

Position is comparatively simple and plain. It is one of unhesitating denial of the historicity of the accounts in question. When Luke makes the early Palestinian Christians speak of Jesus as Kyrios or address Him as Kyrios, this is nothing else but an anachronism, a dating back into the first days of the Church of what later originated at Antioch. In fact in an article published subsequently to the appearance of *Kyrios Christos* Bousset endeavors to show that Kyrios occurs in Acts in such contexts as are non-Palestinian in origin, or in Palestinian contexts only where the author has worked over the material and through his redaction introduced it.<sup>4</sup> He even thinks that on this principle the absence or presence of Kyrios in a piece can be used as a secondary, confirmatory test for the conclusions of the source-criticism of Acts.

In this Bousset treats the sources of Acts not as giving information relative to the time with which they deal, but as reflecting conditions and usages in existence at the time when they (the sources) were produced. The straightforward principle of hearing a document as a historical witness for the facts it professes to report, entirely gives way to the indirect procedure of making a document betray information involuntarily and as it were unconsciously. Bousset applies the same method to the Gospels. He examines and cross-examines them not to ascertain what took place during the life of Jesus on earth, but in order to elicit what were the practice and belief of the church at the time when the shaping or production of the Gospel-tradition was going on. As Acts becomes a source of knowledge not for the early-Palestinian period, but for the later Hellenistic days, so the Gospels become a mine of information not for the Gospel-history, but for the early-Palestinian development. Believing that the older portions of the Gospel-material in Mark (Ur-Markus) and the Logia are of early-Palestinian

<sup>4</sup> *Der Gebrauch des Kyriostitels als Kriterium für die Quellenscheidung in der ersten Hälfte der Apostelgeschichte*, ZNTW, 1914 (xv), pp. 141-163.



provenience, he proceeds to point out that in them the title Kyrios for Jesus does not occur. Thus in Mark there is only one instance of Kyrie in the vocative and only one case of Kyrios objectively used. In the Logia the address Kyrie occurs only once, and the objective Kyrios nowhere. These three isolated cases of occurrence afford no actual instance against the hypothesis, because in Bousset's opinion they can be accounted for on special grounds, apart from any prevailing usage of Kyrios as a title for Jesus. To this argument from the practical absence of the title in the older tradition is added next the argument from its increasing intrusion into what are believed to be elements in the Gospels of later origin. Matthew, to be sure, has the objective Kyrios only once, but he introduces the vocative Kyrie quite a number of times. In Luke both Kyrie and Kyrios stream in quite freely, and therefore with Luke the period of the later usage must be supposed to begin. The history of the tradition, therefore, shows that the mother-church in Palestine did not at first call Jesus Kyrios. But on the same principle that this oldest material can be made to disclose what the first disciples did *not* call Jesus, it can be also positively made to disclose what they *did* call Him. Although Bousset believes that in our present Gospels the title Son-of-Man was subsequently introduced in numerous places, where originally the tradition did not contain it, nevertheless he believes that in a number of passages it is old enough and of sufficiently secure position to afford a reliable index of its prevalence as a name for Jesus when the earliest tradition circulated. This then, Son-of-Man, and not Kyrios, was what the mother-church called Jesus. Here again, it will be observed, the Gospel record is not used as a source of knowledge for the actual life of Jesus, but only as a source of information concerning the belief of the primitive Palestinian Christians. In regard to the question whether Jesus actually employed Son-of-Man as a self-designation Bousset is quite non-committal in harmony with his general sceptical attitude regarding the facts



of the life of Jesus, although he is not prepared to call in doubt the historicity of Jesus as such.

Besides the argument derived from the increasing frequency of the title in the growth of the Gospel tradition, Bousset adduces a linguistic argument in support of his view that Jesus during His lifetime was not addressed as Kyrios. It has been suggested that the Aramaeic word *Mar*, "Lord", was used as an honorific title of Rabbis, and that as a synonym of *Rab* it may have been applied to Jesus, which would furnish a substantial foundation for the Kyrios of the Greek Gospels in distinction from the other titles there found. Particularly Jno. xiii. 13 has been quoted in favor of this, inasmuch as here κύριος and διδάσκαλος seem to be used as synonyms. Bousset denies that such a usage ever existed. If it had been known to Jesus or the tradition, then in Matt. xxiii. 8 ff., where the possible honorific titles addressed by disciples to teachers are enumerated, *Mar* ought to have been given as distinct from *Rab* and "father". Also the absolute Kyrie, Kyrios, without suffix, in the Gospel-literature creates difficulty to this view. The Aramaeic *Mar* could never have been used without a suffix. If Jesus had been addressed or designated by means of it, the form would have been *Mari* or *Maran* "my Lord" or "our Lord", not "Lord" or "the Lord" absolutely. As to Jno. xiii. 13 ff., Bousset takes issue with the interpretation of κύριος and διδάσκαλος as synonyms. The passage according to him implies that the two titles have different import, and he seeks to prove this from its dependence on Matt. x. 24 where the correlate of διδάσκαλος is given as μαθητής, that of κύριος as δούλος.<sup>5</sup>

It is evidently not Bousset's opinion that Kyrie and Kyrios in the Gospels are wherever they occur pure additions by the tradition or the Evangelists. His real view, although not stated in so many words, seems to be, that Kyrie and Kyrios are later unwarranted renderings of an original *Rab*, *Rabbi*, *Rabban*. To the mind of the tradition or the

<sup>5</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 79, 98.

Evangelist Kyrie and Kyrios possessed the higher meaning with which they were familiar from the usage in their own time, and which anachronistically they carry back into the time of Jesus. They do not mean that the disciples and others used *Mari* as a variation of *Rabbi*, but ascribe to them a higher conception of Jesus to express which they felt *Rabbi* to be inadequate. Kyrios in the Gospels has the full pregnant sense of the later period, but for this very reason it cannot be historical.<sup>6</sup>

We wish to enquire whether Bousset's arguments have actually endangered the older view of a pre-Hellenistic use of the title "Lord" with reference to Jesus. Let us begin with the alleged absence of Kyrios from the Logia. Bousset declares: "In the Logia the title *ὁ κύριος* occurs nowhere. The address *κύριε* Lk. vi. 46, "Why call ye me, Lord (= Master) and do not what I say?", which fully explains itself from the context, has no evidential value whatever. Whether *κύριε* in Matt. viii. 8 = Lk. vii. 6, can

<sup>6</sup>There would seem to be some inconsistency between Bousset's statement on p. 95 in regard to the distinction between the vocative *κύριε* and the full title *ὁ κύριος*, and his interpretation of the Gospel-phenomena on the next page. On p. 95 he observes that in regard to the vocative a wider and looser usage can be traced in the New Testament, since not only God and Christ, but other heavenly beings and men of superior position receive the title from inferiors. Consequently in the investigation he proposes to leave the vocative out of account. On p. 96 on the other hand he appeals not merely to the increasing frequency of *ὁ κύριος* but also to the increasing vocative usage in Matthew and Luke as evidence for the influence exerted by the later custom to call Christ Kyrios in a specific and unique sense. If a wider and looser usage existed, then the vocative cases should not have been quoted as symptomatic of the feeling of the later period. It would have been more consistent to stake the whole argument on the objective use of the title. Bousset also leaves us in uncertainty as to whether the wider, looser, untechnical usage recognized by him for the vocative existed only on Greek soil or could have existed also on Palestinian, Aramaic soil, either during the life of Jesus or in the mother-church. What he positively rejects as unhistorical is the employment of *Mar* as a Rabbinical title. But this leaves undecided the question whether with an un-Rabbinical connotation the address by means of *Mar* may not have been Palestinian or even existent and applied to Jesus in His own time.



be traced back to the Logia must remain in doubt, since the derivation of the entire pericope (the centurion of Capernaum) from the Logia continues a disputed point."<sup>7</sup>

The first of these statements "that the title *κύριος* occurs nowhere in the Logia" is correct only, if the technical meaning of "title" is unduly insisted upon. Of a strictly titular use of Kyrios the Logia furnishes no instance. But this is not pertinent to the question at issue. Bousset's position involves that the *conception* of Jesus as Lord was unfamiliar to the early Palestinian circles, and that it is this unfamiliarity which reflects itself in the absence of the *title* from the Logia. The absence of the title in order to be exponential of a Christological stage of development must rest on the background of the absence of the conception which pointedly expresses itself in the titular usage. If the conception appears to have been present, the absence of the title need not be anything more than pure accident. The rule cannot be laid down *á priori*, that, if the title was known in a certain circle, it must of necessity have entered into a document proceeding from that circle. Perhaps good reasons can be assigned why, in passages where it might have been employed, other ways of speaking were preferred. But, even though this should not be so, mere absence of the title in the face of familiarity with the conception proves nothing. Now as a matter of fact the Logia plainly show that the idea of the Lordship of Jesus was current where the Logia are supposed to have been collected and to have circulated. In Matt. xxiv. 43-51 = Lk. xii. 39, 40, 42-46 we meet with the representation of Jesus as *οικοδεσπότης* and as *κύριος* with reference to the disciples.<sup>8</sup> That the representation is parabolic does not in the least detract from its significance. The householder and the slave in the parable illustrate a corresponding spiritual relationship between Jesus and the disciple and it would be difficult to say how

<sup>7</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 96.

<sup>8</sup> See Harnack's reconstruction of the Logia in *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, pp. 26-28, 98, 187.



this could possibly have been conceived in any form different from that of lordship. One need not unduly allegorize the parable to see that this conception shines through at every point. Its meaning is not adequately rendered by saying that, in view of the absence and expected return of Jesus, watchfulness and faithfulness must be practised by the disciple in like manner as watchfulness and faithfulness are demanded of a house servant under similar circumstances with reference to the master of the house. It is distinctly implied that in both cases the duty springs from the relation of lordship. Especially towards the close the parabolic form of speaking perceptibly glides over into a semi-direct description of the spiritual reality, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day when he expecteth not, and in an hour when he knoweth not, and shall cut him asunder, and appoint his portion with the hypocrites; there shall be the weeping and gnashing of teeth."<sup>9</sup> Here there can be no doubt but the returning one is Jesus and He is called "Lord", and that certainly not merely in virtue of the parabolic setting in what precedes but also because of His possessing the dignity on His own account. It may even be questioned whether in verse 45 of Matthew = verse 42 of Luke in the absolute *ὁ κύριος* we have not a reflex of the full titular use itself. The question, "who then is the faithful and wise servant whom *the lord* has set over his household, etc.?" certainly sounds as if "the Lord" as a title of Jesus was familiar to the mind that so phrased it.

A similar case of the parabolic designation of Jesus as Kyrios is found in Matt. x. 24, 25: "A disciple is not above his master, nor a servant above his lord. It is enough for the disciple that he be as his master, and the servant as his lord. If they have called the master of the house (*οἰκο-*

<sup>9</sup>The reference to "the weeping and gnashing of teeth" as well as the term "hypocrites" fall outside of the frame of the parable, and in so far also favor the direct reference of "lord" to Jesus. But "the weeping and gnashing of teeth" does not occur in Luke and for "hypocrites" Luke has "unfaithful" which remains true to the parable. Harnack thinks that the Logia had "hypocrites".

δεσπότην) Beelzebub, how much more them of his household?" Here again what starts out as a mere comparison of Jesus to a teacher or owner of slaves in his relation to the disciples ends with a direct formal designation of Him as "the master of the house", so as to imply familiarity with Jesus' lordship as a current conception. It is true Luke here (vi. 40) has only the figure of teacher and disciple; that of the lord and servant is lacking both in verse 40<sub>a</sub> and verse 40<sub>b</sub>, and also the question of verse 25<sub>c</sub> in Matthew. But, if we may believe Harnack, the fuller form of the double comparison was original in the Logia, and the case is a case of conscious omission on the part of Luke. We may, therefore, put this passage by the side of the other as evidence that the lordship of Jesus, at least as a conception, was known in the Palestinian environment where the Logia first were handed down.<sup>10</sup>

And not merely in regard to the objective use of Kyrios, but also in regard to its vocative use Bousset's appeal to the Logia fails to convince. There is but one instance of this, he claims, and it lacks all evidential value because explainable from the context. This is Lk. vi. 46 "And why call ye me, Lord, and do not what I say?" He assumes that this saying belonged to the Logia in its Lucan form, and that the version in which it occurs in Matthew represents a subsequent stage of development. It is the later invocation of the Kyrios-name in the cult which Matt. vii. 21 carries back into the mouth of Jesus.<sup>11</sup> This assumption is evidently the reason why from the Lucan form the second Kyrie is dropped, although the text, without variants, gives Kyrie, Kyrie. Evidently the duplication of the name appears to Bousset reminiscent of the cult, and carries with it the technical high sense of Kyrios, and therefore in his opinion cannot have been original in the Logia. This, however, is a mere assumption. We may fairly insist upon

<sup>10</sup> *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 58: "In Matt. x. 24, f. Luke seems to me to have omitted the lord and the slave because by the side of teacher and disciple they sounded superfluous and almost trivial."

<sup>11</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 103, note 5.



it that the Lucan version, if it be assigned to the Logia, shall be put there in the form which it actually bears, i.e., with the double Kyrie. And if this be done, it will be seen that the appeal to the connection as sufficiently explaining the case without recourse to a Kyrios-title is unavailing. The contrast between calling Jesus "Lord, Lord", and doing the things he says cannot mean a contrast between the recognition of Jesus as a teacher and the putting of his teaching into practice. The solemnly repeated "Lord" shows that the pretended reverence with which the practical disobedience conflicts is the reverence for Jesus as sovereign lawgiver and not as a mere teacher. For "the things which I say", the "I say unto you" of the earlier part of the discourse may be compared. Now, if such is the actual import of the saying, and if bearing this import it had its place in the Logia, then this proves at least that the *milieu* in which the Logia were first collected was not unacquainted with the conception of the sovereign lordship of Jesus as the basis of his legislative authority and as recognized in the address by means of Kyrie. When Matthew in verse 22 makes Jesus add that the same words "Kyrie, Kyrie" will be addressed to him by many in the day of judgment, there is really no great difference between this and the "Kyrie, Kyrie" he puts upon the lips of some of His followers during His lifetime. It goes without saying that the address to which people will resort in the day of judgment takes "Kyrie" in a very specific sense. Although verse 22 does not occur in Luke and for this reason is not included in the Logia, there is nothing to indicate that, so far as the sense of Kyrie is concerned, it goes beyond Lk. vi. 46.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, pp. 52, 177, feels doubtful about the appurtenance of the saying to the Logia, and surmises that the common source from which Matthew and Luke drew it lies farther back. If, however, a reconstruction of Q be attempted, he would prefer the λέγων μοι κύριε of Matthew to the τί δέ με καλεῖτε κύριε of Luke, and also gives preference to the words "he who does the will of my Father in heaven" in the second clause above the Lucan "and do not



In the story about the centurion of Capernaum Matt. viii. 5-10, 13 = Lk. vii. 1-10 Kyrie occurs in Matthew verse 8 = Lk. verse 6: "Lord I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof." Matthew alone has it also in verse 6: "Lord my servant lies in the house sick."<sup>13</sup> It is usually assumed that the text of Matthew reproduces the account of the Logia in a more original form than that of Luke.<sup>14</sup> As we have seen Bousset sets aside the evidence in this case on the ground that the inclusion of the story in the Logia remains in dispute. Probably this has reference to the view of Wernle who considers the pericope a later addition to Q because in the high opinion expressed about the faith of the centurion it conflicts with the Judaistic character of Q.<sup>15</sup> But the Judaistic character of Q in such a sense as would preclude the recognition of exceptional faith in a Gentile, is not an accepted conclusion in Gospel-criticism. Harnack denies its existence with a reference to the saying (also contained in the Logia) that God can out of stones raise up children to Abraham Matt. iii. 9 = Lk. iii. 8, and to the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman contained in Mark, in which the same judgment is expressed concerning Gentile

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what I say". His preference in the former respect we do not understand. Perhaps it is due to the feeling that *καλέω* implies a formal invocation. The preference for "the will of my Father in heaven" seems to rest on a disinclination to believe that Jesus proclaimed His own word as law. In our view the mention of the Father in heaven does not exclude but rather includes the authoritative, sovereign position of Jesus in virtue of which he is addressed "Kyrie, Kyrie". The implication in Matthew is that Jesus represents God, so that His commands are the commands of God. And He represents God not as a teacher, but as Son, hence: "The will of my Father which is in heaven". It will be noted that Harnack retains the double Kyrie as original.

<sup>13</sup>The omission of *κύριε* in Luke verse 4 is due to the indirect discourse and the condensed character of the statement.

<sup>14</sup>Cp. Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 56: "That Matthew has altered the text transmitted in Q cannot be shown." This does not apply to verse 13, which Harnack does not believe stood in Q because he thinks that not the healing of the servant but the saying about the centurion's faith formed the point of the original story (p. 147).

<sup>15</sup>*Synoptische Frage*, p. 232.

faith.<sup>16</sup> We may therefore confidently count this another instance of the use of Kyrie in the Logia.

That no more than these two instances of the vocative Kyrie occur can create no wonder. The Logia, as most of the critics conceive of this document, is made up of sayings or discourses of Jesus. It offered little occasion, therefore, for describing a meeting with or an approach of people to Jesus such as would call for any formula of address. Where the character of the contents changes to the narrative or the parabolic form, the Kyrie, as we have seen, immediately emerges. If Kyrie is rare, other forms of address such as *διδάσκαλε* or *ῥαββεί* or *ἐπιστάτα* are entirely absent. This shows how little reliance can be placed on the non-occurrence of Kyrie, as a proof of the unfamiliarity of the time and circle in question with its use as a title of Christ. Nor could one expect to meet with Kyrios objectively in reflections or statements of Jesus with reference to Himself. While passages of this character are by no means wanting in the Logia, the title Kyrios would have been out of place, for the twofold reason that from its very nature it does not lend itself for use as a self-designation, and because none of the passages particularly calls for the expression of that aspect of Jesus' position or function, which the Kyrios-name connotes.<sup>17</sup>

The character of the Logia as a collection of sayings and not a narrative of events, will have to be kept in mind also in noting the absence of *ὁ κύριος* as a designation of Jesus by the author or collector of the documents. Such designation could occur only where, by way of exception, the narrative style is adopted. This happens in the account of the temptation, in the centurion pericope, in the episode of the inquiry sent by the Baptist.<sup>18</sup> In these cases, so far as the

<sup>16</sup> *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 147.

<sup>17</sup> Cp. "Son-of-Man" Matt. viii. 20 = Lk. viii. 58; Matt. x. 32 = Lk. xii. 8; Matt. xii. 32 = Lk. xii. 10; Matt. xi. 19 = Lk. vii. 34; Matt. xii. 39 = Lk. xi. 30; Matt. xxiv. 27 = Lk. xvii. 24.

<sup>18</sup> Cp. also Matt. xii. 22 ff. = Lk. xi. 14 ff. and Matt. xii. 38 ff. = Lk. xi. 16 ff.

simple pronoun is not employed, the name Jesus (temptation) or the title Christ (John's inquiry)<sup>19</sup> are brought into use. This, however, is entirely in keeping with the preponderant Gospel usage throughout and proves, of course, nothing as to existence or non-existence of the conception of Jesus' lordship. In none of these cases has Matthew or Luke found occasion to introduce *ὁ κύριος* into the corresponding sections. The preference of the Gospel-narrative for the simple "Jesus" is a phenomenon remarkable enough in itself, but one which has nothing to do with the currency of *ὁ κύριος* in other connections.

We pass on to Mark which, like the Logia, Bousset thinks it possible to place, so far as its traditional material is concerned, within the pre-Kyrios stage of the Christological development. Here the situation is in so far different from the Logia as we are on narrative ground, and occasions for the introduction of either the vocative Kyrie or the objective Kyrios cannot be said to have been wanting. In fact Mark makes various people address Jesus no less than ten times by means of *διδάσκαλε*<sup>20</sup> and three times with a transliterated *ῥαββεί*.<sup>21</sup> Besides there is one instance of *ῥαββουνί* with *κύριε ῥαββεί* and *ῥαββεί* as variants.<sup>22</sup> Twice *ὁ διδάσκαλος* is used of Jesus in the third person.<sup>23</sup> In a number of these cases Kyrie and Kyrios would have seemed quite appropriate, although in some the use of *διδάσκαλε* explains itself and *κύριε* would have been out of place. Here therefore Bousset's contention that the absence of Kyrie and Kyrios from Mark is historically significant can be urged with a far greater semblance of plausibility than in connection with the Logia, because the absence is offset by the rather frequent introduction of other terms in connections where Kyrios or Kyrie might have been expected.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>19</sup> In Matt. xi. 2 D al read Ἰησοῦ instead of Χριστοῦ.

<sup>20</sup> iv. 38; ix. 17, 38; x. 17, 20, 35; xii. 14, 19, 32; xiii. 1.

<sup>21</sup> ix. 5; xi. 21; xiv. 45.

<sup>22</sup> x. 51.

<sup>23</sup> v. 35; xiv. 14.

<sup>24</sup> In view of the above statistics it is not clear what Dalman means



Nevertheless we think that even here the conclusion which Bousset would draw from the phenomena is unwarranted. First of all it should be observed that there is in Mark the same parabolic evidence of familiarity with the Kyrios conception that we found in the Logia. In Mk. xiii. 35 the man in the parable is called the *κύριος τῆς οἰκίας*. Here again it matters little that in the figure this *κύριος* is a common enough designation of a house-owner or house-ruler and has nothing specific about it. The specific character of the word is none the less implied because the house of which Christ is owner and ruler is the circle of disciples, the church or whatever name be given to it. One who owns and rules over this sphere is *κύριος* in a peculiar religious sense. The same conception of lordship meets us in a direct unparabolic form in ii. 28 where Jesus declares that the Son-of-Man is Kyrios *καὶ τοῦ σαββάτου*. This involves the right to make sovereign disposal of the institution of the Sabbath. No matter whether the *καί* be rendered "even" or "also", in either case the implication is that besides the Sabbath many other things fall under the jurisdiction of the Son-of-Man. A comprehensive Messianic lordship is implied from which the highest is not exempt. This *καί* also forbids the un-Messianic, generic interpretation of Son-of-Man, as if to man as such the right of disposing of the Sabbath were accorded. To say that man is lord *also* or *even* of the Sabbath yields no sense, whereas it yields excellent sense when meant to emphasize the wide range of the lordship of the Messianic Son-of-Man.<sup>25</sup> Still another instance

when (*Die Worte Jesu*, p. 269) he seeks to explain the uniqueness of Kyrie in Mark vii. 28 with the observation that Mark "in general is sparing with the recording of such terms of address". Mark has *διδάσκαλε* ten times, *ῥαββεί* 3 times, *ῥαββονί* once, *κύριε* once. This makes 15 instances in all. Matthew has a total of 25 and Luke a total of 19 not taking into account the parabolic cases. This disproportion is not great, and it disappears entirely, if the material which Matthew and Luke have beyond Mark is taken into account.

<sup>25</sup> If for Mark the generic sense of "Son-of-Man" cannot be defended, then there is, of course, no plausibility in ascribing it to Matthew, although his text does not contain the *καί*. Luke's text has *καί*.

of the formal ascription of lordship to the Christ (and to Jesus indirectly) is furnished by our Lord's reasoning against the Scribes concerning the question whether the Messiah be David's son or lord (Mk. xii. 35-37). Bousset is more eager here to call attention to the restricted scope of the idea, the Messiah being represented not as lord in general, but only as David's lord, than he appears to be in connection with the Sabbath-passage to do justice to the generalizing touch introduced by *καί*. We fail to see what force can be allowed to this consideration. The import of the argument is surely not this alone, that the Messiah is superior to David in rank, but that he rules over David as sovereign lord, and that such lordship could not belong to him in the capacity of a descendant and heir of David. Now lordship over David cannot be conceived except against the larger background of a general wide-reaching Messianic sovereignty. Instead of saying with Bousset: "lord over David only," it is much more pertinent to say: "lord even over David, and therefore lord over all that ranks lower than David." The question may even be raised whether the thought of lordship over David can be carried through without including in it authority over the dead as well as the living, for at the time of the Messiah's rule David no longer lives. But this is not essential to the argument. Bousset considers the entire episode unhistorical and explains it as the precipitate of the dogmatizing of the early church.<sup>26</sup> The question now before us is not, however, affected by this. Adjusting ourselves to Bousset's line of reasoning, we are examining Mark not as a direct historical witness to the life of Jesus but as an indirect reflector of the belief that prevailed in the early Palestinian Church. Though we may discount the episode in the former respect, yet the fact remains that when this story was pre-

It is fortunate that the *καί* stands in Mark; if it were lacking in Mark and found in both Matthew and Luke, the charge could be brought with far greater show of reason that the later two Evangelists had changed a generic into a Messianic "Son-of-Man."

<sup>26</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 51.



precipitated there must have been a belief in the lordship of Jesus capable of precipitating it. And still another inference may be drawn from the episode, no matter whether interpreted as historical or as dogmatic precipitate. Bousset suggests that it not merely reflects the church's belief, but also reflects the controversies waged in regard to this belief between the Jewish Scribes and the Christians. Now it ought not to be overlooked that the point at issue either between Jesus and the Scribes or between the early Christians and the Scribes is not whether the Messiah is lord of David. The recognition of this, on the basis of the Psalm, furnishes the common ground on which the real point at issue is argued. The real point at issue is, whether being by common consent David's lord, the Messiah can be at the same time David's son.<sup>27</sup> And this issue presupposes that the attribute of lordship was associated by the Scribes with the character of the Messiah no less than by the Christians with the Person of Jesus. If this was so at the time when the controversies about the divine sonship of Jesus were going on, it would be rash to assume that the conception of the Messiah as Lord was unknown to the Judaism of the slightly earlier period.

The only actual instance of the designation of Jesus as

<sup>27</sup> Bousset thinks the argument implies that in the circle where the episode originated the descent of Jesus from David was denied (*Kyrios Christos*, p. 5). This view of the matter is perhaps more easily reconcilable with the uniform affirmation of the Davidic descent, than the same interpretation of the pericope where the latter is accepted as historical. If Jesus had explicitly denied His Davidic descent, then the later persistent belief in it becomes difficult to account for. If only the early church had made the denial the opposite belief could perhaps assert and maintain itself. In our opinion no denial of bodily descent is implied in the argument. "David's son" is equivalent to "David's heir". The question is not whether lordship over David and descent from David can go together, but whether inheritance of the lordship from David and exercise of lordship over David are compatible. All this, however, and also the further question, whether a higher sonship than the Davidic one, viz., sonship from God, stands in the background of the argumentation, as seems to be the case in Matthew ("What think ye concerning the Christ? Whose Son is he?"), can be left to one side as irrelevant to the present argument.



Kyrios in a technical sense acknowledged by Bousset in Mark is that of xi. 3, where the disciples are instructed to reply with reference to the colt used for the entry into Jerusalem "the Kyrios has need of him." Referring to Heitmüller's attempt to strip the term even here of its sacred technical meaning, Bousset observes that for this secondary passage an exception may safely be made.<sup>28</sup> Of course, if good reasons could be given for declaring the passage secondary, we should have to regard this a safe concession on Bousset's part. In reality the two reasons adduced are such as ought to be ruled out in any fair court of criticism. The one is based on the ascription of supernatural knowledge to Jesus.<sup>29</sup> From such as do not *à priori* deny the supernatural in the consciousness of Jesus this argument can claim no consideration, even where the historicity of the account is the direct point at issue. But it appears altogether irrelevant even from Bousset's own anti-supernaturalistic standpoint, because the supernaturalism involved may with absolute certainty be declared to have been attainable by the earliest stage in the formation of the Gospel-tradition. There surely never was a time in the early Church when the faith of its members in regard to the Person of Jesus fell short of the power of investing Him with such a moderate degree of supernaturalism as is here described. As a criterion for the original or secondary character of a passage in Mark, and more particularly as a criterion for judging of the antiquity of the Kyrios-title contained in that passage, the feature is wholly worthless. The second reason why Bousset considers the passage secondary need not detain us because it rests on the occurrence in it of the Kyrios-title itself<sup>30</sup> To argue first from the Kyrios-title that the account is secondary, and then from the secondary character of the account, that the Kyrios-title is not early-Palestinian would be a *petitio principii*, with which we do not mean to charge Bousset.

<sup>28</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 96, note 1.

<sup>29</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 71, note 1. The same judgment is applied to Mk. xiv. 13 ff.

<sup>30</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 52.

A feature to be carefully noticed in connection with this last passage is the absolute form in which it employs the conception of *ὁ κύριος* without any qualifying genitive. In this an indication might be found of the presence of the later usage which designated the exalted Christ as *ὁ κύριος* absolutely. We do not think that suspicion against it on this score would be well-grounded. In order to avert it, however, it is not necessary to supply the qualifying genitive and take *ὁ κύριος* in the sense of the owner, viz., of the colt, as some have proposed. Of course the right to the use of the animal is implied, but it is implied in the whole situation, not in the term *Kyrios* as such. That this is so can be best perceived by comparing the case with the analogous case Mk. xiv. 14. Here the disciples are told to say to the goodman of the house: "The Master says, where is my guest-chamber, where I shall eat the passover with my disciples?" If here *ὁ κύριος* were read, instead of *ὁ διδάσκαλος* the inference would lie near that Jesus was called "lord" on account of his sovereign right to claim the use of the guest-chamber, and the words "my guest-chamber" might seem to favor this. As it is, the title *ὁ διδάσκαλος* cannot have been intended to justify the claim in question. Neither then will *ὁ κύριος* in the closely parallel passage have any such associations. In both cases we plainly have before us evidences of the passing over into a formal objective title of what had before been a mode of addressing Jesus in the vocative. The persons to whom the message is sent will know who is meant by *ὁ κύριος* and *ὁ διδάσκαλος* because in the circle of the disciples the custom of speaking to Jesus by means of *κύριε* and *διδάσκαλε* had already given rise to such objectivation of the terms. *Ὁ κύριος* in the first instance meant the one whom we are accustomed to address as *κύριε*, just as *ὁ διδάσκαλος* meant, the one whom we are wont to address as *διδάσκαλε*. It is not necessary to assume that a formal objective usage of *ὁ κύριος*, either in the later sense or as a standing title of the Messiah underlies the passage. The non-titular concept of the lordship of the

Messiah would reflect itself in the vocative usage and this would of itself unconsciously and inevitably give rise to the designation of Jesus as *ὁ κύριος* just as we find it here.<sup>31</sup>

If this is actually the background of the absolute *ὁ κύριος* it proves at the same time that the vocative Kyrie is not so utterly unknown to the Marcan tradition as Bousset would have us believe. The occurrence of it in the case of the Syro-Phoenician woman (Mk. vii. 28) he seeks to explain from the nationality of the woman in such a way as to avoid the assumption of a similar usage among the disciples. From the point of view of the tradition this would involve that the term *κύριε* was felt either as a pagan-Syrian or at least as a Syrian-Christian way of addressing Jesus, something that appeared to the early-Palestinian bearers or receivers of the tradition as an exotic custom. And the same construction might be put upon the fact that in the Logia also the one person who addresses Jesus by means of Kyrie is the non-Jewish centurion. Both the uniqueness of the case in each of the two documents and the coincidence of the Gentile nationality of the speakers lend a degree of plausibility to this hypothesis. It should be observed, however, that the two cases are not strictly analogous, for the centurion is only Gentile by descent; religiously he appears closely associated with Judaism. It therefore seems doubtful whether pur-

<sup>31</sup> Mk. v. 19 is a doubtful instance of *ὁ κύριος* for Jesus. Jesus instructs the Gerasene demoniac, "Go to thy house unto thy friends, and tell them how great things *ὁ κύριος* has done for thee". It must remain uncertain whether *ὁ κύριος* here refers to God or to Jesus. The only other passage in Mark, outside of Old Testament quotations, where God is so designated is xiii. 20. In xi. 10 *κύριος* is lacking in the best manuscripts and seems to be a duplication from the preceding verse where it occurs in a quotation. Perhaps the statement to the demoniac might be considered a quotation or at least a reminiscence from Psa. cxxvi. 3. The parallel passage in Luke (viii. 39) has *ὅσα σοι ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός* and therefore takes the *ὁ κύριος* found in Mark as equivalent to *ὁ θεός*. On the other hand, if Mark be interpreted by itself, the recurrence of the same form of statement in verse 20, "he began to publish how great things Jesus had done for him" favors the reference of *ὁ κύριος* to Jesus." Cp. Sven Herner, *Die Anwendung des Wortes Kyrios im Neuen Testament*, pp. 7, 8.



poseful assimilation to a heathen mode of speech can be made responsible for the Kyrie in his case. But there is another feature in regard to which the two pericopes are strictly parallel and with which the simultaneous appearance of Kyrie in each may therefore be much more plausibly connected. Both accounts emphasize the astounding greatness of faith in the person who appealed to Jesus for help, and the declaration of Jesus appended shows how in the case of the centurion the pagan character is reflected upon only insofar as it brings out in strong relief this marvellous faith. It will be further observed that in the narrative of the centurion his extraordinary faith is brought into close connection with the lordship over the powers of healing which he ascribes to Jesus and which he compares to his own relation to the powers above and under him. Thus the story itself leads us to explain the singular mode of address by means of Kyrie from the vivid and strong conviction as to the supernatural power of Jesus implied in the faith of him who used it. And this explanation can be applied with equal plausibility to the account of Jesus' encounter with the Syro-Phoenician woman. It does not favor the assumption that by addressing Jesus as Kyrie the woman classified Him from a specifically pagan or non-Jewish-Christian point of view. The Kyrie introduces a sentence in which the possibility of receiving help from Jesus is suspended on association with Jesus' ministry for Israel: "Yea, Lord: even the little dogs under the table eat of the children's crumbs."<sup>32</sup> This points distinctly to the Messianic interpretation of the Kyrie. Matthew certainly has so understood it for he introduces Kyrie not only in verse 25 in the appeal "Lord, help me" but as early as in the woman's first cry: "Have mercy on me, O Lord, thou Son of David", verse 22. The title Lord which she applies to Jesus belongs to Him as the Son

<sup>32</sup> The *vaí* which precedes Kyrie is neither confirmation of Jesus' preceding statement, nor protest against it, but confirms the last word of the woman herself, verse 26 in Mk., verse 22 in Matthew (xv).

of David, the Messiah.<sup>33</sup> The favorite homiletical motif—as if the woman had first appealed to the Son of David, that is to Jesus in his Messianic capacity, and only after the fruitlessness of this became apparent from Jesus' answer, had appealed to Him in His higher capacity as Kyrios in the universalistic sense—is not warranted by the account even of Matthew, and certainly in Mark cannot find the least semblance of support. There is no reason to interpret this Kyrie on such a high plane as would make it practically equivalent to the Kyrie of the post-resurrection period. The Messianic reference is made probable also by further comparison with the centurion-pericope. Our Lord's declaration in regard to the centurion "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel", implies that what rendered this man's faith unique was the ability to believe what God was doing for Israel without the support derived from Israel's long preparation for such faith in the past.

In a class by themselves stand the passages i. 3; xvi. 19, 20. They are cases of the application of the title *κύριος* to Jesus not by speakers within the frame of the Gospel-history, but by the writer of the Gospel. They reflect plainly the later well-established usage. The two verses in Chapter xvi can remain out of consideration here because they occur in what is regarded by many as the later unauthentic conclusion to the Gospel. The other passage, however, is important for our purpose. It occurs in a quotation from Isa. xl. 3. "Prepare ye the way of the Lord." In the prophet the *κύριος* for whom the way is to be prepared is Jehovah. But there can be no doubt that, so far as the writer of the Gospel is concerned, we have here a case of the substitution of the *κύριος*-Jesus for the *κύριος*-Jehovah, of which there are so many other instances in the New Testament. For in the immediately preceding quotation from Mal. iii. 1, which also in the original represents Jehovah as the coming one,

<sup>33</sup> The mere non-repetition of *υἱὸς Δαυιδ* in verse 25 of Matthew cannot, of course, prove that Kyrie is the second time meant in a higher sense than the first time.



the form has been so changed as to make it refer to Jesus, "I send my messenger before *thy face*, who shall prepare *thy way*" being substituted for "I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me." The question whether this substitution was possible on the basis of the Hebrew or Aramaic idiom can be neglected for the present since the Gospel was written in Greek and the possibilities in the matter were determined not by the Hebrew but by the Greek Old Testament. The writer of i. 3, therefore, is familiar with the designation of Jesus as *ὁ κύριος* in a sense sufficiently high and unique as not to preclude the transfer to Him of what the Old Testament affirms of the *κύριος*-Jehovah. Bousset finds in verse 2 evidence of the progressive embellishment of the history of Jesus with traits supplied by Old Testament prophecy.<sup>34</sup> On this principle the equation of Jesus with *ὁ κύριος* would afford no proof of the existence of the *κύριος*-title during the earlier stage of the tradition in Palestinian circles. We shall not, therefore, press it as an argument in the present connection. But the discounting of it by Bousset on the plea that it belongs to a later stratum of the tradition raises the interesting question, what bearing Bousset's view on this whole subject of the gradual growth of the Gospel-tradition and the evidence he discovers of it in Mark has on the argument derived from the almost total absence of the *κύριος*-title from the Marcan material. Bousset believes that in our present Mark much later material has gathered around the nucleus of actual primitive tradition. The single story and the single logion constituted the first form in which the tradition was handed down. The next stage was the stage of agglutination of the single pieces into groups from the point of view of similarity of content. Of such groups he counts at least eight in Mark. But to this original body were added in course of time a number of secondary pieces. All this applies to the oral tradition. On the question whether the literary composition of Mark passed through several stages

<sup>34</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, p. 85.



Bousset does not commit himself.<sup>35</sup> In the main he places the process of agglutination and accretion within the thirty years of oral tradition that preceded the fixing of the Gospel in written form. Now the observation can be made that in this body of later material the Kyrios-title is scarcely more in evidence than in the tradition-stratum assumed to be of earlier origin. Many instances are specified by Bousset of such later increment or of the touching up in a later spirit of older pieces.<sup>36</sup> In connection with three of these the conception of Jesus' lordship appears viz., the Sabbath-controversy, in the account of the entry into Jerusalem, and in the polemic against the Scribes about the Messiah's being David's son or Lord. Over against these we may place the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman and the parable of the lord of the house, possibly also the story of the Gerasene demoniac. Why is it that the introduction of this later material or the working over of the earlier tradition in a later spirit has not resulted in a far greater frequency of the Kyrios-conception or the Kyrios-title? Are we to assume that all this secondary growth was made in Palestinian circles before the Kyrios-title had had time to work its way from the Syrian-Hellenistic Church

<sup>35</sup> An exception, in regard to the mode of origin, is made for the passion-narrative. This existed, so far as its origin can be traced back, in coherent form and possibly assumed literary shape at an earlier point than the other material. This original passion-narrative, however, is not identical with the present passion-story in Mark. In the latter also later elements are discovered. *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 42-44.

<sup>36</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 47-57; 65-82. Bousset brings under this head, the authority claimed for the Son-of-Man to forgive sin, the parable of the bridegroom concerning fasting, the Sabbath-controversy connected with the plucking of ears of corn, the parable of the binding of the strong one; the logion about the gaining and losing of life, the *ὁμοιωμα*-passages (ix. 37-41), the parable of the wicked husbandmen, the Son- or Lord-of-David pericope, the saying about the passing away of earth and heaven before Jesus' words pass away, the story of the entry into Jerusalem, of the passover-meal, of the trial of Jesus, the inscription on the cross, the accounts of the baptism and the temptation. It is not, of course, assumed that in each of these cases the material as a body is of late origin, but in all cases at least later ideas have been introduced into it.

into the Jewish-Christian community and gain a firm hold upon the tradition there? There would be two difficulties in the way of assuming this. In the first place Bousset himself locates much of this development on Greek soil, as appears from the fact that he regards the title Son-of-God and the dominating rôle it plays in Mark as a Hellenistic product.<sup>37</sup> And in the second place, although the time of a whole generation may be allowed for the growth of the tradition before it became fixed in literary form, this entire period cannot be supposed to have elapsed before the Kyrios-title found an entrance into the Palestinian Church. For at the time of the writing of the First Epistle to the Corinthians Paul already characterizes the Christians (I. Cor. I. 2) as οἱ ἐπικαλούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν and in view of the added words ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡμῶν this cannot possibly be restricted to the Greek Churches, but must include the Palestinian Christians as well.<sup>38</sup> At that time, therefore, from 50 to 58 A. D., according to the chronology adopted, the custom of the invocation of Jesus as Lord was already firmly established among the Christians in Palestine. And since it will be necessary to go back several years of this date, to allow for a required period of gradual adoption of the custom, it seems safe to affirm that not a little of the tradition-material in Mark must on Bousset's own hypothesis have received its present form while the Kyrios-title was generally current in the circle where this took place. In the face of this it becomes precarious to make of the uniform absence of the title from Mark an argument for the non-acquaintance of the early church with this designation. If the later currency of the title could leave the

<sup>37</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 65-70. Bousset now retracts his earlier view (*Religion des Judenthums*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 261 ff.) and accepts Dalman's conclusion (*Worte Jesu*, I, p. 219), that in the apocalyptic literature "Son-of-God" does not occur as a Messianic title. The passages in 4 Ezra originally had not *υἱὸς θεοῦ* but *παῖς θεοῦ*.

<sup>38</sup> Bousset (p. 100 note 1) does not share the suspicion of Joh. Weiss against this statement of Paul. He suggests that the words *καὶ ἡμῶν* might be removed from the text. This does not affect the force of the remaining words *ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ αὐτῶν*.



subsequent development of the tradition unaffected, then the quiescence of the title in the earlier stage need not be in any way indicative of its non-currency at that time. The fact also that the Gospel of Mark as such is a Greek product and that it embodies all the tradition that has flowed into it, the alleged earlier no less than the alleged later elements, in Greek form should give us pause before drawing over-hasty conclusions in this matter. However much respect the writer of the Gospel may have had for the tradition as he found it, he can hardly have confined his task to that of a mere collector. No punctilious regard for the literal retention of the transmitted form need have prevented him from introducing where he speaks in his own person the designation of Jesus as *ὁ κύριος*. This was sufficiently familiar to him, as we have seen, to induce the application of Isa. xl. 3 to Jesus. And yet, apart from the "unauthentic" conclusion of the Gospel, he nowhere refers to Jesus objectively as *ὁ κύριος*. The same applies, with one exception, to the author of the First Gospel. The difference between them and Luke, who on his own account speaks no less than sixteen times of *ὁ κύριος*, is not due to a difference in familiarity with the usage. Why then should such an explanation be given where the similar phenomenon of relative absence or avoidance of the *κύριος*-title within the frame of the narrative comes under consideration?

Before dismissing the subject of the relative infrequency of *κύριος* or *κύριε* in Mark attention may be called to the parallel phenomenon of the rare occurrence of *ὁ κύριος* as a name for God in the same document. Apart from Old Testament quotations, where the use of *ὁ κύριος* could not be avoided,<sup>39</sup> there is but a single passage, xiii. 20, "except the Lord shortened the days," where God is so designated. No one would care to suggest that there is anything significant in this; it must be purely accidental. If it occurred in a later document, where *ὁ κύριος* was the standing title of

<sup>39</sup> Cp. xi. 9; xii. 11, 29, 30, 36; for v. 19 and xi. 10, see note 31.



Christ, it might be attributed to the extrusion of the former by the latter. But in Mark this is not to be thought of. And yet if Mark be compared with Matthew and Luke we find that there appears in the two last-named Gospels a very frequent use of *ὁ κύριος* for God outside of Old Testament quotations.<sup>40</sup> The facts, therefore, run strikingly parallel to those observable in connection with the Kyrios-designation of Jesus. And yet it is absolutely excluded in this case that the infrequency in Mark should reflect any unfamiliarity with the name *ὁ κύριος* for God or rather with the circumlocutions such as *Shema* and *Hasshem* of which *ὁ κύριος* was the substitute from the Greek Bible.

A similar observation can be made with reference to the title "The Christ". Bousset himself tells us that in the Logia this nowhere occurs as a self-designation of Jesus and in Mark only four times altogether, viz., viii. 29; ix. 41; xiv. 61; xv. 32. Of these four passages ix. 41 appears to him suspicious on account of Matt. x. 42, where instead of *ἐν ὀνόματι ὅτι Χριστοῦ ἔστε* is read *εἰς ὄνομα μαθητοῦ*. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that Jesus was currently designated "the Christ" in early Palestinian circles. This follows not merely from the abundant testimony in Acts, which Bousset suggests might perhaps be set down as a literary peculiarity of the writer of that book, but it follows also from the fact that the few passages where it does occur in Mark belong to the best accredited parts of the Gospel-tradition (the episode of Caesarea-Philippi and the trial of Jesus). Bousset admits that the latter circumstance speaks in favor of the credibility of the representation in Acts according to which *ὁ Χριστός* was current, not as a proper name but as an appellative title, in the earliest church. If this be so the fact results that there is a great disproportion

<sup>40</sup> For Matthew Cp. i. 20, 22, 24; ii. 13, 15, 19; ix. 38; xi. 25; xxviii. 2; for Luke i. 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 25, 28, 32, 38, 45, 58, 66; ii. 9, 15, 22, 23, 24, (26), (38); iv. 8, 12; x. 2, 21; xx. 37. The remarkable increase in both Gospels, as compared with Mark, may be due to the peculiar complexion of the accounts of the nativity, in which most of the instances occur.

between the frequency in actual use and the rareness of introduction of the title in the Marcan tradition. How then can we feel sure that the rareness of Kyrios or Kyrie in Mark is an accurate gauge of the familiarity or unfamiliarity of the earliest disciples with these terms?

We now come to the examination of the evidence from Matthew and Luke. It cannot be denied that a great increase in the use of *κύριος* for Jesus along certain lines is perceptible in these Gospels. The vocative *κύριε* as addressed to Jesus occurs twenty-five times in Matthew, not counting the four times of parabolic use with probable indirect reference to Jesus. In Luke it is found nineteen times directly and four times parabolically. This relation of preponderance of the direct over the parabolic use is reversed in regard to the objective *ὁ κύριος* for Jesus within the frame of the Gospel-history. Here Matthew and Luke have each four cases of direct reference, whereas the more or less plain allusions to Jesus as *ὁ κύριος* in parabolic contexts are twelve in Matthew and seven in Luke. As to the use of *ὁ κύριος* by the Evangelists, of this there is but one instance in Matthew, whereas in Luke there are no less than fourteen. In weighing this evidence it ought to be observed that it depends for its force as confirming Bousset's hypothesis on the correctness of his findings in regard to the Logia and Mark. The salient point of the hypothesis is that to the early Palestinian Church Jesus was not yet *ὁ κύριος*. The proof of this cannot be furnished by pointing to a relative increase however great in Matthew over the Logia and Mark; it must from the nature of the case consist in this, that over against the total absence of the conception and the terms in the Logia and Mark, a frequent use can be observed in Matthew and Luke. Now we have already shown that on a basis of objective criticism the presence of the conception and the terms in the earliest accessible strata of tradition both in the Logia and Mark must be admitted. It follows, therefore, that the relative increase in Matthew and Luke cannot be utilized to demonstrate the origin of the Kyrios-title in the interval



that lies between the crystallizing of the Logia-Marcan form of the tradition and its Matthaean-Lucan form. It would be possible, of course, so to modify the hypothesis as to place the introduction of the Kyrios-title into Palestinian circles before the definite fixing of the tradition in the Logia and Mark and to maintain that it had originated previously in the Hellenistic Church. In that case the increasing entrance of it into the Gospels would become significant of the growing popularity of a term in principle known from the beginning. But on such a view the extra-Palestinian, Hellenistic origin could only be assumed, no longer proven by induction from the Gospel phenomena. If the title lies back even of the Logia and Mark, there is no telling how old it may be nor what may have been its origin. It may well have come down from the earliest days of the mother-church or for that matter from the time of the ministry of Jesus.

Though, therefore, the examination of this part of the evidence cannot essentially modify our judgment as to Bousset's hypothesis, yet it need not on that account be without value for our further purpose. So far we have confined ourselves strictly to the question what light the Gospel-tradition throws on the existence or non-existence of the Kyrios-title for Jesus in the early Palestinian Church. But back of this lies the more fundamental question, how in view of the Gospel-data we are to judge of the currency or non-currency and further of the possible import of such a title as applied to Jesus during the Gospel-ministry itself. Bousset's denial of the usage in the early church, of course, includes the denial of everything corresponding to it or preparatory for it during the lifetime of Jesus. It is in view of this reaching back of the problem into the life and teaching of Jesus that the phenomena in Matthew and Luke become important. For it will be remembered that, according to Bousset, both Matthew and Luke, the former more sparingly, the latter with great freedom, introduced or substituted Kyrie and Kyrios where



Historically there was no basis for this or where some other title of a different kind was given in the original tradition. The change was made under the influence of the later custom to call Jesus "the Lord" in the technical sense and address Him as such.

The question before us is not directly how the increasing use of Kyrios and Kyrie in Matthew and Luke<sup>41</sup> can be explained, but whether it furnishes evidence of a desire or tendency to carry the later technical sense of these terms back into the life of Jesus. In seeking to answer this question we obviously must distinguish between the cases where Matthew and Luke present material not contained in the Logia and Mark and the cases in which they are assumed to have taken their material from the Logia and Mark. It is plain that in cases of the latter kind the introduction of Kyrios and Kyrie or its substitution for another title will be more significant than the emergence of Kyrios and Kyrie in new material. Where the title is added or substituted a definite cause will have to be assumed for this procedure on the part of the later Evangelists; and it may appear possible, perhaps even at first sight plausible, to find this in their familiarity with the technical designation of Christ as Kyrios in their own day. On the other hand where the new material comes under consideration such definite cause for the appearance of the terms need be looked for, since the possibility exists that in these cases the tradition as it came to the Evangelists already contained them and may even have contained them from the beginning.

With this distinction in mind we shall be prepared to consider in detail the facts presented by Matthew and Luke in a subsequent article.

inceton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

<sup>41</sup> For convenience' sake we say Matthew and Luke. It is not, of course, necessary *ex hypothesi* to assume that the Evangelists effected the change described. It may have preëxisted in the later form of the tradition incorporated by them in their Gospels.

## CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION<sup>1</sup>

In developing his system, Calvin proceeds at once from the doctrine of God to an exposition of His works of creation and providence (I. xiv-xv, and xvi-xviii).<sup>2</sup> That he passes over the divine Purpose or Decree at this point, though it would logically claim attention before its execution in creation and providence, is only another indication of the intensely practical spirit of Calvin and the simplicity of his method in this work. He carries his readers at once over from what God is to what God does, reserving the abstruser discussions of the relation of His will to occurrences for a later point in the treatise, when the reader's mind, by a contemplation of the divine works, will be better prepared to read off the underlying purpose from the actual event. The practical end which has determined this sequence of topics governs also the manner in which the subject of creation, now taken up (chs. xiv-xv), is dealt with. There is no discussion of it from a formal point of view: the treatment is wholly material and is devoted rather to the nature of the created universe than to the mode of the Divine activity in creating it. Even in dealing with the created universe, there is no attempt at completeness of treatment. The spiritual universe is permitted to absorb the attention; and what is said about the lower creation is reduced to a mere hint or two introduced chiefly, it appears, to recommend the contemplation of it as a means of quickening in the heart a sense of God's greatness and goodness (xiv. §§20-22).

It is quite obvious, in fact, from the beginning, that Calvin's mind is set in this whole discussion of creation primarily on expounding the nature of man as a creature of God; and all else that he incorporates into it is subsidiary to this.

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<sup>1</sup> This article continues articles on *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God*, *Calvin's Doctrine of God*, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity*, published in this REVIEW for April, July and October 1909 respectively.

<sup>2</sup> References by numerals alone are to the *Institutes*.

He is writing for men and bends all he is writing to what he conceives to be their practical interests. He does not reach the actual discussion of man as creature, to be sure (ch. xv), until after he has interposed a long exposition of the nature of angels and demons (xiv. 3-12, and 13-19). But this whole exposition is cast in a form which shows that angels and demons are interesting to Calvin only because of the high estimate he places upon the topic for the practical life of man; and it is introduced by a remark which betrays that his thought was already on man as the real subject of his exposition and all he had to say about other spiritual creatures was conceived as only preliminary to that more direct object of interest. "But before I begin to speak more fully concerning the nature of man," he says quite gratuitously at the opening of the discussion (xiv. 3 *ad init.*), "something should be inserted (*inserere*) about angels." What he actually says about angels, good and bad, in the amount of space occupied by it, is more than what he says about man: but it stood before his mind, we observe, as only "something," and as something, be it noted, "inserted," before the real subject of his discourse was reached. In his own consciousness what Calvin undertakes in these chapters is to make man aware of his own nature as a creature of God, and to place him as a creature of God in his environment, the most important elements of which he conceives to be the rest of the intelligent creation.

It is not to be inferred, of course, from the lightness with which Calvin passes over the doctrine of creation itself in this discussion that he took little interest in it or deemed it a matter of no great significance. That he does not dwell more fully on it is due, as we have said, to the practical nature of his undertaking, and was rendered possible by the circumstance that this doctrine was not in dispute.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvin*, pp. 50-41: "Although the importance of the doctrine of creation is felt by the two reformers, yet we seek in vain in Zwingli as well as in Calvin for a definite theory of creation. . . . The reason why the doctrine of creation was not developed by them in the same degree as that of



All men in the circles which he was addressing were of one mind on it, and there were sources of information within the reach of all which rendered it unnecessary for him to enlarge on it.<sup>4</sup> That he had a clear and firm conception of the nature of the creative act and attributed importance to its proper apprehension is made abundantly plain; and is emphasized by his consecration of the few remarks he gives professedly to the topic to repelling assaults upon its credibility drawn from the nature of the Divine Being (xiv. 1-2).

In his conception of creation Calvin definitely separated himself from all dualistic,<sup>5</sup> and especially from all pantheistic<sup>6</sup> elements of thought by sharply asserting that all substantial existence outside of God owes its being to God, that it was created by God out of nothing, and that it came from God's hand very good. His crispest definition of creation he lets fall incidentally in repelling the pantheistic notion that, as he scornfully describes it, "the essence of the Creator is rent into fragments that each may have a part of it." "Creation," he says, "is not the transfusion, but the origination out of nothing, of essence."<sup>7</sup> "God," says he again, "by the power of His Word and Spirit created out of

providence, must no doubt be sought in the fact that this dogma did not at the time give occasion to any polemic." Also, *De Godsleer van Calvin*, p. 57: "We cannot think it strange that Calvin, as a Biblical theologian, will know nothing of any other theory of creation than that which is given us in the Scriptures."

<sup>4</sup>I. xiv. 20: He refers his readers to Moses, as expounded particularly by Basil and Ambrose, "since it is not my design to treat at large of the creation of the world."

<sup>5</sup>Cf. I. xiv. 3, where he inveighs against "Manichaeus and his sect," who attributed to God the origin of good things only, but referred evil natures to the devil. The sole foundation of this heresy, he remarks, is that it is nefarious to ascribe to the good God the creation of any evil thing: but this is inoperative as "there is nothing in the universe which has an evil nature,"—"since neither the pravity nor the malice of either man or devil, or the sins that are born from them, are of nature, but rather of corruption of nature."

<sup>6</sup>Cf. I. xvi. 5: "To rend the essence of the Creator so that everything should possess a part, is the extremity of madness."

<sup>7</sup>I. xv. 5, *med*: creatio autem non transfusio est, sed essentiae ex nihilo exordium.

nothing, the heavens and the earth," that is to say, all that exists, whether celestial or terrestrial.<sup>8</sup> Firmly stated as this doctrine of creation is, however, so as to leave us in no doubt as to Calvin's conception,<sup>9</sup> the elements of it are little elaborated. There is no attempt for example to validate the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* whether on biblical<sup>10</sup> or on such rational grounds as we find appealed to by Zwingli, who argues that creation *ex materia* implies an infinite series whether the material out of which the creation is made be conceived as like or unlike in kind to that which is made from it.<sup>11</sup> As we have seen, Calvin does argue, however,

\* I. xiv. 20: Deum verbi ac Spiritus sui potentia ex nihilo creasse coelum et terram. Cf. Genevan Catechism, 1545, *Opp.* VI. 15, 16: Per coelum et terram an non quidquid praeterea creaturarum extat, intelligis? Imo vero; sed his duobus nominibus continentur omnes. quod aut coelestes omnes aut terrenae.

\* C. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer von Calvijn*, p. 53: "Calvin's doctrine of creation is in brief, this: God created the world out of nothing in six days through His Word, i.e. through His Son."

In the Argument to the Commentary on Gen. 1, however, he does argue that the Bible teaches that creation is *ex nihilo*, the weight of the argument being made to rest on the use of ברא, which he sharply riminates from עשה. Cf. Baumgartner, *Calvin Hebraisant*, 1889, 50, 51: "Richard Simon has pointed, as a proof that Calvin was strong in Hebrew, to the fact that he understands the ברא of Gen. i. 1 in the sense of 'creation *ex nihilo*.' But here again R. Simon has been misled by his party-spirit, for the modern lexicographers are from pronouncing Calvin's interpretation wrong" (e.g. Gesenius, *Thesaurus*, I. p. 236). The most recent view will scarcely allow that specific idea of creation *ex nihilo* is expressed in ברא but recognizes that the ideas of novelty, extraordinariness, effortlessness are expressed in it, and that thus it may be said to lay a basis for the doctrine in question: cf. Franz Böhl, *Alttestamentliche Studien Rudolf Kittel* 60 *Geburtstag dargelegt*, 1913, pp. 42-60, and Skinner, *Genesis*, 14, 15. Calvin does not understand Heb. xi. 3 of creation *ex nihilo*, interprets it as the manifestation of the Invisible God in the visible works of His hands, "that we have in this visible world a conspicuous image of God"; "thus the same truth is taught here as in Rom. i. 20, where it is said that the invisible things of God are made known to us by the creation of the world, they being seen by His works." This is the burden of the Argument to the Commentary on Gen. 1, and its echoes are heard in *Inst.* I. xv. 1.

\* *Works*, IV. 86 seq.: Zwingli argues that, if the preëxisting stuff is the same in kind as the thing created, we have an infinite series of worlds: if

(like Zwingli), that creation in its very nature is "origination of essence", so that he would have subscribed Zwingli's declaration: "This is the definition of creation: to be out of nothing."<sup>12</sup> He does not even dwell upon the part which the Son takes in the creating, although he does not leave this important matter unmentioned, but declares that "the worlds were created by the Son",<sup>13</sup> and that God created the heavens and earth "by the power of His Word and Spirit",<sup>14</sup> thus setting the act of creation in its Trinitarian relation. It is, however, rather in the preceding chapter where he adduces the share they took in creation in proof of the deity of the Son and the Spirit that Calvin develops this fact. There he urges that the power to create and the authority to command were "common to the Father, Son and Spirit", as is shown. he says, by the words "Let us make man in our image" of Genesis i. 26; and argues at length from the creation-narrative of Genesis and the Wisdom passage in Proverbs, no less than from Heb. i. 2, 3, that it was through the Son that God made the worlds.<sup>15</sup> On one thing, however, he manages of a different kind, we have an infinite series of materials. Hence the world is not *ex materia*, but *ex causa*, which is as much as to say *ex nihilo*.

<sup>12</sup> *Works*, IV. 87: he defines creation as "esse e nihilo; vel, esse quod prius non fuit, attamen non ex alio tamquam ex materia."

<sup>13</sup> I. xiii. 7.

<sup>14</sup> I. xiii. 24 near end.

<sup>15</sup> I. xiii. 7; cf. *Comment.* on Heb. i. 2: "By Him . . . the world was created, since He is the eternal Wisdom of God, which was the director of all His works from the beginning. Hence too we gather that Christ is eternal, for He must needs be before the world has been made by Him." Cf. also *Comment.* on Gen. i. 3: "Since He is the Word of God, all things have been created by Him." And see especially the passage in the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536), at the beginning of the comment on the "second part of the Symbol" (*Opp.* I. p. 64), where, after declaring on the basis of Heb. i. that "since God the Son is the same God with the Father" He is "the creator of the heavens and the earth," he proceeds to explain that the habit of alluding to the Father nevertheless peculiarly as the "creator of the heavens and the earth" is due to "that distinction of properties, already stated, by which there is referred to the Father the principium agendi," so that He Himself is indeed properly said to act (*agere*), yet through His Word and Wisdom—yet in His Power." "But," he adds, "that the action in the creation



to insist despite the sketchiness with which he treats the whole subject. This is that whatever came from the divine hands came from them good. "It is monstrous," he declares,<sup>16</sup> "to ascribe to the good God the creation of any evil thing," and we may not admit that there is in the whole world anything evil in its nature,<sup>17</sup> but must perceive that in all that He has made God has displayed His wisdom and justice. Wherever evil has appeared, then, whether in man or devil, it is not *ex natura*, but *ex naturae corruptione*,<sup>18</sup> not *ex creatione* but *ex depravatione*.<sup>19</sup> We must beware, therefore, lest in speaking of evil as natural to man, we should seem to refer it to the author of nature, whether we more coarsely conceive it as in some measure proceeding from God Himself, or, with more appearance of piety, ascribe it only to "nature". We cannot attribute to God what is in the most absolute sense alien to His very nature, and it is equally dishonoring to Him to ascribe any intrinsic depravity to the "nature" which comes from His hands.<sup>20</sup>

Calvin expressly disclaims the intention of expounding in detail the story of the creation of the world,<sup>21</sup> and judges it sufficient to refer his readers to the account given by Moses, along with the comments perhaps of Basil and Ambrose, for instruction in the particulars of its history.<sup>22</sup> He lets fall, however, a few remarks by the way, which enable us to

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of the world was common to the three Persons is made clear by that word (Gen. i): 'Let us make man in our image and likeness' by which there is not expressed a deliberation with angels, nor a colloquy with Himself, but a summoning of His Wisdom and Power." Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Calvijn*, p. 51-2; *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, p. 53.

<sup>16</sup> I. xiv. 3 *med*: nefas esse adscribi bono Deo ullius rei malae creationem.

<sup>17</sup> Do.: aliquam esse in mundi universitate malam naturam.

<sup>18</sup> I. xiv. 3.

<sup>19</sup> I. xiv. 16 *ad init*.

<sup>20</sup> I. xv. 1. and I. xiv. 16: "Quidquid damnabile . . . est a Deo alienissimum": "Cujus in contumeliam recideret, si quid vitii inesse naturae probantur."

<sup>21</sup> I. xiv. 20 *ad fin*: creationem enarrare.

<sup>22</sup> I. xiv. 20 *ad init*: cf. I. xiv. 1.

perceive his attitude towards the narrative of Genesis. Needless to say he takes it just as he finds it written. The six days he, naturally, understands as six literal days; and, accepting the *prima facie* chronology of the Biblical narrative, he dates the creation of the world something less than six thousand years in the past. He does not suppose, however, that Moses has included in his story anything like an exhaustive account of all that was created. The instance of angels, of whose origin Moses gives no history, is conclusive to the contrary. Moses, writing to meet the needs of men at large, accommodated himself to their grade of intellectual preparation, and confines himself to what meets their eyes.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand Calvin will not admit that the created universe can be properly spoken of as infinite. God alone is infinite; and, "however wide the circuit of the heavens may be, it nevertheless has some dimension".<sup>24</sup> He frankly conceives of the created universe as geocentric,<sup>25</sup> or more properly as anthropocentric. "God Himself," he declares, "has demonstrated by the very order of creation, that He made all things for the sake of man."<sup>26</sup> For, before making man, "He prepared everything which He foresaw would be useful or salutary for him."<sup>27</sup> It was "for human use that He disposed the motions of the sun and stars, that He filled the earth, the waters, the air with living creatures, that He produced an abundance of all kinds of fruits which might be sufficient for food,"—thus acting the part of a provident and sedulous father and showing his wonderful goodness towards us."<sup>28</sup>

Two difficulties which arise out of the consideration of

<sup>23</sup> I. xiv. 3, *ad init*: vulgi ruditate se accommodans . . . populariter loquens.

<sup>24</sup> I. xiv. 1: certe quantumvis late pateat coelorum circuitus, est tamen aliqua ejus dimensio.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. the Argt. to the *Comm.* on Gen. 1: "The circle of the heavens is finite, and the earth, like a little globe, is placed in the center."

<sup>26</sup> I. xiv. 22: omnia se hominis causa condere. Cf. *Com.* on Gen. iii. 1: "the whole world which had been created for the sake of man."

<sup>27</sup> *Do.*

<sup>28</sup> I. xiv. 2.



the infinitude of God in connection with His creative work, Calvin finds sufficiently important to pause even in so rapid a sketch to deal with. These concern the relation of the idea of creation to that of eternity on the one hand, and the description of the creation as a process on the other. Both of these also, however, he treats rather from a practical than a theoretical point of view.

He does not even hint at the metaphysical difficulty which has been perennially derived from the Divine eternity and immutability, that a definite creation implies a change in God,—the difficulty which Wollebius so neatly turns by the remark that “creation is not the creator’s but the creature’s passage from potentiality to actuality.”<sup>29</sup> The difficulty to which he addresses himself is the purely popular one, which, with a view to rendering the idea of a definite act of creation on God’s part incredible, asks what God was doing all those ages before He created the world.<sup>30</sup> His response proceeds in general on the principle of answering a fool according to his folly, although it is directed to the serious purpose of recalling men’s minds, from fruitless attempts to fathom the mysteries of infinity, to a profitable use of the creation-narrative as a mirror in which is exhibited a lively image of God.<sup>31</sup> The gist of this response seems to be summed up in a sentence which occurs in the Argument to his Commentary on the first chapter of Genesis—which runs very much parallel to the discussion here. “God,” he says, “being wholly sufficient for Himself, did not create a world of which He had no need, until it pleased Him to do so.” He does not disdain, however, before closing to advert, under the leading of Augustine,<sup>32</sup> even to the metaphysical consideration that there is no place for a question of “time when” in our thought of that act of God by which time began to be. We might as well inquire, Augustine had reasoned,

<sup>29</sup> *Compendium Theologiae Christ.* Oxford, 1657, p. 36 (I. V.).

<sup>30</sup> I. xiv. 1.

<sup>31</sup> This point is very fully elaborated in the Argument to the Commentary on Gen. i. and in the comment on Heb. i. 13.

<sup>32</sup> *City of God*, xi. 5.



why God created the world *where* He did, as why He created it only *when* He did. We may puzzle ourselves with the notion that there is room in infinite space for an infinite number of finite universes as readily as with the parallel notion that there was opportunity in eternal time for the creation of an infinite series of worlds before ours was reached. The truth is, of course, that, as there is no space outside of that material world the dimensions of which when abstractly considered constitute what we call "space"; so there is no time outside that world of mutable existence from which we abstract the notion of succession and call it time. "If they say," reasons Augustine, "that the thoughts of men are idle, when they conceive of infinite places, since there is no place beside the world, we reply that, by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of past times of God's rest, since there is no time before the world." Utilizing Augustine's remarks Calvin warns his readers against vainly striving to press "outside of the world" (*extra mundum*) by "the boundaries of which we are circumscribed", and exhorts them to seek in "the ample circumference of heaven and earth" and the certainly sufficient space of "six thousand years" material for meditating on the glory of God who has made them all. The primary matter for us to observe in this discussion is the persistence with which Calvin clings to the practical purpose of his treatise, so as even in connection with such abstruse subjects to confine himself to the "practical use" of them. But it is not illegitimate to observe also the hints the discussion supplies of his metaphysical opinions. His doctrines of "space" and "time" are here suggested to us. Clearly, he holds that what we call "space" is only an abstraction from the concrete dimensions of extended substance; and what we call "time," an abstraction from the concrete successions of mutable being. "Space" and "time," therefore, were to him qualities of finite being, and have come into existence and will pass out of existence with finite being. To speak of "infinite" space or "infinite" time contains accordingly a *contradictio in adjecto*.

Perhaps it may not be improper to pause here a moment to observe in passing the employment of humor by Calvin in his discussions. It is rather a mordant bit of humor which appears here, it is true,—this story of the “pious old man” who when a “scoffer” demanded of him what God had been doing before He created the world, replied, “Making hell for inquisitive people” (*fabricasse inferos curiosis*); and moreover it is borrowed,—ultimately—from Augustine.<sup>32</sup> But though borrowing a story of Augustine’s, Calvin does not follow Augustine in his attitude towards it. Augustine declines to commend such a response, because, says he, he would shrink from making a laughing-stock of anyone who brings forward a profound question; while Calvin approves it as a fit answer to a scoffer who raises frivolous objections.<sup>33</sup> And mordant though it is, it provides an instance of that use of humor in argument which was a marked trait of Calvin’s manner,—and which reveals to us an element of his character not always fully recognized. As this humor manifests itself in his writings—which are predominantly controversial in tone,—it is sufficiently pungent. The instance before us is a fair sample of it; and we have already had occasion to note another characteristic instance—his rallying

<sup>32</sup> *Confessions*, XI. xii. 14: “Behold, I answer to him who asks ‘What was God doing before He made heaven and earth’—I answer not, as a certain person is reported to have done facetiously (avoiding the pressure of the question). ‘He was preparing hell,’ saith he, ‘for those who pry into mysteries.’ It is one thing to perceive, another to laugh—these things I answer not. Far more willingly I would have answered, ‘I know not,’ than I should make him a laughing-stock who asks deep things, and gain praise as one who answers false things.” The Argument to the *Commentary* on Genesis i, runs parallel to the opening paragraphs of this chapter in the *Institutes*; and we are there told that Calvin borrows this anecdote immediately, not from Augustine, but from “The Tripartite History,”—that is to say, the *Historiae Ecclesiasticae Tripartitae Epitome*, Cassiodorus’ revision of the translation made at his instance of the histories of Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret by Epiphanius Scholasticus (for whom see Smith and Wace, *Dict. of Christ. Biography*, ii, p. 159). This book supplied the mediaeval church with its knowledge of post-Eusebian church history.

<sup>33</sup> *Ac scite pius ille senex . . . quum posterius quispiam . . . per ludibrium quaeriret.*



of Caroli in the matter of the ancient creeds.<sup>34</sup> His *"Very useful Notice of the great profit which would accrue to Christianity if there should be made an inventory of all the holy bodies and relics which are to be found in Italy, France, Germany, Spain and other kingdoms and nations"* (1543) might almost to be said to reek with similar instances. He became quickly famous for his biting pen and was solemnly reproved by Sebastian Castellion for employing such weapons and encouraging others in the use of them. He not only, however, approved Beza's and Viret's satirical polemics and heartily enjoyed them—commending them to his friends as full of delightfulness—but he even develops a theory of the use of humor in instruction, and of the nature of true facetiousness. "Many—or perhaps we may say, most—men," he says, "are much more readily helped when they are instructed in a joyous and pleasant manner than otherwise. . . . Those who have the gift to teach in such a manner as to delight their readers, and to induce them to profit by the pleasure they give them, are doubly to be praised." "He who wishes to use humor," he adds, however, "ought to guard himself from two faults,"—he must neither be forced in his wit, nor must he descend to scurrility.

But his cutting satire was only one manifestation of a special talent for pleasantry which characterized all his intercourse. Laughter, he taught, is the gift of God: and he held it the right, or rather the duty, of the Christian man to practice it in its due season. He is constantly joking with his friends in his letters,<sup>35</sup> and he eagerly joins with them in all the joys of life. "I wish I was with you for half a day," he writes to one of them, "to laugh with you."<sup>36</sup> In a word, contrary to a general impression, Calvin was a man of a great freshness and jocundness of spirit; and so little was he inclined to suppress the expression of the gayer side of life that he rather sedulously cultivated it in himself and looked

<sup>34</sup> THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October 1909, p. 574.

<sup>35</sup> *E.g.* XI. p. 326 (*jocari quam serio conqueri*).

<sup>36</sup> XII. p. 578.



with pleasure on its manifestation in others. He enjoyed a joke hugely,<sup>37</sup> with that open-mouthed laugh which, as one of his biographers phrases it,<sup>38</sup> belonged to the men of the sixteenth century. And he knew even how to smile at human folly—wishing that the people might not be deprived of their pleasures<sup>39</sup> and might even be dealt with indulgently in their faults. When his students misbehaved, for example, he simply said he thought they ought to have some indulgence and should be accorded the right to be sometimes foolish.<sup>40</sup>

That the work of creation should be thought to occupy time was as much a matter of scoffing from the evil-disposed as that it should take place in time. Why should the omnipotent God take six days to make the world? Did He perhaps find it too hard a task for a single effort?<sup>41</sup> This cavil, too, Calvin deals with purely from the practical point of view, not so much undertaking to refute it as recalling men's minds from it to dwell on the condescension of God in distributing His work into six days that our finite intelligence

<sup>37</sup> In his youthful work as a humanist,—the Commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia*—he betrays the readiness of his laughter by his comments on the amusing matters that come before him. In the comment on I. vii. (*Opp.* V. p. 62) he expresses his sense of the ridiculousness of the soothsayer's solemn mummary and quotes Cato's remark "that it was wonderful that every soothsayer did not laugh whenever he met a fellow soothsayer." On I. x. (*Opp.* V. 84) speaking of the apotheoses of the Roman emperors he adds; "The rites and ceremonies by which the emperors were consecrated are set forth by Herodianus in his ix Book; and I am never able to refrain from laughter when I read that passage. The religion of the Romans was as ridiculous as this" . . . Calvin enjoyed his reading and responded to the matter he read with an emotional movement.

<sup>38</sup> Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, III. pp. 535-540, where the whole subject is admirably illustrated. See also Doumergue, *L'Art et le Sentiment dans l'Oeuvre de Calvin*, etc., Geneva, 1902, the third Conférence, pp. 61-67. On Calvin's use of satire, see C. Lenient, *La Satire en France, ou la Littérature militante au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 1877, Vol. i, pp. 107 seq., esp. pp. 175 seq. Cf. *The Methodist Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1909., pp. 650ff.

<sup>39</sup> XII. 348; non posse negari omni oblectamenta.

<sup>40</sup> *Opp.* X<sup>o</sup>, p. 441.

<sup>41</sup> I. xiv. 2: Hic etiam obstrepat humana ratio, quasi a Dei potentia alieni fuerint tales progressus.

might not be overwhelmed with its contemplation; and on the goodness of God in thus leading our thoughts up to the consideration of the rest of the seventh day; and above all on the paternal care of God in so ordering the work of bringing the world into being as to prepare it for man before He introduced him into it. In drawing the mind thus away from the cavil, Calvin does not, however, fail to meet the difficulty itself, which was adduced. His response to it, is, in effect, to acknowledge that God perfected the world by process (*progressus*, I. xiv. 2); but to assert that this method of performing his work was not for His own sake, but for ours; so that, so far is this progressive method of producing the world from being unworthy of God, because "alien from His power,"<sup>42</sup> that it rather illustrates His higher attributes,—his paternal love, for example, which would not create man until He had enriched the world with all things necessary for his happiness. Considered in Himself, "it would have been no more difficult" for God "to complete at once the whole work in all its items in a single moment, than to arrive at its completion gradually by a process of this kind."<sup>43</sup>

It should be observed that in this and similar discussions founded on the progressive completion of the world, Calvin does not intend to attribute what we may speak strictly of as progressive creation to God. With Calvin, while the perfecting of the world—as its subsequent government—is a process, creation, strictly conceived, tended to be thought of as an act. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth": after that it was not "creation" strictly so called but "formation," gradual modelling into form, which took place. Not, of course, as if Calvin conceived creation deistically; as if he thought of God as having created the world-stuff and then left it to itself to work out its own destiny under the laws impressed on it in its creation. A "momentary

<sup>42</sup> I. xiv. 2: a Dei potentia alieni.

<sup>43</sup> I. xiv. 22: quum nihilo difficilior esset, uno momento totum opus simul omnibus numeris complere, quam ejusmodi progressionem sensim ad complementum pervenire.



Creator, who has once for all done His work," was inconceivable to him: and he therefore taught that it is only when we contemplate God in providence that we can form any true conception of Him as Creator.<sup>44</sup> But he was inclined to draw a sharp distinction in kind between the primal act of creation of the heavens and the earth out of nothing, and the subsequent acts of moulding this created material into the forms it was destined to take; and to confine the term "creation," strictly conceived, to the former. Hence in perhaps the fullest statement of his doctrine of creation given us in these chapters,<sup>45</sup> he expresses himself carefully thus: "God, by the power of His Word and Spirit created out of nothing (*creasse ex nihilo*) the heavens and the earth; thence produced (*produxisse*) every kind of animate and inanimate thing, distinguished by a wonderful gradation the innumerable variety of things, endowed each kind with its own nature, assigned its offices, appointed its place and station to it, and, since all things are subject to corruption, provided, nevertheless, that each kind should be preserved safe to the last day." "Thus," he adds, "He marvellously adorned heaven and earth with the utmost possible abundance, variety and beauty of all things, like a great and splendid house, most richly and abundantly constructed and furnished; and then at last by forming (*formando*) man and distinguishing him with such noble beauty, and with so many and such high gifts, he exhibited in him the noblest specimen of His works."<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> I. xvi. 1. Cf. the Genevan Catechism of 1545 (*Opp.* vi, pp. 15-16, 17-18) where the question is asked why God is called in the Creed only Creator of heaven and earth, when "tueri conservareque in suo statu creaturos," is "multo praestantius" than just to have once created them. The answer is that by this particularizing of creation, it is not intended to imply that "God so created His works at one time (*semel*) that He afterwards rejects the care of them." On the contrary, He upholds and governs all He made; and this is included in the idea of His creation of them all. Cf. also the *Confession des Escholiers* of 1559 (*Opp.* ix, pp. 721-2) where we read: "I confess that God created the world at once (*semel*), in such a manner as to be its perpetual governor. . . ."

<sup>45</sup> I. xiv. 20.

<sup>46</sup> It is worth while to observe here how Calvin betrays his sensi-



It is God who has made all things what they are, he teaches: but, in doing so, God has acted in the specific mode properly called creation only at the initial step of the process, and the result owes its right to be called a creation to that initial act by which the material of which all things consist was called into being from non-being. "Indigested mass" as it was, yet in that world-stuff was "the seed of the whole world", and out of it that world as we now see it (for "the world was not perfected at its very beginning, in the manner it is now seen"<sup>47</sup>) has been evoked by progressive acts of God: and it is therefore that this world, because evoked from it, has the right to be called a creation.

The distinction which Calvin here draws, it is to be observed, is not that which has been commonly made by Reformed divines under the terms, First and Second Creation, or in less exact language Immediate and Mediate Creation. This distinction posits a sequence of truly creative acts of God throughout the six days, and therefore defines creation, so as to meet the whole case, as that act by which God produced the world and all that is in it, partly *ex nihilo*, partly *ex materia naturaliter inhabili*, for the manifestation of the glory of His power, wisdom and goodness";<sup>48</sup> or more fully, as that "first external work of God, by which in the beginning of time, without suffering any change, by his own free will, He produced by His sole omnipotent command *immediate per se* things which before were not, from simple non-being to being,—and that, either *ex nihilo*, or *ex materia* which had afore been made *e nihilo*, but is *naturaliter inhabili* for receiving the form which, created out of nothing, the Creator induces into it."<sup>49</sup>

bility to the glory and beauty of nature (cf. also I. v. 6; *Opp.* XXIX. p. 300). See the remarks of E. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, IV, 1910, p. 105.

<sup>47</sup> These phrases occur in the Commentary on Genesis i.

<sup>48</sup> Joannes Wollebius, *as cited*, p. 35.

<sup>49</sup> Amand. Polanus, *Syntagma Theologiae Christianae*, Hanov. 1625, v. 2. Cf. Gisb. Voetius, *Disp.* I. p. 554: "Creation may be distinguished . . . into first and second. The first is the production of a thing *ex nihilo*, and in this manner were produced the heavens, the elements,

It is precisely this sequence of truly creative acts which Calvin disallows; and he so expresses himself, indeed, as to give it a direct contradiction. Perhaps as distinct a statement of his view as any is found in his comment on Genesis i. 21, where the term "create" is employed to designate the divine production of the animals of the sea and air, which, according to verse 20, had been brought forth by the waters at the command of God. "A question arises here, remarks Calvin, "about the word 'created'. For we have before contended that the world was made of nothing because it was 'created': but now Moses says the things formed from other matter were 'created.' Those who assert that the fishes were truly and properly 'created' because the waters were in no way suitable (*idoneae*) or adapted (*aptae*) to their production, only resort to a subterfuge; for the fact would remain, meanwhile, that the material of which they were made existed before, which, in strict propriety, the word does not admit. I therefore do not restrict 'creation' [here] to the work of the fifth day, but rather say it[s use] refers to (hangs from, *pendet*) that shapeless and confused mass which was, as it were, the fountain of the whole world. God, then, is said to have 'created' the sea-monsters and other fishes, because the beginning of their 'creation' is not to be reckoned from the moment in which they received their form, but they are comprehended in the universal matter (*corpus, corpore*) which was made out of nothing. So that with respect to their kind, form only was then added to them; 'creation' is nevertheless a term used truly with respect to the whole and the parts."

Calvin's motive in thus repudiating the notion of "Mediate Creation" is not at all chariness on his part with respect to the supernatural. It is not the supernaturalness of the pro-

light; and every day there are so produced human souls, so far as they are spiritual in essence. The second is the production of the essential or accidental form, in *praesubjecta sed indisposita plane materia*, and that by the immediate operation of the divine power; and in this manner were produced the works of the five days as also many miraculous works in the order of nature as now constituted."



duction of the creatures which the waters and earth brought forth which he disallows; but only the applicability to their production of the term "creation". On verse 26, he comments thus: "There is in this respect a miracle as great as if God had begun to create out of nothing these things which he commanded to proceed from the earth." Calvin's sole motive seems to be to preserve to the great word "create" the precise significance of to "make out of nothing", and he will not admit that it can be applied to any production in which preëxistent material is employed.<sup>50</sup> This might appear to involve the view that after the creation of the world-stuff recorded in Genesis i. 1, there was never anything specifically new produced by the divine power. And this might be expressed by saying that, from that point on, the Divine works were purely works of providence, since the very differentia of a providential work is that it is the product proximately of second causes. Probably this would press Calvin's contention, however, a little too far: he would scarcely say there was no immediacy in the divine action in the productions of the five days of "creation", or indeed in the working of miracles. But we must bear in mind that his view of providence was a very high one, and he was particularly insistent that God acted through means, when He did act through means, through no necessity but purely at His own volition. Second causes, in his view, are nothing more than "instruments into which God infuses as much of efficiency as He wishes," and which He employs or not at His will.<sup>51</sup> "The power of no created thing," says Calvin, "is more wonderful or evident than that of the sun. . . . But the Lord . . . willed that light should exist before the sun was created. A pious man will not make the sun, then, either the principal or the necessary cause of the things which existed before the sun was created, but only an instrument which God uses because He wishes to; since He could without any difficulty at all do without the sun and

<sup>50</sup> See above, note 10.

<sup>51</sup> I. xvi. 2.



act of Himself."<sup>52</sup> The facility with which Calvin sets aside the notion of "mediate creation" is then due in no sense to desire to remove the productions of the five days of "creation" out of the category of Divine products, but is itself mediated by the height of His doctrine of providence.<sup>53</sup>

It is important further that we should not suppose that Calvin removed the production of the human soul out of the category of immediate creation, in the strictest sense of that term. When he insists that the works of the days subsequent to the first, when "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth", were not strictly speaking "creations," because they were not productions *ex nihilo*, he is thinking only of the lower creation, inclusive, no doubt, of the human body; all this is made out of that primal "indigested mass" which sprang into being at the initial command of God. The soul is a different matter; and not only in the first instance, but in every succeeding instance, throughout the whole course of human propagation, is an immediate creation *ex nihilo*. Moses, he tells us, perfectly

<sup>52</sup> *Ditto*: cf. also the Commentary on Gen. i. 1 sq.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Köstlin. *TSK*, 1868, p. 427: "In the section of edition 2<sup>b</sup> (Vol. xxix, p. 510) on God as the Almighty Creator there should be particularly noted the emphasis with which Calvin maintains, in spite of the mediation of the divine activity through creaturely instruments, yet the dependence of these instruments, and the absolute independence of God with respect to them. And in ed. 3 (Vol. xxx. pp. 145 sq. 150; Lib. I. c. 16 §§2, 7), there are given still stronger expositions of this. God, says Calvin, bestows on the instruments powers purely in accordance with His own will, and governs them; and God could work what He works through them, say through the sun, just as easily without them, purely by Himself. God, he says, in ed. 3, lets us be nourished ordinarily by bread; and yet according to Scripture, man does not live by bread alone, for it is not the abundance of food but the divine blessing which nourishes us; and on the other hand (Isaiah iii. 1) He threatens to break the staff of bread." "We have here already," adds Köstlin, "the general premises for the special use which God, according to Calvin, makes of the Word and of the Sacraments for His saving work." Would anybody but a Lutheran have ever thought of the "means of Grace" in this connection? Nevertheless it is not bad to be reminded that the Reformed doctrine of the "means of Grace" has its analogue in the Reformed doctrine of providence: it is a corollary of the fundamental notion of God as the Independent One.

understood that the soul was created from nothing;<sup>54</sup> and he announces with emphasis,<sup>55</sup> that it is certain that the souls of men are "no less created than the angels," adding the decisive definition: "now, creation is the origination of essence *ex nihilo*." It is thus with the lower creation alone in his mind that Calvin insists that all that can justly be called by the high name of "creation" was wrought by God on the first day, in that one act by which He created, that is called into Being out of nothing, the heavens and the earth.

It should scarcely be passed without remark that Calvin's doctrine of creation is, if we have understood it aright, for all except the souls of men, an evolutionary one. The "indigested mass," including the "promise and potency" of all that was yet to be, was called into being by the simple *fiat* of God. But all that has come into being since—except the souls of men alone—has arisen as a modification of this original world-stuff by means of the interaction of its intrinsic forces. Not these forces apart from God, of course: Calvin is a high theist, that is, supernaturalist, in His ontology of the universe and in his conception of the whole movement of the universe. To him God is the *prima causa omnium* and that not merely in the sense that all things ultimately—in the world-stuff—owe their existence to God; but in the sense that all the modifications of the world-stuff have taken place under the directly upholding and governing hand of God, and find their account ultimately in His will. But they find their account proximately in "second causes"; and this is not only evolutionism but pure evolutionism. What account we give of these second causes is a matter of ontology; how we account for their existence, their persistence, their action,—the relation we conceive them to stand in to God, the upholder and director as well as creator of them. Calvin's ontology of second causes was, briefly stated, a very pure and complete doctrine of *con-*

<sup>54</sup> *Commentary* on Malachi i. 2-6 (*Opp.* 44, p. 401).

<sup>55</sup> *Inst.*, I. xv. 5.



*cursus*, by virtue of which he ascribed all that comes to pass to God's purpose and directive government. But that does not concern us here. What concerns us here is that he ascribed the entire series of modifications by which the primal "indigested mass," called "heaven and earth," has passed into the form of the ordered world which we see, including the origination of all forms of life, vegetable and animal alike, inclusive doubtless of the bodily form of man, to second causes as their proximate account. And this, we say, is a very pure evolutionary scheme. He does not discuss, of course, the factors of the evolutionary process, nor does he attempt to trace the course of the evolutionary advance, nor even expound the nature of the secondary causes by which it was wrought. It is enough for him to say that God said, "Let the waters bring forth, . . . Let the earth bring forth", and they brought forth. Of the interaction of forces by which the actual production of forms was accomplished, he had doubtless no conception: he certainly ventures no assertions in this field. How he pictured the process in his imagination (if he pictured it in his imagination) we do not know. But these are subordinate matters. Calvin doubtless had no theory whatever of evolution; but he teaches a doctrine of evolution. He has no object in so teaching except to preserve to the creative act, properly so called, its purity as an immediate production out of nothing. All that is not immediately produced out of nothing is therefore not created—but evolved. Accordingly his doctrine of evolution is entirely unfruitful. The whole process takes place in the limits of six natural days. That the doctrine should be of use as an explanation of the mode of production of the ordered world, it was requisite that these six days should be lengthened out into six periods,—six ages of the growth of the world. Had that been done Calvin would have been a precursor of the modern evolutionary theorists. As it is, he only forms a point of departure for them to this extent,—that he teaches, as they teach, the modification of the original world-stuff into the varied forms which constitute the

ordered world, by the instrumentality of second causes,—or as a modern would put it, of its intrinsic forces. This is his account of the origin of the entire lower creation.<sup>56</sup>

Of this lower creation he has, however, as has already been pointed out, very little to say in the discussion of the creature which he has incorporated in the *Institutes* (I. xiv. §§20-22). And what he does say is chiefly devoted to the practical end of quickening in our hearts a sense of the glory and perfections of its Maker, whose wisdom, power, justice and goodness are illustrated by it, and of raising our hearts in gratitude to Him for His benefits to us. These are the two things, he says, which a contemplation of what is meant by God being the Creator of heaven and earth should work in us: an apprehension of His greatness as the Creator (§21) and an appreciation of His care for us His creatures, in the manner in which He has created us (§22). More than to suggest this, the scope of his treatise does not appear to him to demand of him; as it does not permit him to dwell on the details of the history of creation,—for which he therefore contents himself with referring his readers to the narrative of Genesis, with the comments of Basil and Ambrose. He pauses, therefore, only to insert the comprehensive statement of the elements of the matter which has already been cited, and which asserts that “God by the power of His Word and Spirit created out of nothing the heavens and the earth” and afterwards moulded this created material into the ordered world we see around us, which also He sustains and governs; in which, then, He has placed man, up to whom all the rest had tended and in whom He has afforded the culminating manifestation of His creative power (§20).

<sup>56</sup>H. Bavinck in the first of his “Stone Lectures” remarks: “The idea of development is not a production of modern times. It was already familiar to Greek philosophy. More particularly Aristotle raised it to the rank of the leading principle of his entire system by his significant distinction between *potentia* and *actus*. . . . This idea of development aroused no objection whatever in Christian theology and philosophy. On the contrary it was greatly extended and enriched by being linked with the principle of theism.” Calvin accordingly very naturally thought along the lines of a theistic evolutionism.



The main items of his teaching as to the physical universe may therefore be summed up in the propositions that it owes its existence absolutely to the Divine power;<sup>57</sup> that it was created out of nothing; that it was perfected through a process of formation which extended through six days; that it was made and adorned for the sake of man, and has been subjected to him; and that it illustrates in its structure and in all its movements the perfections of its Maker.

It is to the spiritual universe that Calvin turns with predilection, and the greater portion of the fourteenth chapter is devoted accordingly to a thoroughly Biblical account of angelic beings, good and bad (§§3-19). The careful Scripturalness of this account deserves emphasis. Calvin himself emphasizes it, and even permits himself to fall into a digression here, in order to expound at some length the proper attitude of the theological teacher to Scripture (I. xiv. 4). His design is to transmit plainly and clearly what the Scriptures teach,<sup>58</sup> and not to pass beyond the simple doctrine of Scripture in anything.<sup>59</sup> He therefore warns his readers against speculations as to "the orders" of angels, asking them to consider carefully the meagreness of the Scriptural foundation these have;<sup>60</sup> and holds the Pseudo-Dionysius up as a terrible example of misplaced subtlety and acuteness in such matters.<sup>60a</sup> Whereas Paul, who was actually rapt beyond the third heavens sealed his lips and declared it not lawful for a man to speak of the hidden things which he saw, Dionysius who never had such an experience writes with a fullness and confidence of detail which could be justified only if he had come down from heaven and was recounting what he had had the privilege of

<sup>57</sup> *Commentary* on Ps. cxlviii. 5 (*Opp.* 32, p. 432), he remarks: "The pronoun *He* is therefore emphatic, as if the prophet would say that the world is not eternal as profane men dream, nor is produced by some concurring atoms, but this beautiful order which we see suddenly stood forth (*exstitisse*) on the mandate of God." Cf. also *Opp.* 31, p. 327.

<sup>58</sup> I. xiv. 3: *diserte et explicate tradamus quae docet scriptura.*

<sup>59</sup> I. xiv. 4 end: *ex simplici scripturae doctrina.*

<sup>60</sup> I. xiv. 8 *ad init.*: *viderint quale habeant fundamentum.*

<sup>60a</sup> I. xiv. 4.

observing carefully with his own eyes. Such prating of things of which we can really know nothing is unworthy of a theologian, says Calvin; "for it is the part of the theologian not to amuse the ear with empty words, but to confirm the conscience by teaching what is true, certain, profitable."<sup>61</sup> And, "since the teaching of the Spirit is invariably profitable (*utiliter*), but in matters which are of less moment for edification, either He is altogether silent or touches on them only lightly and cursorily, it is our business cheerfully to remain ignorant of what is of no advantage to us."<sup>62</sup> There are two rules therefore which the modest and sober man will certainly bear in mind in the whole business of teaching religion. One is, in obscure matters, neither to speak nor to think, nor even to desire to know, anything more than what has been given us in the Word of God. The other is, in reading Scripture, to tarry for prolonged investigation and meditation only on what conduces to edification, and not to indulge curiosity or fondness for useless things.<sup>63</sup> Practicing what he preaches, Calvin endeavors therefore in all he has to say of angels to hold to the limit which the rule of piety prescribes, lest by indulging in speculation beyond measure he should lead the reader astray from the simplicity of the faith.<sup>64</sup> There are many things about angels, indeed, which it may be a matter of regret to some that the Scriptures have not told us.<sup>65</sup> But surely we ought to be

<sup>61</sup> I. xiv. 4: Theologo autem non garriendo aures oblectare, sed vera, certa, utilia docendo, conscientias confirmare propositum est.

<sup>62</sup> I. xiv. 3: Et certe, quum utiliter semper nos doceat Spiritus, in quibus vero parum est momenti ad aedificationem, vel subiceat prorsus, vel leviter tantum et cursim attingat: nostri quoque officii est, libenter ignorare quae non conducunt.

<sup>63</sup> I. xiv. 4: Ne longior sim, memimerimus hic, ut in tota religionis doctrina, tenendam esse unam modestiae et sobrietatis regulam, ne de rebus obscuris aliud vel loquamur, vel sentiamus, vel scire etiam appetamus quam quod Dei verbo fuerit nobis traditum. Alterum, ut in lectione scripturae, iis continenter quaerendis ac meditandis immoremur quae ad aedificationem pertinent: non curiositati aut rerum inutilium studio indulgeamus.

<sup>64</sup> I. xiv. 3 end.

<sup>65</sup> I. xiv. 16.



content with the knowledge which the Lord has given us, especially as, passing by frivolous questions, His wish has been to instruct us in what conduces to solid piety, the fear of His name, true confidence and the duties of holiness.<sup>66</sup> If we are not ashamed to be His disciples, how can we be ashamed to follow the method He has prescribed?<sup>67</sup> Nay, will we not even abhor those unprofitable speculations from which He recalls us, and rest in comfort in the simple Scriptural teaching, which with respect to good angels consoles us and confirms our faith by making us see in them the dispensers and administrators of the Divine goodness towards us, guarding our safety, assuring our defence, directing our ways, and protecting us by their care from evil,<sup>68</sup>—with respect to evil angels, warns us against their artifices and contrivances and provides us with firm and strong weapons to repel their attacks?<sup>69</sup>

In accordance with these views of our relation to Scripture as a source of and guide to knowledge, Calvin's whole discussion of angels is not only kept close to Scripture, but is marked by the strongest practical tendency. Perhaps what strikes the reader most forcibly upon the surface of the discussion is the completeness of the faith which it exhibits in the real existence of angelic beings and the concernment of man with them. We will recall the vividness of Luther's similar faith. Perhaps we may say that the supernaturalistic tone of the conceptions of the Reformers is in nothing more visible than in their vital sense of the spiritual environment in which human life is cast. To them angels and demons were actual factors in men's lives, to be counted upon and considered in our arrangements and adjustments as truly as our fellow men.<sup>70</sup> Denial of their reality as

<sup>66</sup> I. xiv. 3.

<sup>67</sup> *Do.*

<sup>68</sup> I. xiv. 6 *ad init.*

<sup>69</sup> I. xiv. 13 *ad init.*

<sup>70</sup> Zwingli seems to have been an exception, and to have looked upon the ascription of all events to the action of angels and especially to that of devils as inconsistent with the doctrine of providence: he twits Luther with ascribing everything to "the poor devil" and asks what

substantial existences was indeed prevalent enough to require notice and refutation. Calvin's refutation of it is, of course, derived entirely, however, from Scripture, and he recognizes that, therefore, it can have no force for those who do not believe in the Scriptures. He does not consider that it is on that account useless. He designs it to fortify pious minds against such madness and to call back the slothful and incautious to a more sober and better regulated mode of life. For those who believe in the Scriptural revelation, it must be confessed that his argument is complete and final, adducing as it does in the clearest way the chief Biblical evidence for the actual existence and activity of these superhuman intelligences.<sup>71</sup>

Calvin, then, teaches in accordance with Scripture, that angels are not "qualities or inspirations without substance, but real spirits".<sup>72</sup> He calls them "spirits", "minds", and as such defines them as beings whose characterizing qualities are "perception and intelligence".<sup>73</sup> His intention is to represent them as purely spiritual beings; and therefore he incidentally remarks that "it is certain" that they "have no form".<sup>74</sup> As "celestial spirits",<sup>75</sup> they are of higher powers than man, and receive in Scripture designations by which their dignity is indicated: Hosts, Powers, Principalities, Dominions, Thrones, even "Gods"—not of course as if then becomes of universal providence (*Works*, II<sup>b</sup>, 27). Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, p. 77, note. But Luther, remarks Muller, could believe in the determining providence of God, "*und wenn die welt voll teufel wär*". How it strikes a modern of the moderns may be learned from William Wrede's remark (*Paul*, E. T. p. 95): "Angels, in our time, belong to children and to poets; to Paul and his age they were a real and serious quantity."

<sup>71</sup> I. xiv. 9 and 19.

<sup>72</sup> I. xiv. 9: "ex quibus [Scripturis] clarissime evincitur re vera esse spiritus naturae subsistentis"; . . . "non qualitates aut inspirationes sine substantia sed veros spiritus";—19: "non motiones aut affectiones mentium, sed magis revera, quod dicuntur, mentes, vel spiritus sensu et intelligentia praeditos." Cf. *Opp.* 45, p. 271.

<sup>73</sup> I. xiv. 19, "sensu et intelligentia praeditos."

<sup>74</sup> I. xiv. 8: forma spiritus carere certum est. Cf. *Opp.* 40, p. 659: quoniam angeli carent corporibus.

<sup>75</sup> I. xiv. 5.



they were really "Gods" or ought to be worshipped, but "because in their ministry, as in a glass, they represent in some degree divinity to us".<sup>76</sup> "The preëminence (*præstantia*) of the angelic nature has," to be sure, "so impressed the minds of many" that they have felt it would be an injury to angels to degrade them, as it were, under the control of the One only God; and thus there has been invented for them a certain kind of divinity.<sup>77</sup> They are of course like God: for they were made in the image of God.<sup>78</sup> They are, however, just creatures of God, His servants who execute His commands.<sup>79</sup> Moses, it is true, in the history of creation, does not give any account of their creation: but that history does not pretend to be complete, but limits itself to the visible creation, and it is easy to collect from his subsequent introduction of angels as God's ministers that He is their maker.<sup>80</sup> So a matter of course does this seem to Calvin, that he does not stop here to adduce specific Scriptural assertions of the origination of angels by creation. These however he emphasizes elsewhere. Thus for example, in his commentary on the passage, he expounds Col. i. 16 as follows: "Because Paul wished to make this assertion"—that all things were created in the Son—"particularly of angels, he now mentions the invisible things: not only, then, the heavenly creatures visible to our eyes, but also the spiritual ones (*spirituales*) have been made (*conditæ*) by the Son of God." The inferiority of angels to Christ, he proceeds to remark, (in his commentary on the

<sup>76</sup> *Do. Cf. Opp.* 42, p. 455; 52, p. 86.

<sup>77</sup> *I.* xiv. 3.

<sup>78</sup> *I.* xv. 3 end: "Neither is it to be denied angelos ad Dei similitudinem creatos esse, since our highest perfection, as Christ testifies (*Mat.* xxii. 30), will be to become like them."

<sup>79</sup> *I.* xiv. 3: [Moses] angelos Dei ministros inducit, colligere facile licet eorum esse conditorem, cui suam operam et officia impendunt. *Cf.* 5: angelos sane, quum Dei sint ministri ad jussa ejus exsequenda ordinati, esse quoque illius creaturas, extra controversiam esse debet. Again 26: quum a Deo conditus sit diabolus. *Cf. Opp.* 33, p. 206; 55, p. 334.

<sup>80</sup> *I.* xiv. 3: eorum conditor. *Cf. Opp.* 35, p. 466. to the same effect.

next verse) is manifested in the four points: First, "because they were created (*creati*) by Him; secondly, because their creation (*creatio*) is referred to Him as its legitimate end; thirdly, because He always existed before they were created (*creabantur*); fourthly, because it is He who sustains them by His power and conserves them in their condition."<sup>81</sup> Creation in and of itself means with Calvin, as we have seen, absolute origination of essence, and he therefore teaches that the angels have been, like all other creatures, created out of nothing. It is to be held, he says, as a thing certain that the souls of men and angels alike "have been created"—adding at once: "Now creation is not transfusion but the origination out of nothing of essence."<sup>82</sup>

The questions of when they were created and how their

<sup>81</sup> *Opp.* 32, pp. 85-86. The assertion of Psalm cxlviii. 5 (*Opp.* 32, p. 432) he apparently confines to "creaturis sensu carentibus": but on the first verse he incidentally remarks of the angels that "they were created (*conditi sunt*)."<sup>81</sup> Cf. the assertions of the creation of the angels, good and bad, *Opp.* 30, p. 316; 33, p. 206. In the exposition of the Symbol, in the *Institutes* of 1543, he comments on the words "Creator of heaven and earth" thus (ch. vi. §§ 28 and 29): "Under the names of heaven and earth all celestial and terrestrial things are comprehended, as if God were said to be the Creator of all things without exception. This is found more clearly expressed in the Nicene Creed, where He is called the Maker of all things visible and invisible. That was done probably on account of the Manichees, who imagined two principles, God and the Devil; and attributed to God the creation of good things, indeed, but referred evil natures to the Devil as their author,"—and so on as in the *Institutes* of 1559, I. xiv. 3. Then in § 29: "God then is in the first place said to have created the heavens and all that is contained in the heavens. But in that order are the celestial spirits, as well those who have persisted by obedience in their integrity, as those who by defection have fallen into ruin," &c.,—explaining that the fact that Moses does not mention this in the history of creation in no respect throws it into doubt. Cf. the *Confession des Escholiers*, 1559 (*Opp.* ix. 721-2): "I confess that God created not only the visible world, that is the heaven and the earth, and whatever is contained in them, but also the invisible spirits, some of whom have persisted in obedience to God, and some by their own sin have been precipitated into destruction."

<sup>82</sup> I. xv. 5: *animas ergo . . . creatas esse non minus quam angelos, certo statuendum est. Creatio autem non transfusio est, sed essentiae ex nihilo exordium.*



creation is to be related to Moses' narrative Calvin puts aside as frivolous. Moses narrates that the earth was perfected, and the heavens were perfected with all their hosts (Gen. ii. 1): that is certainly broad enough to cover the fact of their creation,—why make anxious inquisition as to the day, in which besides the stars and planets, these other more hidden (*reconditi*) celestial hosts began to be?<sup>83</sup> The very language in which he repels the question, however, as it certainly suggests that Calvin conceived of the entire creation, inclusive of the angelic hosts, as a systematized whole, seems also to hint that he himself thought of the creation of this unitary whole as taking place at the one creative epoch, if such language can be pardoned. If so, then in his instinctive thought on this subject—on which, however, he laid no stress,—he followed the scholastic opinion, as expounded, say, by Thomas Aquinas rather than that of the Greek fathers, who interposed an immense interval between the creation of the spiritual and the subsequent creation of the corporeal universe.<sup>84</sup> It is doubtless, however, a mistake to press his language to imply that he thought of the creation of the angels as taking place on the same day with the

<sup>83</sup> I. xiv. 4: terram esse perfectam, et coelos perfectos cum omni exercitu eorum, narrat Moses (Gen. ii. 1). Quid attinet anxie precontari quoto die, praeter astra et planetas, alii quoque magis reconditi coelestes exercitus esse coeperint?

<sup>84</sup> Aquinas, *Summa*, Pars. I, qu. lxi, art. 3, argues: "Angels are a part of the universe. For they do not constitute in themselves a universe; but unite along with the corporeal creation in a universe. This appears from the relation of one creature to another. For the mutual relation of things is the good of the universe. But no part is perfect, when separated off into a whole by itself. It is not therefore probable that God, 'whose works are perfect', as is said in Deut. xxxii, created the angelic creation off to itself before the other creatures." Jerome, on the other hand, following the Greeks, exclaims on the multitudinous ages which intervened between the creation of the angels and that of man. It is interesting to observe Dante following Aquinas and making the creation of the angels simultaneous with that of the universe at large, the fall of the evil angels being delayed but twenty seconds after their creation (*cf.* Maria Rosetti's *Shadow of Dante*, pp. 14, 15), and Milton following Jerome and putting the creation of angels aeons before that of man.

stars and planets, that is to say, on the fourth day. More probably he thought of them as produced as part of the general creation of the "heavens and earth," that is to say on the first day,<sup>85</sup> and this became the traditional view in the Reformed churches. "When were the angels created?" asks Bucanus, and answers, "Not before the ages, for the Son of God alone was existent before the ages: whence it follows that they were made in the beginning of all things. On what day, however, cannot certainly be defined, though it may be gathered with probability from the history of Moses that they were created on the first day, in which the heavens, the inhabitants of which they are, were created; wherefrom they are called the 'angels of heaven'."<sup>86</sup> "The first day of the creation," says Wollebius,<sup>87</sup> "is illustrious for three works," the first of which is "the creation of the angels with the highest heaven (the heaven called that of the blessed)"; for, he argues, "the creation of the angels can be referred to no better time than the first day, because when God laid the foundations of the earth, it was already celebrated by them (Job xxxviii. 7)"—an argument which is repeated by others, as for example by Van Mastricht,<sup>88</sup> who reasons in general that "it is certain that they were not created before the first day of creation since before that there was nothing but eternity, . . . and it is equally certain that they were not created after man, whom they seduced."<sup>89</sup> Doubtless some such reasoning as this was before Calvin's mind also, although it is clear that he did not take it so seriously.

<sup>85</sup> So he seems to say explicitly in the middle editions of the *Institutes*, (first in 1543), VI. §29 (*Opp.* I. 497): "First then God is said to have created the heavens and all that the heavens contain. But in this order are the celestial spirits, whether those who by obedience remained in their integrity, or those who by defection fell into ruin."

<sup>86</sup> *Instit. Theolog.* ed. 2, 1604, *Loc.* vi. 4, p. 64.

<sup>87</sup> *Compend. Theolog. Christ.* ed. Oxford 1657, p. 36.

<sup>88</sup> *Theoretico-practica theol.* 1714, III. vii. 4.

<sup>89</sup> Heppe, *Dog. d. ref. Kirche*, p. 149, adds that this is also the teaching of the Leiden Synopsis, Riissen, Wendelinus and of the Reformed in general. Cocceius (*Summa Theol.* XVI. 12) thought of the day when the waters above and below the firmament were separated.



On another matter of speculative construction, however, he was not so much inclined to an attitude of indifference. This concerned the distribution of angels into ranks and orders. We have already had occasion to note his reprobation of the Pseudo-Dionysius for his empty speculations on the "celestial hierarchy."<sup>90</sup> He returns to the general matter later<sup>91</sup> to express the opinion that data are lacking in Scripture to justify an attempt "to determine degrees of honor among angels, to distinguish the respective classes by their insignia, or to assign its place and station to each". His positive attitude here is due, of course, to the comparison instituted by the Romanists between the celestial and the ecclesiastical hierarchies,<sup>92</sup> which he wishes to discredit. Here too he set the fashion for the Reformed theology. Quite in this sense Van Mastricht<sup>93</sup> remarks that "the Reformed recognize, indeed, that there is some order among the angels, not only because God their Maker is a God of order, but because the various names of the angels seem to suggest an order to us (Col. i. 16, Eph. iii. 10, *cf.* Ezek. ix. 3, Is. vi. 2, 1 Thes. iv. 16, Gen. iii. 24, Jude 5) while the disjunctive particle, *εἴτε θρόνοι, εἴτε κυριότητες* (Col. i. 16), seems especially to confirm some order among angels, to say nothing of the existence of some order among the evil spirits themselves. But they believe it is not possible for men in this imperfection to determine what the order among the angels is." If this seems to allow a little more than Calvin does, it is to go a little further than he does in denial on the other hand, to contend with Hyperius that there are no permanent distinctions among angels "by virtue of which some angels are always preëminent, others always subordinate," or even with Bucanus, that there are no distinctions in nature among the angels but only differences in office. Surely these determinations are open to Calvin's

<sup>90</sup> I. xiv. 4.

<sup>91</sup> I. xiv. 8.

<sup>92</sup> *Cf.* a similar rejection of the efforts to determine the numbers and orders of angels in *Opp.* 51, 158.

<sup>93</sup> As cited, III. iii. 30.

rebuke of pretensions to knowledge which we do not possess, and contrast sharply with the sobriety with which Calvin abides by the simple statements of Scripture, allowing that there are some hints in Scripture of ranks among angels<sup>94</sup> and contending only that these hints are insufficient to enable us to develop a complete theory of their organization.

In holding back from the temptation to speculate on the organization of the angelic hosts, however, Calvin betrays no tendency to minify their numbers, and he of course recognizes the great distinction between good and bad angels. The numbers of both are very great. Of the good angels, he tells us, "we hear from the mouth of Christ of many legions (Mt. xxvi. 53), from Daniel of many myriads (Dan. vii. 10), Elisha's servant saw numerous chariots; and when it is said that they encamp around about those that fear God (Ps. xxxiv. 8), a great multitude is suggested."<sup>95</sup> When he comes to speak of evil angels his language takes on an even increased energy. He speaks of "great crowds" (*magnas copias*) of them, and even with the exaggerating emphasis of deep conviction of the "infinite multitude" of them.<sup>96</sup> Though these two hosts stand now arrayed against each other they are in origin and nature one; for the evil spirits are just good spirits gone wrong. The fundamental facts which Calvin most insists upon with respect to what he calls "devils" (*diaboli*) are that they are creatures of God and were therefore once good—"for it is impious (*nefas*) to ascribe to the good God the creation of any evil thing"<sup>97</sup>—and that they have become evil by corrupting the good nature with which God endowed them.<sup>98</sup> Their

<sup>94</sup> I. xiv. 8, cf. 14.

<sup>95</sup> I. xiv. 8.

<sup>96</sup> I. xiv. 14.

<sup>97</sup> I. xiv. 3: *nefas esse adscribi bono Deo ullius rei malae creationem.*

<sup>98</sup> I. xiv. 3: "The orthodox faith does not admit that any evil nature exists in the universe of the world; since neither the pravity and malice whether of man or devil or the sins which proceed from them, came from nature but from the corruption of nature; nor has anything at all come into being from the beginning in which God has not given a specimen of His wisdom and righteousness."



evil, says he crisply, is "not from creation but from depravation".<sup>99</sup> "At their original creation they were angels of God, but they destroyed themselves through degeneration."<sup>100</sup> To ascribe to God, their Creator, the evil they have acquired by their defection and lapse, would be to ascribe to Him what above all things is most alien from Him;<sup>101</sup> and thus far the Manichaeans are right—for the good God cannot have created any evil thing.<sup>102</sup> The Scriptural evidence of the fall of the "devils" Calvin states with great brevity but with sufficient point. He adduces 2 Peter ii. and Jude 6 as a clear statement: and 1 Timothy v. 21 as a tacit implication; and he argues that when our Lord (Jno. viii. 44) declares that when Satan "speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own," and adds as a reason "because he abode not in the truth," He implies that he had once been in the truth and issued from it by an act of his own.<sup>103</sup> In his other writings he returns repeatedly to these conceptions and always with the greatest directness and force of statement. "The devils," says he, "have been angels of God but they did not retain the condition in which they were created but have fallen by a horrible fall, so as to become the examples of perdition."<sup>104</sup> "The devils were created by God as well as the angels, but not as they now are. We must always reserve this,—that the evil which is in the devils proceeds from themselves. . . ."<sup>105</sup> "For we know that the devil is evil not by nature, nor from his original creation (*creationis origine*), but by the fault of his own defection."<sup>106</sup>

<sup>99</sup> I. xiv. 16: quum a Deo conditus sit diabolus, hanc malitiam quam ejus naturae tribuimus, non ex creatione sed ex depravatione esse meminerimus.

<sup>100</sup> *Do:* contenti simus hoc breviter habere de diabolorum natura: fuisse prima creatione angelos Dei, sed degenerando se perdidisse et aliis factos esse instrumenta perditionis.

<sup>101</sup> I. xiv. 16, quod est ab eo alienissimum.

<sup>102</sup> I. xiv. 3, as above.

<sup>103</sup> I. xiv. 16.

<sup>104</sup> *Sermon XVI.* on Job. iv. (*Opp.* 33, p. 206).

<sup>105</sup> *Sermon IV.* on Job. i. (*Opp.* 33, p. 60).

<sup>106</sup> *Comment.* on 1 Jno. iii. 8 (*Opp.* 55, p. 334). Cf. farther *Opp.* 30,

It is worth while to dwell on these deliverances, because they contain not merely Calvin's doctrine of devils, but also, so far, his doctrine of the origin of evil. This includes, we already perceive, a vigorous repudiation of the notion that God can be in any way the author of evil. The Augustinian doctrine that *omne esse est bonum* is explicitly reaffirmed. God is good and it is impious to suppose that He may have created anything evil (*malum*). But as God is the author of all that is, everything that has come into being is in its nature good. There is, therefore, no such thing in the universe as an evil nature (*mala natura*). All that is evil arises not from nature (*ex natura*) but from corruption of nature (*ex naturae corruptione*).<sup>107</sup> This corruption has been introduced by the free action of the creature: it is not "of creation" but "of depravation,"—a depravation of which the creature itself is the cause (*cujus ipse sibi causa*).<sup>108</sup> To put it all in a nutshell,—evil according to Calvin has its source not in the creative act of God but in the deflected action of the creaturely will. Such an assertion takes us, of course, only a little way towards a theodicy: but it is important that as we pass we should note as a first step in Calvin's theodicy that he very energetically repudiates the notion that God, who is good, can be, as Creator, the author of any evil thing. All that comes from His hands is "very good."

As the angels owe their existence to God, so of course they subsist in Him. They were not brought into being to stand, deistically, over against God, sufficient to themselves:

p. 316 (*Hom. 71 on 1 Sam. xix*): "Just as when we call the good angels spirits of God, not because they have the same essence with God, but because they were formed and created (*formati et creati sunt*) by Him, so also it is to be thought of devils whose origin was the same with the good angels. For they were not created evil as we see them today, and with that evil with which the Scriptures depict them, but they were corrupted and alienated from God by their departure from their original state; just as, we know, man too fell away from his purity into his present misery."

<sup>107</sup> I. xiv. 3.

<sup>108</sup> I. xiv. 16.



like all the rest of His creatures their dependence on God is absolute. Nothing can be ascribed to them as if it belonged to them apart from Him. They are, indeed, immortal: but this is so far from meaning that it is beyond the power of God to destroy them, that it rather means merely that it is the will of God to sustain them in endless being. In themselves considered, like all other creaturely existences, they are mortal.<sup>109</sup> "We know," remarks Calvin,<sup>110</sup> "that angels are immortal spirits, for God has created them for this condition, that they shall never be destroyed any more than the souls of men shall perish. . . . The angels are immortal because they are sustained by power from on high, and God maintains them—He who is immortal by nature and the fountain of life is in Him, as says the Psalmist (xxxvi. 10). . . . The angels are not stable save as God holds their hand. They are no doubt called Might and Powers; but this is because God executes His power by them and guides them. Briefly, the angels have nothing in themselves by reason of which they may glory in themselves. For all that they have of power and stability they possess from God. . . ." In all their activities, accordingly, angels are but the instruments of God, although, to be sure, they are "the instruments in which God especially (*specialiter*) exhibits the presence of His divinity (*numinis*)."<sup>111</sup> We must not think of them, then, as interposed between us and God, so as to obscure His glory; nor must we transfer to them what belongs to God and Christ alone,<sup>112</sup>—worshipping them, perchance,<sup>113</sup> or at least attributing to them independent activities. The splendor of the divine majesty is indeed reflected in them;<sup>114</sup> but the glory by which they

<sup>109</sup> *Opp.* 48, p. 594: "As they have not always existed, so they are capable of reaching their end."

<sup>110</sup> *Opp.* 33, p. 206 (*Sermon* 16 on Job. 4); cf. *Opp.* 33, p. 368, and 38, p. 152.

<sup>111</sup> I. xiv. 5.

<sup>112</sup> I. xiv. 10.

<sup>113</sup> *Do.*: the cult of angels in the Church of Rome led Calvin to be particularly insistent against their worship. Cf. *Opp.* vi. 83, vii. 653.

<sup>114</sup> I. xiv. 10: in eis fulgor divini numinis refulgeat.

shine is a derived glory, and it would be preposterous to allow their borrowed brightness to blind us to its source. In all their varied activities they must be considered merely "the hands of God, which move themselves to no work except under His direction."<sup>114</sup>

Some question may arise as to the wideness of the sphere of activity in which angels are employed as "the hands of God." There is at least a *prima facie* appearance that Calvin thought of them as the instruments through which the entirety of God's providential work is administered. He dwells especially, to be sure, on their employment as "the dispensers and administrators of the divine beneficence" towards His people;<sup>115</sup> but he appears to look upon this as only the culminating instance of a universal activity. When he says that they are "God's ministers ordained for the execution of His laws,"<sup>116</sup> we may indeed hesitate to press the language. But three several spheres of activity of increasing comprehensiveness seem to be distinguished, when he tells us God "uses their service for the protection of His people, and by means of them both dispenses His benefits among men and executes also the rest of His works."<sup>117</sup> And the whole seems summed up in a phrase when he tells us again that God "exercises and administers His government in the world through them."<sup>118</sup> The universal reach of their activities appears to be explicitly asserted in the comprehensive statement that God "uses their ministry and service for executing all that He has decreed."<sup>119</sup> It

<sup>114</sup> I. xiv. 12: si non ut ejus manus a nobis considerantur, quae nullum ad opus nisi ipso dirigente se moveant.

<sup>115</sup> I. xiv. 6.

<sup>116</sup> I. xiv. 4: Dei ministri ad jussa ejus exsequenda ordinati.

<sup>117</sup> I. xiv. 9: quorum obsequio utitur Deus ad suorum protectionem, et per quos tum sua beneficia inter homines dispensat, tum reliquia etiam opera exsequitur.

<sup>118</sup> I. xiv. 5: imperium suum in mundo.

<sup>119</sup> I. xiv. 5 *ad init.*: ad exsequenda omnia quae decrevit. Cf. Heidegger's threefold distribution of angelic functions: in praeconium laudum ejus, necnon in regimine mundi, ecclesiae imprimis ministrant (as cited by Heppe: *Dogmat. d. ref. Kirche*, p. 146).



certainly would appear from such broad statements that Calvin looked upon the angels as agents through which God carries on His entire providential government.

The question is not unnaturally raised whether by this conception Calvin does not remove God too far from His works, interposing between Him and His operations a body of intermediaries by which He is separated from the universe after the fashion of a false transcendenceism.<sup>120</sup> It is quite plain that Calvin did not so conceive the matter. So far from supposing that the execution of the works of providence through the medium of angels involves the absence of God from these works, he insists that they are only the channels of the presence of God. "How preposterous it is," he exclaims, "that we should be separated from God by the angels when they have been constituted for the express purpose of testifying the completer presence of His

<sup>120</sup> "It deserves remark," says P. J. Muller (*De Godsleer van Zwingli und Calvin*, p. 77), "that Calvin answers the question why God makes use of angels, after a fashion which more or less affects the immanence of God. He points to the multiplicity of our dangers, to our weakness, and to our liability to *trepidatio* and *desperatio*. Now God not merely promises us His care; but He even appoints an 'innumerable multitude of protectors, whom He has commissioned to keep watch over us'; so that we may 'feel ourselves without danger, no matter what evil threatens, so long as we are under this protection and care' (I. xiv. 11),—a mode of conception to which he does not, however, hold, since he looks upon all things and man as well rather as immediately dependent on God Himself and on His care alone." Muller quotes Zwingli (*Opp.* II. b. 27) as complaining of Luther's attribution of all evils to the devil as if there were no such thing as the providence of God. "How is it," asks Zwingli, "that to you the poor devil must have done everything, as no man can do in my house? I thought the devil was already overcome and judged. If the devil is now a powerful lord in the world, as you have just said, how can it be that all things shall be worked out through God's providence?" In both Zwingli's and Muller's cases the antithesis is not exact. All things can be worked out by God's providence and yet the Devil be the author of all that is evil; because the Devil himself may be—and is—an instrument of God's providence. God's use of angels in His providence is no injury to His immanent working, because they are the instruments of His immanent working; and Calvin does not depart from the one notion while emphasizing the other, because they are not mutually exclusive notions but two sides of one idea.

aid to us."<sup>121</sup> Are we separated from the works of our hands because it is by our hands that they are wrought? And the angels, if rightly conceived, must be thought of just as the hands of God—the appropriate instruments, not which work instead of Him, but by which He works.<sup>122</sup> He, therefore, once for all dismisses "that Platonic philosophy" which interposes angels between God and His world, and even asks us to seek access to God through the angels, as if we had not immediacy of access to Him. "For this is the reason they are called Angels of Power or Powers," he remarks in another place;<sup>123</sup> "not that God, resigning His power to them, sits idle in heaven, but because, by acting powerfully in them, He magnificently manifests His power to us. They therefore act ill and perversely who assign anything to angels as of themselves, or who so make them intermediaries between us and God that they obscure the glory of God as if it were removed to a distance; since rather it manifests itself as present in them. Accordingly the mad speculations of Plato are to be shunned as instituting too great a distance between us and God. . . ." In his view, therefore, the angels do not stand between God and the world to hold them apart but to draw them together as channels of operation through which God's power flows into His works.

If he were asked whether he does not, by this interposition of angels between God and His works, infringe on the conception of the Divine immanence and raise doubt as to God's immanent activity, Calvin would doubtless reply that he does not "interpose" the angels between God and His works, but conceives them as just "the hands of God" working; and that he, of course, conceives God as immanent in the angels themselves, so that their working is just His working through them, as His instruments. We must not confuse the question of the method of God's immanent ac-

<sup>121</sup> I. xiv. 12.

<sup>122</sup> I. xiv. 12.

<sup>123</sup> *Com. on Jno. v. 4* (*Opp.* 47, p. 105).



tivity with that of the fact of that activity. The suggestion that God carries on His providential government through the agency of angels is only a suggestion of the method of His immanent working and can raise doubt of the reality of His immanent working only on the supposition that these angels stand so over against God in their independence as to break—so to speak—His contact with His works. This is Deism, and is therefore of course inconsistent with the Divine immanence; but it has nothing to do with the question whether He employs angels in which He is immanent in His operations. In any event God executes His works of providence through the intermediation of second causes; for this is the very definition of a work of providence. The discovery that among these second causes there are always personal as well as impersonal agencies to be taken into account, can raise no question as between immanence and transcendence in God's modes of action—unless personal agents are conceived to be, as such, so independent of God as to exclude in all that is performed by their agency the conception of His immanent working. And in that case what shall we say of the divine immanence in the sphere of human life and activity? In a word, Calvin's conception that all the works of God's providence are wrought through the intermediation of angels excludes the immanence of God in His world as little as the recognition of human activities excludes the immanence of God in history.

The real interest of his conception does not lie, therefore, in any bearing it may be supposed to have on his view of the relation of God to the universe—it leaves his view on that point unaffected—but in the insight it gives us into Calvin's pneumatology. We have already had occasion to note the vividness of his sense of the spiritual environment in which our life is cast. We see here that he conceived the universe as in all its operations moving on under the guiding hand of these superhuman intelligences. This is as much as to say that there was no dualism in his conception of the universe: he did not set the spiritual and physical worlds, or the earthly

and supramundane worlds, over against one another as separate and unrelated entities. He conceived them as all working together in one unitary system, acting and interacting on one another. And he accustomed himself to perceive beneath the events of human history—whether corporate or individual—and beneath the very operations of physical nature—not merely the hand of God, upholding and governing; but the activities of those “hands of God” who hearken to His voice and fulfil His word, and whom He not only charges with the care of His “little ones”, and the direction of the movements of the peoples, but makes even “winds” and a “flaming fire.”

To the question why God thus universally operates through the instrumentality of subordinate intelligences, Calvin has no answer, in its general aspects, except a negative one. It cannot be that God needs their aid or is unable to accomplish without them what He actually does through them. If He employs them, “He certainly does not do this from necessity, as if He were unable to do without them; for whenever He pleases, He passes them by and accomplishes His work by nothing but His mere will; so far are they from relieving Him of any difficulty by their aid.”<sup>124</sup> These words have their application to the whole sphere of angelical activities, as indeed they have to the entire body of second causes,<sup>125</sup> but they are spoken directly only of the employment of angels as ministers to the heirs of salvation. It is characteristic of Calvin that he confines his discussion of the subject to this highest function of angelic service, as that which was of special religious value to his readers, and that to which as a practical man seeking practical ends it behoved him particularly to address himself. In this highest sphere of angelic operation he is not without even a positive response to the query why God uses angels to perform His will. It is not for His sake but for the sake of His people; it is, in fact, a concession to their weakness.

<sup>124</sup> I. xiv. 11.

<sup>125</sup> I. xvi. 2.



God is able, certainly, to protect His people by the mere nod of His power; and surely it ought to be enough for them and more than enough that God declares Himself their protector.<sup>126</sup> To look around for further aid after we have received the promise of God that He will protect us, is undeniably wrong in us.<sup>127</sup> Is not the simple promise of the great God of heaven and earth sufficient safeguard against all dangers? But we are weak;<sup>128</sup> and God is good,—full of leniency and indulgence,<sup>129</sup>—and He wishes to give us not only His protection but the sense of His protection. Dealing with us as we are, not as we ought to be, He is willing to appeal to our imagination and to comfort us in our feeling of danger or despair by enabling us to apprehend, in our own way, the presence of His grace. He, therefore, has added to His promise that He will Himself care for us, the further one that “we shall have innumerable escorts to whom He has given charge to secure our safety.”<sup>130</sup> Like Elisha, then, who, when he was oppressed by the numerous army of the Syrians, was shown the multitude of the angels sent to guard him, we, when terrified by the thought of the multitude of our enemies, may find refuge in that discovery of Elisha’s: “There are more for us than against us.”

In insisting upon this particular function of angels above all others, Calvin feels himself to be, as a Biblical theologian, simply following the lead of Scripture. For, intent especially on what may most make for our consolation and the confirmation of our faith, the Scripture lays its stress, he tells us, on angels as the dispensers and administrators of the Divine beneficence towards God’s people; and “reminds us that they guard our safety, undertake our defence, direct our ways, and exercise solicitude that no harm shall befall

<sup>126</sup> I. xiv. 11: illud quidem unum satis superque esse deberet, quod Dominus asserit se nostrum esse protectorem.

<sup>127</sup> *Do.*: perperam id quidem fieri a nobis fateor, quod post illam simplicem promissionem de unius Dei protectione, adhuc circumspectamus unde veniat nobis auxilium.

<sup>128</sup> *Do.*: imbecilitas, mollities, fragilitas, vitium.

<sup>129</sup> *Do.*: pro immensa sua clementia et facilitate.

<sup>130</sup> *Do.*

us."<sup>131</sup> These great provisions are universal, he tells us, and belong "to all believers" without exception. Every follower of Christ has, therefore, pledged to his protection the whole host of the angels of God. In the interests of the greatness of this pledge, Calvin enters the lists against the idea of "guardian angels", which had become the settled doctrine of the old church,<sup>132</sup>—not indeed with the sharpness and decision which afterwards obtained in the Reformed churches,<sup>133</sup> but yet with an obvious feeling that this notion lacks Scriptural basis and offers less than what the Scriptures provide for the consolation and support of God's people. If it is to be accepted at all, Calvin wishes it to be accepted not instead of, but alongside of, what he feels to be the much greater assurance that the whole body of angels is concerned with the protection and salvation of everyone of the saints. "Of this indeed," he remarks, "we may be sure,—that the case of each one of us is not committed to one angel alone, but that all of them with one consent watch over our salvation."<sup>134</sup> This being a settled fact, he does not consider the question of "guardian angels" worth considering: if "all the orders of the celestial army stand guard over our salvation", he asks, what difference does it make to us whether one particular angel is also told off to act as our particular guardian or not? But if any one wishes to restrict the protection granted us by God to this one angel,—why that is a different matter: that would be to do a great injury to himself and to all the members of the church, by depriving them of the encouragement they receive from the divine assurance that they are compassed about and defended on all sides in their conflict by the forces of heaven.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>131</sup> I. xiv. 6.

<sup>132</sup> I. xiv. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. Voetius, *Disput.* I, p. 900, who remarks that most of the Reformed (including himself) deny the existence of guardian angels, adding: "We embrace the opinion of Calvin in *Instit.* I. xiv. 7, and *Com. on Psalms* (91) and *on Matthew* (18), and of the other Reformers, who reject this opinion as vain and curious, and we think that something in this matter has adhered to the ancient fathers from the Platonic theology and the mythological theology of the Gentiles."

<sup>134</sup> I. xiv. 7.

<sup>135</sup> This last sentence is new to the latest edition of the *Institutes*.



What Calvin has to say about the evil spirits—the “devils” as he calls them—is determined by the same practical purpose which dominates his discussion of the good angels. He begins, therefore, with the remark that “almost everything which Scripture transmits concerning devils, has as its end that we should be solicitous to guard against their snares and machinations, and may provide ourselves with such arms as are firm and strong enough to repel the most powerful enemies.”<sup>136</sup> He proceeds by laying stress on the numbers, the malice, and the subtlety of these devils; and by striving in every way to awaken the reader to a realizing sense of the desperation of the conflict in which he is engaged with them.<sup>137</sup> The effect is to paint a very vivid picture of the world of evil, set over against the world of good as in some sense its counterfeit,<sup>138</sup> determined upon overturning the good, and to that end waging a perpetual war against God and His people.<sup>139</sup> He then points out that the evil of these dreadful beings is of themselves, not of God,—coming not from creation but from corruption<sup>140</sup>—and closes with two sections upon the relation they sustain to God’s providential government. To these closing sections (§§17 and 18), it will repay us to devote careful attention. In them Calvin resolves the dualism which is introduced into the universe by the intrusion of evil into it, by showing that this evil itself is held under the control of God and is employed for His divine purposes; and he does this in such a manner

We may note in passing that Calvin both in the *Institutes* and in his commentary on the passage, understands Mat. xviii. 10 of “the angels of little children” (cf. *Instit.* I. xiv. 7, 9), which seems certainly wrong. Cf. art. “Little Ones” in Hastings’ *Dict. of Christ and the Gospels*.

<sup>136</sup> I. xiv. 13 *ad init.*

<sup>137</sup> *Do.*: 13-15.

<sup>138</sup> I. xiv. 14, end: “For just as the Church and the Society of the Saints have Christ as head, so the faction of the impious and impiety itself is depicted to us with its prince, who holds there supreme dominion.” Cf. *Opp.* 35, p. 35; 53, p. 339.

<sup>139</sup> I. xiv. 15, beginning: Hoc quoque ad perpetuum cum diabolo certamen accendere nos debet, quod adversarius Dei et noster ubique dicitur. Cf. the whole § and especially its closing words.

<sup>140</sup> I. xiv. 16.

that we scarcely know whether to admire most the justice of the conceptions or the precision and clearness of the language in which they are given expression.<sup>141</sup>

The first of these sections asserts the completeness of the control which God exercises over the devils. It is true that Satan is at discord and strife with God:<sup>142</sup> he is by nature—that is, acquired nature—wicked (*improbis*) and every propension of his will is to contumacy and rebellion; of his own accord he does nothing, therefore, which he does not mean to be in opposition to God.<sup>143</sup> But he is, after all, but a creature of God's and God holds him in with the bridle of His power and controls his every act. Although, therefore, every impulse of his will is in conflict with God, he can do nothing except by God's will and approval.<sup>144</sup> So it is uniformly represented in Scripture. Thus we read that Satan could not assault Job until he had obtained permission so to do;<sup>145</sup> that the lying spirit by which Ahab was deceived was commissioned from the Lord;<sup>146</sup> that the evil spirit which punished Saul for his sins was from the Lord;<sup>147</sup> that the plagues of Egypt, sent by God as they were, were wrought, nevertheless, by evil angels.<sup>148</sup> And thus Paul, generalizing, speaks of the blinding of unbelievers both as the "work of God" and the "operation of Satan", meaning of course that Satan does it only under the government of God.<sup>149</sup> "It stands fast, therefore", Calvin concludes, "that Satan is under God's power, and is so governed by God's

<sup>141</sup> Cf. the definition given of demons by Voetius, *Disp.* I. p. 911, summing up what is more broadly taught by Calvin in the brevity of a definition. A demon, says he, "is an angel, created in integrity, who, subjected on account of his own defection to endless evil and misery, serves, even though unwillingly, the providence and glory of God."

<sup>142</sup> I. xiv. 17: discordia et pugna cum Deo.

<sup>143</sup> *Do.*

<sup>144</sup> nisi volente et annuente Deo, nihil facere posse.

<sup>145</sup> nisi impetrata facultate.

<sup>146</sup> a Domino amandatus.

<sup>147</sup> spiritus Domini malus.

<sup>148</sup> per angelos malos.

<sup>149</sup> opus Dei—operatio Satanae.



will (*nutu*) that he is compelled to render God obedience. We may say certainly that "Satan resists God, and his works are contrary to God's works; but we at the same time assert that this repugnancy and this strife are dependent on God's permission. I am not now speaking of his will (*voluntate*), nor yet of his efforts (*conatu*), but only of the results (*effectu*). For the devil is wicked by nature and has not the least propension towards obedience to the divine will, but is wholly bent on contumacy and rebellion. What he has from his own iniquity, therefore, is that he desires and purposes to oppose God: by this depravity he is stimulated to try to do those things which he thinks in the highest degree inimical to God. But God holds him bound and curbed by the bridle of his power, so that he can carry out only those things which are divinely permitted to him, and thus, will he nill he, he obeys his Creator, seeing that he is compelled to perform whatever service God impels him to."<sup>150</sup>

This important passage appears first in the edition of the *Institutes* published in 1543; but its entire substance was in Calvin's mind from the beginning. It is given expression, first, in the course of the broader discussion of the relation of God's providence to the evil acts of men and devils incorporated into the second chapter (*De Fide*) of the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536).<sup>151</sup> "Thus, the affliction of Job", Calvin there declares, "was the work of God and of the devil; and yet the wickedness of the devil must be distinguished from the righteousness of God; for the devil was endeavoring to destroy Job, God was testing him (Job i. and ii.). So Assur was the rod of the Lord's anger, Sennacherib the axe in his hand (Is. x.); all called, raised up, impelled by Him, in a word His ministers. But how? While they were obeying their unbridled lust, they were unconsciously serving the righteousness of God (Jer. xxvii. 6). Behold God and them, the authors of the same work,

<sup>150</sup> I. xiv. 17, end.

<sup>151</sup> *Opp.* I. p. 60.

but in the same work the righteousness of God and their iniquity manifested!" The same line of thought is much more completely worked out, and very fully illustrated from the instance of Job, as a part of the discussion of man's sinfulness in the presence of the machinations of evil and the providence of God, which was incorporated into the second edition of the *Institutes* (1539) and retained from it throughout all the subsequent editions—in the final edition forming the opening sections of the discussion of *How God works in the hearts of men* (II. iv. 1-2).<sup>152</sup>

Much the same line of thought is developed again in the full discussion of the providence of God which appears in the tract against the Libertines, which was published in 1545. Speaking here of the particular providence of God, Calvin proceeds as follows: "It is furthermore to be noted that not only does God serve Himself thus with the insensible creatures, to work and execute His will through them; but also with men and even with devils. So that Satan and the wicked are executors of His will. Thus He used the Egyptians to afflict His people, and subsequently raised up the Assyrians to chastise them, when they had sinned; and others in like manner. As for the devil, we see that he was employed to torment Saul (1 Sam. xvi. 14, xviii. 10), to deceive Ahab (1 Kings xxii. 22), and to execute judgment upon all the wicked whenever they require it (Ps. lxxviii. 49); and on the other hand to test the constancy of God's people, as we see in the case of Job. The Libertines, now, meeting with these passages, are dumfounded by them and without due consideration conclude that, therefore, the creatures do nothing at all. Thus they fall into a terrible error. For not only do they confound heaven and earth together but God and the devil. This comes from not observing two limitations which are very necessary. The first is that Satan and wicked men are not such instruments of God that they do not act also of their own accord. For we must not imagine that God makes use of a wicked man

<sup>152</sup>*Opp.* I. p. 351; II. p. 225.



precisely as He does of a stone or of a piece of wood. He employs him rather as a reasonable creature according to the quality of the nature He has given him. When, then, we say that God works by means of the wicked, this does not forbid that the wicked work also on their own account. This Scripture shows us with even remarkable clearness. For while, on the one hand, it declares that God shall hiss (Is. v. 26), and as it were sound the drum to call the infidels to arms and shall harden or inflame their hearts—yet, on the other, it does not leave out of account their own thought and will, and attributes to them the work they do by the appointment of God. The second limitation which these unhappy men disregard is that there is a very real distinction between the work of God and that of a wicked man when he serves as the instrument of God. For it is by his own avarice, or his own ambition, or his own jealousy, or his own cruelty, that a wicked man is incited to do what he does; and he has no regard to any other end. And it is according to the root, which is the affection of the heart, and to the end which it seeks, that the work is qualified; and so it is rightly accounted wicked. But God has an entirely contrary purpose. It is to execute His righteousness, to save and conserve the good, to employ His goodness and grace towards the faithful, to chastise the ill-deserving. Here, then, lies the necessity of distinguishing between God and men, so as to contemplate in the same work God's righteousness, goodness, judgment, and, on the other side, the malice of the devil or of the wicked. Let us take a good and clear mirror in which to see all that I am saying. When Job heard the news of the loss of his goods, of the death of his children, of the many calamities which had fallen on him, he recognized that it was God who was visiting him, and said, 'The Lord has given, the Lord has taken away.' And, in truth, it was so. But was it not also the devil who had brewed this pottage? Was it not the Chaldeans who had spoiled his goods? Did he com-

mend the thieves and brigands, and excuse the devil, because his affliction had come to him from God? Certainly not. He well knew there was an important distinction to be observed here. And so he condemns the evil, and says 'Blessed be the name of the Lord.' Similarly David, when he was persecuted by Shimei, no doubt said that he had received this from the Lord (2 Sam. xvi. 11), and saw that this wretch was a rod by which God was chastising him. But while he praised God, he did not omit to condemn Shimei (2 Kings ii. 9). We shall return to this at another place. For the present let it suffice to hear this: that God so uses His creatures and makes them serve His providence, that the instrument which He employs may often be bad; that His turning the malice of Satan or of bad men to good does not in the least excuse their evil or make their work other than bad and to be condemned, seeing that every work receives its quality from the intention with which it is done. . . . On the contrary, we must needs observe that the creatures do their works here in their own degree, and these are to be estimated as good or bad according as they are done in obedience to God or to offend Him. All the time, God is above, directing everything to a good end, and turning the evil into good, or, at least, drawing good out of what is evil, acting according to His nature, that is in righteousness and equity; and making use of the devil in such a manner as in no way to mix Himself with him so as to have anything in common with him, or to entangle Himself in any evil association, or to efface the nature of what is evil by His righteousness. It is just like the sun which, shining on a piece of carrion and causing putrefaction in it, contracts no taint whatever from the corruption, and does not by its purity destroy the foulness and infection of the carrion. So God deals in such a manner with the deeds of the wicked that the holiness which is in Him does not justify the infection which is in them, nor is contaminated by it."

We have thought it desirable to quote at some length one of the more extended passages in which Calvin develops the



doctrine announced in the section before us, although it leads us somewhat away from the single point here to be emphasized, into the mysteries of the divine providence. This broader view once before us, however, we may return to emphasize the single point which now concerns us—Calvin's teaching of the absolute control of the evil spirits by God. This seemed to Calvin to lie so close to the center of Christian hope and life that he endlessly repeats it in his occasional writings, and has even incorporated an assertion of it in his Catechism (1545).<sup>153</sup> "But what shall we think of the wicked and of devils", he there asks,—“are they, too, subject to God?” And he answers: “Although God does not lead them by His Spirit, He nevertheless holds them in check as with a bridle, so that they cannot move save as He permits them. And He even makes them ministers of His will, so that He compels them to execute unwillingly and against their determination what seems good to Him.”<sup>154</sup> The recognition of this fact seemed to him essential even to an intelligent theism, which, he urges, certainly requires that God should be conceived not less as Governor than as Creator of all things—as, indeed, the two things go together. “If, then, we imagine”, he writes,<sup>155</sup> “that God does not govern all, but that some things come about by fortune, it follows that this fortune is a goddess who has created part of the world, and that the praise is not due to God alone. And it is an execrable blasphemy if we think that the devil can do anything without the permission of God: that is all one with making him creator of the world in part.” “Now Satan”, says he again,<sup>156</sup> “is also subject to God, so that we are not to imagine that Satan has any principality except what is given him by God; and there is good reason why he should be subject to Him since he proceeds from Him. The devils were created by God as well as the angels, but not

<sup>153</sup> *Opp.* vii. p. 188 *sq.*

<sup>154</sup> *Opp.* vi. pp. 17, 18.

<sup>155</sup> *Opp.* xxxv. p. 152 (Sermon 130, on Job. xxxiv).

<sup>156</sup> *Opp.* xxxiii. p. 60 (Sermon 4 on Job. i).

such as they are. It is necessary that we always reserve this,—that the evil which is in the devils proceeds from themselves."<sup>157</sup>

Calvin was not the man, however, to insist on the control of the devils by God without consideration of the ends for which this control was exercised. He therefore follows up his assertion of this control (§17) with a discussion of the use God makes of "unclean spirits" (*immundi spiritus*) (§18). This use, he tells us, is twofold. They are employed to test, try, exercise and develop the faithful. And they are employed to punish the wicked. On the latter of these he dwells as little as its faithful presentation permitted. Those whom God "does not design to enroll in His own flock", he tells us, He delivers over to the control of Satan as the minister of the divine vengeance; and he pictures in a few burning words the terribleness of their fate. On the employment of Satan and his angels for the profit of God's people he dwells more at length and with evident reminiscence of his own Christian experience. "They exercise the faithful with fighting", he tells us, "they assail them with snares, harrass them with assaults, push them in combat, even fatigue them often, confuse, terrify, and sometimes wound them." Yet they never, he adds, "conquer or overcome them". God's children may often be filled with consternation, but they are never so disheartened that they cannot recover themselves; they may be struck down by the violence of the blows they receive, but they always rise again; they may be wounded, but they

<sup>157</sup>Cf. also *Opp.* ix. p. 309; xxxviii. pp. 478-484; xxx. pp. 287, 315; xlviii. p. 594 where it is the ascended Christ who is affirmed (as God of providence) to hold the devils in check so that they do nothing save by His will. Also the statement in the *Confession des Escholiers* of 1559 (*Opp.* ix. pp. 723-4): "And although Satan and the reprobate endeavor to throw everything into confusion to such an extent that the faithful themselves doubt the right order of their sins, I recognize nevertheless that God, as the Supreme Prince and Lord of All, turns the evil into good, and governs all things by a certain secret curb, and moderates them in a wonderful way, which we ought with all submission of mind to adore, since we are not able to comprehend it."



cannot be slain; they may be made to labor through their whole lives, but in the end they obtain the victory.

There are several things that are thrown out into a high light in this discussion which it will repay us to take notice of. We observe, first of all, Calvin's view of the Christian life as a conflict with the powers of evil. "This exercise", he says, or we might perhaps almost translate it "this drill" (*exercitium*)—it is the word for military training—"is common to all the children of God. We observe, next, his absolute confidence in the victory of God's children. The promise that the seed of the woman shall crush the head of Satan belongs not only to Christ, but to all His members; and, therefore, he can categorically deny that it is possible for the faithful ever to be conquered or overcome of evil. The dominion of Satan is over the wicked alone, and shall never be extended to the soul of a single one of the faithful. We observe again that Calvin conceives the victory as therefore complete already in principle for every one who is in Christ. "In our Head indeed", he declares, "this victory has always been full and complete (*ad plenum exstitit*); because the prince of the world had nothing in Him." And we observe, finally, that he holds with clear conviction that it will never be complete for any of us in this life. We labor here throughout the whole course of life (*toto vitae curriculo*) and obtain the victory only in the end (*in fine*). The fulfilment of the promise of crushing the head of Satan is only "begun in this life", the characteristic of which is that it is the period of conflict (*ubi luctandum est*): it is only after this period of conflict is over (*post luctam*) that it shall be completely fulfilled. It is only in our Head that the victory is now complete: in us who are members, it appears as yet only in part: and it is only when we put off our flesh, according to which we are liable to infirmity, that we shall be filled with the power of the Holy Spirit. In these several considerations we have outlined for us very vividly Calvin's conception of the life which we now live in the flesh, a life of faith and hope not of full attainment:

a life filled with conflict, but with the sure promise of victory.

The preoccupation of Calvin's mind with man throughout his whole discussion of creation is very strikingly illustrated by his absorption, even while discussing angels and devils, with human relations and human problems. What he is apparently chiefly concerned about is that men shall understand and take their comfort out of the assurance that angelic hosts encamp about them for their protection, and angelic messengers are busied continually with their direction; that men shall understand and take their admonition from the certainty that numerous most subtle and malignant unseen foes lie in wait continually for their souls. We have pointed out that Calvin's conception of the universe was frankly anthropocentric. We see that this anthropocentrism of thought embraced in it the spiritual as well as the physical universe. He does not say, indeed, that these higher spiritual existences exist purely for man: he only says that for our consolation and the confirmation of our faith the Scriptures insist principally on their employment for the dispensing and administering of God's kindness to His people. Here is no speculative investigation into the final cause of angels. Here is only a practical reference to those functions of angels which it most concerns us to know. But he does teach of course (on the basis of Col. i. 16) that the very creation of angels is referred to Christ as its end: and it might be contended that in this declaration there lie the beginnings of a "gospel of creation" by which all things without exception which have been brought into being are set forth as ancillary to the great end of the redemption of the human race. A certain amount of confirmation may be found for this contention in the unitary conception which, as has been pointed out, Calvin cherished of the universe as a systematized whole. Meanwhile we have no formal discussion from him of the final cause of angels, and not even (at this place, at all events), any guiding hints of how he would



resolve such a question. Least of all have we here any such discussion as meets us in many of his followers of the final cause of the devil,<sup>158</sup> although the elements of such a discussion are involved in any theodicy, and cannot escape suggestion in any attempt to deal seriously with the great problem of evil. Calvin, therefore, has not failed to suggest them; but not directly in our present context, where he contents himself with assuming the existence of evil in the spiritual world, declaring its origination by the creature and asserting the divine control of it and utilization of it in God's government of the world.<sup>159</sup> For what may penetrate into the problem more deeply than this, we shall have to go elsewhere.

Meanwhile, having expounded at some length the nature of the spiritual, and more briefly the nature of the physical, environment of man, Calvin is now able to turn definitely to the subject which had really been occupying his thoughts throughout the entire discussion of creation,—man, con-

<sup>158</sup> Few of them, however, have been able to say so much so well in such few words as Voetius, *Disp.* I. 922: "Final causes of the devil as such ought not to be assigned, because evil has no end. But although the *opus* (as we say) in and of itself has no end, the *operans Deus* has—who has made everything for Himself (*propter seipsum*, Prov. xvi. 4). For to a fixed end He both created him in the state of integrity, and permitted his fall, and left him in his fallen state, and ordained his malice to multiplex good. His ultimate end is therefore the glory of God; the subordinate use of the devil is as an instrument of divine providence, in this life for plaguing men, the pious for their discipline only, the impious for their punishment and undoing; after this life, for torturing the impious. Thus God in both raises a trophy to the honor of His blameless glory."

<sup>159</sup> A brief statement of how Calvin habitually thought of devils may be found in his tract against the Libertines xii. (*Opp.* vii. p. 282): "The Scriptures teach us that the devils are evil spirits who continually make war on us, to draw us to perdition. And as they are destined to eternal damnation, they continually strive to involve us in the same ruin. Likewise that they are instruments of the wrath of God, and executioners for the punishment of unbelievers and rebels, blinding them and tyrannizing over them, to incite them to evil (Job. i. 6, xii. 2, vii. 7; Zech. iii. 1; Mat. iv. 2; Lk. vii. 29, xxii. 31; Acts vii. 51, xxvi. 18; 2 Cor. ii. 11; 1 Thes. ii. 18; Jno. viii. 44; xiii. 2; 1 Jno. iii. 8)."

sidered as a creature of God. The ruin which has been wrought in man by sin, he postpones for a later discussion; here he concerns himself only with the nature of man as such. Not of course as if he were inviting an idle contemplation of something which no longer exists and therefore cannot deeply concern us. But with a twofold practical object in view. In the first place, that we may not attribute to God, the author of our nature, those natural evils which we perceive in ourselves, in our present condition. And next, that we may properly estimate the lamentable ruin into which we have fallen, by seeing it as it really is,—as a corruption and deformity of our proper nature. With these ends in view he invites us to attend to a *descriptio integrae naturae*, that is to an account of the constitution and nature of man as such.<sup>159a</sup>

Man, in his view, owes his origin, of course, to the productive energy of God<sup>160</sup> and is spoken of by Calvin as among all the works of God, "the most noble and supremely admirable example of the Divine righteousness and wisdom and goodness."<sup>161</sup> His peculiarity among the creatures of God is that he is of a duplex nature. For that man consists of two disparate elements—soul and body—ought, in Calvin's opinion, to be beyond controversy.<sup>162</sup> On the one side, then, man takes hold of lower nature,—“he was taken from earth and clay”;<sup>163</sup> and this surely ought to be a curb to our pride. On the other side,—which is “the

<sup>159a</sup> I. xv. 1.

<sup>160</sup> I. xv. 5.

<sup>161</sup> I. xv. 1 *init.*: inter omnia Dei opera nobilissimum ac maxime spectabile justitiae ejus, et sapientiae, et bonitatis specimen. Cf. *Commentary* on Gen. i. 25: "If you rightly weigh all circumstances man is among other creatures a certain preëminent specimen of divine wisdom, justice and goodness, so that he is deservedly called by the ancients μικρόκοσμος, 'a world in miniature'." Calvin seems to be speaking with regard only to the other *visible* creatures.

<sup>162</sup> I. xv. 2 *init.*: porro hominem constare anima et corpore, extra controversiam esse debet. Cf. *Opp.* xii. 111, 1544: "We hold then, in conformity with the whole teaching of God that man is composed and consists of two parts: that is to say of body and soul."

<sup>163</sup> I. xv. 1, end: ex terra et lute sumptus fuit.



nobler part" of man,<sup>164</sup>—he is an immortal spirit dwelling in this earthly vessel as a domicile; and in this he may justly glory as a mark of the great goodness of His maker.<sup>165</sup> Calvin, we perceive then is a dichotomist, and that not merely inadvertently but with an express rejection of the trichotomistic schematization. He recognizes some plausibility in the arguments advanced to distinguish between the sensitive and rational souls in man; but he finds that there is really no substance in them and advises that we draw off from such questions as frivolous and useless.<sup>166</sup>

Of the bodily nature of man, Calvin has (here at least) little to say. He is not insensible to the dignity of the human form and carriage, celebrating it in a familiar classical quotation;<sup>167</sup> and he admits that by as much as it distinguishes and separates us from brute animals by that much it brings us nearer to God.<sup>168</sup> Though he insists that the image of God is properly spiritual,<sup>169</sup> and that even though it may be discerned sparkling in these external things it is only as they are informed by the spirit;<sup>170</sup> he yet in this very statement seems in some sense to allow that it does "sparkle" at least in these external things, and indeed says plainly that "there is no part of man including the body itself, in which there is not some luminous spark of

<sup>164</sup> I. xv. 2: quae nobilior ejus pars est.

<sup>165</sup> I. xv. 1: fictoris sui.

<sup>166</sup> I. xv. 6: qui plures volunt esse animas in homine, hoc est sensitivam et rationalem, . . . repudiandi nobis sunt.

<sup>167</sup> From Ovid, *Metam.* Lib. I.

<sup>168</sup> I. xv. 3. Cf. *Com.* on Genesis ii. 7 where he finds in the very way in which man was formed, gradually and not by a simple fiat, a mark of his excellence above the brutes. "Three stages," he says, "are to be noted in the creation of man: that his dead body was formed out of the dust of the earth; that it was endued with a soul whence it should receive vital motion; and that on this soul God engraved His own image, to which immortality is annexed."

<sup>169</sup> In accordance with Augustine's declaration (*De Trinitate* xii. 7): Non secundum formam corporis homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, sed secundum rationalem mentem. (Cf. *De Gen. ad lit.* vi. 27: imaginem Dei in spiritu mentis impressam. . . .).

<sup>170</sup> I. xv. 3: modo fixum illum maneat, imaginem Dei, quae in his externis notis conspicitur vel emicat, spiritualement esse.

the divine image."<sup>171</sup> What he objected to in Osiander's view accordingly was not that he allowed to the body some share in the divine image but that he placed the image of God "promiscuously" and "equally" in the soul and body.<sup>172</sup> Calvin might allow it to extend even to the body, but certainly he would not admit that it had its seat there in equal measure as in the soul. The only proper seat of the image of God was to him indeed precisely the soul itself,<sup>173</sup> from which only it might shine into the body.<sup>174</sup>

He even, indeed, permits himself to speak of the body as a "prison" from which the soul is liberated at death;<sup>175</sup>

<sup>171</sup> *Inst.* I. xv. 3. Cf. A. S. E. Talma, *De Anthropologie van Calvin*, 1882, who thinks Calvin speaks somewhat waveringly about the body.

<sup>172</sup> *Promiscue tam ad corpus quam ad animam.*

<sup>173</sup> So he says in the *Psychopannychia* (*Opp.* v. p. 180) that in the body, *mirabile opus Dei, prae caeteris corporibus creatis, apparet, nulla tamen ejus (in eo) effulget*, and reasons out the matter at length in *Opp.* vii. 112 (1544): "Now where will it be that we shall find this image of God, if there is no spiritual essence in man on which it may be impressed? For as to man's body it is not there that the image of God resides. It is true that Moses afterwards adds (*Gen.* ii. 7) that man was made a living soul,—a thing said also of beasts. But to denote a special excellence, he says that God inspired the power of life into the body he had formed of dust. Thus, though the human soul has some qualities common to those of beasts, nevertheless as it bears the image and likeness of God it is certainly of a different kind. As it has an origin apart, it has also another preëminence and this is what Solomon means when he says that at death the body returns to the dust from which it is taken, and the soul returns to God who gave it (*Eccl.* xii. 7). For this reason it is said in the Book of Wisdom (ii. 23) that man is immortal, seeing that he was created in the image of God. This is not an authentic book of Holy Scripture but it is not improper to avail ourselves of its testimony as of an ancient teacher (*Docteur ancien*)—although the single reason ought to be enough for us that the image of God, as it has been placed in man, can reside only in an immortal soul, if we understand its contents as Paul expounds it, that is to say, that we are like God in righteousness and true holiness."

<sup>174</sup> *Sermons on Daniel*, *Opp.* xlv. 459.

<sup>175</sup> *I.* xv. 2: *ubi soluta est a carnis ergastulo anima; nisi animae corporum ergastulis solutae manerent superstites.* In his early tract (1534) against soul-sleeping, he rings the changes on this idea: *ex hoc corporis ergastulo; corpus animae est carcer; terrena habitatio eomedes sunt; post dissolutam compagem corporis; exuta his vinculis, &c.* (*Opp.* V. pp. 195, 196.)



though this is doubtless merely a classical manner of speech, adhered to without intentional implication of its corollaries,<sup>176</sup> whenever at least his mind is not consciously on "the body of this death", that is, specifically the sinful body. In contrast with the soul, he never tires indeed of pouring contempt upon the body as a mere lump of clay, which is sustained and moved and impelled solely by the soul which dwells in it.<sup>177</sup> Dust in its origin, it shall in accordance with its nature, in obedience to the curse of God, return to dust,<sup>178</sup> although of course afterwards it shall be raised again in virtue of Christ's redemption; but here we are speaking again of the body, not as it is in itself, but as it is under sin, subject on the one hand to the death from which it was wholly free in the state of integrity<sup>179</sup> and to the redemption by which it is recovered from the death incurred by sin. Though then our bodies are in themselves, under sin, "mere carcases yet as members of Christ they cannot" sink into

<sup>176</sup> This is clearly the case in his early tract, *Psychopannychia*, 1534, *Opp.* V. 195-196, where the body is "a lump of clay," "a weight of earth, which presses us down and so separates us as by a wall from God": and it is only when the load of the body is put off that "the soul set free from impurities is truly spiritual (vere spiritualis) so as to consent to the will of God and no longer to yield to the tyranny of the flesh rebelling against Him."

<sup>177</sup> *Opp.* v. 195: tanta est vis animae, in massa terrae sustinenda, movenda, impellenda; the soul is on the contrary by nature agile (natura agilis).

<sup>178</sup> *Opp.* v. 204: Is vero pulvis est, qui formatus est de limo terrae: ille in pulverem revertitur, non spiritus, quem aliunde e terra acceptum Deus homini dedit.

<sup>179</sup> *Commentary on Gen.* ii. 17: "He was wholly free from death; His earthly life no doubt would have been only for a time; yet he would have passed into heaven without death." On *Gen.* iii. 19: "When he had been raised to so great a dignity that the glory of the divine image shone in him, the earthly origin of the body was almost obliterated. Now however, despoiled of his divine and heavenly excellence, what remains but that by his very departure out of life, he should recognize himself to be earth? Hence it is that we dread death, because dissolution, which is contrary to nature, cannot naturally be desired. The first man, to be sure, would have passed to a better life had he remained upright; but there would have been no separation of the soul from the body, no corruption, no kind of destruction, in short, no violent change."

putrefaction without hope of resurrection."<sup>180</sup> They may be "wretched corpses", but they do not cease to be "temples of the Holy Ghost", and God "wishes to be adored in them". "We are the altars at which He is worshipped, in our bodies and in our souls."<sup>181</sup> Hence, as well as for other reasons, Calvin has much to say of the duty of a proper care of the body—of its health and even of its cleanliness. If God deigns to dwell in us we should endeavor to walk in purity of body as well as of soul, to keep our bodies in decency, not to afflict them with austerities, or to neglect them in disease, but so to regulate our lives that we shall be able to serve God, and be in suitable condition to do good.<sup>182</sup>

Even the body, it must be borne in mind was not according to Calvin created to be the prey of death. In his commentary on Gen. ii. 16 he tells us that had man not sinned,

<sup>180</sup> *Inst.* III. xxv. 7.

<sup>181</sup> Sermons on Deuteronomy, *Opp.* xxvii. 19, 20.

<sup>182</sup> Sermons on Deut. *Opp.* xxviii. p. 101, Sermons on 1 Tim. *Opp.* viii. 533-536. Cf. in general on Calvin's doctrine of the body, E. Doumergue, *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Jan., 1909 (VII. 1) pp. 93-96, where he brings out the salient points in opposition to the representations of Martin Schulze's *Meditatio Futurae Vitae, ihr Begriff und ihre herrschende Stellung im System Calvins*, 1901, p. 7 sq. In his address on *Calvin le prédicateur de Genève* delivered at the celebration at Geneva of the 400 anniversary of Calvin's birth (July 2, 1909) Doumergue briefly sums up his contentions here: "Oh! no doubt the body is a *tent*, a *prison* and worse still in the vehement language of our preacher. But at the same time, 'there is no part of the body in which some sparkle of the divine image is not to be found shining.' It is the 'temple of the Holy Spirit,' 'the altar' on which God would be adored. . . . And it is in a sort of canticle that Calvin celebrates its resurrection. What madness it would be to reduce this body to dust without hope. No, the body of St. Paul, which has borne the marks of Jesus Christ, which has magnificently glorified Him, will not be deprived of the reward of the 'crown.'—Accordingly what care we should take of this body! Care for the health is a religious duty: 'God does not wish that men should kill themselves,' and to abstain from the remedies which are offered is a 'diabolical pride.'—Health and cleanliness: here is the whole of modern hygiene, which is to be nowhere more scrupulous or splendid than with the peoples which have been most strictly taught in the school of the preacher of Geneva,—the Scotch and Dutch" (p. 21).



his earthly life indeed would have ceased but only to give way to a heavenly life for the whole man.<sup>183</sup> That man dies is due therefore entirely to sin. Without sin the body itself would have been immortal. Its *exinanitio* is as much due to sin as the *maledictio* which falls on the soul.<sup>184</sup> By Adam's sin death entered into the world<sup>185</sup> and thus alienation from God for the soul, and return to dust for the body. And therefore by the redemption in Christ there is purchased for the soul restoration to communion with God and for the body return from the dust, in order that the whole man, soul and body, may live forever in the enjoyment of the Divine favor. The body is not in and of itself therefore, although the lower part of man and uniting him with the lower creation, an unworthy element of human nature. All that is unworthy in it comes from sin.<sup>186</sup>

The "nobler part"<sup>187</sup> of man, the "soul", or as it is alternatively called, the "spirit",<sup>188</sup> differs from the body not merely in nature but in origin. In its nature, Calvin conceives it as distinctively percipient substance: whose "very nature, without which it cannot by any means exist, is movement, feeling, activity, understanding".<sup>189</sup> From the metaphysical point of view Calvin defines it as "an immortal,

<sup>183</sup> "terrena quidem vita illi fuisset temporalis" but in coelum tamen sine interitu et illaesus migrasset.

<sup>184</sup> Nunc mors ideo horrore nobis est: primum quia quaedam est exinanitio, quod corpus: deinde quia Dei maledictionem sensit anima.

<sup>185</sup> On Rom. v. 12.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Talma, as cited pp. 37-40.

<sup>187</sup> I. xv. 2: nobilior pars: praecipua pars.

<sup>188</sup> Anima . . . interdum spiritus vocatur (I. xv. 2 *ad init.*). He repeatedly investigates in his occasional works the Biblical usage of the terms "soul" and "spirit." E.g. in his early work, *Psychopannychia, ad init.* (*Opp.* v. 178 sq.), and towards the end of the tract against the Anabaptists (*Opp.* vii. 111). Cf. Talma, as cited, p. 34.

<sup>189</sup> *Psychopannychia, Opp.* v. 184: "If any confess that the soul lives, and deprive it at the same time of all sensation (*sensu*), they just imagine a soul with nothing of soul about it; or they tear away the soul from itself; quum ejus natura, sine qua consistere ullo modo nequit, sit moveri, sentire, vigere, intelligere; and (as Tertullian says) animae anima, sensus sit.

yet created essence",<sup>190</sup> and he is at considerable pains to justify each element of this definition.

In opposition to the notion that the soul is but a breath (*flatus*) or power (*vis*) divinely infused into bodies, but itself lacking essence (*quae tamen essentia careat*),<sup>191</sup> he affirms that it is a substantial entity distinct from the body, incorporeal in its own nature (*substantia incorporea*),<sup>192</sup> and therefore incapable of occupying space, and yet inhabiting the body as its domicile "not only that it may quicken all its parts,<sup>193</sup> and render its organs fit (*apta*) and useful for their activities, but also that it may hold the primacy (*primatum*) in the government of the life of man", whether in concerns of this life or in those of the life to come.<sup>194</sup> The substantiality of the soul as an essence distinct from the body he considers to be clear on its own account, and on the testimony of Scripture as well.<sup>195</sup> The powers with which the soul is endowed, he urges, transcend the capacities of physical substance, and themselves afford therefore ample proof that there is "hidden in man something which is distinct from the body".<sup>196</sup> Here is conscience, for example, which, discriminating between good and evil, responds to the judgment of God. "How shall an affection without essence<sup>197</sup> penetrate to the tribunal of God and strike terror into itself from its guilt"; or fear of a purely spiritual punishment afflict the body? Here is the knowledge of God itself. How should an evanescent activity (*evanidus vigor*) rise to the fountain of life? Here is the

<sup>190</sup> I. xv. 2 *init.*: animae nomine essentiam immortalem, creatam tamen intelligo, quae nobilior ejus pars est.

<sup>191</sup> I. xv. 2.

<sup>192</sup> I. xv. 6.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. *Psychopannychia*, *Opp.* v. 180: essentiam immortalem, quae in homine vitae causa est.

<sup>194</sup> I. xv. 6.

<sup>195</sup> I. xv. 2: et res ipsa et tota scriptura ostendit.

<sup>196</sup> I. xv. 2: clare demonstrat latere in homine aliquid a corpore separatum.

<sup>197</sup> I. xv. 2: motus sine essentia—the expression is just in view of modern phenomenalist psychology.



marvellous agility of the human mind, traversing heaven and earth, and all the secret places of nature; here are the intellect and memory gathering into themselves all the ages, arranging everything in proper order and even forecasting the future from the past; here is the intellect, conceiving the invisible God and the angels, which have nothing in common with the body, apprehending what is right, and just, and honest, things to which no bodily sense is related: must there not be something essentially distinct from the body which is the seat of such intelligence?<sup>198</sup> It is upon the Scriptural argument for the distinctness of the soul, however, that Calvin especially dwells; and he has, of course, no difficulty in making it perfectly plain that from beginning to end the Scriptures go on the assumption of the distinctness and even the separability of the soul from the body.<sup>199</sup>

This whole argument was inserted into the *Institutes* for the first time in the preparation of the last edition (1559). But it is old ground for Calvin. It was already traversed by him with great fullness in his youthful tract against the advocates of Soul-Sleep (1534), the main contention of which is that the soul "is a substance and lives after the death of the body, endowed with sense and intelligence".<sup>200</sup> Ten years later (1544) it was gone over again somewhat more concisely in his "Brief Instructions to arm all good Christians against the errors of the common sect of the Anabaptists", among whose errors was the contention that "souls, departed from the body, do not live until the resurrection", whether because the soul was conceived, not as "a substance or as a creation having essence, but only as the power which man has to breathe, move and perform the other acts of life, while he is living", or because, while it was conceived as "an essential creature", it was thought to sleep "without feeling or knowledge" until the judgment day. As over against the former and extremer type of

<sup>198</sup> I, xv. 2.

<sup>199</sup> I, xv. 2 *ad fin.*

<sup>200</sup> *Opp.* v. 177.

Anabaptism he undertakes to demonstrate that "souls have an essence of their own"<sup>201</sup> given to them by God".<sup>202</sup> The richness of the Scriptural material at Calvin's disposal is fairly illustrated by the fact that in these three Scriptural arguments, although some of it is employed more than once, yet much of it is in each case drawn from different passages.

It is interesting to observe that Calvin conceives himself to establish the immortality of the soul in establishing its distinct substantiality. In the argument in the *Institutes*, the two topics of the essentiality and the immortality of the soul are treated so completely as one, that the reader is apt to be a little confused by what seems their confusion.<sup>203</sup> Calvin's idea seems to be that if it be clear that there is "something in man essentially distinct from the body", the subject of all these great powers of intellect, sensibility and will, it will go of itself that this wonderful somewhat will survive death. This point of view is perhaps already present to his mind in the *Psychopannychia*, although there he more clearly distinguishes between the proof "that the soul or spirit of man is a substance distinct from the body", and the proof that the soul remains in existence after the death of the body, representing the latter specifically as the question of the immortality of the soul<sup>204</sup>—although it does not seem obvious that even the question of the survival of the crisis of death is quite the same question as that of immortality. His method seems in point of fact to be the result of a more fundamental conception. This fundamental conception which underlies his whole point of view seems to be that a spiritual substance is, as uncompounded, naturally immortal. On that presupposition the proof that there is a spiritual substance in man is the proof of his immortality. Of course this assumption

<sup>201</sup> *Opp.* vii. 111-112: que les ames ont une essence propre.

<sup>202</sup> *Opp.* vii. 112: l'ame humaine a une essence propre qui luy soit donnée de Dieu.

<sup>203</sup> I. xv. 2.

<sup>204</sup> *Opp.* v. 184.



is not to be understood to mean that Calvin imagined that any creatures of God whether men or angels are so immortal in and of themselves, that God cannot destroy them or that they exist otherwise than "in Him", and by virtue not only of His purpose in constituting them as He has constituted them, but of His constant upholding power.<sup>205</sup> It means only that Calvin supposed that in constituting them spirits God has constituted them for immortality and given them

<sup>205</sup> Accordingly Calvin in his *Psychopannychia* (*Opp.* v. p. 222) says plainly: "When we say that the spirit of man is immortal we do not affirm that it is able to stand against the hand of God or to subsist apart from His power." In his Commentary on 1 Tim. vi. 16 he explains the declaration that God alone has immortality to refer not to His having immortality *a seipso* but to His having it *in potestate*: accordingly, he says, immortality does not belong to creatures save as it is planted in them by the inspiration of God: *nam si vim Dei quae indita est hominis animae tollas, statim evanesceret: naturae immortalitas* does not belong to souls or angels. Similarly in his *Responsio contra Pighium de Libero Arbitrio* (*Opp.* vi. 361) he denies that the soul of man is in this sense *per se* immortal: *nam et eo modo neque animam per se immortalem esse concedimus*. The exception however proves the rule, and the use of this as an argument against Pighius *ex concessu*, suggests that there is a sense in which otherwise than *eo modo*, the soul is *per se* immortal. Pighius had asserted that "mortality and corruption are *ex conditione*, non *vicio naturae*." "What is his proof?" asks Calvin, and supplies it thus: "Since the body is thus from its principia out of which it is compounded and from the nature of composition." "But by that argument," rejoins Calvin, "it might be proved that the body would be obnoxious to death even after the resurrection; and that the soul is now mortal. For from what principium has the soul sprung except nothing?" "No doubt," he adds, "if we should say that that perfection which God conferred on man from the beginning did not so belong to nature that he had it *per se* and *ex se*, I would freely accept this opinion. For not even do we concede that the soul is after that fashion *per se* immortal. And this is what Paul teaches when he attributes immortality to God alone (1 Tim. vi. 16). Nevertheless we do not on that account confess the soul to be mortal: for we do not estimate its nature from the first power (virtute) of the essence, but from the perpetual condition which God has imparted to His creatures." Cf. the tract against the *Libertines* (vii. p. 180): "St. Paul, they say, calls God alone immortal (1 Tim. vi. 16). I fully agree with St. Paul. But he means that God alone has this privilege of Himself and of His own nature, so that He is the source of immortality. But what He has of Himself He communicated to our souls by His grace, when He formed them in His image."

natures adapted for and implicating their endless existence. The proof that there is an uncompounded spirit in man, therefore, is in his view already a proof of immortality.

It must not be inferred, however, that Calvin always relies solely on this indirect proof of the immortality of the soul. More direct proofs are found elsewhere in the *Institutes*,—as for example, in the chapter on the witness of the works and deeds of God to Him (I. v. 10), where a digression is made to point out that the apparent inequality of the moral government of the world suggests the hypothesis of a further life for its rectification. But the simplicity with which he as a Biblical theologian relies on the Scriptures precluded the development by Calvin of an extended or a complete argument for immortality on general considerations. On his view of the disabilities of the human mind induced by sin, he would not look for such an argument among the heathen. The heathen philosophers, he tells us accordingly, having no knowledge of the Scriptures, scarcely attained to a knowledge of immortality. Almost no one of them, except Plato, roundly asserts the soul to be an immortal essence. Certain other Socratics reach out towards such a conception indeed; but they are all in more or less doubt and cannot teach clearly what they only half-believe. Nevertheless Calvin is persuaded that there is ineradicably imprinted on the heart of man a desire for the celestial life, and also some knowledge of it.<sup>206</sup> No man can escape then from some intimations of immortality. And after the heart has been quickened by grace and the intellect illuminated by the workings of the Spirit, proofs of it will abundantly suggest themselves.<sup>207</sup>

<sup>206</sup> I. xv. 6.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. the remarks of Talma, as cited, p. 35: "But still all men, according to Calvin too, have a certain sense of their immortality. By their alienation from the Father of lights, the light in men is not so wholly extinguished that they are incapable of this sense. . . ." Talma sums up: "It is very certain that Calvin has not fully and finally proved the existence and immortality of the human soul. But this is not his purpose. His object was not so much to refute the error of those who denied these two things, as to strengthen his believing



Now, this immortal substance, alternately called soul and spirit, which constitutes the animating or governing principle in the human constitution, Calvin is insistent, is an immediate creation of God. He insists upon this, not merely in opposition to the notion that it is no thing at all, but a mere "breath" or power", but with equal strenuousness in opposition to that "diabolical error" which considers the soul a derivative (*traducem*) of the substance of God—seeing that this would make "the divine nature not only subject to change and passions, but to ignorance also, to depraved desires, to weakness and every kind of vices"<sup>208</sup> . . . "rending the essence of the Creator that every one may possess a part of it". No, says he, "it is to be held as certain that souls are created" and "creation is not transfusion of essence, but the origination of it from nothing".<sup>209</sup> This "origination of the soul out of nothing", which alone can be called "creation" he insists on, again, not merely with reference to the origin of the first soul,<sup>210</sup> but also with reference to every soul which has come into existence since. It is horrible, says he, that it should be thrown into doubt by men who call themselves Christians, whether the souls of men are a true created substance.<sup>211</sup> Calvin's doctrine of the creation of the soul is thrown up into contrast, therefore, on the one side with his view that all else which was brought into being during the creative week, after the primal creation of the indigested mass of the world-stuff on the first day, was proximately the product of second causes; and on the other side, with his belief in the production of the body by

readers in their faith. And for this end the popular presentation of the grounds on which the two things rest was sufficient." On the difference between the human soul and the souls of animals according to Calvin, see Talma, p. 36.

<sup>208</sup> I. xv. 5.

<sup>209</sup> *Do.*

<sup>210</sup> Cf. e.g. *Comment. on Mat. xii. 6* (*Opp.* 44. p. 401): "Moses understands that man's soul was created from nothing. We are born by generation, and yet our origin is clay, and the chief thing in us, the soul, is created from nothing."

<sup>211</sup> *Opp.* vii. 180.

ordinary generation in the case of all the descendants of Adam. The soul of the first man stands out as an exception in the midst of mediately produced effects, as the one product of God's direct creative power in the process of the perfecting of the creative scheme. And the souls of the descendants of this first man stand out in contrast with their bodily forms, as in every case also products of God's direct creative activity. In creating souls (*in creandis animabus*), he says, "God does not use the instrumentality of man (*non adhibet hominum operam*)."<sup>212</sup> "There is no need," he says again, "to resort to that old figment of some (*figmentum*), that souls come into being (*orientur*) *ex traduce*."<sup>213</sup> "We have not come of the race of Adam," he says yet again, "except as regards the body."<sup>214</sup> And not only does he thus over and over again through his writings sharply assert creationism as over against traducianism, but he devotes a whole section of the *Institutes* to the question and formally rejects the whole traducian conception.<sup>215</sup>

In its nature, as we have seen, this "immortal and yet created essence" which vitalizes and governs the human frame, is defined by Calvin as percipient substance, whose very nature it is to move, feel, act, understand; which is, in a word, characteristically sensibility.<sup>216</sup> When we attend to Calvin's conception of the soul from this point of view we are in effect observing his psychology: and, of course, he develops his psychology with his eye primarily upon the nature of man in his state of integrity—or rather, let us

<sup>212</sup> On Heb. xii. 9.

<sup>213</sup> On James iii. 6.

<sup>214</sup> Sermon on Job. xiv. 4.

<sup>215</sup> II. i. 7. Two subordinate points in Calvin's doctrine of creation may be worth noting here. He remarks in passing while commenting on Numbers xvi. 22 (*Opp.* 25. p. 222) that it may be collected from that passage that each man has his separate soul: and that by this "is refuted the prodigious delusion of the Manichaeans that all souls are so infused *ex traduce* by the Spirit of God that there should still be one spirit." He returns often to this. Commenting on Job iii. 16 (*Opp.* 33, p. 162) he teaches that God breathes the soul into the creature at the moment when it is conceived in its mother's womb.

<sup>216</sup> *Opp.* v. 184: *sensus*.



say, in his uncorrupted condition.<sup>217</sup> "When definitions are to be given", he remarks in another place,<sup>218</sup> "the nature of the soul is accustomed to be considered in its integrity." He develops it also, however, under the influence of a strong desire to be clear and simple. Subtleties in such matters he gladly leaves to the philosophers, whose speculations he has no desire to gainsay as to either their truth or their usefulness; for his purposes, however, which look to building up piety, a simple definition will suffice.<sup>219</sup> It is naturally upon the questions which cluster around the Will that Calvin's chief psychological interest focuses. We must, however, leave the whole matter of Calvin's psychology and his doctrine of the Will to another occasion. We must postpone also an exposition of his doctrine of the image of God. A survey of these two topics remains in order to complete our exposition of his doctrine of the creature.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

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<sup>217</sup> I. xv. 1.

<sup>218</sup> *Responsio contra Pighium de Libero Arbitrio* (Opp. vi. p. 285): "It is sufficiently clear that [in Basil's remarks here under consideration] the nature of the soul is considered in its integrity; as it is accustomed to be in giving definitions."

<sup>219</sup> Talma, as cited, p. 43, remarks: "The whole manner in which Calvin deals here (*Int.* I. xv. 6) with the faculties of the soul is remarkable. The style loses the liveliness, the progress of thought its regularity; and the whole makes the impression that Calvin did not feel fully at home in this field. . . ." Talma notes that the discussion of the faculties of the soul is not found in the *Institutes* of 1536, but is already very full in the edition of 1539. (Cf. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, iv. p. 109, for Calvin's psychology).

## THE LIFE AND WORK OF JOHN HUS\*

July the sixth, five hundred years ago, beyond the city walls of Constance, Switzerland, with hardly a voice raised to comfort, encourage, or to praise him, John of Husinecz, a man of God, died at the stake for his faith. With the sound of his singing still lingering in the air and with his lips murmuring prayers to his blessed Master, his soul passed on to God who gave it. His ashes, soon after dissipated upon the waters, drifted on to the sea. But his message remained warm in the hearts of his fellow-men, now truly understood by a few, now perverted by the many, now prominent in the bitter civil wars, now re-expressed as a part of the Protestant Reformation and now at last finding a noble end in the inauguration of the grand and glorious endeavor to carry the gospel to every land, that all might know of the love of God manifested in Christ Jesus.

A hero was John Hus and a great one, a patriot and the truest, and in all things a great noble God-fearing soul, and he died at the stake for his faith. He was brought to death by a church grown worldly, grown rich, grown faithless to God's will, finding its head in the most pretentious council in the history of Christianity, yet narrow, bigoted and mean, sending a son of its own, unheard, to the burning stake. He was brought to death by a state finding its head in a man false to his word, false to his friends, false to his own kinsman, unworthy of the name of king. He was brought to death by the church and the state, but he was beloved and honored by the best of his own people, the rich and the poor, the great and the small, the noble and the peasant, with a fervent love that continues down to our own day. Well may we remember his death, for by his sacrifice he achieved a great victory. Well may we recount the story of his life, for it is one that thrills, inspires, ennobles, and im-

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\* An address delivered in Miller Chapel, April 1, 1915, in honor of the five hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of John Hus.



pels to deeds of valor for God, for truth, and for the land we love so well.

John Hus came from obscurity and died the most talked of man of his day. One of many children of a humble but thrifty peasant pair, he was born some time between the years 1369 and 1375 in the little village of Husinecz near the Bavarian frontier, where the Teuton met the Slav, where the border spirit ran high and the race rivalry was bitter. The son John was a lad o' pairts with loving sacrificing parents and a vision lighting his heart. His early education was obtained in the larger town of Prachtice a short distance removed from Husinecz. These vague bits of information and the statement that he was the favorite son of his mother constitute the sum of our knowledge of this period of his existence.

In 1389 he left his home and journeyed forth to the city of Prague, his heart strong, his purse empty, but a great ambition moving him forward to better his condition and to serve God in the labor of the ministry. Here in the University he lived and labored many years. Here he found the truth and became its loyal servant. Here he led his people in their religious and political struggles and aspirations. Here his troubles originated. Here his great friends were made. Here his enemies were busy, spying out and seeking to accomplish his downfall.

The University of Prague was founded in 1348 by Charles IV for his people, the Bohemians, but it very soon came under the control of the ever-present Germans. They had the majority in the voting. They controlled the church of Bohemia and secured for themselves the rich benefices. They domineered over the Bohemians to the point of desperation. What the Czech advocated, the German despised, and what the German proclaimed as true the Bohemian was ready to declare false. In the scholastic controversies the Bohemians were Realists, the Germans were Nominalists. In the questions of empire, the Germans recognized the claims of Rupert, the Czechs rallied about Wenzel. In

the troublous conditions arising out of the papal Schism the Germans supported Gregory XII, the Bohemians forsook him and gave their approval to the Pisan cardinals and later Alexander V. This was the condition of things when Hus arrived at Prague, a poor student, unknown, with his heart afire with patriotism; and it was in this very struggle of nations that he was to play the leading rôle.

We have some information concerning his student days. We know that he did his work well and was interested therein, though not especially proficient. He was well liked by his companions, cheerful in labor, interested in the recreations of the time, particularly in the playing of chess—in which he showed great skill; and in spite of poverty and oftentimes dire want the days seem to have passed in a rather happy and healthful way. The latter part of his student life was rendered free from great care by his admission to the newly founded college of Wenzel, where his expenses were greatly reduced.

The third period in the life of Hus, extending from 1393 to 1408, may be characterized as one of academic activity, patriotic leadership and popular preaching. In 1393 he received the bachelor's degree, in 1396 the master's, in 1398 he began to lecture in the University, in 1400 he was ordained priest, and in 1402 he was elected rector, which position he held according to the custom, for about half a year.

In the year 1402 he was also appointed preacher at the recently founded Bethlehem Chapel, an establishment which had come into existence as a result of the reformatory preaching of Milicz and through the munificence of two rich burghers. Here preaching was the chief concern and the gospel—a fact which is noteworthy and important—was proclaimed in the Bohemian tongue. Here Hus had a popular outlet for his great spirit. Here he influenced many from all classes who came to hear him and who remained his ardent supporters and the leaders in the Hussite movement. Among those who were affected by his message de-



livered in the Bethlehem Chapel was the wife of Wenzel, Queen Sophia, who remained loyal to Hus to the end, thereby on several occasions endangering her own reputation for orthodoxy.

It was during these years that Hus became intimately acquainted with the writings of Wyclif, which were to play such an important part in the reform movement in Bohemia. The works of John Wyclif had been introduced into Bohemia by students who had gone to England in the reign of Richard II. The occasion of their departure for England was the marriage of their country-woman, Anna, sister of Wenzel and Sigismund, to Richard, and the reason for it was the great fame of the University of Oxford. During the years of their sojourn Wyclifism was at its high water mark in the University circles. They became imbued with his doctrines and returned home with many of his important works. Wyclif was first known in Bohemia as a philosopher and schoolman and in the scholastic controversies as a Realist, but as matters of speculation were to him secondary to the preaching of God's word and the reform of the church, so were they soon relegated to the background by his followers in Bohemia, and he became through his writing their leader in solving the more vital questions of holy scripture and holy church. Wyclifism became especially popular in Prague where his works were studied, expounded and popularized primarily by John Hus, by other masters of the University many of whom afterwards fell away, and by the occasionally present but ever erratic Jerome of Prague.

We have during these comparatively untroubled years the Hussite movement taking definite form and the opposition developing which was to wreck the career of its leader. It is during these years that the storm clouds were packed and the winds piled up which were to be loosened in full fury in the years which were to follow. Here we can trace ever so clearly the lines of force which were uniting to break his influence and destroy his life.

In the first place Hus was the leader of the Bohemians in the University struggles and won for himself in his identification with their cause the personal hatred of the Germans, and the Germans held the ruling power in the Bohemian church. Secondly, his popularity in the Bethlehem Chapel was a source of great envy for the less successful parish priests who became at first secretly and then openly his enemies, spying out and spreading abroad their evil gossip, charging things which were often slanderous, many times perverted and generally groundless. These very charges were themselves a third source of opposition in that they spread to Rome itself the endeavor to crush out his influence. He was charged with false teachings concerning the church, the sacraments, and the Trinity, and with the full advocacy of the already condemned Wyclifism. But especially did he draw upon himself the bitter hatred of the clergy in his clear-cut condemnation of their life, in his bitter denunciation of the shocking clerical immorality, of the practices of simony, and of the worldliness and greed of prelates and especially of the See of Rome. His words rang out with the fierce challenge of a John the Baptist, and as of old they who felt themselves accused resolved to silence the accuser.

The year 1408 marks the turning point in the life of Hus. Now he begins to reap what he has sown. Now he stands forth as the avowed enemy of clerical immorality and the champion of his people in their religious and political struggles with the worldly forces in the church openly arrayed against him. Now we find the parish priests, the powerful archbishop and the pope of Rome all united in the endeavor to stem the tide which had swept over the country as a result of the preaching of one poor priest. Now he rises to the position of the greatest popular leader Bohemia has ever known, with all classes of the people ready to support him, ready to defend him with their lives. Now popular enthusiasm rises to the very heights and clerical antagonism and bitter hatred begin to lay the mines for his destruction.



It was towards the end of the year 1408 that the volcanic conditions in the University came to the eruptive point and that Wenzel, with considerable difficulty, was persuaded by his courtiers, his queen, and the French envoys present and interested in the papal question involved, to side definitely with the nationalists. January 18, 1409 he was induced to sign the decree of Kutna Hora by which the king declared that the Bohemians, who in all University assemblies, judgments, and so forth, had heretofore had but one vote out of four should henceforth have three. This decree changed radically the constitution of the University and was a great victory for the Bohemians. It was followed almost immediately by the famous withdrawal of the Germans and the founding of the new University of Leipzig.

The departure of the Germans was almost a death knell to the University of Prague. The institution now became one of secondary importance, and the struggles which had been carried on in a circumscribed way in Bohemia were now aired abroad throughout northern Europe. These conditions resulting from the victory of the Bohemians were unfortunate and unhappy, but a true patriot would willingly and bravely accept them. Rather see the University become merely the instructor of a few Bohemians, rather destroy it entirely, than have it continue under the control of domineering foreigners.

The University now became the rallying point of the Bohemians in the religious and political struggles, and Hus as the newly appointed rector came more and more to the fore.

The archbishop of Prague, during these years, was Zbinek Zajic of Hasenburg, a man of good intentions and truly zealous for the reform of the church, but more of a soldier than a priest, better qualified for service in the camp than in the church. He, at first, treated Hus with high regard and endeavored to support him in his plans for the cleansing of the church. He made him synodical preacher and appointed him upon a rather important commission to Brandenburg. The two were gradually estranged, first through the

position which Hus assumed on the papal question when he refused to recognize Gregory XII, and then because of his fuller acceptance of the doctrines of Wyclif. Finally Zbinek, reading the signs of the times, transferred his allegiance to the pope of the Pisan cardinals and became himself the leader of the opposing forces and the chief representative of the papacy in the endeavor to crush out the Hussite movement.

Alexander V, elected pope June 26, 1409, had been made aware, by letter, by visitation, by voluntary spying and rich presents, of conditions in Bohemia, and as a result on December 20, 1409, he issued a bull against John Hus and his followers. The bull was delayed in passage and was not read in Prague until March 9 of the following year. By its terms a council of four magistrates of theology and two doctors of canon law was to be appointed to examine into the situation. After hearing opinions they were to forbid all heretical preaching and preaching of any kind except in the cathedral, the college and parish churches, and monastic houses. Furthermore the writings of Wyclif were to be delivered up and burned. In the endeavor to execute the bull feeling ran high on both sides and many excesses were indulged in. Hus continued to preach and proclaim the Word of God, to condemn clerical immorality, and to call the people to righteous living, and all with the ardent support of the nationalists, with the protection of the King, and despite the definite prohibition contained in the papal bull.

The next step taken by the church was his excommunication, and in a day when the fulminating power of the papacy had lost its force because of its lavish use very little was accomplished. Then came canonical citation and summons to Rome by John XXIII and finally the city was placed under an interdict and all with little avail, although at this time Stephen Palecz and a few others fell away who were to be numbered by Hus among his bitterest enemies.

Towards the end of the year 1411 Hus came out with all



the force of his powerful invective against the traffic in indulgences carried on to finance the so-called Holy War which John XXIII was undertaking against Ladislas, King of Naples. Conditions in Bohemia were at the breaking point, and for the good of all concerned Hus was persuaded by King Wenzel to go into retirement for a time.

The period of his voluntary exile extended from the latter part of the year 1412 to October 1414. Where the years were passed we know not. Much of the time was probably spent in Southern Bohemia with occasional visits, undoubtedly, to Prague. It was a time of very useful itinerant preaching. It was a period full of literary activity. It witnessed the production of some of his original work. Though absent from the chief center of the reform movement he was continually in touch with it, directing, encouraging and serving his people.

At this time Sigismund, King of Hungary and of the Romans, brother of Wenzel and heir to the Bohemian crown, instrumental in calling the Council of Constance and its dominant spirit, saw in the Hussite movement a force which was giving Bohemia a bad reputation in the world and which was working against his own personal desires and ambitions. He saw in Hus not only the leader but the power without which the stress of conditions would soon pass away. He felt that the removal of Hus from Bohemia would be the ending of the Hussite movement. If, however, he were to attempt to remove him arrogantly, he would bring upon himself the enmity of many of the influential noblemen who were his warm supporters. The Council of Constance seemed to offer the occasion desired. It was called to reform the church. The Hussite movement certainly needed investigation. Hus was its leader and in his anxiety to plead his cause and prove his innocence would undoubtedly come when summoned. So Sigismund correctly reasoned.

With apparent candor but premeditated deceit he sent a summons to Hus to come to Constance, promising, regard-

less of consequence, a safe conduct to and from the Council. Hus as expected felt that this was an opportunity to vindicate before the church his position and to prove in general council that he believed and taught nothing contrary to the accepted faith of the church. In spite of the warning of many who prophesied that he would never return to his native land Hus set out, October 11, 1414, for the Council, before the arrival of the safe conduct. He was accompanied by his proved friends, John of Chlum, Wenzel of Duba, and Henry of Leitenbock. The journey made through Bavaria was in the main uneventful, and they arrived at Constance, November 3 of the same year. Hus took up his lodging in a little tavern near the Schnitz Gate kept by a widow named Fida. His enemies were at work even before his arrival, but he was allowed considerable liberty until they accomplished his imprisonment.

The Council of Constance, to which he had come, was the biggest and most brilliant assemblage the Church has ever known. Thousands upon thousands were there, good and bad, noble and prelate, courtier and courtesan, priest and pauper, drawn together from the length and breadth of Christendom. They were gathered to Constance for the purpose of reforming the church under the leadership of the self-seeking Sigismund and the sin-ridden John XXIII. They talked much, debated many questions and condemned to death John Hus, the most godly man present.

A short time after his arrival, on complaint of Stephen Palecz, a former friend, John of Leitomysl, Michael the Pleader, and others, on various prettexts, that he held mass in his apartment and that he had attempted to escape in a hay wagon, Hus was brought, without forewarning and to his great surprise and sorrow, before a commission of the cardinals. He declared that he had come to Constance to make his defense in open meeting after the arrival of Sigismund, under whose safe conduct he was present. His accusers took little heed of this, his former friends gloated over his predicament, and he was soon lodged in confinement in



a Dominican monastery, situated on an island hard by the mainland. There in a damp and dismal cell near the latrines they placed him. He was deprived of books, of papers, of the Word of God. Communication with his friends was only accomplished by stealth and through a well-disposed jailor, and in increasing weakness and pain he was left in loneliness to suffer.

When John XXIII, seeing the Council slipping from his grasp, fled to Schaffhausen, the keys of the prison were delivered over to Sigismund, and he could have liberated him had he so desired. However, he was removed to the castle Gottlieben of the Bishop of Constance, located some distance from the city. There he was confined in an "airy prison" high in the tower. He was removed from all contact with the world, was chained day and night, and although every effort was made to break his strength, his spirit remained undaunted.

A commission with D'Ailly at its head, appointed to examine the charges made against him, visited Hus at the castle Gottlieben but accomplished little; and with the development of other matters of interest to the Council little was done until the many and powerful friends of Hus in Bohemia and the few in Constance by their very importunity and their imposing seals gained for him what the Inquisition very rarely granted—a public hearing.

On June 5 he was again transferred, this time to the Franciscan monastery within the city, for the convenience of his examiners. The hearing extended over three days. On the first day charges were presented before Hus was admitted, and when he was brought before the assembled commissioners he was not allowed to say a word in defense or explanation. The second day, with Sigismund present, the discussion was concerned chiefly with the scholastic controversy of Nominalism and Realism in which D'Ailly endeavored to prove that Hus, as a Realist, must hold to the remanence theory of the eucharist and therefore must be an advocate of the Wyclifite or some other heretical interpreta-

tion of the sacrament. Here Hus showed great skill in meeting his antagonists on their ground although they knew that his interest and heart were far removed from these unfruitful questions. The third day many articles from his books were read, some in the spirit of their context and some perverted. The discussion was mainly concerned with the question of dominion, civil and ecclesiastical, and was for the most part vain. It was clear to all what the end would be. Hus must abjure and recant. "I am prepared to obey the Council and be taught," he said, "but I beseech of you in the name of God, do not lay snares of damnation for me by compelling me to tell a lie and to abjure articles which I never held."

Hus had come to the trial with a promise of safe conduct. Shortly after his arrival he was thrown into prison. He had come to defend himself in public hearing against the charges of heresy. He was not allowed to say a word in self-defense. After a period of sickness, of suffering, of great trial, in which his spirit remained undaunted and his faith was refined as through a fire, he was declared a heretic.

After the public examination in the Franciscan monastery there was a month of weary waiting and then a travesty of a proceeding for his public condemnation held in the cathedral on July 6, preparatory to the execution. All the notables of church and state were there. While mass was read poor Hus was kept without the doors unworthy to meet with the children of God at the table of His Son. At last he was taken into the cathedral and the trial began. A sermon was delivered against heresy by Archbishop Lodi which was followed by the presentation of articles against Hus. It was declared that he had taught that the church was the totality of the predestinated, that civil authority depends on character, and that priests and prelates living in mortal sin are unworthy and incapable of administering the sacraments of God. For holding such dreadful views, which he was given no opportunity of explaining or even of denying he had held, he was condemned a heretic. At



the conclusion of a trial which was from beginning to end spectacular and cowardly, he was deconsecrated, disrobed of his priestly garments, his tonsure destroyed, his body given over to the secular authorities and his soul to the devil.

"We commit thy soul unto the devil," they thundered.

"And I," he cried, "commit it unto the most gracious Lord Jesus Christ."

Then they led him forth, the great mob following out of the cathedral, past the pile of burning books, down by the house of the good Frau Fida, out the Schnitz Gate and on to the so-called Place of the Devil.

A stake had been made fast in the ground and faggots were lying about. Hus knelt, recited several Psalms, prayed to God and arose strengthened. He was then stripped and bound to the pole.

"Turn him to the west," came up from the mob. "He is a heretic. He shall not face the east."

The change was made. The fire lighted, and as the flames arose the heart of Hus lifted itself up in praise to God in song. When the flames blew across his face and he could sing no more, his lips were noticed moving in silent prayer and his countenance bore the rare light of joy which comes alone to those who approach the hour of death in the calm assurance of the everlasting love of God.

The end came and with it the further cruelty and barbarity of his enemies. Finally for fear his followers might endeavor to preserve relics of him and thus keep warm his memory, his ashes were gathered together and thrown into the waters.

Thus he perished, a man whose only proved offense even in the eyes of those who condemned him, was that he placed the Bible before the Church, the Lord before the Pope, and the individual conscience before the will of the hierarchy. Thus he perished, John Hus, a man who deserves to live on in the hearts of those who love the Lord, as a dauntless hero, a champion of the Holy word, a martyr to the truth. Thus he perished, a man who was a great patriot

and leader of his people, a heaven-inspired preacher of righteousness and as such one truly zealous for the reform of the church.

He was a man well qualified for patriotic leadership. His was the sort of personality around which men love to group themselves. He was a man pleasing and magnetic with a fervent love of country. He was a man of unquestioned courage and uprightness of character, ready to sacrifice himself in the cause of country, in the service of truth, for the will of God. As a Bohemian patriot his zeal was great for the betterment of his native land in every possible way in which his personality and his talents could be used in her service. He sought to develop foreign ties which would be to her advantage. He sought to disseminate knowledge and raise her intellectual status. He sought to build her up morally and to anchor that morality in the Word of God.

While connected with the University he sought to free her from the dominance of the Germans and to make her truly a place for the education and upbuilding of his people. He was recognized as the leader in this endeavor and after the withdrawal of the Germans he was immediately elected rector on the reorganized plans laid down by Wenzel.

Recognizing that one of the prime requisites for true nationalism is a unity of language, he endeavored in every possible way to make the Bohemian tongue truly the language of the country. He endeavored to purify it from foreign accretions, to cleanse it from stilted formalism, to enrich and strengthen it by building it upon the foundation of the popular spoken tongue. He wrote in it. He composed hymns in it. He preached in it. He sought most of all to make the translation of the Scriptures in the Bohemian language as perfect as possible. To the formation and development of the Bohemian language he bears the same relation that Dante does to the Italian, that Wyclif does to the English, and that Luther does to the German.

Hus sought not only to instill and encourage a love of



country but he sought to found the patriotism of his people in worthy moral living. He sought not only to arouse a Bohemian pride but to make the Bohemians better people. This was the great passion with him. He sought to restore the simplicity, the sincerity, the spiritual fervor of the apostolic church. He sought to make the shepherds of Christ's sheep true patterns for the flock in earnestness, in righteousness, in godliness. He sought to free the Bible and give it to the people. He sought to free the conscience and make religion truly a matter of the heart. He sought, and this was his great endeavor, to build his people up as true followers of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in such a work, in a day of church decadence and degeneracy, he was most assuredly zealous for the reform of the church and the cleansing of her from the many evils within her doors, which had grown strong and now ruled every phase of her life.

As a reformer the field for Hus had been ploughed and watered. No matter how low the church in its life at any period may have fallen, there have always been voices raised in protest, messengers of God sent to lead her back. The Bohemian Church was no exception. His condemnation of clerical immorality was not the first that his generation had heard. The theories as to church and authority which he propounded were not for him discoveries. The Waldenses, Conrad Waldhauser, Milicz, Stitny, Janov and others, before his coming, had preached better living and general reform, and although they had lacked the boldness of Hus they had accomplished good work for the faith. Marsiglio of Padua many years before had taught daring things concerning the church and the state which seem to have been the source not only for the views of Hus but also for those of his English precursor. John Wyclif, himself the path-breaker for the Bohemians, went far beyond Hus in his condemnation of the evils in the Church. Wyclif was indeed a man born out of time, for he varies but little from the later reformers. Hus follows him but a short distance, yet he was moving ever nearer and his development in so far as it had proceeded bears a striking resemblance to that of Wyclif.

Wyclif of England and Hus of Bohemia are two men closely associated in the minds of the historian. Both have their beginnings clouded in obscurity. Both appear first of all as leaders in patriotic movements. Both are prominent in the development of their languages. Both had the first seat of their activity in their respective universities. Both were forceful preachers of righteousness. Both gave form to the restless craving for liberty in religious thought. Both were reformers attacking simony and clerical immorality and seeking to rebuild the church on the foundation of Holy Writ. They differ in that Wyclif, though preceding and influencing Hus, goes far beyond him in the condemnation of errors which had crept into the Roman Church in matters both of faith and of practice. With his fundamental doctrine, the Scripture the seat of authority and the Spirit the revealer of its meaning to the individual heart, Wyclif swept the decks clean for action, condemning pilgrimages, processions, auricular confession, judiciary absolution, image and saint worship, transubstantiation, celibacy, clerical immorality, monastic orders, salvation by works, and the temporal and spiritual claims of an arrogant and decadent papacy.

Hus, indeed, spoke clearly and forcibly against the immorality of the clergy and their worldliness and greed, but he claimed from the beginning to the end that he varied not from the accepted faith of the church, and that if he had taught anything that was contrary to the church and it were revealed to him, he would renounce the same. Wyclif in a day of schism, when the church was weak and he was well supported, died at a good old age a natural death. Hus in a later day, though varying little, when a Council was bold, died at the stake for his faith, died because he would not abjure that which he had not taught, because he would not mislead his followers, because he would not be false to the voice of conscience.

Hus is to be reckoned as one of the Mediaeval Reformers in that his attack was made not so much against doctrines which were false as against practices which were



contrary to the true spirit of Christianity. It is the immorality of the clergy, their lack of piety, their worldliness and greed, their concern with things temporal rather than things spiritual that he condemns in bitterest terms. These are matters which he lamented most of all, and in his endeavor to restore the purity of the early church he stands on the ground that was occupied by those who had preceded him, men such as St. Gregory VII, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and St. Francis of Assisi, whom the church had been pleased to canonize.

He is also to be reckoned with the precursors of the Protestant Reformation in that his doctrinal teaching was at times out of accord with the reformers of the mediaeval church and at one with those who prepared for and were themselves a part of the later and more successful attempt to cleanse and reform the church of God. In his doctrine concerning the church, in which he declared that she was the community of the predestinated, he was presenting a conception of the church that was certainly not acceptable to the hierarchy, and he was on the ground of Wyclif. In his declaration that the seat of authority was the Word of God, he stood on bed rock. This was the foundation stone upon which Wyclif erected his system which had its climax in the translation of the Scriptures, the condemnation of all superstition, and the sending forth of the poor priests. If Hus had been given more time, who knows to what heights he might have attained?

Hus declared that he was true to the faith of the Church and that he was not responsible for all that Wyclif had said. He was, indeed, in a certain sense orthodox to the church of his day in that he was ready to submit to her will, and he certainly did not go as far as Wyclif. He said he was ready to recant anything which was proved to him to be false. This matter of proving doctrines was but a source of further irritation for his examiners. Why should it be necessary for the Church of Rome to prove what was its faith to this the meanest of its ministers? When it declared that such and

such were its teachings he should accept them without question. When it declared that he taught certain things which were contrary to its doctrines, he should abjure and recant without discussion. These were things which Hus could not do.

He was also charged with teaching a Wyclifite interpretation of the sacraments, and gross doctrines concerning the Trinity. He declared that he was innocent of these charges, and innocent he was. What difference did it make whether he held them or not? All that was required was the abjuring and recanting. But this he would not do. He would not abjure that which was not shown to him to be false nor would he recant doctrines which he was charged with holding and which he had not taught. For this spirit which the church called obstinate, and Sigismund ridiculous, but which the true Christian can find paralleled in the life of the Master, he suffered at the stake.

Hus was not original. He was not a man of great genius. He was not a man of profound thought. He was not, as Wyclif, a Protestant born out of time. He was a path-breaker in that he gave Wyclif to his people, in that he sought to restore the fervent love of God and His Word to the Church of Bohemia, and in that he started a movement for reform which though persecuted, divided, perverted, and practically destroyed realized itself eventually in the later freedom.

The full light had not come to him. He was too far down the valley, but he was climbing ever upward and the vision was becoming more and more beautiful. They plucked him off in his young manhood. Who knows what the years might have revealed? But it was God's will. He died for the truth and the truth makes free. He moved the people to righteous living and his power in service was great. A wonderful vision was the light of his soul, and he was never disobedient unto it. Whence came his great power? Whence his wonderful vision? Were not the vision and the power from the Word of God, the source of Truth and Life, the



fountain from which he drank and gave to the thirsting sheep?

Nothing reveals the man Hus more than the letter which he wrote two days after the trial in the Franciscan monastery, when the conviction was definitely established that death awaited him at the hands of the Council and that life was a matter of days, perhaps hours. It is in his letters that we come to know Hus best and this is one of the most precious. Here we see him the great good man that he was, so gentle, so tender, so forgetful of self, so great in courage, so truly filled with the Holy Spirit, so abounding in the love of God. And here we may well leave him.

“To the Bohemian nation,

Master John Hus in good hope a servant of God, hopes that the Lord God will grant to all true Bohemians that love and will love the Lord God to live and die in his grace and reside forever in celestial joy. Amen.

Faithful in God, men and women, rich and poor! I beg and entreat you to love the Lord God, praise his word, gladly hear it and live according to it. Cling I beg you to the divine truth which I have preached to you according to God's law. I also beg that if anyone has heard either in my sermons, or privately anything contrary to God's truth, or if I have written anything such—which I trust God is not the case—he should not retain it. . . . I beg you to love, praise, and honor those priests who lead a moral life, those in particular who work for the Word of God. I beg of you to beware of crafty people, particularly of unworthy priests of whom our Saviour has said that they are clothed like sheep, but are inwardly greedy wolves.

I beg the nobles to treat the poor people kindly and rule them justly. I beg the burghers to conduct their business honestly. I beg the artisans to perform their duties conscientiously and joyfully. I beg the servants to serve their mistresses and masters faithfully. I beg the teachers to live honestly, to instruct their pupils carefully, to love God above all. . . . I beg the students and other scholars to obey and

follow their masters in everything that is good and to study for the sake of the praise of God for their own salvation and that of others.

I write this letter to you in prison and in fetters, expecting to-morrow the sentence of death, full of hope in God, resolved not to recede from his divine truth, nor to recant the errors which false witnesses have invented and attributed to me. How God has acted toward me, how he has been with me during all my troubles—that you will only know when by the grace of God we shall meet again in heaven. Of Master Jerome, my beloved comrade, I hear nothing except that he is in prison, as I am, expecting death and that because of his faith, which he bravely expounded to the Bohemians. It was these Bohemians who are our bitterest enemies who delivered us up for imprisonment to our other enemies. I beg you to pray to God for these men. . . . I also beg you to love one another, not to allow good men to be oppressed, and to grant to all that which is due them.

Written on Monday, the night before the feast of St. Vitus, after the feast of good angels."

REMSEN DU BOIS BIRD.

*Princeton.*



## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* New Series. Vol. XIV. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirty-fifth Session, 1913-1914. 8vo, pp. 438. Published by Williams and Norgate, 4 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1914. Ten shillings and sixpence, net.

This goodly volume contains the following elaborate papers:

- I.—“Appearance and Reality.” By G. Dawes Hicks.
- II.—“On Feeling.” By J. A. Smith.
- III.—“William of Ockham on Universals.” By C. Delish Burns.
- IV.—“Philosophy as the Coördination of Science.” By H. S. Shelton.
- V.—“Intuitionism.” By N. O. Lossky.
- VI.—“Some New Encyclopaedists on Logic.” By J. Brough.
- VII.—“Discussion—The Value of Logic.” By A. Wolf and F. C. S. Schiller.
- VIII.—“The Psychology of Dissociated Personality.” By W. Leslie MacKenzie.
- IX.—“The Notion of a Common Good.” By F. Rosamond Shields.
- X.—“The Treatment of History by Philosophers.” By David Morrison.
- XI.—“Freedom.” By S. Alexander.
- XII.—“Symposium—The Status of Sense-Data.” By G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout.
- XIII.—“The Principle of Relativity and its Importance for Philosophy.” By H. Wildon Carr.

As its predecessors, this volume does credit equally to its writers, to its publishers and to the Society under whose auspices it is issued. The cause of philosophy, which is the cause of truth, cannot fail to be advanced by such publications.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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### GENERAL THEOLOGY

*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.* Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and LOUIS H. GRAY, M.A., Ph.D., Sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York. *Volume VII: Hymns—Liberty.* New York: Charles Scrib-

ner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1915. Royal 8vo, pp. xx, 911.

This volume of the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* is interesting, perhaps, above its fellows to the student of Christian Theology. It opens with a comprehensive article on "Hymns" and closes with a sketchy one on "Christian Liberty"; while in its midst is buried a considerable article on the central theme of Christianity—"Jesus Christ",—flanked by what seems, on a cursory view at any rate, to be an unusual proportion of articles on specifically Christian themes.

The article on "Hymns" is one of those composite ones which form a specialty of this *Encyclopaedia*. It extends to fifty-eight pages and consists of sixteen parts, each dealing with the hymns of a particular people, or cult, or period. Naturally these parts vary somewhat in value. Among non-Christian hymns, the Vedic hymns seem to be most adequately treated. Among Christian hymns, the sections on Greek hymns by Dr. A. Baumstark and on Syriac hymns by Bishop A. J. Maclean deserve to be singled out for especial praise: they not only cover their ground but illuminate their subjects. The section on Modern Christian hymns is too skimpy to be very useful. That on Latin hymns by Fr. Guido M. Dreves is more adequate. It is unfortunate that its Roman Catholic author should have thought it necessary to go out of his way to describe John Hus (in this, the year of the world-wide celebration of his martyrdom too) as that "unfortunate fanatic" (p. 24a). It is "a common fault of American hymns", Mr. T. G. Crippen tells us in his sketch of Modern hymnology, that they show "a too great tendency towards sentimentalism; and many of them seem to owe their popularity to the light jingling tunes to which they are wedded" (p. 37a). One wonders whether this judgment is founded upon the total serious output of American hymn-writers, or upon the widespread use (and usefulness) of the popular collections of "Gospel Songs". There is a little fragment on "Cumanic and other early vernacular hymns" (p. 37b), of merely bibliographical value, tucked away in an odd corner where it cannot hope to be consulted by any one in search of such things but only to be lighted upon by accident.

The article on "Christian Liberty" with which the volume closes is chiefly notable for its complete ignoring of the fact that the term "Christian Liberty" has a history and a definite significance fixed by this history. For all that we find here Luther might have never written his epoch-making tract, *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* or Calvin the famous nineteenth chapter of the Third Book of his *Institutes*. Mr. R. M. Pope, the author of the article, prefers to go his own way in assigning a meaning to the term "Christian Liberty", and in determining the limits of Christian liberty and defending its rights within the definition which he assigns it: and it does not seem to us a good way. Incidentally we may observe that when it is said (p. 910b) that "Christ's general attitude towards heterodoxy was that of tolerance"—much depends on what is meant, indeed, by "tolerance"—the remark is in the sense in which it is made quite beside the mark; as much



beside the mark as when it is said shortly afterwards that to Christ, "'faith' was not assent to an intellectual proposition or formula, but the spirit of receptivity in relation to Himself and His teaching." Faith with our Lord, was neither the one nor the other of these things; but an humble entrusting of oneself to the God of mercy and grace. And as for "heterodoxy", Jesus really "tolerated" nothing but the pure truth,—He that was Himself the Truth.

Most Christian readers will go at once, however, on turning over the pages of this volume, to the important central article on "Jesus Christ", which is written by President W. Douglas Mackenzie of the Hartford Seminary Foundation. Nor in point of ability or comprehensiveness of treatment will the article disappoint them. It is written moreover with a notable independence and freshness of judgment which raises it at numerous points out of the ruts in which most recent writing on Jesus Christ runs. On the critical and historical sides it is especially strong and it contains many illuminating passages and numerous fine sayings are scattered through it. There is, for example, a notable vindication of the central place which Jesus gave His own Person in the worship of His followers. "The matter before us is one of fact. It would seem that, according to the earliest tradition, Jesus did, without formality of claim"—we enter a caveat upon this clause—"but constantly, on all sides of His self-expression, in word and act, draw to Himself the faith and obedience of His disciples, and present Himself to them as the standard of moral worth—in fact became to them the object of a religious regard. The effort to prove that this worship of Christ arose only after His death and is reflected into the story of His ministry has been prolonged, painstaking, and futile" (p. 515b). "The real question is whether we have proof that Jesus became to His disciples a 'religious object' during His earthly life, and whether their experience in that matter was the effect of His conscious will, as He by teaching, miracle, example, and direct moulding of their life formed them into the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingship of God to be realized" (p. 521b, cf. 523b). There is also an excellent treatment of the matter of the sinlessness of Jesus (pp. 509f.). When turning to speak of the Christology of the early church a beginning is well taken in a fruitful insistence upon the immanent logic of history (p. 533), and on that basis the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the early church is successfully defended, against, for example, the Ritschlian attempt to make it out only a disaster which the church suffered at the hands of intruding Greek philosophizing (p. 534). It is tellingly asked in this connection what would have happened to the church if the modern "Liberal" conception of Christ had become the ruling one in the early centuries (p. 534b). Good use is made again of this "logic of a 'circle'" at a later point in criticism of the development of the modern "Liberal" and "Post-Liberal" theories of the Person of Christ (p. 547). Such a remark as the following is an oasis of refreshing good sense in the

midst of the arid waste of nonsense which stretches around us on the subject of the Two Natures: "A protest should be entered against the frequent yet absurd suggestion that the 'two-nature hypothesis' first arose at or just before Chalcedon. The very idea of an incarnation involves that of two natures somehow made into one life. The idea dates back to the New Testament, to the combination of 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man', of 'existing in the form of God' and 'found in fashion as a man'. And the entire course of Christological speculation presupposed this hypothesis from the beginning" (p. 538a). Despite these admirable features, however, the article is eminently unsatisfactory as a whole. The constructive element in it falls far behind the critical and historical; and its ultimate conclusion, we regret to say, is lame in the extreme.

That the hand which handles critical matters so firmly trembles when positive construction is attempted, the reader is not long in becoming aware. He is soon startled, for instance, by the fumbling touch with which the predictive element in Jesus' teaching is dealt with (p. 512). Jesus' eschatological sayings were not thoroughly understood by His disciples, and were accordingly very naturally confused in their reports of them (pp. 512, 518). Jesus' own prophetic vision was incomplete (*do.*). And, in any case, predictions of future events, dependent for their fulfilment on the acts of men, necessarily contain elements of uncertainty (p. 512). An attempt is made to limit these elements of uncertainty to "form and date". But this is obviously nugatory. If the form and time of the fulfilment of such predictions are necessarily uncertain because the human action on which they depend is incalculable, we cannot escape the conclusion that the fact of their fulfilment, which equally hinges on the acts of man, lies under the same uncertainty. If Jesus could not know the time of His second coming because its occurrence rests on the acts of man which are uncertain, He could not know that it would ever occur. We would better believe in predestined events, not indeed unrelated to man's conduct, but not conditioned on man's indeterminate conduct,—if we wish to believe in any certain events at all in the sphere of human history. An event cannot be certain to occur the occurrence of which is contingent on other events which are intrinsically uncertain. As we read, thus, we gradually acquire an attitude of mind which prepares us for the unsatisfactoriness of the Positive Statement with which the article ends (pp. 548-550). We have read this Positive Statement with what care we might, but remain in very considerable uncertainty of exactly what view it commends to us of our Lord's Person. That a superhuman element in our Lord's Person is contended for is clear; but not what this superhuman element is, or what its relations are to God on the one hand or to man on the other. Language is sometimes used which might lead us to suspect that only a kind of super-man was presented to us in Christ. "This is a new type of personality which has arisen within the processes of human life. It is human, yet more



than human, somewhat as man is truly animal and more than animal, yet not a 'monster'. But it seems clear that it is not conceived of as a product of merely earthly forces coöperating towards the production of a new type. It is a visitant from another sphere. But so, we are reminded, may every man that comes into the world also be. And this other sphere, we are also punctually reminded, cannot "without careful discrimination" be identified with God. Confusion is increased by the repeated paradox that whatever is "spiritual" or "personal" is by reason of that very fact human, so that, at bottom, God (who is "self-conscious will") and man (who is "conscious will") are the same—although, the paradox, on every occasion of its announcement, is, of course, at once contradicted. In Jesus Christ, we are told (p. 587a) "we have a unique type of personality. It is at once human because it is conscious will, and yet more than human because it has invaded the course of human life from a range of conscious being and life above the human." There is something "more than human" in Him, we are told again: "But the 'more than human' is human. And this must be possible if God and man are spiritual, conscious beings" (p. 549a). Nevertheless we are immediately told that "the idea of the identity of original type between the divine and human natures must not make us imagine that the gulf between the Creator and the creation is abolished, or bridged, or even lessened" (p. 550b). It is all very puzzling. Perhaps we shall find our way best by abiding strictly by the somewhat precise statement: "The self-conscious being, the pre-existent Christ, the Son of God, entered as an individual, vital, and mental organism into the process of physical, organic history in the womb of His earthly mother, and grew up among men as a new type of human personality" (p. 550a). The announcement of this position unqualifiedly in this place seems to intimate that, of the two alternative forms of statement presented a little afterward (p. 550a, bottom), this one represents President Mackenzie's preference. In that case his view would seem to be a form of Kenoticism not essentially different from that of W. F. Gess, which had nevertheless been described at an earlier point (p. 545) without obvious intimation of fundamental sympathy with it: even the Arianizing implications of Gess are present in it, although entering it after another fashion. The alternative view suggested, but apparently not preferred, is presented as a fuller working out of the view advocated by the present Bishop of Zanzibar in his *The One Christ*. It seems to be essentially Kenoticism of the Ebrardian type; although, of course, in Dr. Mackenzie's case it would be burdened with his apparent unwillingness quite to identify "the Son of God" who is supposed to have become incarnate after this fashion, with God.

If Dr. Mackenzie is thus to be read as on the whole commending a Kenotic view of the Person of Christ, the corrective of his reasoning may be found in the companion article by Friedrich Loofs on "Kenosis". This article begins with a most discouraging statement of the extent of our possible knowledge of Paul's meaning in Phil.

ii. 5ff, but then proceeds to give a very careful account of the theories of Kenosis which have been held during the history of the church, and ends in the expression of a definite and a very definitely wrong opinion of what Paul did mean in Phil. ii. 5ff. In the meantime, however, it pronounces afresh the modern Kenotic theories of the incarnation pure mythology and gives solid reasons for this opinion.

Two further pendants to the article "Jesus Christ" are provided by short articles on "Jesus Christ in Judaism" and "Jesus Christ in Zoroastrianism." The former, although from a Christian hand is so defective as almost to appear pro-Jewish: from its opening words one might imagine that whatever hatred Jews may have shown towards Christians has originated solely in the persecutions of Jews by Christians—that Jews were persecutors of Christians at the first seems to have fallen out of mind. The latter gives some brief account of Zoroastrian polemics against Christianity.

The excellent article on "Josephus" by the late Benedict Niese, is interpolated by Louis H. Gray with an account—not altogether complete—of recent defences of the genuineness of the famous notice of Christ in *Antt.* xviii. 63f. Dr. Gray expresses himself as agreeing with Burkitt, Harnack and Barnes (who are the writers whose arguments he reports upon) in pronouncing for the genuineness of the passage. The history of opinion on this matter is very instructive. The passage is found in all the MSS., but it has become almost an axiom of criticism that it is an interpolation. The insufficiency of the grounds on which this judgment rests became apparent, so soon as the critics needed the passage enough to counterbalance their desire to eliminate so apparently striking a testimony to the supernaturalness of Christ's apparition. Thus the action of their critical judgment was released from the pressure of prejudice sufficiently to function somewhat normally.

We may mention in passing that the article on "Liberal Judaism" by I. Abrahams reads much like a manifesto. There are no articles on "Liberal Christianity" or "Liberal Protestantism." This seems a pity. For it tends to the identification out of hand of Liberal Christianity and Liberal Protestantism with Christianity and Protestantism, whereas, of course, "Liberal Christianity" is no more "Christianity" and "Liberal Protestantism" is no more "Protestantism" than "Liberal Judaism" is "Judaism." The way it works may be seen in a flagrant example in the treatment of the topic "Inspiration." Two articles are given to "Christian Inspiration." The one is headed "Protestant Doctrine"; the other "Roman Catholic Doctrine." There is no essential difference, however, between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic doctrines of Inspiration. This is one of the points in the doctrine of Holy Scripture on which all the great historical branches of the church are agreed. There is an immense difference, however, between the "Liberal Protestant" and the Roman Catholic doctrines of Inspiration; and what is given



here under the caption of the "Protestant Doctrine" is not in the least the Protestant doctrine but the "Liberal Protestant" doctrine. There is no question what the Protestant doctrine of Inspiration is. It is embodied in the great Confession of the Protestant churches; it is expounded by their accredited dogmaticians; it is set forth in the histories of Protestant doctrine. One may read it in his Schmid, or in his Heppe; in his Otto Ritschl; or, if he chooses, in his Haering or in his Wendt, under the name of "the Old Protestant doctrine". But he will not read it in Mr. James Strahan's article on the "Protestant Doctrine of Inspiration." That article, too, like Mr. Abrahams' on "Liberal Judaism" is a manifesto; a manifesto for the Liberal Protestant doctrine of Inspiration (or of no-Inspiration); it gives the doctrine not of the Protestant Churches, but, as itself says, of "Protestant scholars of the present day, imbued with the scientific spirit." The result is that the Protestant doctrine gets no statement and no hearing at all in this *Encyclopaedia*. This *Encyclopaedia* itself becomes thus a manifesto for Liberal Protestantism; and thereby its historical character is lost. There is a sense in which orthodox Protestantism receives less consideration in this *Encyclopaedia* than any other system of religious thought.

When we turn to the composite article "Images and Idols" and look down the list of sub-topics, we come to this one: "Christian." But if we expect to find here a thorough and candid treatment of the place "Images and Idols" have taken in the history of Christianity, we shall be disappointed. No article on the subject is provided. We are merely told: "See Iconoclasm, Images and Idols (General and Primitive), Worship (Christian)." The article on "Christian Worship" is not yet before us; we shall have to wait to see what we shall see in it. The other references are sadly inadequate, Count Goblet D'Alviella's article, "Images and Idols (General and Primitive)," has in it no doubt a number of allusions to Christian use of these objects. He classifies Images into three types: "purely representative images," "magical images," and "idols", *i.e.*, "conscious and animated images," or somewhat glorified fetishes. Christian images he naturally speaks of most distinctly in the first class,—in which Christian images hold a prominent place: "No religion can rival Christianity in the multiplicity of its images." It is incidentally plain enough, however, that magical images and "idols" proper have had a part to play in the history of Christian worship. It is a pity that a full and candid account of the part they have played in it has not been given; at least as full and as candid an account of it as has been given of the part they have played among the Buddhists, say, or among the Greeks and Romans. The lack of such an account is not supplied by the article on "Iconoclasm." This is by a Roman Catholic writer and is written very distinctly from the Image-worshipping point of view. A number of other articles on Roman Catholic topics have also been assigned

to Roman Catholic writers, not with the best results. Among them is the article on "Jesuits," which is a pure apology. We wish it could have been written by a George Tyrrell! That on "Immaculate Conception" by Joseph Turmel is more frank. That on the "Inquisition"—that is, the Inquisition of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries against the Cathari and the Waldenses, the later history being reserved for a later article—also makes a manifest effort to be fair. Abuses due to the fault of individuals are discriminated from the institution itself; the faults inherent in the inquisitional procedure (as distinguished from the accusational), however, are not glozed. The political and social side of the heresies prevalent during the periods surveyed is emphasized, and the forwardness of the civil power in punishing them is insisted upon, but the implication of the church in the death penalty is not wholly denied. On the whole the Inquisition is pronounced a good thing, marking an advance in dealing with heretics and making for social progress. The clear article on "Invincible Ignorance" is by a Protestant writer.

The penultimate article in the volume is a bright discussion of "Libertarianism and Necessitarianism" by Professor Donald Mackenzie of Aberdeen. It abounds in illuminating statements, as when T. H. Green is said to have "seen clearly that states of consciousness would never account for consciousness of states", or as when the fundamental fact which raises all the pother about freedom is summed up in the declaration that "we find new individuals appearing who were never there before, a fact which no bare singularism can ever explain". Professor Mackenzie sees no outcome without the postulation of a truly creative power for the will; but so far as we can see he discovers no ground for such a postulation beyond the extreme desirability that a new and better world should be somehow created. "Surely", he exclaims, "the real question is: Can the tree itself be made good? not, Can grapes grow on thorns?" He certainly is on solid ground when he adds: "If any libertarian holds that good fruit can come from a bad tree without changing the tree itself first, then libertarianism is a lingering chimera." But as certainly he has lost his footing on the rock when he contends that libertarians must, in the nature of the case, therefore be able to point to a "possibility of changing the bad character itself". True enough, "for Christianity, at any rate, the possibility of new creatures and a new world is basal". But it is equally basal for Christianity that this is a possibility for God (with whom "all things are possible") and not for man himself. It is therefore that Christianity is a religion of Salvation. It is a faulty exegesis which reads our Lord as exhorting us ourselves to make the tree good that the fruit may be good: and the Kantian doctrine that every "ought" implies a "can" is but an *obiter dictum*, which Kant himself confessed had to be taken on faith and could not be rationally justified. Creation is not such an easy thing that we can lightly assume that it lies in our daily, nay momentarily, power, because



without it we cannot escape from our evil selves—except by an act of God. It were better to abide in the *obiter dictum* of a greater than Kant: "Ye must be born again."

We have, naturally, touched in this notice only upon a few out of the multitude of articles which fill this rich and bulky volume, and that merely at random, as we have chanced to turn them up. Perhaps enough has been said, however, to serve as a sample of its contents.  
*Princeton.* BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

### APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*The Bible: Its Origin, its Significance, and its Abiding Worth.* By ARTHUR S. PEAKE, M.A., D.D., Rylands Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1913. 8vo. Pages xxxvi, 517. \$2.00 net.

In laying this book aside, we are not altogether satisfied what it would have us understand when we speak of the Bible as the Word of God. It is something like our idea of a river. Usually we mean a depression in the earth's surface, with more or less water in it that has a source somewhere, exists for some purpose, and is making its way to some ocean. But how much water, or whether it is all really water, and what is the nature of its source and the character of its channel, and where the ocean is to which it flows,—if we go too much in detail into these things we might discover either that the river is not a river at all, or that it is the kind of a river that must not be studied too closely. Yet we call it a river because, well, just because it has a fluid in it which we know to be bona fide H<sub>2</sub>O, and while it is not much, what there is of it is real water, and it is going in the right direction, so what does it matter? Do not demand too much of it, and don't forget that there are some rivers, *e.g.*, the Rio Grande and the Los Angeles, which sometimes in the year do not have any water. If you think that water is essential to a river, you are "in error of mortal mind".

We should not want it inferred from the above analogy that Professor Peake stands for a superficial study of the Bible. Far from it. The point of the analogy is just how much of the Bible we actually possess as a result of its study. He believes that the Bible has irretrievably lost the place it once had in Christendom (p. vii), and his aim is to restore it to an ever higher because truer and, as he thinks, more defensible place in our Christian affections (p. III. Cf. p. 190). This can only be done, according to Professor Peake, by accepting in the main the chief results of the more liberal criticism, by breaking forever with what he terms "an atomistic view of the Bible" (p. 468). This involves sweeping denials. Verbal inspiration is, of course, to be "heartily repudiated" (p. 483. Cf. pp. 102, 310-311, 380, 397-399). There are proved errors in the Bible (pp. 83-87, 126-127). The Old

Testament has internal inconsistencies in it (p. 342), while we cannot claim for the book as a whole consistency in teaching (p. 226). The Epistle of James is "a relatively insignificant book" (p. 353). The Bible is not a revelation, but the record of a revelation (p. ix). All of which being true, "it is one of the serious difficulties of Protestantism that it has constantly found an infallible seat of authority in Scripture" (p. 466. Cf. Chap. 22, esp. pp. 447, 461). In a word, we simply do not have an infallible Bible, and to allege that the original autographs were inerrant is baseless, for "Of what use is it to predicate infallibility of documents which no longer exist"? (p. 398. Cf. p. xvii). The presupposition which underlies this reasoning is that the purified text of Scripture is not the original text. But if all our Mss., Versions, and Citations do not furnish us the text of the original documents, then where is our Bible? Have then all the colossal achievements of textual criticism been nothing more than an *ignis fatuus*, a *Love's Labor Lost*? What we have in the Bible of Professor Peake's studies is not so much the infallible truth of God as a sort of moral mixture, which, after a severe testing, turns out to be only a few scattered filtrations of presumably essential truth. Recurring to our figure of the river, if we supposed that in our Bible we had a real river, beautiful and overflowing with the pure water of Divinity, we awake to find that what we really have is scarcely a river at all, but at best only something like a river-bed with a minimum of water flowing through it, a *Bächlein*, but not a *Strom* or *Fluss*. In such a Bible there is so much of unguided humanity that the divinity of it is reduced to a minimum and is often scarcely discernible at all.

There is, however, another side to Professor Peake's picture. The rigorous radicalism with which he approaches the Old Testament is for some reason largely absent when he comes to the New Testament. Practically all of this is held intact, though the Synoptists have irreconcilable discrepancies, and Mark is not always trustworthy (pp. xxvii, 307-311). He is not in unqualified agreement with those who would deny or minimize the essential historicity of the Bible. He is "constrained to believe" that at least *some* of the patriarchs are historical figures (p. 302). But the old historical accuracy once claimed for the Bible must be given up (p. 310). Strange as it may seem, this argument, which might even do away with Jesus Himself, is not pressed when we come to Him. His reply to Pfeiderer's theory is that we *must* have the historic Jesus (pp. 338f. Cf. p. 320, and Chap. XVI *passim*). And why? For no other reason, we may add, than that Jesus is demonstrably historical.

Professor Peake insists that the study of facts shall precede the elaboration of theories, and that the New Testament must not be read with a scheme of theology in the head (pp. 29, 419). But, it is legitimate to ask, does he always come to the Bible with a mind absolutely purified of all presupposition? We wish that we might say as much for him, did his own study allow us. But it does not. He has



a theory of inspiration, one of revelation, one of criticism, another of authority: theories which intrude themselves into his argument more than the author seems to imagine. Chapter X, on "The Conservative Reply to the Old Testament Critics", is almost a marvel of frugality and presupposition. There we are told that opposition to the radical view does not come as a rule from "acknowledged experts in the field of Biblical scholarship" but largely from "dogmatic theologians" (p. 154); and where there are eminent Hebraists who espouse the conservative side, we are bidden to remember that *these* may be dominated by extraneous and theological considerations! (p. 155). The student is warned from trusting statements on Old Testament criticism given by defenders of the traditional position (pp. 158-159). Even if all this could be proved, it would not constitute first-class evidence that Professor Peake were himself absolutely unbiased.

To conclude, there is here a most readable compilation of not always ideally-connected essays on the Bible in many of what have come to be regarded its more debatable features. The author could scarcely defend himself against the charge of being tainted with subjectivism. Indeed, he lays great stress on experience and emotion, which latter he thinks is the essential core of religion (p. 422. Cf. pp. 462, 481). But he is too wise to stake all on experience. He resolutely refuses to make common cause with those who decry reason and reduce our faith to an ungrounded emotionalism (pp. 464, 472. Cf. p. 285 and Ch. 21 *ad lib.*). Having a religion, we must have a theology.

At the beginning there is a table of contents which gives an exhaustive synopsis of each chapter. Professor Peake's style is captivating. The reader is borne along through material severely technical at times but always presented with such literary charm that one is never wearied. The most permanent feature about the book is not its argument but its style.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

*The Miracles of Jesus.* A Study of the Evidence, being the Davies Lecture for the year 1913. By E. O. DAVIES, B.Sc., Author of "Theological Encyclopaedia", "Prolegomena to Systematic Theology", etc. London, New York, Toronto. Hodder and Stoughton: 1913. 8vo, pp. xi, 240.

We have in this treatise an admirable application of the scientific method to the study of the evidence for the miracles of Jesus.

"In Book I the alleged miracles are studied simply as extraordinary events which, judging by the face value of the narratives recording them, do not happen in the course of nature as known to us. The evidence for the alleged events is examined, and an attempt is made to judge it in the light of analogy. In Book II the term miracle is used with the implication that the extraordinary acts attributed to Jesus were 'acts for which the immanent causal nexus could not account (even if our knowledge were adequate)'. The following

aspects of miracle, regarded in this sense, are dealt with in succession: Physical Impossibility and Possibility, Moral Impossibility and Possibility, and Antecedent Probability. Then the view of Hume "that no amount of evidence can substantiate a miracle is examined. In conclusion, the evidence as determined in Book I, for the extraordinary acts attributed to Jesus is reconsidered in the light of the results reached in Book II respecting miracles as there regarded" with the result that "if the miracles attributed to Jesus in the Gospels are believed to be 'events which cannot be explained from the totality of intramundane factors', then, on the assumption that the fundamental postulate of Christian Theism is valid, and that Jesus was a direct personal representative of God on earth, the evidence in support of those miracles is sufficient to justify the belief that they happened, speaking generally, as recorded."

On the argument thus outlined by the author himself the following remarks are in order:

1. Mr. Davies has had the advantage of the criticism of eminent scholars, such as Bosanquet, and, as he says, he has benefited much from such criticism.

2. His discussion is based on wide and accurate reading and is fully up to date. Indeed, it would almost seem to have been called forth by the Rev. J. M. Thompson's "Miracles in the New Testament"; and, in the judgment of the reviewer, it is a sufficient answer to that considerably talked of and elusive book, as well as to the better known position of Harnack.

3. Mr. Davies' work has the somewhat rare merit of so conceiving and describing the miracle as at once to force to the front the real question. This is not whether the miracle is marvelous, nor whether it is beyond the power of nature as we know it; but it is whether it is beyond what we should find to be the power of nature, were our knowledge of nature complete and perfect. This is the issue. Only as thus understood can the miracle attest the intervention and so the reality of the Supernatural.

On the whole, we can scarcely speak too highly of Mr. Davies' work. He confines himself rigorously—sometimes we think almost too rigorously—to his prescribed task; but he accomplishes that task. To read his book and still deny that the miracles of Christ were both real and supernatural occurrences, one must be governed by considerations other than those of evidence.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Further Evolution of Man.* A Study from Observed Phenomena.

By W. HALL CALVERT, M.D. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London, Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo; pp. 324.

This treatise is both negative and positive. The Darwinian theory of evolution by means of natural selection it would refute and it would have us look to socialism for the spiritual perfection of man.



On its negative side it is largely a representation of a work published in Edinburgh in 1908 by George Paulin and entitled "No Struggle for Existence; No Natural Selection." With Paulin, our author claims, that "there is no such thing as every individual of every species fighting continually with its neighbor in order to secure sufficient food by which to maintain life"; that the elimination necessary to prevent this struggle takes place long before the individual reaches maturity or can propagate his kind, being effected ultimately by the cannibalism of the carnivorous male; that in the case of man, where such a check would not apply, even the Malthusian doctrine, which Darwin adopted, is not true; that the means of subsistence increase more rapidly than the population; that the principle of heredity has been much overworked, the truth being that "a man inherits only the characteristics and instincts of the genus homo, plus a very few attributes of form and feature"; and that environment is so omnipotent that though emigrants of every race are pouring into the United States, the result is already a race which is visibly approximating the type of feature and form of the aboriginal red Indians. Having thus cleared the way, Dr. Calvert proceeds to show how man will, indeed, must develop as his environment becomes more and more nearly perfect. This development will be characteristically and increasingly spiritual. Competition having been eliminated and Christian ethics being in the air, it will follow, that the units of passion will be dissolved; that the "gold standard will be non-existent and private wealth and property a thing of the past"; that "all the means of production, distribution and exchange will be nationalized"; that every one will have some work and much leisure; that senseless and harmful fads like woman suffrage will disappear; and that the wisdom of the state will solve every emerging problem.

On the details of this scheme, whether in its negative or positive aspect, the reviewer does not care to comment. It is sufficient to say that a scheme which explicitly denies "original sin", as does this (p. 296), and which seems to postulate in Christian ethics an inherent power of self-propagation, runs directly counter to "observed facts" and is, therefore, condemned by the author's own and constantly reiterated boast.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Truth of Christianity.* Being an Examination of the More Important Arguments For and Against Believing in that Religion. Compiled from Various Sources by LT-C. W. H. TURTON, D.S.O., Late Royal Engineers. Eighth edition—thirtieth thousand. (Carefully revised throughout.) New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. viii, 636.

We are very glad to welcome another and improved edition of what continues to impress us as "much the best of our handbooks of Christian Evidences". A full and careful review of it will be found in

*The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, the immediate predecessor of THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Oct. 1900, p. 690.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Sporen van Animisme in het Oude Testament?* Door Dr. G. Ch. Aalders, Dienaar des Woords by de Geref. Kerk van Ermelo. Kampen: J. H. Kok. 1914. Pp. 62.

In putting the question whether traces of animism are discoverable in the Old Testament the author takes animism in the most general possible sense as denoting "the primitive belief that spirit or spirits exist and exert influence in nature." This is wide enough to include Lippert's, Stade's and Schwally's theory of ancestor-worship, Robertson Smith's theory of totemism, Piepenbring's theory of fetishism, and Eerdman's theory of a diffused soul-matter entering into or attaching itself to individual objects. In the subsequent discussion, however, a more restricted definition is brought into play, as on page 20, where it is argued against Stade, that the identification of soul and breath or soul and blood of itself affords no proof of the existence of animism, because characteristic of animism is the belief of a special influence of souls and spirits, which is either to be feared or sought. The author insists upon it that the method employed in determining the question at issue should be wholly direct and *à posteriori*. He rejects the procedure of postulating animism in Israel on the basis of phenomena which, with a greater or lesser degree or similarity, occur in other religions and there bear animistic significance. He further denies, as disproven by modern discoveries, the assumption that Israel's original stage of culture was so low as to allow of no other than an animistic form of religion. Nor can such a conclusion be based on the general postulate that all peoples must of necessity have passed through an animistic period, because not a few recognized authorities in the field of comparative religion question the accuracy of this view. Dismissing all these *à priori* considerations, the author confines himself to the clean-cut issue, whether any Old Testament phenomena demand an animistic explanation. The argument is not directed towards the end of positively explaining the facts in a more satisfactory manner than the advocates of animism succeed in doing; it contents itself with rendering the verdict "not proven". In view of the inveterate habit of the advocates of animism of representing their theory as scientifically established and no longer partaking of the vicissitudes of an hypothesis this method has its merit. It is very important to keep alive in the mind of Old Testament scientists the distinction between facts and the evaluation of facts and the injustice of accusing conservative scholars of blindness to the facts, when they only refuse to accept certain constructions more or less plausible or implausible evolved out of the facts.



It is reassuring to learn that not even as excrescences in the popular religion, irrespective of the legitimate faith of Israel, can any animistic beliefs or practices with certainty be pointed out. Of course, even if this could be done, as the author observes, nothing would have been gained thereby in support of the thesis that these were survivals of an older common faith, and that animism was the original primitive religion of Israel. One feels, however, that all through the argument would have gained in force if it had been worked out more fully on the positive side and in each case, so far as possible, a conservative explanation of the phenomena within the frame of revealed religion provided. This is done only at isolated points, as *e.g.* where the author accepts Frey's understanding of the mourning-customs as forms of *Verdehmüthigung*, only differing from Frey in not calling them cases of *Selbstdemüthigung*, because they are also imposed on others. There is a certain inconsistency in this, that on page 27 an objection is made to Eerdman's animistic interpretation of the mourning-customs as defensive measures, on the ground that it does not explain why certain mourning-customs were prohibited and others allowed, and yet later on the *Verdehmüthigungs*-theory is favored without any corresponding attempt to give a reason for the prohibition in some, the allowance in other cases. Incompleteness in the induction also occasionally appears, as when the prohibition of the eating of blood is represented as entirely due to the sacrificial use made of the blood on the basis of Lev. xvii. 11 and Gen. ix. 4 is left out of account. While, on account of its negative purport and limited scope. Dr. Aalders' work will not take the place of the more exhaustive and positive contributions of Frey and Grüneisen, it can render excellent service as a first introduction to the study of the animistic controversy, all the more so since in the notes the literature is given with great fulness.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

**Codex B and its Allies. A Study and an Indictment.** By H. C. Hoskier, Author of "Concerning the Genesis of the Versions of the New Testament"; "Concerning the Date of the Bohairic Version"; and Editor of Collations of "The Morgan Gospels", and of the Greek Cursives 157 and 604 (700). London: Bernard Quaritch. 1914. Two vols., large 8vo; pp. xvi, 407 and 417. Indexes.

It is a great pity that there must be such a thing as division of labor. Everybody ought to know everything and do everything. Division of tasks, differentiation of functions, utilization of special aptitudes, may be necessary to the accomplishment of anything. But it has its difficulties and dangers. No doubt nothing worthy could be done, were it not distributed to many hands according to the particular capacity of each: but then nothing so done can be as well done as if one hand could have had all the capacities and itself done it all. Division of labor is a concession to human weakness; and it is apt to call human weaknesses into activity. Each laborer

on a common task is apt to magnify his particular portion of the task and to minify the tasks of others. We well remember that, when in our young days we haunted the country-side, gun on shoulder, we cherished a hearty contempt for "closet-naturalists," and shared the opinion lately expressed by an Exalted Personage that the "field naturalist" is "it." In few branches of Biblical science is this differentiation of function more marked, or its accompanying tendency to fail somewhat in mutual appreciation more apt to manifest itself among the workers, than in Textual Criticism.

The "diplomatists" and the "critics," those who gather the material and those who utilize it in forming the text, stand well apart; and though they cannot do without one another and nothing is accomplished except by the combined labors of all, they not seldom fail fully to appreciate one another's accomplishments. He who handles the manuscripts distrusts him who handles the various readings, and is inclined to suppose that his own intimate knowledge of the documents and their ways fits him alone to pronounce on their affinities, and on the history, and original form, of the text they embody. He who busies himself with the text of the author is tempted to dispise him whose occupation is rather with the texts of the scribes, and to wave him off from what he considers his own preserves as a matter too high for him.

Mr. Hoskier has made notable contributions to our exact knowledge of documents of importance in the history of the text of the New Testament. Dr. Alexander Souter thinks that that is enough for Mr. Hoskier to have done; and bids him content himself with it and keep to his own field. "We cannot afford," he says, "to do without his valuable coöperation in New Testament textual criticism, but would suggest that he confine his energies to the collection and accurate preservation of material, and leave theorising to others, at least meantime." Not unnaturally, Mr. Hoskier is disinclined to follow this advice. He knows the documents as few living men know them, and he thinks his knowledge of the documents prepares him to pronounce on their relative values, especially as he is prepared to spare no pains in ascertaining their affinities and history through the medium of minute comparisons. Hence these large and elaborately worked-out volumes.

In the conclusions to which each severally tends with respect to the general history of the text of the New Testament and its original form, we find ourselves of Dr. Souter's rather than of Mr. Hoskier's opinion. We do not think that the main lines of Dr. Hort's construction of the history of the text, or the general form of the text as he has reconstructed it in the light of its history, will require serious modification as the result of Mr. Hoskier's very instructive investigations into the character of codices Vaticanus and Sinaiticus. Meanwhile we are free to marvel over the minuteness and searchingness of his inquisition into the character and affinities of these



manuscripts, and to profit, in our own way, from his results, set forth with such fullness and acuteness in these rich volumes.

Mr. Hoskier describes his work as "a study and an indictment": a study and an indictment of "codex B and its allies." He is nerved to his task by the conviction that "it is high time that the bubble of Codex B should be pricked." The bubble which he wishes to be pricked is the opinion that B and its allies present what in its main features may be called a "neutral" text, a text, that is, which preserves a line of, so far, uncorrupted descent from the autographs. On the contrary, he contends, they present "a doctored text," a text, "plainly, indubitably doctored," that is, a revised text which owes its peculiar features to Egyptian "corrections." Thus he would turn the tables on Dr. Hort. Dr. Hort rejected the "Syrian" text on the ground that it was a deliberate revision of the texts earlier current, the elements of which are in our hands apart from it. Mr. Hoskier wishes to reject the text of B and its allies on the ground that it is rather *it* that is the deliberate revision, and the so-called "Syrian" text underlies it; "that the maligned *textus receptus* served in large measure as the base which B tampered with and changed." "My thesis is then that it was B<sup>g</sup> and their forerunners with *Origen* who revised the 'Antioch' text. And yet, although there is an older base than either of these groups, the 'Antioch' text is purer in many respects, if not 'better', and is nearer the original base than much of that in vogue in Egypt."

"The Church at large," continues Mr. Hoskier, "recognized all this until the year 1881—when Hortism (in other words Alexandrianism) was allowed free play—and has not since retraced the path to sound tradition." What he desires is to call back the church to the "path of sounder tradition," which runs, in his view, through the "Antioch" rather than the "Alexandria" transmission. As will be perceived, Mr. Hoskier's contentions are essentially those of Dean Burgon and he may not improperly be looked upon as the continuer—on different lines no doubt, but on fundamentally the same assumptions—of Dean Burgon's work. It is Dean Burgon's indictment of Codex Vaticanus which Mr. Hoskier takes up. And he pronounces Dean Burgon's indictment of that Codex "as a false witness," "abundantly proved," and his general position "absolutely unshaken."

The material which Mr. Hoskier lays before us in these two closely-packed volumes is very extensive and very detailed. It calls out our admiration by the diligence with which it has been collected, the skill with which it has been presented, and the acuteness of the management of the argument founded on it, or rather transfused through it. The bulk of it is so great that it will require some time for it to be fully assimilated and finally estimated in its bearing and ultimate meaning. We have ourselves, of course, been able to go over it as yet only cursorily, though we hope not wholly carelessly. We are bound to confess that on this first cursory survey of it we have

been immensely instructed indeed, but not convinced. We are willing enough to believe that the so-called "Neutral" text is Egyptian in its provenience. But we are unwilling to believe that it rests on Origen rather than Origen on it; or that it rests on the Syrian text rather than the Syrian text, in part, on it. We should be helped in our estimate of Dr. Hoskier's argument if he had told us plainly somewhere or other what he thinks of and is prepared to do with the "Western" text. That it is "profoundly ancient and important" everybody understands. Does it contain the whole valuable base of the "Syrian" text? Is there an element common to the so-called "Syrian" and Mr. Hoskier's "Egyptian" text, not found in the "Western" documents, which is original? Is there an element in the "Western" documents not found in either the "Syrian" or the "Egyptian" text which is original? We have not been able on a cursory reading of the book to make out clearly the broad answers which Mr. Hoskier would give to such questions. Where is that "base" which Mr. Hoskier recognizes as older than either the "Antioch" or the "Alexandria" groups to be found?

We have not been able to persuade ourselves, under Mr. Hoskier's guidance, that the Gospel of Mark was written originally in Latin as well as in Greek and that our Greek text has been affected by a Greek translation of the original Latin,—anymore than we were able to persuade ourselves, under Blass' guidance, that it was written originally in Aramaic and was circulated in two Greek translations from it. Here is a place where it is worth while to look at Mark itself and not at its scribes. It is clear enough that Mark is an original Greek book.

In one thing we feel in very complete accord with Mr. Hoskier. We refer to his attitude towards what is now commonly spoken of as "Modernism." We agree with him that what Mr. Robinson Smith, for instance has to say of the Gospels and what Dean Inge for instance has said of Paul in the writings cited is "unfortunate."

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*Die Apostelgeschichte.* Von der 5. Auflage neu bearbeitet von D. HANS HINRICH WENDT, o. Professor in Jena. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913. Pp. iv 370. Mk. 8 geb. ca. 9.40. (Kritisch-exegetische Kommentar über das Neue Testament begründet von Heinr. Aug. Wihl. Meyer. Dritte Abteilung—9 Auflage.)

Since 1899, there have been many important developments in the study of Acts; the present edition of Wendt's well-known work is therefore to be greeted with satisfaction. Wendt has in general made abundant use of the recent literature though the total ignoring of the most elaborate and perhaps the most valuable of recent commentaries—that of Knowling in the *Expositor's Greek Testament*—constitutes a very serious defect.

The commentary of Wendt is characterized especially by an admirable clearness; the author is at all times in full mastery of his material;



it is very seldom that so learned a work is at the same time so refreshingly easy to use. The method of the commentary is entirely different from that of Meyer; unlike the founder of the undertaking of which the present work forms a part, Wendt is rather sparing in his citation of diverging exegetical opinions, though such citations appear when they are really necessary, and though the author's own view is defended against serious objections. The book is thus kept within reasonable bounds. Yet conciseness never degenerates into obscurity, and the treatment of exegetical difficulties, though brief, is seldom inadequate. In method and in form, this commentary provides an admirable model.

With regard to historical questions, the commentator is pretty clearly naturalistic in his point of view; the miraculous elements in the narrative of Acts are regarded as legendary. Both historical criticism and literary criticism, however, are applied, on the whole, as moderately as is to be expected on the basis of naturalistic presuppositions. The return of Harnack to traditional views as to authorship and date, finds, it is true, no favor with Wendt; the Book of Acts, according to our commentator, was written about A.D. 100 by a man of the post-apostolic age; the post-apostolic point of view is thought to be revealed by important misconceptions on the part of the author with regard to the early history of the Church. On the other hand, however, Wendt rejects altogether the Tübingen conception of the purpose of the book; the chief purpose he believes to be simply historical—the purpose of narrating the facts—though this purpose was supplemented by a disturbing endeavor to make history subservient to edification. The supposed historical defects of the book are thus attributed, not, as the Tübingen scholars believed, to intentional misrepresentation, but to the necessary limitations of an author who lived at a time when the unedifying conflicts of the apostolic age had been largely smoothed away from the memory of the Church; the author presented the facts honestly as he saw them, but he saw them under the presuppositions of his own time.

The treatment of the knotty problem of sources affords abundant scope for Wendt's gift of lucid exposition; with wise elimination of minutiae, the chief generic views are briefly characterized and the author's own solution is clearly presented. Wendt believes that only one source can be clearly distinguished in the Book of Acts, though other sources may well have been used. This source, according to Wendt, embraces the so-called "we-sections" of the book; it was written by a companion of Paul and in all probability by Luke. It is by no means to be limited, however, to the we-sections themselves; these sections are indissolubly connected with their context; the Lucan source embraces not merely the bulk of the narrative from Chapter xiii on, but also the account of Stephen which lies at the base of Chapters vi and vii, and the account of the founding of the Antioch church in xi. 19ff. Of course this Lucan source is

not thought to have been reproduced exactly by the author of the book; on the contrary Wendt thinks it was not only made to conform to the author's own style, but was also supplemented and expanded at many points.

The means by which the Lucan source can be separated from the rest of the book is, according to Wendt, to be found not in any linguistic criteria—for the author has impressed his own style upon the whole—nor chiefly in the higher degree of historical probability which is to be detected in the work of the eye-witness as compared with the other portions of the narrative, but rather in the roughnesses caused by the joining of the source to narratives really contradictory to it. It may be said at this point that such a method of analysis has very uncertain results. The really important difficulty, however, that faces any separation of a Lucan source from elements added by the final author is simply the presence of the first person plural in the narrative; and it cannot be said that Wendt has overcome the difficulty. Why did the final author permit the first person plural of the source to remain? He might conceivably have done so if he had been a mere compiler, if he had reproduced the source in a purely mechanical way. But as a matter of fact he was not a mere compiler; Wendt is in substantial agreement with Harnack as to the literary unity of the book. Why did so skillful a writer remove every peculiarity of the source except the one which most needed removal (compare Harnack, *Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte*, p. 11); why did a writer of the post-apostolic age leave in his work the nonsense of a first person plural in a narrative of events with which he was not personally connected? The only light which Wendt seems to be able to shed upon this question is that the first person plural had impressed itself firmly upon the author's memory and that perhaps he purposely retained this feature of the source just in order to show that he was using the narrative of an eye-witness. This latter suggestion is surely very unsatisfactory; a clumsier way for a post-apostolic writer to call attention to an apostolic source could scarcely be imagined; if the author had any definite purpose in retaining the "we", it could only be that of designing himself (falsely) as an eye-witness, and that he had this purpose Wendt is very properly unable to believe. The truth is, the only natural explanation of the first person plural in the Book of Acts is the old explanation that the author was himself a companion of Paul. The author introduces himself in Acts i. 1 in a thoroughly personal way; Theophilus knew exactly who he was; when therefore in Acts xvi. 10 he suddenly drops into the use of the first person, there could be no reasonable doubt as to what he meant—he meant simply that at Troas he himself had joined the Pauline company and was therefore an eye-witness of the events that followed. The use of the "we" is the most natural thing in the world if the author of the "we-sections" was also the author



of the whole book; on any other hypothesis it presents a literary problem which neither Wendt nor anyone else has succeeded in solving.

With regard to the much discussed question of the Apostolic Council Wendt arrives at very conservative results. The author is thought to have elaborated, in accordance with his own ideas, the information which he had received, but that information itself is rated high; the apostolic decree (Acts xv. 28, 29), in particular, Wendt believes to have been adopted at the time where it is placed by the author of Acts, and essentially in the form in which it appears in the  $\aleph$  B text. The error of the author is practically reduced to the assignment by him of a wider scope to the decree than it really had. Wendt has here performed a useful service in the defence of the Book of Acts; and those who accept the Lucan authorship will not find much difficulty in removing the objection that Wendt still allows to stand; it may easily be shown that the author of Acts by no means necessarily implies the imposition of the decree by Paul generally upon Gentile converts. In defending the essential historicity of the decree, an opponent of the Lucan authorship of the book has here refuted admirably what has been regarded as a decisive argument against the traditional view.

Space would fail us to give even any fair sample of the contribution made by this notable commentary to the interpretation of the Book of Acts; every page of the work is worthy of the most careful attention; the author deserves the gratitude of every earnest student. Such gratitude, however, should not be allowed to obscure the momentous issues involved. There are only two really distinct views about the origin of Christianity. The one makes Christianity a product of the creative activity of the transcendent God, an entrance into the world of a new saving power, unlike the ordinary activities of God's providence; the other makes it a product of such forces—call them divine or not as you please—as were already here. The one is the view of the New Testament; the other is the view of modern naturalism. There is no real middle ground; the choice must be made. And Wendt, it is to be feared, has chosen; his confidence in the Lucan history concerns details; the essential message of the Book of Acts is apparently by him rejected.

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

*Kritische Analyse der Apostelgeschichte.* Von JULIUS WELLHAUSEN. Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Neue Folge. Band xv. Nro. 2. Berlin. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 1914. pp. 56.

The literary unity of Acts is well established. The author certainly made use of sources of information other than his own experience, and some of these may have been written sources; but it is difficult to determine the character and extent of the written sources by the

ordinary criteria of literary criticism since the linguistic phenomena—lexical and grammatical—afford no evidence sufficient for their identification. Harnack has recently pointed this out (*Die Apostelgeschichte*, 1908, pp. 131ff). Consequently Harnack has recourse in his analysis of the first half of Acts to considerations indicative of the local and personal origin of the traditions embodied in the narrative. A critical analysis of the book may however raise directly the problem of the historical value of its contents. This Wellhausen does, subjecting each section (incident or speech) to a critical examination, frequently commenting on the variants of the Western text and expressing his opinion about the character, relation and value of the several elements of the narrative. The analysis is keen—at times too keen; blunt affirmation startles; difficulties in the text are uncovered; the records of different events are resolved into an underlying identity; defects even of intelligence are attributed to the author without reckoning with the possibility that something—let us say, "common sense"—may have been expected of the readers. The analysis is not disturbed by any thought of Lucan authorship; it suggests a different origin for narratives within the "We-Sections" and proceeds upon the purely theoretical view, and in explicit opposition to the premise of the author of Acts, that prophecy is *vaticinium post eventum*.

Some of the more striking features of the "Critical Analysis" concern the Seven, the Apostolic Council, the journey of Paul after his visit to Europe, and the chronology of Paul's life. Wellhausen calls attention to the fact that the Seven appointed to administer the charitable funds of the Church were all Hellenists. The subsequent activity however of the only two whose work is described was evangelistic; and from this it is inferred that their appointment constituted the establishment not of the deaconate but of another group occupying among the Hellenists the place that the Apostles held among the Hebrews and that like the Apostles their function was not limited to the *ministerium mensae* but extended also and chiefly to the *ministerium verbi*. But this plainly presses the facts beyond their natural implications.

In regard to the Apostolic Council Wellhausen follows D. Iren, it etc. in omitting *πνικτόν* from the decree as an addition explanatory of *αἷμα* but retains the ceremonial interpretation—basing it on *αἷμα* which refers not to murder (which fell under the penal law of the State) but to the eating of flesh not properly slaughtered (Gen. ix. 4). The journey of Paul to Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 1f) is identified with the famine visit (Acts xi. 27f) which is the same as the visit described in Acts xv. Both Gal. i. 21 and Acts xv. 23, 41 imply the existence of churches in Syria and Cilicia but not in Pisidia and Lycaonia. The presence of Peter and John moreover shows that the Council must have preceded the death of Herod Agrippa in 44 by whose persecution the Apostles were scattered from Jerusalem. It thus appears that chapter xv has been transposed from its proper place



before chapters xiii and xiv. Of this the following explanation is proposed. The narrative of the Council could not be introduced until a successful work of Paul and Barnabas among the Gentiles had been recorded. But Acts gives no account of the mission in Syria and Cilicia. It was necessary therefore for the narrative of the mission in Lycaonia to precede the narrative of the Council and be presented as the common work of Paul and Barnabas. The obvious chronological objection to this view is met in the usual way by reckoning the fourteen years of Gal. ii. 1 from Paul's conversion. The hypothesis however takes no account of the consideration that the address of the decree may have been limited intentionally—as the question with which the decree dealt arose in Antioch, concerned Antioch chiefly and, in view of the reason for the adoption of its recommendations as given by James (xv. 20), probably was intended for regions in which the Jewish population was large and which were in close proximity to Palestine. The general description by Paul in Gal. i. 21 of the place of his sojourn between his first visit to Jerusalem after his conversion and the visit to the Council is difficult of explanation only on the South Galatian hypothesis of the address of the Epistle.

When Paul left Corinth Acts narrates a journey by way of Ephesus to Syria, mentioning Caesarea and Antioch and probably implying a visit to Jerusalem. The journey is described briefly—according to Wellhausen “in telegram style.” This journey beyond Ephesus is rejected as a duplication of the later journey in xx. 3f as xv. 1f was of xi. 27f. The details upon which this judgment is based are interesting. In xviii. 18 Priscilla is introduced before Aquila to make possible the reference of *καρπάριος* to the latter (but cf. xviii. 26) and is unnatural. Paul leaves his companions behind in Ephesus; but he himself remains also in Ephesus—a faulty antithesis (—was ist das für ein schiefer Gegensatz). The antithesis is faulty however only on Wellhausen's rejection of the journey to Syria (for which therefore the fault here alleged can not constitute a reason. And finally the record indicates no purpose for the journey; but this is an argument from silence to which importance seems to be attached in proportion to the light esteem in which the positive statement of fact is held.

It will have appeared that Wellhausen—in dependence chiefly on Schwartz (“Zur Chronologie des Paulus”, *Nachrichten v. d. kg. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften z. Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1907, pp. 263ff)—adopts a very early chronology of the life of Paul. He recognizes that the date of the proconsulship of Gallio has been fixed by the Delphi inscription [not definitely, as it seems to me, but within the limits of two years; cf. this *Review*, 1911 (ix), pp. 293ff, 1913 (xi), pp. 124f] as falling in the year 51-52 (choosing the earlier alternative with Deissmann, Lietzmann and others). The inference drawn from this however is turned chiefly—and of course rightly—

against dating the Council in 52. The considerations really determinative for his view of the Pauline chronology are however the dating of the accession of Festus in 55 and the Council in 44. From the latter it follows that Paul's conversion occurred in 31—reckoning inclusively 14 years before the Council; from the former that Paul arrived in Rome in the beginning of 56 and died there, as Wellhausen holds, in 58. The dating of the Council in 44 and the conversion in 31, is opposed by strong evidence not only in Acts but in Galatians where *ἔπειτα* in ii.1 implies temporal sequence in relation to the preceeding *ἔπειτα* in i.18 and 21, the succession of *ἔπειτα*—three times between the conversion and the Council—making it extremely unlikely that the 14 years of ii.1 is to be counted from the conversion. The date of the accession of Festus is based on the interpretation of xxiv. 27, *διετίας δὲ πληρωθείσης ἔλαβεν διάδοχον ὁ Φῆλιξ Πόρκιον Φῆστον*, as having reference not to the duration of Paul's imprisonment but to the length of the administration of Felix as procurator of the whole province,—a longer administration in Palestine being admitted as required by the statements of both Josephus and Tacitus but limited to Samaria and regarded as contemporary with the administration of Cumanus in Galilee (and Judea—so Josephus, *Ant.* xx. 6. 1-3; *B. J.* ii. 12. 3-7) in accordance with the statement of Tacitus (*Ann.* xii. 54). The interpretation of xxiv. 27 however is not natural; and Schürer has shown (*Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*,<sup>1</sup> i. p. 570, n. 14) that the statement of Josephus in this matter is more reliable than that of Tacitus. Wellhausen's attempt to maintain the statement of Tacitus (*Israelitische u. jüdische Geschichte*, 1914, p. 340, n. 1) is not satisfactory.

The "Critical Analysis" abounds in pointed statements. One of these, casually added in a footnote, effectively meets a brilliant but unsound hypothesis that has had some influence. Referring to the agitation of the disciples caused by the fact that the one whom they believed to be the Christ had met His death on Golgotha, Wellhausen says (p. 6): "Only because while on earth He had already been regarded as the Messiah did Jesus rise as the heavenly Messiah; the Rabbi of Nazareth could never by death have become the Messiah. Wrede makes the gospel of the resurrection and with it the origin of Christianity impossible". And this is true and accords with the evidence when the witness of the same evidence to the consciousness of Jesus—His claim and resurrection—is accepted. This and this alone sets forth the only adequate cause of the gospel of the resurrection and of the Christian faith and Church.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

*Kommentar über den Ersten Brief Petri.* Von D. G. STÖCKHARDT, Professor am Concordia-Seminar zu St. Louis St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1912. Pp. 230.

This commentary shares in those qualities which were noted in the



work of the same author on the Epistle to the Romans (see *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, vol. viii (1910), pp. 490f.); Dr. Stöckhardt has given us a helpful commentary of a rather old-fashioned kind. A sensible view is maintained with regard to the Petrine authorship and Roman provenience of the epistle, but the treatment of these historical questions will hardly seem adequate to the modern student. The commentary itself is rich in references to older writers, especially to Luther; and Dr. Stöckhardt's own exposition is full and plain.

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

*The History and Literature of the Early Church.* By JAMES ORR, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, United Free Church, Glasgow. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton [No Date.] Pp. ix, 180. \$1.00 net.

Dr. Orr's book is a revision of the volume he contributed in 1901 to a series of "Christian Study Manuals" and is intended to serve the purpose of a concise outline of its subjects and to meet the needs of students in College or elsewhere who may be engaged in the study of early Church History. In explanation of its contents Dr. Orr says: "The book is based on the extended lectures in Early Church History given by the author when Professor of Church History in Edinburgh. Although, therefore, necessarily highly condensed, it is believed that few points of importance in the History and Literature of the first three centuries have been overlooked, while the practical experience of teaching has enabled the author to throw into due prominence and perspective those aspects of the subject which are of chief moment." The book fulfils its object fairly well. Its point of view is sound; its judgments sensible. Its chief defects are formal; the style at times is rugged and unfinished, the references to the literature of the subject—the sources, translations, critical or general discussions—are meager, and the suggestions for further study might have been omitted.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

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## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica.* Geschriften uit den tyd der Hervorming in de Nederlanden. Door DR. S. CRAMER EN DR. F. PYPER. Tiende Deel. De Geschriften van Dirk Philipsz, bewerkt door Dr. F. Pyper. 'S Gravenhage. Martinus Nyhoff 1914.

This is the final volume of a remarkable collection of rare publications dating from the early reformatory period of Dutch ecclesiastical history. The task of editing this volume was originally assigned to Dr. S. Cramer of the City University of Amsterdam and of the Mennonite Seminary in that city. Alas! he passed away January 30, 1913, at a ripe age, without being permitted even to lay the foundations

for the work contemplated. Then it fell to the lot of Dr. F. Pyper to assume the duty; rather a delicate one, as he confesses in the introduction, inasmuch as he does not belong to the Mennonite Church, which considers these ancient documents with almost idolatrous reverence. But no one can read after Dr. Pyper in the various introductions found in this volume, without being convinced that he has not only succeeded in being absolutely objective; but that he has penetrated into the very marrow of the matter, by a rare historical insight, which enabled him to transfer himself into the period, wherein these documents were written, and that he has thus studied men and events as seen from that angle of view.

Who was Dirk Philipsz? In a former volume of this work we have met with the name of Obbe Philipsz, who was Dirk's brother, but the latter far excelled him in ability and abiding influence. The age of the Reformation naturally was an age of apologetics; and especially the Anabaptists, with their inborn radicalism, were continually called upon to defend their position. Thus the "Enchyridion" of Dirk Philipsz, as a collection of apologetical and doctrinal writings, occupies among the literature of the Anabaptists a foremost rank, and is to the Mennonites what the "Loci Communes" were to the Lutherans, Beza's "Confession" to the Huguenots and the "Leken Wechwyser" to the Dutch Reformed. It is only after the publication of the B. R. N. that we have access to some of the sources, needed for sketching the life of Dirk Philipsz. There is no certainty as to the date of his birth, presumably it was in the year 1504. He was apparently the son of a priest at Leeuwarden in Vriesland. It is evident from numerous instances of similar births that, prior to the council of Trent, celibacy, especially in the North of Europe, was a dead letter. He may have been a Franciscan monk in early life, anyhow he was well educated and his writings indicate great erudition. Besides the inevitable Latin, he was apparently acquainted with Hebrew and Greek. Moreover he was able to read and write French and German (Intr. 6). He shows familiarity with Luther's writings and has a singularly clear and trenchant style, far beyond that of most of his literary cotemporaries. Nearly all his books were written in his native tongue, the Low Dutch of the period. Popular as a speaker, with an indomitable will and an attractive personality, he stood side by side with Menno Simons as the father of the reformed Anabaptist sect, called Mennonites, a man of the hour and a maker of destiny in Northern Europe. He joined the Anabaptists in the fatal year 1533, the year of the Münster tragedy. But extravagance and revolution were unknown words in his vocabulary and apparently he took no part in the rebellious activities of the Anabaptists in Vriesland in 1535 (Int. 89). His whole life made for peace and order and consistent Christian living. It is evident from his tract—"De Geestelycke Restitution" that he detested the vagaries of the Münster faction, the millennial kingdom, polygamy, etc. In



1537 he became a great factor in the affairs of the Mennonites and gained a position of leadership, which he maintained to the end. For several years he was hunted by the Inquisition and lived in obscurity, and when the clouds lifted a little we find him at work in East-Frisia, Mecklenburg and Prussia, but he never forgot his fatherland and was always deeply interested in what happened there. He bitterly opposed the liberal and hypocritical tendencies of the followers of Sebastian Franck, whom he publicly attacked in some open letters in 1541; all extremes being evidently repugnant to one of his frank and open temperament. Equally decided was the stand he took in opposition to Adam Pastor, apparently one of his own disciples and sent out into the ministry by him, with whom we have become acquainted through his own published writings in the *B. R. N.* Vol. V. 361-516. On various points of faith and church-order Adam Pastor evidently was not completely weaned from the old Catholic views, but he was manifestly at variance with many accepted Anabaptist views and was a bitter opponent of the doctrine of the incarnation and a decided Anti-Trinitarian. It would be interesting to trace the connection between these, far from uncommon, departures from the common Christian faith among the early Anabaptists and the astonishing growth of the Socinians, toward the close of the century, largely covering the same territory where the former had greatly flourished. Dirk Philipsz bitterly opposed Adam Pastor and finally excommunicated him (*Int.* 21), on which account some friction arose between him and Menno Simons.

The Anabaptists were as strict in their opposition to intermarriage between their own members and outsiders as ever the Roman Catholic Church has been, and they compelled people so situated to separate from the other party even to the point of excommunication. On this point Dirk Philipsz fully endorsed the position of his communion. This very question occasioned the final schism between the "Fine" and "Coarse" Anabaptists, otherwise called "Waterlandians" and "Flemingians," in 1555, the foundation of which was the refusal of one Swaantje Rutgers', the wife of an excommunicated Anabaptist, to separate from him. A part of the church at Embden now demanded the excommunication of the woman as well as of the man, whilst another faction opposed such a radical course. The course followed, in the line of Church discipline, by the strict party among the Anabaptists was almost identical with that of the extremists among the early schismatics, in regard to the question of the "Lapsi." Even after repentance, those guilty of great and scandalous sins were to remain outcasts from the Church. The theology of Dirk Philipsz as regards the incarnation of Christ reminds one forcibly of the "docetic Christ" of Gnosticism; that on discipline, of the Donatists of North Africa, since even communication with the excommunicated is strongly deprecated (*Ench.* 258, *Intr.* 38). A little later I will refer to the evident influence of these views expressed by Dirk Philipsz

on the formation of the Liturgical Forms of the Dutch Reformed Church. Let me say right here that this doctrine of the complete ostracising of the excommunicated is found first in the *Enchyridion* and then in the Dutch Form of Excommunication. Speaking of the ban, as it applies to notorious sinners, Philipsz recommends first excommunication then complete separation from the sinner, on the part of the church. Precisely the same line is followed in the Dutch Form. The excommunicated person is to "be accounted as a heathen man and a publican" and the church is exhorted "to keep no company with him." The only hope Dirk Philipsz holds out to them is final restoration and ecclesiastical reconciliation, when after long repentance their lives are open books, in which men can read a true conversion.

Through these and other causes two mutually hostile factions arose in the Anabaptist communion and in 1565 a split had become inevitable. The final conflict was that between the Anabaptists of the cities of Harlingen, Franeker, Leeuwarden and Dokkum, all situated in Frisia. These had formed a secret coalition for a common defense against the Flemings. Meanwhile Dirk Philipsz, who had borne the lion's share of the efforts to prevent an open rupture, was beginning to feel the burden of old age. As early as 1562 he was described as "an old man", and in his writings of that period he himself spoke of writing "with great difficulty and bodily illness". Six years later he died after a busy and stormy life near the city of Embden, having been tracked by the Inquisition the greater part of his life and having come nevertheless to a peaceful and honored end.

The *Enchyridion* of Dirk Philipsz is a collection of writings which cover many years and a great variety of subjects. Written in a clear and simple style, they touch the fundamental points of Christian doctrine and they evidently formed the mainstay, theologically speaking, of the Dutch Anabaptists in their second historical period. Philipsz treats of "The confession of our faith, of baptism, of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, of the true knowledge of Jesus Christ, of the exposition of the tabernacle of Moses, of regeneration, of spiritual restitution, and of the Church of God". The remaining 250 pages of the volume before me are filled with *varia*, mostly referring to the disturbed inner life of the Anabaptist communion, of which the narrative of the events leading to the schism, the tracts on "the marriage of Christians" and on the attitude of husbands and wives to excommunicated partners would seem to be the most important.

In his theology Philipsz is absolutely trinitarian, although he holds the most singular views in regard to the human nature of Christ. These are broadly stated in his "*Bekentnisse onses Gheloofs*" (*Ench.* 61) and are more fully developed in his tract on the incarnation (*Ench.* 135, 153). Christ is a true man, but his humanity is in no wise connected with the body of Mary. As God created a body for Adam, so He created one for Christ. Or as other Anabaptist writers expressed it—He passed through Mary as light passes through glass.



For the rest both his theology and soteriology seem to be in accord with accepted Catholic orthodoxy. In his extended treatise on baptism, no reference whatever is made to the rite of baptism. Not even by implication does he refer to immersion, the very idea never seems to have occurred to him. I have searched in all the Anabaptist writings, reprinted in the "Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica", in vain for any reference to it. Neither here nor in Adam Pastor's works, nor in the accounts of the Inquisitorial proceedings against Anabaptist prisoners is there a trace of it.

A matter of great interest, especially to those acquainted with the Liturgy of the Dutch Reformed Church, is the familiar sound of many phrases found in the writings of Dirk Philipsz, which seem to be re-echoed in the Dutch Forms, especially those referring to the sacraments. Is it through John a Lasco, who labored in these regions, specially under the influence of Anabaptist efforts at reform, and who must have been familiar with many of the works of Philipsz, that this echo has come down to us? The Enchyridion was published in 1564, but of its separate writings many had appeared earlier, those on the sacraments *e.g.* twenty years before this date. One thing is evident—whoever wrote these Forms must have had read the Enchyridion. Thus we read in the Dutch Form: "En alhoewel onze jonge kinderen deze dingen niet verstaan, zoo zal men ze nogthans daarom van den doop niet uitsluiten". Here I read:—"Nademaal nu de jonge kinderen van alles wat de doop beteechent ende daer by behoort niet en weten noch verstaen noch en hebben, daarom so en coemt haer ooc de doop niet toe", (Ench. 73). The one evidently is an echo of or a rejoinder to the other.

Again Dirk Philipsz sees in the deluge a type or symbol of baptism (Ench. 78, 79), and in the prayer of the Dutch Form of baptism we find this identical typical use made of the deluge, in practically the same terms. Or take the Form of communion:—

Says Philipsz, "Soo en sien wy principael niet op de wtwendighe teecken en maer op Jesus Christus selven" (Ench. 103). Of the believer it is said, "die wordt ghespyst metten hemelschen manna, ja die eet dat vleesch en drinckt dat bloet Jesu, maer geestelyck met den mond der sielen en niet vleeschelyck met dem mond dss lyfs" (Ench. 114). And the Dutch Form has it, "Opdat wy dan met het waarachtige hemelsch brood Christus gespyzigt mogen worden zoo laat ons met onze harten niet aan het uiterlyke brood en den wyn blyven hangen maar dezelve opwärts verheffen, waar Christus Jezus is, enz".

Again Philipsz says, "Want alle geloovigen worden door eenen Gheest tot een lyf gedoopt" (Ench. 121). "Ooc dat sy met malcander vereenicht syn als leden eens lichaems, als een broot wt vele coornen en een wyn wt veel besyen" (Ench. 132). The Dutch form reads, "Daarbeneven dat wy ook door dien Geest onder elkander als leden van een lichaam in waarachtige broederlyke liefde verbonden worden, gelyk de heilige apostel spreekt: een brood is het zoo zyn wy velen

een lichaam dewyl wy allen een brood deelachtig zyn." "Want gelyk uit vele graankorrels een meel gemalen en een brood gebakken wordt, en uit vele bezien saamgeperst zynde een wyn en drank vliet en zich onder een vermengt enz."

It is almost startling to read the final sentences of Philipsz's tract on communion and to compare them with the Dutch Form. Here, "Een iegelyk spreke in zyn hart aldus- Loof den Heere myne Ziel", etc. There, "Spreekt metten Propheet-Loeft den Heere myn siele ende alle wat etc." (Ench. 132). The closing prayer of the Form appears startlingly like an adaptation of the closing words of the treatise before me (Ench. 133). It is impossible for me, with the two documents before me, to conceive that the similarity between them is a mere accident.

In his discussion of the sacraments Dirk Philipsz unconsciously advances a strong argument against a legend, which has been current in Baptist circles, viz. that the Anabaptists are the historical continuation of the Waldenses or rather of the "Old Evangelical" churches, which are said to have been in existence from the days of the Apostles. This theory has been stoutly defended by L. Keller in his "Staupitz und die Anfänge der Reformation". Leipzig, 1888, and in his "Reformation und die ält. Reform. Parteien". 1885. But this position has been clearly met and rejected by Mueller and Kolde. Dirk Philipsz, who was evidently one of the best informed, if not the best informed man among the Anabaptists of his time, ought to have known of such a historic succession, if it existed at all. And the argument *e silentio* is all the stronger since he refers to the Waldenses in his Enchyridion. He admits that there must always have been a core of evangelical believers, even in the darkest days of the Church (Ench. f. 244), also that he and his followers confess themselves one with the true Church of God from the beginning, i.e. with the true Christian apostolic and catholic Church (Ench. f. 97). But the only reference to the Waldenses, he makes is in a quotation from Luther—Item hy bekyft die Waldenses die haar kinderen doopen en toch niet geloouen dat sy een eigen geloof hebben, ende also Gods naem ydel noemen ende voeren". (Ench. f. 82). On the fundamental point of baptism the Waldenses were therefore at variance with the Anabaptists.

In his discussion of the call to the ministry, Philipsz lays stress both on the immediate and mediate call, the one of God, the other of the Church. He presents a high ideal and expects much from the ministry, he demands irreproachableness in life and doctrine and ability to teach. The times point at bitter experiences and crossbearing (Ench. 223), but he admonishes to fidelity. As has been said, Dirk Philipsz sides with the strict party in regard to discipline and the ban, all deliberate and unrepented sins call for irrevocable excommunication (Ench. 259). The Church as the bride of Christ must maintain her purity to avoid slander, for only thus the final salvation of the sinner can be attained (1 Cor. v. 5). This strict construction of the doctrine of the ban



is everywhere stoutly maintained by the author (Ench. f 137, 138, 250, 268, 277, etc.). But in this very strictness lay the menace of a coming schism.

It is impossible to discuss in detail the contents of the Enchyridion, which seems to me to be by far the most reliable source of information, as regards the theology and life of the Dutch Anabaptists, inasmuch as Dirk Philipsz is consistently conservative and was evidently considered an authority and as such was looked up to by the greater part of the Anabaptists of his time, exerting a far greater and more abiding influence than such men as Adam Pastor and Sebastian Franck. The contents of the Enchyridion read easily, they have a certain rhythm which appeals to the reader and the prevailing tone is characteristically that of the Old Testament. Its finished style, its lucidity, incisiveness and scripturalness make it fully worth while to the student who wishes to know at first hand what these hounded and hated Anabaptists really stood for.

The balance of this last volume of the B.R.N. consists in the main of controversial tracts written by Dirk Philipsz. First of all comes a reply to the letters of the popular but liberal Anabaptist leader, Sebastian Franck, who apparently, through Coornhert, author of "Wellevenkunst", exerted a considerable influence on the development of the Arminian controversy. Franck appears to have questioned the absolute authority of the Scriptures, he clung to the old Catholic Church with one hand and extended the other to the Anabaptists. He despised the sacraments and laughed at discipline, denied the necessity of a visible Church and made light of the call to the ministry. Ministers, he claimed, had to experience an outward, miraculous, divine call, like the prophets of old, and must substantiate this call by miracles and wonders. Against all these new fangled doctrines of Franck, Philipsz bitterly inveighs in his open letter, and yet his attack is free from the coarseness which characterizes the controversial writings of the leaders of the Reformation, especially of Luther.

The "Sendtbrief aen de Vier Steden" (Franeker, Leeuwarden, Harlingen and Dokkum) affords us a comprehensive and intimate view of the causes, which led to the great schism in the ranks of the Anabaptists, viz. the split between the Flemings and Waterlandians. It is a weird story of dissent and underhand measures, of ignoble efforts to obtain the upperhand in the struggle between two contending factions, of the abuse of the power of the keys, of vain appeals to the simple unwritten constitution of the Anabaptist communion and of vain hopes, on the part of better minded partisans in the struggle, to use the great and acknowledged influence of Dirk Philipsz to prevent the coming schism.

Hindered from coming himself, Philipsz tried to allay the coming storm, but alas in vain, and thus he wrote the tender, wonderful epistle before us. The heart of the matter lay in the relation between the Church and the ministry and therefore Philipsz added to his epistle

the official declaration regarding the call and office of the ministry, passed at Embden in 1565, and subscribed by all the pastors who adjudicated the case of Leendert Bouwensz, pastor at Embden, a warm friend of Dirk, who had been guilty of repeated and wilful neglect of pastoral duty. This declaration laid stress on the importance of a localized ministry and permitted absence from one's post only with the consent of the church he served.

But all efforts went for naught and the bitter internal strife in the ranks of the Anabaptists, as De Hoop Scheffer has plainly shown, largely influenced the astonishing growth of the Reformed Church in Holland, since 1566.

Dirk Philipsz may have been somewhat dictatorial; old leaders usually exhibit such a tendency; his enemies called him "touchy and hasty"; firm and decided in his opinions he certainly was; but the reading of his writings seems to impress one with a sense of leadership rarely found among his communion, he appears to make for peace and becomes irascible only when age has enfeebled him and when the hope for peace, through his efforts, seems to have completely failed. The brochure "*Cort doch Grondtlich Verhael*", of nearly twenty pages is invaluable as a source for the study of the history of the schism. Dr. Pyper calls it "both a defense and justification" of Dirk Philipsz. What sorrow of heart speaks in every line of it! What bitter pain at the defection of old friends and disciples! Critical investigation and comparison of other documents touching this schism seem to assure us of the trustworthiness of this narrative of Philipsz. He seems to feel that the foundations of the Anabaptist communion are crumbling, his own standing and authority are destroyed and he is now old and ill, whilst his whole life has been an endless fight for the faith as he knew it and preached it.

But the struggle ever grew in bitterness, as the appendix to his "*Cort Verhaal*" proves. The commonest duties, e.g., that of shielding the brethren from persecution, were forgotten and names of brethren, who were attacked, were given in full, to play, as it were, into the hands of the common enemy (Ench. 606).

Then follows the last writing of Philipsz, the little booklet "*Van den Echt der Christenen*". In the vocabulary of the Anabaptists "Christians" are members of their own communion. All the others are lost. Under their strict laws, no matter how much a man loved his wife, if he had married her outside of the communion, the ban was applied. The tract is addressed to those who did not sympathize with this extreme view. Dirk has no patience with mixed marriages, all outsiders are of the world; if believers are "unequally yoked with unbelievers" the believing party must separate from the unbelieving, as had been demanded by Ezra and Nehemiah. The couple must separate; but if the man is the sinner, he is compelled to maintain his former wife. All this applies only to mixed marriages when one had joined the Anabaptist communion before marriage. If marriage was contracted



before the "conversion" of either party, the law did not apply, for in such cases there remained the hope of bringing the other party into the fold. This brochure, coupled with that on the "Ban" gives us a tolerably correct view of the ascetic attitude of life of the Anabaptists. *Separation from the world*—was their motto. But in this very tendency lay the rock on which they were to split asunder. We find the same historic phenomenon in the Manichaean, Catharistic and Puritan movements.

The volume closes with a reprint of a letter of consolation and encouragement, addressed to an Anabaptist woman, awaiting martyrdom at Antwerp, and other correspondence, in reference to the trouble among the Anabaptists; and last of all we find here samples of hymns, written by our author for use in worship, as is evident from the tunes to which they are to be sung.

All in all this tenth volume of the B. R. N. is one of the most interesting and valuable of the entire series. What a pity that Dr. Cramer did not live long enough to see the completion of this monumental work, by which the editors have placed Church historians under a lasting debt of gratitude. Hereafter the thorough study of the early reformatory movements in the Netherlands, especially those covering the Anabaptist period of the Dutch reformation, will be far more practicable than before these volumes were issued. Even the most earnest and painstaking student formerly had to travel from point to point to search out these rare and almost forgotten sources, scattered in different libraries at widely separated points; and even then of necessity his knowledge must remain fragmentary because he could not be expected to reach them all. Now, thanks to the B. R. N., these scattered sources are accessible to all, in a handy compass. And therefore all Church historians will unite in expressing to the editors of this monumental work, Dr. Cramer (deceased) and Dr. Pyper, their liveliest gratitude for this labor of love. Such work is usually a thankless task, the market for it is small, the reward practically nothing. And yet we venture to say that nothing these scholars have done or may do, will ever level up to the importance and value of the difficult task of editing for the scholarly world this treasury of an almost lost and forgotten early Dutch Reformation literature. The students of Church history, the world over, crown them for it with a chaplet of immortelles.

Louisville, Ky.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

*A Guide to the Study of Church History.* By W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, Ph.D. (Berlin), D.D. Professor of Church History in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1914. \$1.50 net.

We heartily recommend this new and revised edition of Dr. McGlothlin's *Guide* as one of the most satisfying treatises of this kind. The author has admirably succeeded in presenting the outstanding facts and movements in the history of the Church in a concise yet comprehensive and quite readable form.

Throughout the volume references are made to four standard manuals of Church history representing as many confessional viewpoints: Newman (Baptist), Hurst (Methodist), Kurtz (Lutheran), and Alzog (Roman Catholic). These works will serve to introduce the student to the general literature on any phase of the whole subject.

The treatise is clearly outlined and fairly proportioned. Considering the limited compass of the *Guide*, the treatment of the Eastern Church, after its separation from the Western, is exceptionally well managed, and the same is true also of the last division of the book (1789-1914). As is natural the author gives special attention to the Baptists, but this does not defeat his aim to do justice to all denominational interests.

The value of the *Guide* is enhanced by the addition of a good Index and an Appendix containing chronological lists of popes, emperors, kings, etc.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

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### SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*Mysticism and The Creed.* By W. F. COBB, D.D. Rector of St. Ethelburga's in the City of London. London: Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. 559.

The occasion of this book, the author says, is to be found in the fact that the works on the Apostles' Creed, such as those of Caspari, Kattenbusch, Harnack, Zahn, Burn, and McGiffert, are for the most part concerned with the form or the history of the Creed, and only secondarily, if at all, with its content or meaning. But Dr. Cobb is not concerned with its historical or literal meaning, *i.e.*, with what the Creed was originally intended to teach, but with its "mystical" or "inner" meaning. And this is described as being its meaning from the point of view which modern thought has caused to be that of the "ordinarily well instructed Christian".

In the times in which the Creed was constructed, the underlying religious philosophy, Dr. Cobb says, was widely different from that which now prevails. Then men believed in miracles, *i.e.*, in events in the external world due to the immediate power of God acting apart from second causes, events which therefore are inexplicable by second causes or so called laws of Nature. Nowadays, he says, all this has changed. Modern thought has taught us the uniformity of Nature and the inviolability of natural law and the impossibility of miracles. A radical, *i.e.*, a common sense man, or, in Dr. Cobb's language, "an elementary soul" for whom "a thing is or is not", would be for casting aside the Creed—nay Christianity itself. Not so, however, the mystic. The latter can see not only the inner meaning and value of the Creed, but he realizes, unless he be a fanatical and extreme mystic, that the Life which constitutes religion in general and the Christian religion in particular, must manifest itself in forms. Indeed it would seem



that Dr. Cobb would show how it must manifest itself in just these historical forms. Hence, while he baldly proclaims that the historical element in Christianity is derived from pagan myths and gnostic speculation, he nevertheless seems to believe in the permanent value of these forms.

By this time it will be evident that what Dr. Cobb gives in this volume is not an interpretation of the Apostles' Creed, but rather a philosophy of religion. When we say this, however, we are not meaning to find fault with him, for it is beyond dispute that a philosophy, *i.e.*, a definite conception of God and His relation to the world, underlies the statements of the Creed taken in their literal and historical sense. The question is what is Dr. Cobb's religious philosophy, and will it allow us to "interpret" the Creed, or will it force us to misinterpret it, and whether this philosophy will leave us with any Christianity in any historically defensible sense.

Dr. Cobb's philosophy is that reality is Life, and that Life, whether it be that of God the "Supreme Spirit", or that of our finite spirits, is self-determined in itself, and that too after a sort of Bergsonian capricious fashion, but that Life submits itself to the "mechanical process when it goes out of itself into objectivity". It is, therefore, only in the inner world that freedom rules, while in the world of external manifestation, both God and man are bound fast by mechanical necessity. It would appear, then, that neither God nor man could be possessed of a life which could be characterized as that of a free spirit, or at least that the sphere in which God and man can be called free agents and really live their true life, is a very limited one.

But this is not the whole of the matter, nor the worst of it. For the only self-conscious subject which we know—whether God or man—is always in duration or time, and hence is subject to the law of absolute necessity. If, therefore, we would penetrate the sphere of Religion, Life, and Freedom, we must seek a sphere where duration and time are no more, and this is just the sphere of the Unconscious which, to become conscious or attain consciousness, must put on the "mantle of time" and evolve in time, subject to the laws of a necessary and mechanical evolution.

In religion, therefore, we have to do with a "life-process" and the outward forms in which it has manifested itself. In a word, we have Life and form, freedom and authority, mysticism and history, and the problem is how to reconcile them. This is the problem discussed in the first chapter entitled "Mysticism and Tradition". The extreme mystic lets go of history altogether, but is attempting the impossible since Life unexpressed is unconscious. Life and form are inseparable. The traditionalist, on the other hand, has his true life crushed by a literal adherence to dead forms. But the "practical mystic" realizes that both life and form are necessary, and his position is "that he lives his life and accepts the form that is provided". This sounds rather indefinite. This statement quoted is immediately followed and explained

by the statement that the mystic's duty is "to listen to what the voice of his inner life bids him to do, and then to make full use of the forms that tradition offers him". But this statement is far from clearing up the matter. The mystic is to follow some inner voice as regards his action, but will he then know the inner meaning of credal forms? And of precisely what use will religious truths and credal forms of statement be to him? The answer to these questions does not seem easy to give. Dr. Cobb is, however, ready with an answer. He goes on to say that the mystic must interpret for himself the credal forms which tradition gives him, and in doing this he must seek their inner or mystical meaning. Every vision, every mystical experience, Dr. Cobb says, unless it is to "remain sterile", must find some means by which its energy can be brought to bear on others, that is to say, it must take on a "form". But the form can never yield the inner meaning to one who has not had the mystical experience.

Applying this to the Creed, in the chapter on "Mysticism and the Creed", Dr. Cobb says that the Creed wears a philosophical and a historical form, but that his concern is not with either of these, but with its hidden Life. Its Trinitarian form, when thus approached, constitutes no difficulty, but will be found to express some experience which the mystic has of God. And yet being a mere doctrine or outer form, it must be criticised and brought into harmony with any fuller knowledge of God we may possess in our modern life. And when the mystic comes to the historical portion of the Creed which "tells the life-story of Jesus Christ", he will "see there not so much the story of a particular life, as of a universal and, therefore, a typical life". And the details of this life, the mystic will "construe as forming his own ideal life-story, without troubling himself unduly about the historical side of them". Thus the Virgin Birth of Jesus, His Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension, the mystic will be concerned neither to affirm nor to deny. As historical facts they are indifferent to him. As a religious man and a mystic he will approach them as symbols of events on the pathway of the true life. "Virgin Birth, Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension, are not only moments in the life of one Individual, but are moments in His because they have cosmic significance, and in some degree have always been part of the world-order". But this, Dr. Cobb continues, is not to regard the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth as a myth and the Gospel story as unhistorical, for Life and Event are complementary and not mutually exclusive.

Enough has been said to make it quite clear that for Dr. Cobb the historical facts of Christianity are not after all "complementary to" the Christian life, and an essential part of Christianity, but something completely indifferent, and in no sense an essential part of the Christian religion. The great historical events of Christianity are regarded as mere symbols of religious truths. Thus the Virgin Birth means that God imparts His life to Jesus and to every believer. The Crucifixion in its "essence" symbolizes the inner crucifixion of self to which Jesus



submitted, and which must be repeated in each of His followers. It is not the Cross of Christ which saves the sinner, but the principle of self-sacrifice. Dr. Cobb quotes with approval Scheffler's lines on the "Mystic Catholic", two of which lines illustrate pointedly his own view—

"The Cross on Golgotha will never save thy soul;  
The Cross in thine own heart alone can make thee whole."

Similarly the Resurrection of Christ is a symbol of His continued life and power, and of the rising of the believer to a higher life. The Ascension likewise is "not so much a physical happening—though he (the mystic) is not called on to deny this—as the last act in the long drama of the birth, pilgrimage, and home coming of the soul, which out of many tribulations has its life now hid with Christ in God".

If, then, the great facts of Christ's life are only symbols of what goes on in the life of the soul of man, Dr. Cobb is quite logical in regarding the question of their historical reality as a matter of indifference. What possible difference can it make whether or not these symbols actually happened as real historical events in Christ's life, so long as we hold fast the inner truth which they set forth? The story of the Cross of Jesus is as good as the actual occurrence of the Crucifixion if it is only a symbol to teach self-sacrifice, and nothing more. Consequently it is not a matter of importance or interest to follow Dr. Cobb through his entire discussion to find out how much of the historical events of Christianity he really does accept.

On this point he is neither clear nor consistent. He would seem to believe that Jesus really lived and died. The Virgin Birth, while said to be a matter of indifference as a "physical fact", Dr. Cobb would not be unwilling to admit, were it not for the silence of the New Testament on the subject outside the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke which he does not regard as historically trustworthy. This would appear to be a denial of the fact of the Virgin Birth, based upon a supposed lack of evidence, Dr. Cobb apparently having totally forgotten that earlier in the volume he had declared such a miracle to be impossible. The Resurrection of Christ's body is apparently denied, and Dr. Cobb supposes that the body which Jesus assumes is the body of each believer who surrenders his will to Him.

Thus from his lofty mystical position of indifference to the great Christian facts, Dr. Cobb seems to pass over to the denial of them, or at least some of them, and to the reduction of all of them alike to mere symbols of religious truths. And this being so, we repeat that he is right in affirming that their historical reality is a matter of complete indifference.

But we must go on to say—and here Dr. Cobb halts in his logic—that upon this view of the historical facts of Christianity, the existence of Jesus Himself is a matter of indifference. For if God did not enter this sinful world and intervene through His Son for man's salvation, if Christ is not the Saviour of sinners, but only a symbol of religious

truth, His very existence becomes a matter of indifference. In short, upon these principles one can have a Christianity without Christ.

But this leads us finally to remark that what Dr. Cobb has given us is not Christianity at all, but just the truths of bare natural religion construed in his mystical and half pantheizing fashion. He has reduced his Christianity to the level of the natural religious sentiment, and thereby has done away with it altogether. For Christianity is not the product of the natural religious sentiment of man. No more easy way of substituting one's own religious philosophy for Christianity could be conceived than Dr. Cobb's "mystical interpretation" of the Creed. Christianity is an historical religion. Its nature is to be historically determined. From the outset it consisted in the belief in a Divine Saviour from sin; in redemption through atoning blood; in the power of Christ's Resurrection. One can accept or reject it, but one has no right to read his own philosophy into a Christian creed, and then say this is what Christianity really is.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*A Constructive Basis for Theology.* By JAMES TEN BROEKE, PH.D.  
Professor of Philosophy in McMaster University, Toronto, Canada.  
London: MacMillan & Co. 1914. Pp. 400.

The idea of the author is that philosophical thought furnishes a constructive basis for theology, and that contemporary philosophy affords a better basis than does either ancient philosophy, or modern philosophy, broadly speaking.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the origin and development of Christian theology. Its "antecedents" are traced to ancient philosophy, an outline of which is given in the second chapter. Then the meaning of Christianity is discussed, and the Patristic and Mediaeval theology outlined in a historical sketch occupying two chapters. In this period the idea of an external authority, whether ecclesiastical or Biblical, was the controlling factor in theology. Then came the modern revolution in thought, and the erection of the principle of Individualism. This gave rise to a new philosophy, and consequently to a new theology.

Part two traces the history of this modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, and from Kant through the post-Kantian German Idealism and Romanticism, and then, in the three following chapters, it is shown how this issued in a new theology in Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and others. These modern types of theology are all characterized by basing theological knowledge on an internal or subjective authority, emphasizing either the intellect, feeling, or will, as the case may be.

Professor Ten Broeke concludes, however, that none of these systems has become the theology of the present day, and he seeks, in the third part of the volume, to show that in certain phases of contemporary thought is to be found a constructive basis for a new theology, which theology, however, he says he will not attempt to construct, though



he devotes a chapter to briefly outlining its view in regard to certain Christian doctrines.

This volume, it will thus be seen, is to a large extent—*i.e.*, throughout its first two parts—occupied with an outline of the history of philosophy and theology. It will be of more interest, therefore, for us to discuss the author's own point of view on the fundamental questions involved in the third part of the book.

The first question which must be determined is what is the author's idea of the nature and task of theology? He speaks of theology (p. 6) as "the science of God or, as we may more freely say, the science of religious experience". Here at the outset confusion is introduced by the identification of two things which are quite distinct. Any science which deals with religious experience as its object is a branch of psychology or anthropology. To identify this with theology which has God for its object, is only to confuse matters at the outset. When, however, we examine the author's treatment of the subject, we discover that it is the definition of theology as the science of religious experience which he really adopts. In the analysis of a positive religion, he tells us (p. 4), it is important to distinguish between the primary experience of the Founder and the interpretation or dogma or theology which is developed. Theology is thus regarded as the "interpretation" of religious experience. According to this idea, Christian theology is the result of a long process, no part of which is regarded by Dr. Ten Broeke as being pathological or destructive of Christianity. There is to be distinguished, in the case of a positive religion, the experience of the Founder and his teachings or interpretations of his experience; then there are the numerous interpretations of the significance of the Founder's experience and teaching; there next follows the embodiment of these doctrines in the life of the religious community; then comes the religious experience of the individual Christian in response to his environment; and finally the individual's own interpretation of his religious experience in the light of his own knowledge. This last is his theology which is thus a "secondary" product. This derivative or "secondary" character of theology is made still more emphatic from the standpoint of epistemology, when Dr. Ten Broeke affirms that "truth is always for use. Its validity, necessity, and universality, are such only because these formulations are a successful means to satisfy the conduct of life" (pp. 6 and 7).

It is obvious that two questions are here involved. The first is the nature and validity of knowledge, and the second is the relation of theology to Christian experience. This latter is the question involved in the above set of five distinctions, and need not be complicated or involved by this set of distinctions. For it is simply the question of the relation of experience to doctrine.

As regards the first question, the author asserts that the validity of truth consists in a proposition or idea being a successful means to the conduct of life. In a word, truth is that which works. This idea

of knowledge and truth will not stand the test of facts in any sphere of life and experience. To take an example from ordinary life—it may not “work” at all—except in a fatal way against life—for a patient with organic heart disease to know the real nature of his malady. Take, again, but one example of religious truth—the thought of future punishment may work well in helping some people to the better “conduct of life”, and yet it may not work thus at all with others. Can we decide, then, whether the doctrine of future punishment is true or not by asking whether it helps or “works” in the “conduct of life”? Obviously we cannot decide whether or not an idea or proposition is true by any such pragmatic tests. A proposition is not true because it works; it works because it is true. Indeed truth in some cases may not “work” at all. There are undoubted truths which seem to have no “functional relation” whatever to “the conduct of life”—to use the language of the pragmatist.

It is surprising, however, to find Dr. Ten Broeke apparently adopting the position of the pragmatist, because in a later chapter he criticises Pragmatism acutely. If Pragmatism is a false view of truth and knowledge, then theology is not a “secondary product” in the sense that its doctrines are mere aids to religious life, nor can this be the test of their truth and validity.

The second question concerned the relation of experience to theology or doctrine. Theology is said by Dr. Ten Broeke to be a “secondary product” because it is the interpretation of religious experience, and because thought presupposes something to think about. This last statement is obviously true, or, let us say, a truism. Thought does presuppose something to think about, and of course theological thought has an object which is thought of. Its object, however, is not religious experience, but God who is the object of that experience. Moreover the religious experience is determined and conditioned by an idea of God or a theological doctrine. Likewise in the case of Christian experience and Christian theology, the experience is conditioned by the Christian revelation. This revelation is the primary matter, and not the theology which we construct from it. But the revelation itself contains thoughts or truths which condition and determine both Christian theology and Christian experience. In a certain sense the theology itself when formulated conditions the experience. Theology, therefore, seeks the truth about God, that is, ideas which correspond with the nature of God as He really is. The nature of theology is, therefore, determined by the nature of the revelation which God has made of Himself.

The second fundamental question concerns the relation of theology to philosophy. The author argues from the necessity for unity in our own experience and knowledge, that Christian theology must be harmonized with what we believe to be a true philosophy. That this position embodies an important truth should be recognized, though it is a different matter as to the way in which Dr. Ten Broeke carries out this idea. Christian theology has God as its object. Christianity claims



to be the final and supernatural revelation of God. It cannot, therefore, escape attacks from false philosophy, nor refuse the defense of philosophical apologetics. Is there a God? Can He be known? Can He reveal Himself in a supernatural way? These are questions the answers to which are presuppositions of Christian theology. They are the subjects dealt with by philosophical apologetics. It is impossible to keep our theology in one pocket and our philosophy in another. Over against the fashionable scorn of philosophical apologetics, Dr. Ten Broeke's contention is fully justified. But this is not to say that philosophy is to supply the "form" which Christian "principles" are to be made to assume. The author says (p. 367) that we are to find in our Lord's moral and religious consciousness "eternal principles", and that we are to separate them from their "historical form" and to "unify them" with all other principles known by us. This really means that Dr. Ten Broeke adopts the old rationalistic distinction between the kernel and the husk, and amounts to saying that we are to put our Christianity into the moulds of our philosophy. The inevitable result of such a process is that what we get as a result is not the Christianity of the New Testament, but just our own philosophical notions. That this is so is illustrated by the case of T. H. Green and the Cairds whose so called Christianity is really nothing but Hegelianism. Dr. Ten Broeke's method, it must be said, is not precisely that of this Hegelianized theology. He has a chapter in which he first seeks to state certain fundamental Christian truths, and then subsequently to harmonize them with his philosophical views. But one can easily see that his philosophy rather than a careful exegesis of the New Testament, was the determining factor in his statement of these Christian doctrines.

This leads us naturally and necessarily to ask thirdly, what is his view of the nature of Christianity. Dr. Ten Broeke's treatment of this subject is vitiated by a false method of procedure. He says that there are certain truths in common between believers in the historical Christianity of the New Testament and the "liberal school" which distinguishes an "interpretative element" which is the "faith" or "dogmatic" of the first Christian believers. It is these truths which are held in common by these two different views of Christianity which are essential and which are to be related to contemporary thought. But this method can only result in giving us a reduced Christianity, and amounts to a foregone conclusion in favor of the "liberal school". The ideas expressed by the terms Son of Man, Son of God, Messiah, and all the sayings which deal with the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, are all said by the author to belong to the "interpretative or apologetic" element in the New Testament, and not to be essential to Christianity (p. 317); while the essential element is supposed to come from Jesus—that is, "the Kingdom of God and its coming; God the Father and the infinite worth of the human soul; the better righteousness, and the command of love" (p. 55). Of course these truths are common to believers in New Testament Christianity and to the "liberal school", though

the latter neglects the eschatological aspect of Jesus' teaching concerning the Kingdom of God. Indeed most of these ideas are identical with those of natural religion based on a theistic conception of God. The fact that they are common to the New Testament Christianity and to the Christianity of the liberal theology does not by any means render them constitutive of the essence of Christianity. Rather does the fact that they are shared by theistic religious philosophy show that they are not the peculiar marks of Christianity. We have here two essentially and wholly different views of Christianity, and an answer should be sought earnestly to the question which is the true one. Dr. Ten Broeke, on the contrary, assumes that the critical opinions of the "liberal school" of New Testament criticism are true and well founded. He makes no attempt to examine the question for himself. Had he done so he might have found that all these ideas which are said not *really* to come from Jesus, were *actually* taught by our Lord according to the supposed sources of the Synoptic Gospels. It can be denied that these ideas come from Jesus Himself only by a purely subjective method of criticism which presupposes that Jesus could not have had these ideas, and that they must therefore come from some other source. This whole method is purely subjective and without scientific value. Then in addition there is the question of the authority of the Apostles as teachers, and of Christ's relation to them, and as to whether Apostolic Christianity is not essential Christianity. This question Dr. Ten Broeke leaves hanging in the air. These are questions which must be first decided and not assumed, before we can state the meaning of Christianity. To assume that all which distinguishes Christianity from natural religion is unessential, is to reduce Christianity to the level of natural religion, and so to destroy it, for Christianity is not the product of man's religious nature. It is a historical religion, and its nature is to be historically determined in all its fulness. It can never be done by any such process as that which Dr. Ten Broeke has followed.

We have limited ourselves to the discussion of the author's views on these fundamental questions, which are not only fundamental in themselves, but fundamental for the theme of this book. In these matters we are obliged to differ with the author. There are, however, other matters in his book of which it would have been interesting to speak. There is his treatment of special Christian doctrines, and the interpretation given them by what he calls contemporary thought. There is also the historical sketch of contemporary thought, which is clearly and concisely stated, and shows the author's acquaintance with recent philosophical literature. It is, indeed, in its history of philosophical thought that the chief merit of this volume lies. As furnishing a constructive basis for theology, or as giving an idea of what Christianity is, and what Christian theology should be, we cannot regard the volume as a success.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.



*La Philosophie de la Croix.* Par JULES GINDRAUX. Genève: J.-H. Jeheber, Libraire-Éditeur, 28, Rue du Marché. Paris: Libraire Fischbacher, 33 rue de Seine. Fr. 3.50. Pp. viii, 309, with Table des Matières at close.

Following an opening chapter on preliminary questions, the philosophy of Christian redemption is discussed in four subsequent chapters in the light of the pagan religions, the Jewish idea of expiation, the affirmations of Christ and the apostles; and its development is traced in the Christian Church from apostolic times, by way of the Reformation and Schleiermacher, down to the present day.

M. Gindraux begins his philosophy of the Cross with the threefold assumption of a sinless Christ, human sin, and the existence of the God of the Bible (p. 12). For him God's holiness is His attachment to the moral law, to the moral good (pp. vii, 24, 108). There is in God retributive or vindictory justice, and the cross is an homage, a sacrifice to this moral requirement of Deity (pp. 20, 31, 211, 280-282). It is a λύτρον, or ransom, but one paid to Divine justice and not to the devil, as some earlier dogmaticians fancied (pp. 148, 226. Cf. p. 168). This emphasis on the judicial aspect of the cross M. Gindraux is careful to maintain. He looks upon the modern view as an attempt to turn the cross into a "pedagogical instrument" (p. 270. Cf. p. 290), with no justice in it at all. Nevertheless, the cross is an exhibition: he calls it "a pillory" (p. 33), presenting Christ to the eyes of all ages. It is accordingly an appeal (p. 83). But its ultimate *raison d'être*, the author rightly claims, can never be sought in its spectacular influences down the ages, never in what it *exhibits*, but alone in what it *does*.

The Pauline presentation of the atonement is substantially accepted and defended. Paul has given, the author says (p. 210), almost a complete philosophical commentary on the work of the cross. Obedience to God is for Paul the great virtue of the cross (p. 200). It is ἡ ἱλαστήριον, a propitiation, an expiation, and as such it is the historic condition of pardon (pp. 44, 295-296). With Vinet, Christ's whole life of perfect obedience is included in the author's view (p. 38. Cf. pp. 252-256, 262, where Vinet's position is criticized, although M. Gindraux has high admiration for Vinet, thinks he is sincere and possibly orthodox).

The writer holds to the vicarious interpretation of the cross. He reads, however, into the word "substitution" a special meaning which may throw him open to suspicion on the part of an inquisitorial reader. "The word substitution," he says, "has for us a special sense. It designates that voluntary participation of Christ in our sufferings which makes of Him a representative and a protector in whom we can trust. There is nothing cold or mechanical in this notion" (p. 11). "We shall speak of substitution. But the substitution which we believe to be seen in the Bible is not the dry and mechanical replacement of certain theories which pass for evangelical. It is a living union of trust (un rapport vivant de confiance), born of a natural solidarity and of a purposed

solidarity between him who represents and those who are represented, a union inspired by God Himself" (pp. 46-47. Cf. p. 246). Into the anthropological details of this "solidarity" M. Gindraux does not go, and the most he may mean by it is simply, that on the cross Christ truly took *our* place. It was actually *our own* guilt that He bore. "The old word substitute," he concludes, "must be interpreted by the word representative, which our democracy better understands, and which designates the same thing" (p. 297). Christian thinkers, however, as indeed Christians in general, will be loath to let go of the word "substitution", which has done such good service. As a matter of fact, one may be a representative without being a substitute in the stricter meaning of the term, and while the Victim of Calvary was a true representative both of God and man, it is quite as important, if not more so, that our salvation, and therefore our soteriology, be theocratic as that it be democratic.

In his philosophy of the cross M. Gindraux does not ignore the legal side. He very properly expounds Paul's view of Justification as a juridically imputed righteousness (pp. 175-178, 193, 204, 208, 211, 249-250. Cf. pp. 183-185). He does not think that this exhausts the Pauline idea, for justification always issues in personal sanctification (pp. 193, 204). Conscience has no insignificant part in the author's soteriology (pp. 16-17, 85, 262), though its function is viewed as condemnatory rather than corrective.

An Epilogue is added in which several objections are examined. One of these takes up the question of the Father's participation in the atoning agonies of the cross, and has a patripassian coloring. Yet God is said to suffer not *per essentiam*, but only in so far as He condescends, "living by His sympathy in the existence of His creatures" (p. 283). Or, as it is expressed on a later page, it is the cross in which God suffered in the Person of His Son (pp. 19, 296. Cf. pp. 43, 277).

In a single paragraph (p. 307) M. Gindraux sums up his philosophy of the cross with beautiful conciseness. "What then is the cross?" he asks. It is, he replies, the imposing monument of the Divine love and holiness and justice; a monument, too, of the human perfection, charity, patience, and faith of Christ, as well of the cruel wickedness and profound corruption of our race. Yet it is still more. Its efficacy is in this: that it brings pardon and transformation, protecting fallen man from a merited condemnation. There are times when the author lets slip a sentence that is open to a moralistic interpretation, but these are few, so that on the whole this presentation of the philosophy of the cross is well within evangelical limits.

We search in vain for the date of the book's publication: an unfortunate omission. Two misprints occur: "lihrement" for "librement" (p. 104, line 1); and "nons" for "nous" (p. 197, line 15).

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.



*The Bible and Universal Peace.* By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, PH.D., Leipzig University, D.D., Dartmouth College. Author of "The Student's Life of Jesus" (1900), "Jesus" (1912), "Interpretation of the Bible" (1908), "The Life of Paul" (1899), "A Short History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age" (1906), "The Book of Acts" (1908), etc. New York and London: Funk & Wagnall's Company. 1914. 8vo; pp. xi, 229.

This is a timely book. Written, as it would seem, without any foresight of the present gigantic European war, it has come out just when all thinking persons are looking for precisely such a discussion. It is no less adequate than timely. Dr. Gilbert writes out of ample knowledge, both Biblical and historical. Its style matches its subject-matter. It would be difficult to find in the whole book an obscure phrase or a halting sentence. Not yet, however, have we touched its highest excellence. This is its judicial spirit. The writer is never carried away by his theme. He has no theory of his own to maintain. His one aim is to set forth the actual relation of the Bible to universal peace, and to do this without exaggeration. He first considers the fact of war in Biblical history. He shows next how Biblical writers regarded this fact, presenting first the ancient Hebrew view of war, that it was "a religious activity", and afterward the Christian teaching, which rendered the old view obsolete. This is succeeded by a study of the elements of peace in those visions of the future which form so fascinating a part of the sacred writings. The influence of the Bible on the sentiment and the institutions of peace is then traced from the beginning of Christian literature in the second century down to the Hague Conference of 1907. The modern appeal to the Bible in support of war is next illustrated in connection with our Civil War and the British Boer War of 1899. The duty and the opportunity of the Church to make the Bible contribute to the movement for universal peace are then dwelt on, and, finally, the relation of Jesus to the Modern Peace Movement is developed with nice discrimination and in strict accord with truth. The position is taken that, while the authority of the Bible has often been invoked for war, it is "the great book of peace"; and that while the modern Peace Movement would reach its goal by the shorter road of "outward enactment", only the influence of the Bible can bring in "the inward and imperishable peace of brotherhood." An excellent "General Index" and an "Index of Scripture References" conclude the volume.

The reviewer regrets to have to say that Dr. Gilbert's discussion is seriously vitiated by his denial of the supernatural inspiration of the Bible and especially by his low view of the Old Testament. He has no use for the latter. Indeed, he thinks that "a drastic revision and expurgation of the Psalms, as of the entire Old Testament, is a clear and pressing Christian duty" (p. 53). But his opinion of the New Testament is not much higher. Thus he rejects even our Lord's teaching of the second advent (p. 88). His idea is

that the worth of this or of that part of the Bible must be determined by its agreement with the spirit of Christ and that the spirit of Christ must be determined—it is hard to say it, but such is the impression made—by his own, as it seems to him, highest consciousness. The result of it all is that the view presented of the Bible's relation to peace has no more authority than Dr. Gilbert himself can give it. His discussion is interesting and enlightening, but that is all.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Individual and the Social Gospel.* By SHAILER MATHEWS. Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. Published jointly by The Missionary Education Movement and Laymen's Missionary Movement. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada. 1914. 8vo; p. 84.

This is not a plea to supplant the old gospel of a supernatural salvation for the individual by the new gospel of the salvation of the community through social service. It is an earnest and a strong plea to aid and to supplement the salvation of the individual by Christianizing the social institutions, such as the home, education, and, indeed, the whole social order, through which the individual as well as society, and the individual even more than society, is influenced.

The discussion is sane, and very suggestive. There are some particularly strong and timely passages. Among such are the writer's insistence on page 30 that the "woman movement", in order to maintain its high type of idealism, "needs all the assistance religion can afford"; and his presentation on page 45 of the folly and danger of the modern passion for amusements. We agree with him heartily when he says that "the most ingenious of us have not yet discovered a way by which men can be entertained into salvation".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*God's Paths of Peace.* By ERNEST RICHARD. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 109. 75 cents net.

One cannot but admire the optimism of a writer who, in the face of the present European and world-wide catastrophe, beholds the certain evolution of universal and abiding peace. By God's paths the writer refers to nothing religious, much less Christian; but only to those international movements which are resulting in a more or less definite "world organization". Among these movements are included modern facilities for transportation, the international postal system, international conferences and societies, and the general movement toward closer relations between the representatives of different nations. The author argues that as an evolutionary process has resulted in extending the peace of individual families to the peace of entire nations, so a



similar process is resulting in the establishment of "the peace of the world". He seems however to forget that the process must first be begun in the hearts of individual men before we can hope to see the results for which he looks, and that many of the agencies which he mentions are purely selfish in their aim.<sup>1</sup> Until the law of Christ and the desire for service have been more fully established by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, we can hardly expect, in the light of the present war, the definite and far off event of which the writer treats.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Bible as Literature.* By IRVING FRANCIS WOOD, PH.D., and ELIHU GRANT, PH.D. New York: The Abingdon Press. Cloth, crown 8vo, pp. 346. \$1.50.

The publication of such a volume as this by the Professor and the Associate Professor of Biblical Literature in Smith College would be a matter of little concern were it not for the fact that it forms one of the *Bible Study Textbook Series*, "specially designed for the use of undergraduate classes in colleges" and "prepared in harmony with the complete course in Bible study outlined by a joint committee representing the Eastern and Western sections of the Association of College Instructors in the Bible, the department of colleges and universities and of teacher training of the Religious Education Association, the Student Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A., and the Sunday School Council". That is to say, this "Introduction to the Literature of the Bible" is intended for the instruction of *all the youth of America*. What then are its teachings? Merely the dogmatic assertion of the commonplaces of destructive biblical criticism under the familiar caption, "accepted by the common consent of modern scholars". The chapters dealing with "The Books of Narrative" are devoted mainly to a statement of the composite character of these books, and to assigning their various portions to the "original sources", "J", "E", "P", "D" and "R". Deuteronomy is shown to be a pious forgery dating from the time of Josiah, but only a portion of the book, or a brief "early edition", is as early as this date. Some "fragments of Hebrew literature antedate David". The earliest writers were the prophets; but the experience of the earlier "prophets" did not differ in essence from "the shaman of Central Asia, beating his drum and working himself into a frenzy; the American Indian Medicine Man; Socrates, with his belief in his demon; the Delphic Oracle, or the Mohammedan dervish"; and even the later prophets had no divine inspiration, only keen political insight and sagacity. Daniel contains no predictions but was written in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes hundreds of years after the imaginary life of the "traditional wise man" whose name it bears, and around whose name this "cycle of stories is gathered".

The composite character of the synoptic Gospels is affirmed; the authorship of the fourth Gospel is denied to John; the authenticity of

the Pastoral Epistles and of 2 Peter is discredited; and the Apocalypse is described as "a compilation, coming from different sources, and edited perhaps in the persecutions under Trajan in (A.D.) 112."

These teachings are not original or new; but are they of the character our young people need? Were they true, they are surely not the form of instruction to be given to those who are only beginning their study of the Bible, and who are in need of encouragement and inspiration and faith. But they are not true; they are mere theories of certain rationalistic interpreters, and it is not right to state them as accredited facts, particularly when nothing is said as to what other scholars teach and what the great church of Christ believes. Whatever simple suggestions the volume contains as to the outline or purpose of some of the books, their value is far outweighed by the statements which, instead of giving anything constructive and helpful, tend only to arouse doubt and unbelief.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Legend of the Christmas Rose.* By HENRY E. JACKSON, M.A.  
New York: Hodder and Stoughton; George H. Doran Company.  
Cloth 12mo, pp. 113. 75 cents net.

Five of the world's great Christmas paintings are treated in these chapters; and their interpretations, and the legends associated with them embody beautiful messages appropriate to Christmas-tide. The first of these paintings, by Alfred Hitchens, gives the title to the volume in which the five interpretations are contained; the legend here portrayed is shown to illustrate the creative power of love. "The Virgin Dream" by Alfred Bramtot, is shown to be a suggestion of "the anticipation of Christmas", the longing of the heart which is satisfied in the "gift of God". The third painting, "The Arrival of the Shepherds" by Henri Lerolle, is interpreted as embodying "the loneliness of Christmas". "The Evening Hymn to the Virgin" by Bouguereau, reminds us of the music of Christmas and its message to the believing heart. The last of the five, "The Arrival at Bethlehem" by Luc-Oliver Merson, brings the familiar but serious message of the possibility of excluding Christ from the Christmas festival, and the need of making room for Him if we are to taste anything of true Christmas joy.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Golden Censer.* By FLORENCE L. BARCLAY. New York: George H. Doran Company. 16mo, pp. 61. Decorated boards, 50 cents net.

It might not be thought necessary to consider seriously this little book on intercessory prayer, were it not evident that it was seriously written, and with an earnest desire to set forth the teaching of inspired Scripture; and did it not further seem that its interpretation of Scripture is open to serious question and its influence misleading. The attention of the reader is concentrated upon one point, namely,



that it is contrary to the will of God for one to pray for an unconverted soul, or city, or nation. The argument is based upon the statement of our Lord: "I pray not for the world"; so, it is urged, we are not to pray for the world, nor for anyone in the world, until that one has first accepted Christ. The explanation of this prohibition, and indeed of the words of Christ, is found in the fact of the freedom of the human will, and the unwillingness of God to do violence to this freedom. The writer seems to overlook the fact, to which reference is made in the book itself, that Christ prayed that the unity of the church might be used as a means to the end "that the world may believe". The fallacy of the argument lies just here; the writer fails to realize that every prayer presupposes that God will employ means to accomplish his ends. We are urged "to preach" and not to pray; but can we not pray that the preaching will be of such a character that the hearer will gladly accept the message and freely choose Christ as Lord? Can we not then quite as properly pray even though we make no specific mention of the means which God may use in the answer of our prayer for the salvation of souls? However sincere the writer, we cannot feel that justice has been done to the words of Paul when he expresses his own prayer to God for unbelieving Israel (Rom. x. 1) or to his earnest exhortation "that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men" (1 Tim. ii. 1). Another book, *The Rosary*, by this same author has a circulation of a million copies; it may be hoped that this well-intended volume will be less widely read.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Students and The World-Wide Expansion of Christianity.* Addresses delivered before the Seventh International Convention of The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Kansas City, Missouri, December 31, 1913, to January 4, 1914. Edited by Fennell P. Turner, General Secretary, New York, Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. Cloth 8vo; pp. 743.

Among the influences which are making toward the development of the spiritual and religious life of American students, and the directing of this life toward the evangelization of the world, none is comparable in importance to the organization known as *The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*. This opinion, which has frequently been voiced by secretaries of mission boards, and other leaders of the missionary enterprise, is substantiated by the publication of this Report of the Kansas City Convention. The volume is a history of only one student gathering, and so an illustration of only one of the agencies employed by the Student Movement; but it suggests and in part indicates the manifold agencies continuously brought to bear upon the student life of America by the Movement, while it describes in detail the most important convention which has been held under its auspices. These gatherings of students, held every

four years, have become events of deep significance in the religious life, not only of America but of the world. The purpose of these conventions, as stated in the Report, is to bring together carefully selected delegations of students and professors from important institutions of the United States and Canada, and the leaders of the missionary enterprise, both at home and abroad, to consider the great problem of the evangelization of the world and unitedly to resolve to undertake, in His strength, greater things for the Kingdom of Christ.

Six such gatherings had been held in previous years but none equalled the Convention at Kansas City, either in careful preparation, in the number or representative character of the delegates and speakers, in the breadth of scope, or in the permanence of its influence. In many ways and in countless lives, will this influence be extended; but by no one instrument so effectively as by this valuable Report prepared by the efficient General Secretary, Mr. F. P. Turner.

It includes the calls to prayer and articles on prayer sent in advance of the Convention to Student Volunteers, missionaries, and friends of the Student Movement in all parts of the world; and the suggestions for meditation and prayer used by the delegates during the Convention. It shows that these delegates numbered over 5000 and represented some 755 distinct institutions. It contains carefully edited reports of the addresses delivered by 134 different speakers. It contains appendixes which give a list of the Volunteers who have sailed to the foreign field, a carefully selected bibliography of missionary literature, and a statement of the amounts contributed to missions by the several American institutions during the quadrennium 1909-1913. The main portion of the volume is of course devoted to the addresses, of which no detailed mention can be made; suffice it to say that they included almost every phase of the problem of missionary activity, and of the relation of students to the world-wide expansion of Christianity.

The arresting Report of the Executive Committee of the Student Volunteer Movement showed the remarkable growth of the Movement, particularly during the past four years, and emphasized the demands made upon the Movement in the present and in the immediate future. The discussions which followed dwelt upon "The Present World-Situation", "The Forces to be Wielded", "The Preparation Demanded for the Modern Missionary Career", and "The World-Strategy of the Christian Conquest of North America". The great fields and problems presented by Asia, Africa, China, India, Japan, Latin America, and the Turkish Empire, were presented by a succession of qualified speakers. In sectional conferences there were discussions of the relation of theological students to foreign missions, of the Chinese students (who were represented by a strong and enthusiastic delegation) to China's present awakening, and the relation of laymen to missions; and finally there were presented specific calls for service. These various addresses and discussions form a veritable



and invaluable library of missionary information; but they also reflect present conditions and demands and make an impressive appeal for action to this generation of American students. All the material of these addresses is made easily accessible by a carefully prepared index. No one can review the contents of this important volume without being impressed anew with the debt owed by the Church to the Student Volunteer Movement.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Angel in the Sun.* By JOHN BALCOM SHAW. Fleming H. Revell Co., \$1 net.

This volume contains sixteen brief papers which treat of important themes in a vigorous and attractive way. The titles given them are striking—Sowing or Storing One's Life, The Parallelogram of Love, The Evil Eye, The Questions of Jesus, The Exclamations of Jesus, Straightening the Curves, Entering the Cloud—and the interest excited by the titles is sustained throughout. The book is an excellent example of the exposition and application of Scripture truth. And on every page the note of faith and hope and courage sounds full and clear.

A few inconsistencies and misapprehensions may be noted. On page 22 Paul is called the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, while on page 71 it is correctly observed that the author is unknown. It is hardly in accord with history to speak of John's "genius of leadership" (p. 52). *Dost* is used for *does* (p. 86). On page 113 an untenable distinction is drawn between *believe in* and *believe on*. The sayings of Jesus, it is said, make a volume of three hundred and seventy-one closely printed pages (p. 118). In view of the fact that the whole of the four Gospels cover only one hundred six and a half pages in minion type, it would be interesting to know from what sources these *sayings* are drawn. Upon what authority is it affirmed that "Jesus is soon coming back to our earth"? page 124. He is always here, and if his return in glory is meant Scripture gives us no warrant to fix the time, which is known to the Father only. Ps. 17:15 is wrongly interpreted (p. 173). The thought is, "I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with beholding thy form" (R. V.).

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*My Daily Meditation for the Circling Year.* By JOHN HENRY JOWETT. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25 net.

The book contains a page for every day in the year, in which some passage of Scripture is interpreted and applied. It has all the qualities which we are accustomed to find in Dr. Jowett's writings. Rich in thought, chaste in style, full of the spirit of the Gospel, it provides a choice manual of devotion. The short sentences are packed with truth and charged with emotion. As a striking example may be named *The Three Gardens*, page 53.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The Open Door.* By HUGH BLACK. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1 net.

The purpose of the book is stated in the opening sentence, "to suggest a certain attitude towards the world and life." Man is endowed with immeasurable capacities, and placed in an infinite universe. The titles of the several chapters suggest the course of thought: *The Open Door, The Laws of the Open Door, The Shut Door, The Doorways of Tradition, The Magic Door, The Lure of the Open Door, The Door of Opportunity, The Adventure of the Open Door, The Last Open Door.* The book should excite and encourage its readers to seek the larger and richer life that is opened to men through Christ.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The Seer's House.* By REV. JAMES RUTHERFORD, B.D. T. & T. Clark. 1914.

This is the latest volume in the series entitled *The Scholar as Preacher*. It is interesting and suggestive. Rare skill is shown in drawing out the meaning of the text, and in applying it to present needs. The titles are often striking, and the mode of treatment is textual rather than topical. The sermon on Christ's Word to Simon may be noted as an example of effective analysis. On page 166 Hood's lines: "to know I'm further off from heaven than when I was a boy," are apparently ascribed to Wordsworth.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The Illustrative Teachings of Jesus.* By REV. GEORGE H. YOUNG, M.A. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.00 net.

This book undertakes "to present for popular use the central truths of Christ's important illustrations." An introductory chapter treats of the salient features of Jesus' teaching, and his illustrations are then classified under two main heads, those drawn from human society and those drawn from nature. It cannot be said that much originality is shown, but the spirit of the Gospel is manifest. Now and then we meet with statements that should not go unchallenged. To say that Christ "did not lay down forbidden or permissible rules of conduct or of worship" (p. 10) is to contradict much of his teaching. That he taught ordinarily rather by principles than by precepts is true, but at times he did lay down rules as sharp and positive as those given by any lawgiver. The representation given of the state of society in the time of Jesus is curiously confused and inconsistent. We are told on page 77 that "it was far from being bad . . . in some of the distant provinces, and especially in Palestine there was a strong deep undercurrent of social justice." Yet on page 71 we read, "In Jesus' time, Jewish society was parading a formal religiosity without, and seething with wickedness within." On page 118, the "practical effect" of the Jewish religion "on society was cruel in the extreme. The first thing necessary was to reform the sources and wellsprings



of society." On page 128, "To secure justice in the courts of Palestine was wellnigh impossible." On page 158, "A spirit of lawlessness was everywhere evident, and life and property were insecure". Palestine is not three hundred miles long (p. 117). Familiar lines of Byron are incorrectly quoted on page 221. Awkwardly worded sentences occur. "The Parable of the Draw-net cannot be dogmatically interpreted other than the lesson Jesus himself states" (p. 26). And what is meant by *syncopated sin* (p. 223)?

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Jesus and His Parables.* By GEORGE MURRAY, B.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1914.

Mr. Murray has treated some of the parables in Hastings' Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels. In this volume they are grouped under five heads:—I. Grace in the Individual Life. II. Pharisaism the Foe. III. Fellowship with God the Ideal. IV. The Course of the Kingdom. V. Discipline and Judgment. The classification is not particularly helpful, nor is it consistently carried out. There seems to be no reason, for example, why The Unmerciful Servant should not find a place under Discipline and Judgment, instead of under Grace in the Individual Life. Nor why the Prodigal Son should be included under Pharisaism the Foe. Certainly the elder brother is not the central figure of the story. In the course of the interpretation the principle is maintained that the parables "are older than the setting in which they are found", that "The prefatory remarks and the expository ending are of less authority than the stories themselves" (pp. 8, 9). "Thus the interpretative versions of the Sower, and of the Tares, are held to be of later date" (p. 10). But when it is added that this "does not necessarily imply that Jesus never spoke in private to his followers about the meaning of his tales", the question naturally arises, Why then should we not accept the interpretation of the parable which comes to us with precisely the same historical witness as the parable itself?

These are various assertions to which exception may be taken. On page 19 it is said, "To master truly Groups IV and V, let it be added, we must keep in view that the 'Kingdom of God' was not an entity apart from the state; rather it was its higher reading, a subjective sovereignty." Was that the conception that Jesus entertained of the Kingdom? The suggestion is several times repeated that additions were made to the parables by speakers at the weekly meetings, "improving prosaically upon the moral" (p. 89 note.) Certainly it is a violent assumption that the parable of the Wedding Garment must have taken its present form after the destruction of Jerusalem because the King is represented as sending his armies to destroy the murderers and burn their city.

It must be said on the whole that the book has little of interest or value to contribute to our study of the parables.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Elements of Preaching.* By ARTHUR S. HOYT. MacMillan Company. 1914. \$1.50 net.

*The Romance of Preaching.* By CHARLES SILVESTER HORNE. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25 net.

Different as these books are in style and method, they are built upon the same truth, that it is the man behind the message that gives it power. The Holy Spirit may use the most weak and imperfect instruments, but it is reasonable and Scriptural to believe that the better the instrument the more fruitful will the service ordinarily be. The Spirit seeks trained and consecrated men through whom He may accomplish His purpose of grace.

The volume of Professor Hoyt is the third that he has prepared upon the same general theme. First came "The Work of Preaching", then "The Preacher". This book, he thinks, "will seem a nearer approach to the secret of effective preaching" (p. vii). Many words are spoken to which not young ministers alone but also those who have been long in the work may well give heed. Dr. Hoyt has drawn upon his own large and rich experience, and his counsels are just and wise.

The other volume, one of the series of the Yale Lectures on Preaching, comes to us as "The Last Message of a Leader of Men". A melancholy interest attaches to it from the sudden death of the author only three days after the course was finished. The place he held in England as preacher, patriot, author, statesman, reformer, was large, but he filled it nobly. The lectures express his own eager, energetic, inspiring personality. They deal rather with preachers than with preaching, rather with the man than with the message, as the titles of the several chapters indicate—"The Servant of the Spirit. The First of the Prophets. The Apostolic Age. The Royalty of the Pulpit: Athanasius and Chrysostom. The Rulers of the Peoples: Savonarola, Calvin and John Knox. The Founders of Freedom: John Robinson and the Pilgrim Fathers. The Passion of Evangelism: Wesley and Whitefield. The Romance of Preaching.

The book belongs to the literature of inspiration. The style is chaste and strong, and the martial note rings out on every page. The purpose is not to teach men how to preach, but rather to kindle the desire and the ambition to preach with power. It is the word of a man who is thoroughly in earnest because he is profoundly convinced of the truth of his message and the greatness of his calling. Some striking passages occur. "The Watchword of the past century was Freedom. . . . The watchword of our new century is Justice" (p. 286). Wise words are spoken upon the place of evangelism in the work of the pastor (pp. 227, 262). "I am one of those who believe that the churches have never been so rich in scholarship, and so competent in criticism. But I am not sure that any human being has been inspired to attempt the heights of love and life because he has been thrilled with the realization of the composite character of the Book of Genesis."

Princeton

J. RITCHIE SMITH.



*Egypt to Canaan, or Lectures on the Spiritual Meanings of the Exodus.*

By A. H. TUTTLE. New York: Eaton and Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham. No date. Pp. 286. \$1.00 net.

In sixteen chapters Dr. Tuttle, the scholarly and eloquent pastor of the Methodist Church at Summit, N. J., traces the progress of the people of Israel from their condition in Egypt to their settlement in Canaan. As the sub-title indicates, the purpose is not so much historical as homiletical, though his way of effecting this purpose is by no means through formal homilies, but through rapid sketches, in which a hint suggests as much as in most writings of this sort suffices for a whole sermon. The effect of this style is that of rapid movement and wealth of material. In fact this author is a very poor illustration of that parsimonious dealing out of the minister's weekly dole, which is recommended in some quarters and practised in more, as the only safe course for the preacher who does not wish to run dry. It is safe to say that a preacher of this type could run his mill for a year with the water that Dr. Tuttle here lavishes with the bounty of Nature, where what seems waste is in fact the generosity of limitless resource. In the spirit of Paul in 1 Cor. x. 11, the writer shows the ways in which the historical and biographical data of Exodus may be viewed as "ensamples", and the record of them as an "admonition" of lasting value for the Church. For example, in the first chapter, Egypt is painted for us as the type of "this present evil world", under the five heads of (1) its teeming industry, (2) its magnificence of art, (3) its intellectual culture, (4) its stimulating pleasure, and (5) its magnificence of religion. Then in a few strokes the effect of all this life of the world upon the spiritual man is depicted,—its enslaving power, from which a heaven-wrought deliverance is needed.

The little volume is to be commended most highly; it deserves a sale commensurate with the usefulness it is sure to develop for its readers.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

*Twice Born Men.* A Clinic in Regeneration, A Foot Note in Narrative to Professor William James's "The Varieties of Religious Experience. By HAROLD BEGGIE, Author of "The Vigil", "Tables of Stone", etc. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo, pp. 280.

We are glad to welcome this neat fifty cent edition of what is spoken of as "the most discussed book of the generation" and of what has proved to be one of the most useful publications of our day.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## GENERAL LITERATURE

*The Later Version of the Wycliffite Epistle to the Romans, compared with the Latin Original: a Study of Wycliffite English.* By EMMA CURTIS TUCKER. Yale Studies in English, xlix. New York: Holt and Company. 1914. Pp. xxxvi, 177. \$1.50.

The primary intention and significance of this book is linguistic. But any study of the single word in whatever version of the English Bible must be of concern to those who are interested in the history of literature and style, and in the growth of religious thought and faith among English-speaking people. It is the author's purpose "to make a small beginning in the study of the Wycliffite versions, with a view to discovering the resources and capacities of the English language in the last quarter of the Fourteenth Century." No other texts could be so useful to the study of "resources and capacities" as Biblical English. It is, like all language pertaining to religion, conservative, carefully weighed, and elevated; and it represents in translation an original which defines it by various possible lines of comparison. For the purposes of this first specimen of such study the Epistle to the Romans is chosen "on the ground that its philosophy and logic make larger demands upon the translator" than passages of simple narrative, and it is "less entangling" than the highly figurative Apocalypse.

Miss Tucker presents her comparison in a variety of ways. She prints in parallel the later (Purvey) version of Wyclif ("since it is more truly representative of the English language of its day" than the earlier version), the Vulgate, and, for chapters vi to viii and xii to xiv, a contemporary fragment called, from its editor, the Paues version. Some seventy pages are filled with notes of detailed comparison of single words and expressions with other versions in Old, Middle, and Modern English, but chiefly with the earlier Wyclif version and the Authorized Version. The most interesting part of the work is a pair of indexes of the important words, the one Latin-English, the other English-Latin. In another section of introductory notes the author, by the help of the *Oxford Dictionary* and various concordances, comments interestingly, if somewhat obviously, upon the history of various words and expressions in Wyclif. It is not exact to speak of 'ghost' in the sense of 'spirit' becoming practically obsolete in the fifteenth century." I note some three undeniable instances in Shakespeare and nine in Spenser. We are also told that 'ghostly' in the sense of 'spiritual' is even less common." Shakespeare, however, used it seven times in this sense, and Spenser twice. By which it appears that the quoted statements should at least be qualified.

In Rom. i. 28 we read: "Tradidit illos Deus in reprobum [*ἁδόκιμον*] sensum" (Vulg.); "God bitook hem into a reprevable wit" (Wycl.); "God gave them over to a reprobate mind" (Auth. Vers.). Miss Tucker says; that the "Vulgate here lost the precision



of the Greek . . . the idea of 'failing to stand a test' being omitted". *Reprobus*, however, was used of coins, meaning "false, spurious", thus rendering the Greek about as accurately as a single word could. Cf. Jer. vi. 30: "Argentum reprobum vocate eos, quia Dominus projecit illos"; and Auth. Vers.: "reprobate silver, shall *men* call them, because the Lord hath rejected them". Again, the later English word *reprobate*, says the author, "is used almost entirely in senses derived from Biblical passages." This is to overlook the weight of theological meaning with which it has become charged in discussion of the doctrine of election in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, indeed with especial reference to this very passage.

But these details are aside from the author's real task of comparison, which, to all appearance, has been completely and accurately performed.

*Princeton University.*

CHARLES G. OSGOOD.

*Trees and Men.* By WILLIAM VALENTINE KELLEY. New York: Eaton and Mains.

This is an essay in the field of the "obscure and fascinating mystery" of the relation between "tree" and "man", which though it evades analysis, is, nevertheless, not "a fiction of the fancy". The effort is sufficiently sustained by an appeal to artists and poets. The effort to reach the sublime by way of appreciation of the beautiful is not achieved and though largely successful we do not find here the last word on the subject. Our author is sometimes more poetic than the quotations which he makes from the poets. There is much fine phrasing; but it is sometimes overdone, as evidenced by the apparent effort.

The book is delightfully entertaining but does not sufficiently intellectualize. We have a right to expect some attempt at the analysis of the sublime, but find none. The truth is there, but it remains behind the veil, as in the beginning. The most serious criticism to be made is that it is written too largely out of second hand experiences, and shows too plainly the patch-work process. But withal it is an altogether worthy effort and the author is to be congratulated. Furthermore, it serves splendidly as a guide to the literature bearing on the subject.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. M. CANTRALL.

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## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, January: RALPH B. PERRY, Religious Values; J. M. POWIS SMITH, Religion and War in Israel; GEORGE CROSS, Modern Trend in Soteriology; CLYDE W. VOTAW,

Gospels and Contemporary Biographies; W. C. A. WALLAR, A Preacher's Interest in Nietzsche; SHIRLEY J. CASE, Religion of Lucretius.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oberlin, January: SAMUEL G. WILSON, Bahaism an Anti-christian System; LEWIS M. MILLER, Why Did St. Paul Write Greek?; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, The Two Genealogies of Jesus; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Germany and the Bible; JAMES LINDSAY, Critical Estimate of Nietzsche's Philosophy; HAROLD M. WIENER, Historical Criticism of the Pentateuch, II; ALFRED M. HAGGARD, A Difficult Messianic Prophecy.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, January: FR. VON HÜGEL, Christianity in Face of War: Its Strength and Difficulty; A. C. HEADLAM, The Ezra Apocalypse; Confirmation and Communion: The Legal Question; ARCHIBALD J. ALLEN, Moral Problems of the War; ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, Women and the War; H. KELLY, Eschatological Interpretations and War.

*Constructive Quarterly*, New York, March: EDWARD S. TALBOT, Topic of Unity; G. C. BINYON, The Gospel and the Modern Situation; ERICH SCHÄDER, Theocentric Theology: in Peace and in War; W. B. SELBIE, The Churches, the War and the Future; I. I. SOKOLOFF, Byzantium the Preserver of Orthodoxy; S. MICHELET, Present Theological Crisis in the Church of Norway; FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, Ecclesiastical Honesty; CARL STANGE, Natural Law and Belief in Miracle; MAX MEINERTZ, The Fact of the Resurrection; MGR. BATIFFOL, The Catholic Church and War; HENRY T. HODGKIN, The Church and War; C. A. DINSMORE, Newman and Bright.

*East & West*, London, January: BISHOP MONTGOMERY, The War and Christian Missions; H. L. CLARKE, The War, The Empire, and the Missionary Problem; Attitude of Europeans in India towards the Spread of Christianity; PROFESSOR GRISWOLD, Mass Movement of the Punjab; DR. GILL, Strategic Value of Mass Movements in India; T. I. TAMBYAH, The Gate Beautiful; BISHOP NELIGAN, Samuel Marsden—a centenary Article; F. F. MONK, Evangelistic Work in Indian Mission Colleges; C. A. H. GREEN, Salvation of Buddha and Mohammed; M. A. BULLARD, Christian and Buddhist Ideals; E. H. WHITLEY, The Munda Parha System.

*Expositor*, London, January: D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Healing on the Sabbath Day; JAMES MOFFATT, Prophets and Kings; RENDEL HARRIS, Once more the Cretans; EMERY BARNES, The Psalter as an Aid to Worship in the Twentieth Century; W. A. CURTIS, Christianity and the Life of the Nation; J. G. JAMES, Was Jesus Really Tempted? JOHN BAILLIE, Belief as an Element in Religion. *The Same*, February: EMERY BARNES, The Prophet of the God of Love; EUGENE DE FAYE, Gnostic Sketches; A. VAN HOONACKER, Connexion of Death with Sin according to Genesis ii, iii; E. C. SELWYN, St. Luke and the Eclipse; JOHN A. HUTTON, Julian the Apostate: A Parallel; WILLIAM WATSON, The New Heaven and the New Earth; ALEXANDER SOUTER, Pelagius' Doctrine in Relation to his Early Life.



*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, January: H. R. MACKINTOSH, The Name of Jesus; WILLIAM M. RAMSAY, The Old Testament in the Roman Phrygia. *The Same*, February: A. E. GARVIE, In Praise of Faith; J. A. SELBIE, The new Edition of Davidson's 'Grammar'; J. AGAR BEET, Another Solution of Revelation xx-xxii; MARGARET D. GIBSON, Arabic Christian Literature.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, January: JAMES L. BARTON, The Modern Missionary; J. P. JONES, Protestant Missionary Propaganda in India; HOWARD N. BROWN, Immortality; AURELIO PALMIERI, The Russian Doukhobors and Their Religious Teachings; JOHN P. PETERS, Excavations in Persia; BENJAMIN W. BACON, After Six Days: A New Clue for Gospel Critics.

*Hibbert Journal*, Boston, January: ABBE NOËL, The Soul of Belgium; PROFESSOR VINOGRADOFF, The Slavophile Creed; HEADMASTER OF ETON, What Next?; Narrative of a Professor in Louvain; PROFESSOR SULLY, Göttingen in the Sixties; PROFESSOR STRONG, The Jews through Roman Spectacles; PROFESSOR MOFFATT, Meredith and his Fighting Men; EDWARD WILLMORE, "Why we are Fighting." A Reply; F. S. MARVIN, Unity of Civilization; L. T. MORE, Scientific Claims of Eugenics; D. NOEL PATON, A Physiologist's View of Life and Mind; GEORGE HAW, Religious Revival in the Labour Movement; D. A. WILSON, Germans, Tartars, and a Chinese Patriot.

*Hindustan Review*, Allahabad, January: RAMDAS KHAN, Can Germany be a World Power?; Some Effects of Recent Currency Legislation in India; E. J. DILLON, "Just for a Scrap of Paper"; N. GUPTA, The Message of Hinduism; E. M. WHITE, Bergson an Education.

*International Journal of Ethics*, Concord, January: BERTRAND RUSSELL, Ethics of War; ARTHUR PONSONBY, International Morality; H. A. OVERSTREET, The Changing Conception of Property; ALBERT KOCOUREK, Law and Other Sciences; J. H. TUFTS, Why Should Law and Philosophy Get Together; JOHN E. BOODIN, Social Immortality; JOSEPH D. MILLER, Difficulties of Democracy; W. M. SALTER, Nietzsche's Moral Aim.

*Interpreter*, London, January: J. W. DIGGLE, Biblical Criticism; EVELYN UNDERHILL, The Mystic and the Corporate Life; E. G. KING, Psalm cxxx; L. W. GRENSTED, Immortality in the Old Testament; T. F. ROYDS, Prayer and Spiritual Law; J. E. SYMES, The Second Epistle of Peter: A Plea for Reconsideration; GEORGE SMITH, Value of Familiarity with the Ipsissima Verba of the Bible as a Method of Interpretation; A. C. BOUQUET, Why is the Book of Enoch so Important?; ARTHUR DAKIN, Influence of Bible on St. Francis of Assisi; The Kingdom of God and War.

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin, January: MGR. O'RIORDAN, The Legacy of Christ; HUGH POPE, Where are we in Pentateuchal Criticism?; DAVID BARRY, Special Knowledge and the Just Price; J. MACRORY, "The Son of Man."

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, January: CHARLES SINGER, Allegorical Representation of the Synagogue in a Twelfth Century MS. of Hildegard of Bingen; MAYER SULZBERGER, Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide, ii-iii; B. HALPER, A Volume of the Book of Precepts by Hefes B. Yaşliaḥ; ISRAEL DAVIDSON, Some Remarks on the Poems ascribed to Joseph Ben Abraham Hakohen.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, January: A SPAGNOLO AND C. H. TURNER, An Ancient Homiliary; H. ST. J. THACKERAY, Song of Hannah and Other Lessons and Psalms for the Jewish New Year's Day; F. J. BADCOCK, Council of Constantinople and the Nicene Creed; A. C. CLARK, Primitive Text of the Gospels and Acts, a rejoinder; B. T. D. SMITH, Apollos and the Twelve Disciples at Ephesus; H. G. EVELYN-WHITE, The Second Oxyrhynchus Saying; J. MEARNS, The Anthologia Graeca Carminum Christianorum.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, January: W. M. CROOK, The War: Its Origin and Causes; J. W. LIGHTLEY, The Recently-Discovered Zadokite Fragments; J. HOPE MOULTON, Christianity and Defensive War; G. A. JOHNSTON, Renaissance of Scholasticism; E. E. KELLETT, John Dryden: His Poetry and His Prose; DORA M. JONES, Nietzsche, Germany, and the War; W. ARTHUR TATCHELL, The Medical College Movement in China; SAINT NIHAL SINGH, India's Part in the War.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, January: E. T. HORN, The Christian and Society; H. OFFERMANN, Canon of New Testament; T. E. SCHMAUK, Greek Mysteries and the New Testament; F. W. STELHORN, Pauline Conception of the Righteousness of God; B. B. WARFIELD, Are they Few that be Saved?; P. W. H. FREDERICK, Kingdom of God according to St. Paul; A. G. VOIGT, Christology from the Johannine Point of View; H. D. BAUSLIN, Excesses of the Puritans; J. A. SINGMASTER, Reconciliation of God; E. F. KRAUSS, Efficiency in Theological Training; J. FRY, The Preachers of the Old Testament and their Preaching; C. E. LINDBERG, Leadership of the Educated and the Good; C. M. JACOBS, Genesis of Luther's Doctrine of the Church.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, January: J. A. SINGMASTER, The European War; HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, Present Status of Old Testament Criticism; S. ERNEST SMITH, Religion and Ethics in the Sermon; D. FRANK GARLAND, Vital Needs of the Age; STANLEY BILLHEIMER, Contribution of the Lutheran Church to the Present Age; T. C. LONGAKER, Call and Training of Religious Workers; L. W. RUPP, Staging the English Miracle Play; H. D. HOOVER, College Training for Missions.

*Methodist Review*, New York, March-April: JAMES R. DAY, Restore our Episcopacy; R. J. COOKE, Some Thoughts on the Present Crisis in Europe; S. P. CADMAN, Council of Constance; J. M. WALDEN, Thomas A. Morris—Last of the Pioneer Bishops; CHARLES G. SHAW, Dogmatic Character of German Culture; C. B. DALTON, Ethical Import



of the Incarnation; C. F. REISNER, Church Members from the Sunday School; F. O. BECK, The Church in Europe at the Opening of the War; H. E. WING, Hear Ye the Lord's Controversy; J. R. T. LATHROP, Paul the Mystic.

*Methodist Review Quarterly*, Nashville, January: GROSS ALEXANDER, The War: A Time of Reckoning and of Readjustment; WILLIAM A. BROWN, God in History: from the Point of View of the Present War; BISHOP E. E. HOSS, Bishop William McKendree; WILLIAM BRADFIELD, Local Preachers in the British Wesleyan Church; P. T. FORSYTH, Regeneration, Creation, and Miracle, II; E. Y. MULLINS, Germany of To-Day; LI TIEN LU, The Confucianistic Reaction in China; A. T. ROBERTSON, The Value of the Greek Testament to the Minister; JOHN R. MOTT, Consecration; MABEL HEAD, Enfranchisement of Women; THOMAS CARTER, Unwritten Sayings of Our Lord; ROY L. SMITH, Loyola, The Jesuits, and the Counter-Reformation.

*Monist*, Chicago, January: RICHARD GARBE, St. Thomas in India; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Sensation and Imagination; K. C. ANDERSON, Orthodox and Liberal Christianity, A Via Media; THORNDIKE, Some Medieval Conceptions of Magic.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, January: R. LEIGHTON GERHART, The Cross; RICHARD C. SCHIEDT, Germany and the Formative Forces of the Great War; CHARLES E. MEYERS, Rationalistic Element in American Literature Previous to 1860; FREDERICK A. RUPLEY, Modern Life and Pastoral Work; LEONARD L. LEH, Comparative Study of Ancient and Medieval Missions; RAY H. DOTTERER, A Review of "The Problem of Christianity"; HENRY GEKELE, Can We Know God?; THEODORE F. HERMAN, The Church and the Social Order.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, January: JOHN CLIFFORD, The European War as a Conflict of Ideas; E. Y. MULLINS, Nietzsche and his Doctrine; GIOVANNI LUZZI, An Estimate of the Life and Work of Pius X; EDWARD B. POLLARD, What Shall we Think of Creeds?; B. H. DEMENT, Principles and Methods of the Master Teacher; GEO. B. EAGER, The Anti-Alcohol Movement and the European War; H. L. WINBURN, Apostolic Ideal of Christian Unity and Union; B. F. RILEY, Humanity and Materialism; CHARLES H. NASH, The Holy Spirit Testifies with the Christian's Spirit that he is a Child of God.

*Union Seminary Review*, Richmond, January: A. F. SCHAUFFLER, The Teacher's Eleven Helpers; J. F. CANNON, The Faith Once for all Delivered to the Saints; J. B. GREEN, The Value of the Church to the Community; A. A. LITTLE, The Country Church; E. D. BROWN, the Country Pastor; WILLIS THOMPSON, Church Work with Country Organizations; WARREN H. STUART, A Caesarea-Philippi in China.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, January: NORMAN ANGELL, America and the European War; ARTHUR T. HADLEY, The Political Teachings of Treitschke; P. VINOGRADOFF, The Russian Problem; THOMAS R. LOUNSBURY, Southey as Poet and Historian; KENNETH RAND, Credo; FLORENCE V. KEYS, Academic Superstition and Democracy.

*Bilychnis*, Roma, Dicembre: L. PASCHETTO, Confessioni. I; ROMOLO MURRI, La religione nell' insegnamento pubblico in Italia; PAOLO ORANO, Neutralità Filosofica; MARIO ROSSI, L'opera di Giovanni Weiss; SALVATORE MINOCCHI, I miti babilonesi e le origini della gnosi; GIOSUE SALATIello, L'umanesimo di Caterina da Siena; NICOLÒ FANCELLO, Guardando la morte; SILVIO PONS, Il panislamismo e il panturchismo nell' attuale momento politico. *The Same*, Gennaio: MARIO FALCHI, Confessioni, II; GIOVANNI PIOLI, Riccardo Cobden, l'Italia e Pio IX; G. E. MEILLE, Un vescovo socialista-F. S. Spalding; ANTONINO DE STEFANO, Saggio sull' eresia medievale nei secoli XX e XIII-II contenuto sociale delle eresie popolari; ARTURO PASCAL, Antonio Carracciolo, vescovo di Troyes.

*La Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: ALBERTO COLUNGA, La profecía de Jeremias y los años de la cautividad; SABINO LOZANO, El discurso sobre el método de la Filosofía católica; RAYMOND MARTIN, La doctrina sobre el pecado original de la "Summa contra gentiles"; J. G. ARINTERO, Cuestiones místicas.

*Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Heusden, Januari: S. GREYDANUS, 'n Betere Methode?; A. G. HONIG, Eenige verschijnselen in de tegenwoordige Islamietische wereld en hunne beteekenis voor de missie. *The Same*, Februari: RIDDERBOS, Maatschappelijke toestanden onder Israel in de volheid des tijds; G. CH. AALDERS, Nog iets over de Silo-profeetie; Nieuwere homiletische Literatuur. *The Same*, Maart. D. J. VAN KATWIJK, De Verdelgingsoorlogen der Israelieten tegen de Kanaänieten; J. G. UBBINK, Waarneming, Autoriteit, Heilige Schrift.

*Lehre und Wehre*, St. Louis, Januar: Das Bekenntnis Hiobs; Pius X. *The Same*, Februar: Das antike Weltbild und die moderne Apologetik; Das Bekenntnis Hiobs.

*Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Leiden, 48e Jaargang, afl. vi: F. M. TH. BÖHL, Die Juden im Urteil der griechischen und römischen Schriftsteller, II; JAN TEN HOVE, Animisme; D. PLOOY, Varia; H. WINDISCH, Der Untergang Jerusalems (Anno 70) im Urtheil der Christen und Juden.

*Welt des Islams*, Berlin, Dezember: ARTUR SCHEFFLER, Die Dardanellenfrage; F. SCHIFF, Zur Assanierung Jerusalems; DIEDRICH WESTERMANN, Die Verbreitung des Islams in Togo und Kamerun.

*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, Innsbruck, xxxix, 1: KARL SIX, P. Denis Mesland, ein junger Freund Descartes' aus dem Jesuitorden; ALBERT SCHMITT, Probabilismus und supplierte Jurisdiktion; AUGUSTIN ARNDT, Die Sekten der russischen Kirche, III; URBAN HOLZMEISTER, Unbeachtete patristische Agrapha, II.



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# The Princeton Theological Review

JULY, 1915

## HISTORY AND FAITH\*

The student of the New Testament should be primarily an historian. The centre and core of all the Bible is history. Everything else that the Bible contains is fitted into an historical framework and leads up to an historical climax. The Bible is primarily a record of events.

That assertion will not pass unchallenged. The modern Church is impatient of history. History, we are told, is a dead thing. Let us forget the Amalekites, and fight the enemies that are at our doors. The true essence of the Bible is to be found in eternal ideas; history is merely the form in which those ideas are expressed. It makes no difference whether the history is real or fictitious; in either case, the ideas are the same. It makes no difference whether Abraham was an historical personage or a myth; in either case his life is an inspiring example of faith. It makes no difference whether Moses was really a mediator between God and Israel; in any case the record of Sinai embodies the idea of a covenant between God and His people. It makes no difference whether Jesus really lived and died and rose again as He is declared to have done in the Gospels; in any case the Gospel picture, be it ideal or be it history, is an encouragement to filial piety. In this way, religion has been made independent, as is thought, of the uncertainties of historical research. The separation of Christianity from history has been a great concern of modern theology. It has been an inspiring attempt. But it has been a failure.

Give up history, and you can retain some things. You

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\* An address delivered May 3, 1915, by John Gresham Machen on the occasion of his inauguration as Assistant Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis in Princeton Theological Seminary.

can retain a belief in God. But philosophical theism has never been a powerful force in the world. You can retain a lofty ethical ideal. But be perfectly clear about one point—you can never retain a gospel. For gospel means "good news", tidings, information about something that has happened. In other words, it means history. A gospel independent of history is simply a contradiction in terms.

We are shut up in this world as in a beleaguered camp. Dismayed by the stern facts of life, we are urged by the modern preacher to have courage. Let us treat God as our Father; let us continue bravely in the battle of life. But alas, the facts are too plain—those facts which are always with us. The fact of suffering! How do you know that God is all love and kindness? Nature is full of horrors. Human suffering may be unpleasant, but it is real, and God must have something to do with it. The fact of death! No matter how satisfying the joys of earth, it cannot be denied at least that they will soon depart, and of what use are joys that last but for a day? A span of life—and then, for all of us, blank, unfathomed mystery! The fact of guilt! What if the condemnation of conscience should be but the foretaste of judgment? What if contact with the infinite should be contact with a dreadful infinity of holiness? What if the inscrutable cause of all things should turn out to be a righteous God? The fact of sin! The thralldom of habit! This strange subjection to a mysterious power of evil that is leading resistlessly into some unknown abyss! To these facts the modern preacher responds—with exhortation. Make the best of the situation, he says, look on the bright side of life. Very eloquent, my friend! But alas, you cannot change the facts. The modern preacher offers reflection. The Bible offers more. The Bible offers news—not reflection on the old, but tidings of something new; not something that can be deduced or something that can be discovered, but something that has happened; not philosophy, but history; not exhortation, but a gospel.



The Bible contains a record of something that has happened, something that puts a new face upon life. What that something is, is told us in Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. It is the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The authority of the Bible should be tested here at the central point. Is the Bible right about Jesus?

The Bible account of Jesus contains mysteries, but the essence of it can be put almost in a word. Jesus of Nazareth was not a product of the world, but a Saviour come from outside the world. His birth was a mystery. His life was a life of perfect purity, of awful righteousness, and of gracious, sovereign power. His death was no mere holy martyrdom, but a sacrifice for the sins of the world. His resurrection was not an aspiration in the hearts of His disciples, but a mighty act of God. He is alive, and present at this hour to help us if we will turn to Him. He is more than one of the sons of men; He is in mysterious union with the eternal God.

That is the Bible account of Jesus. It is opposed today by another account. That account appears in many forms, but the essence of it is simple. Jesus of Nazareth, it maintains, was the fairest flower of humanity. He lived a life of remarkable purity and unselfishness. So deep was His filial piety, so profound His consciousness of a mission, that He came to regard himself, not merely as a prophet, but as the Messiah. By opposing the hypocrisy of the Jews, or by imprudent obtrusion of His lofty claims, He suffered martyrdom. He died on the cross. After His death, His followers were discouraged. But His cause was not lost; the memory of Him was too strong; the disciples simply could not believe that He had perished. Predisposed psychologically in this way, they had visionary experiences; they thought they saw Him. These visions were hallucinations. But they were the means by which the personality of Jesus retained its power; they were the foundation of the Christian Church.

There, in a word, is the issue. Jesus a product of the

world, or a heavenly being come from without? A teacher and example, or a Saviour? The issue is sharp—the Bible against the modern preacher. Here is the real test of Bible authority. If the Bible is right here, at the decisive point, probably it is right elsewhere. If it is wrong here, then its authority is gone. The question must be faced. What shall we think about Jesus of Nazareth?

From the middle of the first century, certain interesting documents have been preserved; they are the epistles of Paul. The genuineness of them—the chief of them at any rate—is not seriously doubted, and they can be dated with approximate accuracy. They form, therefore, a fixed starting-point in controversy. These epistles were written by a remarkable man. Paul cannot be brushed lightly aside. He was certainly, to say the least, one of the most influential men that ever lived. His influence was a mighty building; probably it was not erected on the sand.

In his letters, Paul has revealed the very depths of a tremendous religious experience. That experience was founded, not upon a profound philosophy or daring speculation, but upon a Palestinian Jew who had lived but a few years before. That Jew was Jesus of Nazareth. Paul had a strange view of Jesus; he separated Him sharply from man and placed Him clearly on the side of God. "Not by man, but by Jesus Christ", he says at the beginning of Galatians, and he implies the same thing on every page of his letters. Jesus Christ, according to Paul, was man, but He was also more.

That is a very strange fact. Only through familiarity have we ceased to wonder at it. Look at the thing a moment as though for the first time. A Jew lives in Palestine, and is executed like a common criminal. Almost immediately after His death He is raised to divine dignity by one of His contemporaries—not by a negligible enthusiast either, but by one of the most commanding figures in the history of the world. So the thing presents itself to the modern historian. There is a problem here. However the problem may be solved, it can be ignored by no one.



The man Jesus deified by Paul—that is a very remarkable fact. The late H. J. Holtzmann, who may be regarded as the typical exponent of modern naturalistic criticism of the New Testament, admitted that for the rapid apotheosis of Jesus as it appears in the epistles of Paul he was able to cite no parallel in the religious history of the race.<sup>1</sup>

The raising of Jesus to superhuman dignity was extraordinarily rapid even if it was due to Paul. But it was most emphatically not due to Paul; it can be traced clearly to the original disciples of Jesus. And that too on the basis of the Pauline Epistles alone. The epistles show that with regard to the person of Christ Paul was in agreement with those who had been apostles before him. Even the Judaizers had no dispute with Paul's conception of Jesus as a heavenly being. About other things there was debate; about this point there is not a trace of a conflict. With regard to the supernatural Christ Paul appears everywhere in perfect harmony with all Palestinian Christians. That is a fact of enormous significance. The heavenly Christ of Paul was also the Christ of those who had walked and talked with Jesus of Nazareth. Think of it! Those men had seen Jesus subject to all the petty limitations of human life. Yet suddenly, almost immediately after His shameful death, they became convinced that He had risen from the tomb and that He was a heavenly being. There is an historical problem here—for modern naturalism, we venture to think, an unsolved problem. A man Jesus regarded as a heavenly being, not by later generations who could be deceived by the nimbus of distance and mystery, but actually by His intimate friends! A strange hallucination indeed! And founded upon that hallucination the whole of the modern world!

So much for Paul. A good deal can be learned from him alone—enough to give us pause. But that is not all that we know about Jesus; it is only a beginning. The Gospels enrich our knowledge; they provide an extended picture.

<sup>1</sup> In *Protestantische Monatshefte*, iv(1900), pp. 465 ff., and in *Christliche Welt*, xxiv(1910), column 153.

In their picture of Jesus the Gospels agree with Paul; like Paul, they make of Jesus a supernatural person. Not one of the Gospels, but all of them! The day is past when the divine Christ of John could be confronted with a human Christ of Mark. Historical students of all shades of opinion have now come to see that Mark as well as John (though it is believed in a lesser degree) presents an exalted Christology, Mark as well as John represents Jesus clearly as a supernatural person.

A supernatural person, according to modern historians, never existed. That is the fundamental principle of modern naturalism. The world, it is said, must be explained as an absolutely unbroken development, obeying fixed laws. The supernatural Christ of the Gospels never existed. How then explain the Gospel picture? You might explain it as fiction—the Gospel account of Jesus throughout a myth. That explanation is seriously being proposed to-day. But it is absurd; it will never convince any body of genuine historians. The matter is at any rate not so simple as that. The Gospels present a supernatural person, but they also present a real person—a very real, a very concrete, a very inimitable person. That is not denied by modern liberalism. Indeed it cannot possibly be denied. If the Jesus who spoke the parables, the Jesus who opposed the Pharisees, the Jesus who ate with publicans and sinners, is not a real person, living under real conditions, at a definite point of time, then there is no way of distinguishing history from sham.

On the one hand, then, the Jesus of the Gospels is a supernatural person; on the other hand, He is a real person. But according to modern naturalism, a supernatural person never existed. He is a supernatural person; He is a real person; and yet a supernatural person is never real! A problem here! What is the solution? Why, obviously, says the modern historian—obviously, there are two elements in the Gospels. In the first place, there is genuine historical tradition. That has preserved the real Jesus. In the second place, there is myth. That has added the supernatural attributes. The duty of the historian is to separate



the two—to discover the genuine human traits of the Galilean prophet beneath the gaudy colors which have almost hopelessly defaced His portrait, to disentangle the human Jesus from the tawdry ornamentation which has been hung about Him by naïve and unintelligent admirers.

Separate the natural and the supernatural in the Gospel account of Jesus—that has been the task of modern liberalism. How shall the work be done? We must admit at least that the myth-making process began very early; it has affected even the very earliest literary sources that we know. But let us not be discouraged. Whenever the mythical elaboration began, it may now be reversed. Let us simply go through the Gospels and separate the wheat from the tares. Let us separate the natural from the supernatural, the human from the divine, the believable from the unbelievable. When we have thus picked out the workable elements, let us combine them into some sort of picture of the historical Jesus. Such is the method. The result is what is called “the liberal Jesus”. It has been a splendid effort. I know scarcely any more brilliant chapter in the history of the human spirit than this “quest of the historical Jesus”. The modern world has put its very life and soul into this task. It has been a splendid effort. But it has also been—a failure.

In the first place, there is the initial difficulty of separating the natural from the supernatural in the Gospel narrative. The two are inextricably intertwined. Some of the incidents, you say, are evidently historical; they are so full of local color; they could never have been invented. Yes, but unfortunately the miraculous incidents possess exactly the same qualities. You help yourself, then, by admissions. Jesus, you say, was a faith-healer of remarkable power; many of the cures related in the Gospels are real, though they are not really miraculous. But that does not carry you far. Faith-healing is often a totally inadequate explanation of the cures. And those supposed faith-cures are not a bit more vividly, more concretely, more inimitably re-

lated than the most uncompromising of the miracles. The attempt to separate divine and human in the Gospels leads naturally to a radical scepticism. The wheat is rooted up with the tares. If the supernatural is untrue, then the whole must go, for the supernatural is inseparable from the rest. This tendency is not merely logical; it is not merely what might naturally be; it is actual. Liberal scholars are rejecting more and more of the Gospels; others are denying that there is any certainly historical element at all. Such scepticism is absurd. Of it you need have no fear; it will always be corrected by common sense. The Gospel narrative is too inimitably concrete, too absolutely incapable of invention. If elimination of the supernatural leads logically to elimination of the whole, that is simply a refutation of the whole critical process. The supernatural Jesus is the only Jesus that we know.

In the second place, suppose this first task has been accomplished. It is really impossible, but suppose it has been done. You have reconstructed the historical Jesus—a teacher of righteousness, an inspired prophet, a pure worshipper of God. You clothe Him with all the art of modern research; you throw upon Him the warm, deceptive, calcium-light of modern sentimentality. But all to no purpose! The liberal Jesus remains an impossible figure of the stage. There is a contradiction at the very centre of His being. That contradiction arises from His Messianic consciousness. This simple prophet of yours, this humble child of God, thought that He was a heavenly being who was to come on the clouds of heaven and be the instrument in judging the earth. There is a tremendous contradiction here. A few extremists rid themselves easily of the difficulty; they simply deny that Jesus ever thought He was the Messiah. An heroic measure, which is generally rejected! The Messianic consciousness is rooted far too deep in the sources ever to be removed by a critical process. That Jesus thought He was the Messiah is nearly as certain as that He lived at all. There is a tremendous



problem there. It would be no problem if Jesus were an ordinary fanatic or unbalanced visionary; He might then have deceived Himself as well as others. But as a matter of fact He was no ordinary fanatic, no megalomaniac. On the contrary, His calmness and unselfishness and strength have produced an indelible impression. It was such an one who thought that He was the Son of Man to come on the clouds of heaven. A contradiction! Do not think I am exaggerating. The difficulty is felt by all. After all has been done, after the miraculous has carefully been eliminated, there is still, as a recent liberal writer has said, something puzzling, something almost uncanny, about Jesus.<sup>2</sup> He refuses to be forced into the mould of a harmless teacher. A few men draw the logical conclusion. Jesus, they say, was insane. That is consistent. But it is absurd.

Suppose, however, that all these objections have been overcome. Suppose the critical sifting of the Gospel tradition has been accomplished, suppose the resulting picture of Jesus is comprehensible—even then the work is only half done. How did this human Jesus come to be regarded as a superhuman Jesus by His intimate friends, and how, upon the foundation of this strange belief was there reared the edifice of the Christian Church?

In the early part of the first century, in one of the petty principalities subject to Rome, there lived an interesting man. Until the age of thirty years He led an obscure life in a Galilean family, then began a course of religious and ethical teaching accompanied by a remarkable ministry of healing. At first His preaching was crowned with a measure of success, but soon the crowds deserted Him, and after three or four years, He fell victim in Jerusalem to the jealousy of His countrymen and the cowardice of the Roman governor. His few faithful disciples were utterly disheartened; His shameful death was the end of all their high ambitions. After a few days, however, an astonishing thing happened. It is the most astonishing thing in all

<sup>2</sup> Heitmüller, *Jesus*, 1913, p. 71.

history. Those same disheartened men suddenly displayed a surprising activity. They began preaching, with remarkable success, in Jerusalem, the very scene of their disgrace. In a few years, the religion that they preached burst the bands of Judaism, and planted itself in the great centres of the Graeco-Roman world. At first despised, then persecuted, it overcame all obstacles; in less than three hundred years it became the dominant religion of the Empire; and it has exerted an incalculable influence upon the modern world.

Jesus, Himself, the Founder, had not succeeded in winning any considerable number of permanent adherents; during His lifetime, the genuine disciples were comparatively few. It is after His death that the origin of Christianity as an influential movement is to be placed. Now it seems exceedingly unnatural that Jesus' disciples could thus accomplish what He had failed to accomplish. They were evidently far inferior to Him in spiritual discernment and in courage; they had not displayed the slightest trace of originality; they had been abjectly dependent upon the Master; they had not even succeeded in understanding Him. Furthermore, what little understanding, what little courage they may have had was dissipated by His death. "Smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered." How could such men succeed where their Master had failed? How could they institute the mightiest religious movement in the history of the world?

Of course, you can amuse yourself by suggesting impossible hypotheses. You might suggest, for instance, that after the death of Jesus His disciples sat quietly down and reflected on His teaching. "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." "Love your enemies." These are pretty good principles; they are of permanent value. Are they not as good now, the disciples might have said, as they were when Jesus was alive? "Our Father which art in heaven." Is not that a good way of addressing God? May not God be our Father even though Jesus is now dead?



The disciples might conceivably have come to such conclusions. But certainly nothing could be more unlikely. These men had not even understood the teachings of Jesus when He was alive, not even under the immediate impact of that tremendous personality. How much less would they understand after He had died, and died in a way that indicated hopeless failure! What hope could such men have, at such a time, of influencing the world? Furthermore, the hypothesis has not one jot of evidence in its favor. Christianity never was the continuation of the work of a dead teacher.

It is evident, therefore, that in the short interval between the death of Jesus and the first Christian preaching, something had happened. Something must have happened to explain the transformation of those weak, discouraged men into the spiritual conquerors of the world. Whatever that happening was, it is the greatest event in history. An event is measured by its consequences—and that event has transformed the world.

According to modern naturalism, that event, which caused the founding of the Christian Church, was a vision, an hallucination; according to the New Testament, it was the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. The former hypothesis has been held in a variety of forms; it has been buttressed by all the learning and all the ingenuity of modern scholarship. But all to no purpose! The visionary hypothesis may be demanded by a naturalistic philosophy; to the historian it must ever remain unsatisfactory. History is relentlessly plain. The foundation of the Church is either inexplicable, or else it is to be explained by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. But if the resurrection be accepted, then the lofty claims of Jesus are substantiated; Jesus was then no mere man, but God and man, God come in the flesh.

We have examined the liberal reconstruction of Jesus. It breaks down, we have seen, at least at three points.

It fails, in the first place, in trying to separate divine and

human in the Gospel picture. Such separation is impossible; divine and human are too closely interwoven; reject the divine, and you must reject the human too. To-day the conclusion is being drawn. We must reject it all! Jesus never lived! Are you disturbed by such radicalism? I for my part not a bit. It is to me rather the most hopeful sign of the times. The liberal Jesus never existed—that is all it proves. It proves nothing against the divine Saviour. Jesus was divine, or else we have no certain proof that He ever lived. I am glad to accept the alternative.

In the second place, the liberal Jesus, after he has been reconstructed, despite His limitations is a monstrosity. The Messianic consciousness introduces a contradiction into the very centre of His being; the liberal Jesus is not the sort of man who ever could have thought that He was the Messiah. A humble teacher who thought He was the Judge of all the earth! Such an one would have been insane. To-day men are drawing the conclusion; Jesus is being investigated seriously by the alienists. But do not be alarmed at their diagnosis. The Jesus they are investigating is not the Jesus of the Bible. They are investigating a man who thought He was Messiah and was not Messiah; against one who thought He was Messiah and was Messiah they have obviously nothing to say. Their diagnosis may be accepted; perhaps the liberal Jesus, if He ever existed, was insane. But that is not the Jesus whom we love.

In the third place, the liberal Jesus is insufficient to account for the origin of the Christian Church. The mighty edifice of Christendom was not erected upon a pin-point. Radical thinkers are drawing the conclusion. Christianity, they say, was not founded upon Jesus of Nazareth. It arose in some other way. It was a syncretistic religion; Jesus was the name of a heathen god. Or it was a social movement that arose in Rome about the middle of the first century. These constructions need no refutation; they are absurd. Hence comes their value. Because they are absurd, they reduce liberalism to an absurdity. A mild-



mannered rabbi will not account for the origin of the Church. Liberalism has left a blank at the beginning of Christian history. History abhors a vacuum. These absurd theories are the necessary consequence; they have simply tried to fill the void.

The modern substitute for the Jesus of the Bible has been tried and found wanting. The liberal Jesus—what a world of lofty thinking, what a wealth of noble sentiment was put into His construction! But now there are some indications that He is about to fall. He is beginning to give place to a radical scepticism. Such scepticism is absurd; Jesus lived, if any history is true. Jesus lived, but what Jesus? Not the Jesus of modern naturalism! But the Jesus of the Bible! In the wonders of the Gospel story, in the character of Jesus, in His mysterious self-consciousness, in the very origin of the Christian Church, we discover a problem, which defies the best efforts of the naturalistic historian, which pushes us relentlessly off the safe ground of the phenomenal world toward the intellectual abyss of supernaturalism, which forces us, despite the resistance of the modern mind, to recognize a very act of God, which substitutes for the silent God of philosophy the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, having spoken at sundry times and in divers manners unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son.

The resurrection of Jesus is a fact of history; it is good news; it is an event that has put a new face upon life. But how can the acceptance of an historical fact satisfy the longing of our souls? Must we stake our salvation upon the intricacies of historical research? Is the trained historian the modern priest without whose gracious intervention no one can see God? Surely some more immediate certitude is required.

The objection would be valid if history stood alone. But history does not stand alone; it is confirmed by experience.

An historical conviction of the resurrection of Jesus is

not the end of faith, but only the beginning; if faith stops there, it will probably never stand the fires of criticism. We are told that Jesus rose from the dead; the message is supported by a singular weight of evidence. But it is not just a message remote from us; it concerns not merely the past. If Jesus rose from the dead, as He is declared to have done in the Gospels, then He is still alive, and if He is still alive, then He may still be found. He is present with us to-day to help us if we will but turn to Him. The historical evidence for the resurrection amounted only to probability; probability is the best that history can do. But the probability was at least sufficient for a trial. We accepted the Easter message enough to make trial of it. And making trial of it we found that it is true. Christian experience cannot do without history, but it adds to history that directness, that immediateness, that intimacy of conviction which delivers us from fear. "Now we believe, not because of thy saying: for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world."

The Bible, then, is right at the central point; it is right in its account of Jesus; it has validated its principal claim. Here, however, a curious phenomenon comes into view. Some men are strangely ungrateful. Now that we have Jesus, they say, we can be indifferent to the Bible. We have the present Christ; we care nothing about the dead documents of the past. You have Christ? But how, pray, did you get Him? There is but one answer; you got Him through the Bible. Without the Bible you would never have known so much as whether there be any Christ. Yet now that you have Christ you give the Bible up; you are ready to abandon it to its enemies; you are not interested in the findings of criticism. Apparently, then, you have used the Bible as a ladder to scale the dizzy height of Christian experience, but now that you are safe on top you kick the ladder down. Very natural! But what of the poor souls who are still battling with the flood beneath?



They need the ladder too. But the figure is misleading. The Bible is not a ladder; it is a foundation. It is buttressed, indeed, by experience; if you have the present Christ, then you know that the Bible account is true. But *if* the Bible *were* false, your faith would go. You cannot, therefore, be indifferent to Bible criticism. Let us not deceive ourselves. The Bible is at the foundation of the Church. Undermine that foundation, and the Church will fall. It will fall, and great will be the fall of it.

Two conceptions of Christianity are struggling for the ascendancy to-day; the question that we have been discussing is part of a still larger problem. The Bible against the modern preacher! Is Christianity a means to an end, or an end in itself, an improvement of the world, or the creation of a new world? Is sin a necessary stage in the development of humanity, or a yawning chasm in the very structure of the universe? Is the world's good sufficient to overcome the world's evil, or is this world lost in sin? Is communion with God a help toward the betterment of humanity, or itself the one great ultimate goal of human life? Is God identified with the world, or separated from it by the infinite abyss of sin? Modern culture is here in conflict with the Bible. The Church is in perplexity. She is trying to compromise. She is saying, Peace, peace, when there is no peace. And rapidly she is losing her power. The time has come when she must choose. God grant she may choose aright! God grant she may decide for the Bible! The Bible is despised—to the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Greeks foolishness—but the Bible is right. God is not a name for the totality of things, but an awful, mysterious, holy Person, not a "present God", in the modern sense, not a God who is with us by necessity, and has nothing to offer us but what we have already, but a God who from the heaven of His awful holiness has of His own free grace had pity on our bondage, and sent His Son to deliver us from the present evil world and receive us into the glorious freedom of communion with Himself.

*Princeton.*

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

## THE BOOK OF DANIEL AND THE CANON

In all recent works on the Book of Daniel the charge is made, that the position of the book in the Hebrew Canon points to the conclusion that the book was written at a time much later than that at which the Jewish and Christian churches have always and unanimously, until recently, supposed that it was written. Since the last six chapters are in the first person, and since they are dated from the reigns of Belshazzar, Darius the Mede, and Cyrus, no one can doubt that they claim to be the record of visions which can have been known only to Daniel himself. The first six chapters, though written in the third person, purport to record actual events in the lives of Daniel and his three companions during the reigns of Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar, and Darius the Mede. In ancient times, the claim of Daniel to be historical was contested only by Porphyry, a man who rejected all of the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments. Within the last two centuries, however, it has been frequently asserted, that the first six chapters of Daniel are at best but a series of traditions "cast by the author into a literary form, with a special view to the circumstances of his own time"; and that the visions of the last six chapters are a narration of events already past, put in an apocalyptic form.

Among the specifications in this general charge against the historical character of Daniel, is the one which will now be considered, to wit: That the position of the Book of Daniel in the Hebrew Canon points "more or less decisively to an author later than Daniel himself".

In the discussion of this specific charge, I shall pursue the following method. First, I shall state the charge in the words of those that make it. Secondly, I shall present the admissions and assumptions involved in the charge. Thirdly, I shall cite and discuss the evidence upon which these assumptions rest. And, lastly, I shall give the conclusions which the evidence seems to justify.

## THE CHARGE

The first proof of the late date of Daniel is "the position of the Book in the Jewish Canon, not among the Prophets, but in the miscellaneous collection of writings called the *Hagiographa*, and among the latest of these, in proximity to Esther. Though little definite is known respecting the formation of the Canon, the division known as the Prophets was doubtless formed prior to the *Hagiographa*; and had the Book of Daniel existed at the time, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have ranked as the work of a prophet, and have been included among the former".<sup>1</sup>

In the Hebrew Scriptures "Daniel never occupied a place among the Prophetical Books, but is included in the third collection of sacred writings, called the Kethubim or *Hagiographa*. Of the history of the Jewish Canon very little is known with certainty, but there is every reason to believe that the collection of Prophetical Books, from which lessons were read in the Synagogue, was definitely closed sometime before the *Hagiographa*, of which the greater part had no place in the public services. That the collection of Prophetical Books cannot have been completed till sometime after the Exile, is obvious, and on the supposition that Daniel was then known to the Jews, the exclusion of this book is wholly inexplicable."<sup>2</sup>

"The place of the Book of Daniel among the *Hagiographa* favors also its late composition. If it had been written during the Exile, notwithstanding its apocalyptic character, it naturally would have been placed among the prophets."<sup>3</sup>

"Not until the time of the LXX (which, moreover, has treated the text of Daniel in a very arbitrary fashion) does it find a place, after Ezekiel, as the fourth of the 'great'

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<sup>1</sup> Driver, *Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 497.

<sup>2</sup> A. A. Bevan, *A Short Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> E. L. Curtis in *Hastings Bible Dictionary*.



prophets, and thus it comes to pass that once in the New Testament Daniel is designated as a prophet."<sup>4</sup>

"The position of the book among the Hagiographa instead of among the Prophetical works would seem to indicate that it must have been introduced after the closing of the Prophetical Canon." "The natural explanation regarding the position of the Book of Daniel is that the work could not have been in existence at the time of the completion of the second part of the Canon, as otherwise, the collectors of the Prophetical writings, who in this case did not neglect even the parable of Jonah, would hardly have ignored the record of such a great prophet as Daniel is represented to be."<sup>5</sup>

Among "objective reasons of the utmost weight, which render the view of its non-genuineness necessary", Professor Cornill mentions "the position of the book in the Hebrew Canon, where it is inserted, not among the prophets, but in the second division of the Canon, the so-called Hagiographa. If it were the work of a prophet of the time of Cyrus, no reason would be evident, why there should be withheld from it a designation which was not denied to a Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi—nay, even to a Jonah".<sup>6</sup>

"In the Hebrew Canon, Daniel is not placed among the Prophets, but in the Hagiographa, the latest section of the Canon; although Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, who were later than the time at which Daniel is described as living, are placed among the prophets. Either the Jews did not regard the book as prophetic, or it was considerably later than Malachi, c. 444."<sup>7</sup>

#### ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions involved in the above statements are as follows: 1. It is assumed that the position of a book in the Hebrew Canon determines the time of its writing, or

<sup>4</sup>Kamphausen in *Encyclopedia Biblica*, Vol. i, p. 1011.

<sup>5</sup>Prince, *Commentary on Daniel*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>6</sup>*Introduction to the Old Testament*, pp. 384-6.

<sup>7</sup>Bennett; *A Biblical Introduction*, p. 225.

2. at least that the position of a book in the Hebrew Bible determines the time of its admission into the Canon. 3. It is assumed that the division of the Hebrew Bible called "Prophets" in our Hebrew Bibles was doubtless formed prior to the Hagiographa. 4. It is assumed that had the book of Daniel existed at the time when the division called Prophets was formed, it is reasonable to suppose, that if it had been ranked among the prophetical books, it would have been placed in this division. 5. It is assumed that no reason is evident why there should have been withheld from a Daniel a designation which was not denied to a Haggai, a Zechariah, and a Malachi—nay, even to a Jonah. 6. It is assumed that Daniel never occupied a place among the prophetical books. 7. It is assumed that the collection of prophetical books from which lessons were read in the synagogues, was definitely closed before the Hagiographa. 8. It is assumed that the greater part of the Hagiographa had no place in the public services.

#### ADMISSIONS OF THE CRITICS

Before proceeding to a discussion of these assumptions, special attention should be called to the admissions of the critics on the matter of the evidence bearing on the assumptions; and on the character of the premises that justify these critics in their conclusions. First, as to the evidence, Dr. Driver admits that "little definite is known respecting the formation of the Canon". Mr. Bevan, also, admits that "of the history of the Jewish Canon very little is known". Secondly, as to the character of the premises from which they deduce their conclusions, it will be noted in the above citations, that Dr. Driver says, after having admitted that very little is known respecting the formation of the Canon, that the division known as the Prophets was "doubtless formed prior to the Hagiographa", and that "it is reasonable to suppose that the Book of Daniel would have been included among the former". Professor Cornill says that "no reason is evident why Daniel should not be among the

Prophets". Professor Prince says that the position of the book would seem to indicate, that it was introduced into the Canon after the closing of the Prophetical Canon, and the natural explanation of its position is that it did not exist at the time of the closing of the Prophetical Canon. Mr. Bevan says that there is every reason to believe that the collection of Haphtaroth was made before the closing of the Hagiographa; and that on the supposition that Daniel was known, his exclusion from the Prophetical Canon is inexplicable, or not very easy to reconcile with the theory of the antiquity of the Book.

It will be observed that, while admitting that little is known, the critics indulge in such phrases and words as "doubtless", "reasonable to suppose", "seem to indicate", "every reason to believe", "supposition", "not easy to reconcile", "inexplicable", "natural explanation", and so forth. All of these words and phrases are admissions on the part of the critics that their theory with regard to the book of Daniel is not convincingly supported by the evidence, even themselves being witnesses.

#### EVIDENCE

The evidence bearing upon the divisions, number, order, and use of the books regarded by the Jews and Christians as canonical may, for convenience of treatment, be marshalled under two heads: 1, the evidence relating to the divisions, number and order; and 2, that relating to the use.

##### 1. *Divisions, Number and Order*

1. Ben Sira, the elder, speaks a number of times of the Law,<sup>8</sup> and cites in order Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Job, The Twelve Prophets, and Nehemiah. He cites, also, from Chronicles, and mentions the Psalms of David and the Proverbs of Solomon.<sup>9</sup>

2. The Prologue to the Greek translation of Ben Sira,

<sup>8</sup> References to the Torah are found in 15-1; 32.15, 17, 18, 24; 33.2, 13; 41.4, 8; 42.2; 45.5; 48.3, 6; 49.4; 50.20.

<sup>9</sup> Chapters 44-49.



written about 132 B.C., refers three times to the three-fold division of the Old Testament, as follows: (1) The Law and the Prophets and the other books which follow them. (2). The Law and the Prophets and the other ancestral books. (3). The Law and the Prophecies and the rest of the books.

3. The First Book of Maccabees contains the following speech delivered by Mattathias, the father of the Maccabees, to his sons in the year 169 B.C., just before his decease (ii. 49<sup>b</sup>-61): "Now hath pride and rebuke gotten strength, and the time of destruction, and the wrath of indignation: now therefore, my sons, be ye zealous for the Law and give your lives for the covenant of your fathers. Call to remembrance what acts our fathers did in their time; so shall you receive great honor and an everlasting name. Was not Abraham found faithful in temptation, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness? Joseph in the time of his distress kept the commandment and was made lord of Egypt. Phinehas our father in being zealous and fervent obtained the covenant of an everlasting priesthood. Jesus for fulfilling the word was made a judge in Israel. Caleb for bearing witness before the congregation received the heritage of the land. David for being merciful possessed the throne of an everlasting kingdom. Elias for being zealous and fervent for the Law was taken up into heaven. Ananias, Azarias, and Misael, by believing were saved out of the flame. Daniel for his innocence was delivered from the mouth of lions. And thus consider ye throughout all ages, that none that put their trust in him shall be overcome," etc.

4. The Second Book of Maccabees contains a letter written in 124 B.C., in which the writer speaks (ii. 13) of "the records and commentaries of Nehemiah and how founding a library, he gathered together the books concerning the kings and prophets and those of David and epistles of kings concerning votive offerings." The Syriac version is slightly different and reads thus: "It is related in books

and in memoirs that Nehemiah did thus: that he assembled and arranged in order the books of the kingdoms and of the prophets and of David and the letters of the kings which concern offerings and sacrifices".<sup>10</sup>

5. Philo, who died about A.D. 40, says that the sect of the Therapeutae received "the Law, and the Oracles uttered by the Prophets, and the hymns and the other (writings) by which knowledge and piety are augmented and perfected".<sup>11</sup>

6. In the New Testament the following passages bear upon our subject: (1). In Luke xxiv. 44, the Lord speaks of those things which were written concerning Him "in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms". (2). In Luke xxiv. 27, the author speaks of "Moses and all the Prophets". With this compare "Law and the Prophets" of John i. 45. (3). In Matthew xxiv. 15, mention is made of "Daniel the prophet". With this compare "David the prophet" Mat. xiii. 35, Acts ii. 30; "Isaiah the prophet", Mat. iii. 3, Jonah the prophet", Mat. xii. 39; and "the prophet Joel" Acts ii. 16.

7. Josephus has the following to say of the Canon: "We have not an innumerable multitude of books among us, disagreeing from and contradicting one another, but only twenty-two books, which contain the records of all the past times; which are justly believed to be divine; and of them five belong to Moses, which contain his laws, and the traditions of the origin of mankind till his death. This interval of time was little short of three thousand years; but as to the time from the death of Moses till the reign of Artaxerxes king of Persia, who reigned after Xerxes, the prophets, who were after Moses, wrote down what was done in their times in thirteen books. The remaining four

<sup>10</sup> See Lagarde, *Libri Apocryphi Veteris Testamenti Syriace*, p. 216.

<sup>11</sup> *De Vita contemplativa*, ii. 475. The genuineness of this work has been defended in recent times by F. C. Conybeare, P. Wendland, and L. Massebieau; the last of whom has "shown with great thoroughness that in language and thought alike it is essentially Philonic". See Art. by Professor Bigg in *Ency. Brit.* XXI. 412.

books contain hymns to God, and precepts for the conduct of human life. It is true, our history has been written since Artaxerxes, very particularly, but hath not been esteemed of like authority with the former by our forefathers, because there hath not been an exact succession of prophets since that time; and how firmly we have given credit to those books of our own nation is evident by what we do; for during so many ages as have already passed, no one has been so bold as either to add anything to them or take anything from them".<sup>12</sup>

Of Daniel himself, Josephus says: "He was so happy as to have strange revelations made to him and those as to one of the greatest of the prophets. . . . He retains a remembrance that will never fail, for the several books that he wrote and left behind him are still read by us till this time; and from them we believe that Daniel conversed with God; for he did not only prophesy of future events, as did the other prophets, but he also determined the time of their accomplishment; and while the prophets used to foretell misfortunes, and on that account were disagreeable both to the kings and to the multitude, Daniel was to them a prophet of good things, and this to such a degree, that, by the agreeable nature of his predictions, he procured the good-will of all men; and by the accomplishment of them, he procured the belief of their truth, and the opinion of (a sort of) divinity for himself, among the multitude. He also wrote and left behind him what made manifest the accuracy and undeniable veracity of his predictions. . . . And indeed it so came to pass, that our nation suffered these things under Antiochus Epiphanes, according to Daniel's vision, and what he wrote many years before they came to pass. In the very same manner Daniel also wrote concerning the Roman government, and that our country should be made desolate by them. All these things did this man leave in writing, as God had showed them to him, insomuch as that such as read his prophecies, and see

<sup>12</sup> *Contra Apion*, i. 8.



how they have been fulfilled, would wonder at the honor with which God honored Daniel".<sup>13</sup>

8. In his *Eclogues*, a collection of testimonies to Christ and Christianity made from the Old Testament, Melito, Bishop of Sardis about A.D. 175, gives "a catalogue of the books of the Old Testament which it is necessary to quote". We have two recensions of this catalogue, one in the *Church History* of Eusebius, iv. 26, the other in the Syriac fragments published by Cureton. The Greek of Eusebius reads: "Melito to his brother Onesimus, Greeting: since thou hast often, in thy zeal for the word, expressed a wish to have extracts made from the Law and the Prophets concerning the Saviour, and concerning our entire faith, and hast also desired to have an accurate statement of the ancient books, as regards their number and their order, I have endeavored to perform the task, knowing thy zeal for the faith, and thy desire to gain information in regard to the word, and knowing that thou, in the yearning after God, esteemest these things above all else, struggling to attain eternal salvation. Accordingly, when I went East, and came to the place where these things were preached and done, I learned accurately the books of the Old Testament, and sent them to thee as written below. Their names are as follows: Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, five books; Jesus Nave, Judges, Ruth; of Kings, four books; of Chronicles, two; the Psalms of David, the Proverbs of Solomon, which also is Wisdom, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Job; of Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah; of the twelve prophets, one book; Daniel, Ezekiel, Esdras."

From the Syriac recension I shall give only the names in order, to wit: "Of Moses, five (books), Genesis, and Exodus, and Numbers and that of the Priests, and Deuteronomy; and again that of Joshua son of Nun, and the book of Judges and Ruth; and the book of four Kings; the book of two Chronicles; and the Psalms of David; and of Solomon, the Proverbs, which is Wisdom, and Koheleth,

<sup>13</sup> *Antiquities*, X. xi. 7.

and the Song of Songs; and Job; and of the Prophets, Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the Twelve Prophets together, and Daniel, and Ezekiel and Ezra."

9. In Chapter iv. 21-22 of *The Ascension of Isaiah*, is found the following partial list of Old Testament books: "All these things, behold they are written in the Psalms, in the Parables of David the son of Jesse, and in the Proverbs of Solomon his son, and in the words of Korah and Ethan the Israelite, and in the words of Asaph, and in the rest of the Psalms also which the angel of the Spirit inspired. 22. (Namely), in those which have not the name written, and in the words of my father Amos, and of Hosea the prophet, and of Micah and Joel and Nahum, and Jonah and Obadiah and Habakkuk and Haggai and Zephaniah and Zechariah and Malachi and in the words of Joseph the Just, and in the words of Daniel."<sup>14</sup>

10. In the first chapter of *Fourth Esdras*, the Minor Prophets are enumerated in the following order: Hosea, Amos and Micah, Joel, Obadiah and Jonah, Nahum and Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, which is called also an angel of the Lord".

11. In the Talmud, the following are the most important allusions to the Old Testament Canon.

(1) "The Rabbis have taught the order of succession in the Books of the Prophets runs thus: Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and the Twelve. The order of succession in the Hagiographa is: Ruth, the Book of Psalms, Job and Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, and Lamentations, Daniel and the Book of Esther, Ezra and Chronicles."<sup>15</sup>

(2) "All Sacred Scriptures render the hands unclean. The Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes render the hands

<sup>14</sup> See *The Ascension of Isaiah* by R. H. Charles. If we put these verses in the Testament of Hezekiah, they will have been written according to Charles between A.D. 88 and 100. If they belong to the Redactor, they were written about A.D. 200. See pp. xlv-xlv.

<sup>15</sup> *Baba Bathra* 14b.

unclean." "All the Scriptures are holy."<sup>16</sup> "The Aramaic portions of Ezra and Daniel render the hands unclean." "The Sadducees said: 'we blame you Pharisees because you say Sacred Scriptures render the hands unclean, but the books of Hameram<sup>17</sup> do not render the hands unclean'. . . . They say that the bones of an ass are clean, but the bones of Jochanan the High Priest are unclean." "According to their value is their uncleanness, so that no one may make the bones of his father and mother into spoons." "So are the Sacred Scriptures; according to their value is their uncleanness. The books of Hameram, which are not valued, do not render the hands unclean".<sup>18</sup>

(3) "Rab Yehuda alleges that Shemuel said the book of Esther does not defile the hands. This is tantamount to saying that it was Shemuel's opinion that the book of Esther was not dictated by the Holy Spirit. But Shemuel asserted that the book of Esther was dictated by the Holy Spirit."<sup>19</sup>

(4) "Remember that man with respect; his name is Hananiah the son of Hezekiah. Had it not been for him, the book of Ezekiel would have been suppressed, because its contents were contradictory to the words of the Law."<sup>20</sup>

(5) On the festival of the Year, three texts at least were read from the Law, three from the Psalms, and three from the Prophets.<sup>21</sup>

(6) On the Day of Atonement, selections were read to the High Priest "in Job and in Ezra and in Chronicles. Zechariah, the son of Kebutal said, 'I often read before him in Daniel'. "<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Yadayim*, iii. 5. *Id.* iv. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Perhaps Hameram is Homer.

<sup>18</sup> *Yadayim*, iv. 5.

<sup>19</sup> *Megilla*, fol. 7d. See Hershon, *Treasures of the Talmud*, p. 44.

<sup>20</sup> Hershon, p. 45. *Moed Katan*, 5a. In a note, Hershon adds: "Rashi *in loco* points Ezek. xlv. 31 and xlv. 20 as contradictions to the Law. From the former text it might be inferred that Israelites are allowed to eat that which was prohibited to the priests, and this would be a contradiction to the Law. The second passage contains an innovation of the prophet, for the Law says nothing about such a sacrifice as that on the second day of the month".

<sup>21</sup> See Barclay, *The Talmud*, p. 157.

<sup>22</sup> *Yoma*, i. 6.



(7) "The Chaldee (Aramaic) passages in Ezra and Daniel defile the hands."<sup>23</sup>

(8) "All the Holy Scriptures may be saved from fire on the Sabbath". "This is interpreted as referring to the Hagiographa as well as to the Law and the Prophets."<sup>24</sup>

(9) All the books of the Old Testament are cited as Scripture in one or another of the tractates of the Mishna. The two usual formulas of citation are "It is written", and "It is said", both being used alike for quotations from the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa. For example, (a) "It is written". Deut. xvi. 14, in *Moedkaton*; 1 Kings vi. 20 in *Megillah*; Dan. ii. 46 in *Sanhedrin*, Dan. iii. 12 in *Megillah*. (b). "It is said". Gen. xxiv. 42 in *Sanhedrin*; I Sam. xv. 32, *id.*; Dan. ii. 32, *id.*

(10) Especially to be noted is the citation of all of the so-called disputed books, Proverbs, Chronicles, Jonah, Ezekiel, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, and Esther, with the same formulas as those employed for the Law. E.g., 2 Chron. xxxiii. 13, *Sanhedrin*: Proverbs, iii. 2, 8, 16, 18, iv. 9, 22, *Aboth*; Ezekiel xli. 22, *Aboth*; Jonah iii. 10, *Taanith*; Ecc. i. 15, *Sukkoth*, *Chagiga*; Song of Songs iii. 11, *Taanith*; Esther ii. 22, *Aboth*. A citation from the Song of Songs, iii. 9, 10, is introduced by the phrase "the explanation of the Prophets is", *Sukkoth*, vi.

(11) "Some desired also to withdraw (*ganaz*) the book of Proverbs from use because it contained internal contradictions,<sup>25</sup> but the attempt was abandoned because the wise men declared: 'We have examined more deeply into the book of Ecclesiastes, and have discovered the solution of the difficulty'."<sup>26</sup>

(12) "At first, they withdrew Proverbs, and the Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes from public use, because they

<sup>23</sup> *Yadayim*, iv. 5.

<sup>24</sup> *Shabbath*, xvi.

<sup>25</sup> E.g. xxvi. 4 and 5, "Answer a fool according to his folly", and "Answer not a fool according to his folly".

<sup>26</sup> *Sabbath*, 30 b.

spoke in parables. And so they continued, until the men of the Great Synagogue came and expounded them."<sup>27</sup>

(13) "The wise men desired to hide (*ganaz*) the book of Koheleth, because its language was often self-contradictory."<sup>28</sup>

(14) "Again, it was asserted that Ecclesiastes contradicted other Scriptures. Thus, in *Sabbath* 30a, where it is asserted that the Preacher contradicts the words of the Psalter: "O Solomon, where is thy wisdom? where is thy discernment? Doth it not suffice thee that many of thy words contradict the utterances of David, that thou contradictest even thyself?"<sup>29</sup>

(15) "Moses wrote his own book, as also the chapter of Balaam's prophecy and Parables, and the book of Job. Joshua wrote his own book and the last eight verses of the Pentateuch. Samuel wrote his own book, and also Judges and Ruth. David wrote the book of Psalms through the ten elders Adam, Melchisedek, Abraham, Moses, Herman, Jeduthun, Asaph, and the three sons of Korah. Jeremiah wrote his own book, as also the Kings and the Lamentations. Hezekiah and his company wrote the book of Isaiah, Proverbs, Canticles, and Ecclesiastes. The men of the Great Synagogue wrote the book of Ezekiel, the twelve Minor Prophets, the book of Daniel, and the book of Esther. Ezra wrote his own book and joined on the Chronicles."<sup>30</sup>

(16) Next to the Law, most of the so-called disputed Books were most highly honored in the services of the Temple. Thus, (a) Jonah was the only one of the Prophets of which the whole was read in the public services. On the Sabbaths and Feast days, selections, called Haphtaroth, were read from the other Prophets; but the whole of Jonah

<sup>27</sup> *Aboth di Rabbi Nathan*.

<sup>28</sup> *Sabbath*, 30. E.g., "sorrow is better than laughter" (vii. 3), and "I said of laughter, it is to be praised" (ii. 2).

<sup>29</sup> See Ryle, *The Canon of the O. T.* p. 196.

<sup>30</sup> *Baba Bathra*, 14 b.

was read on the day of Atonement.<sup>81</sup> (b) Twelve Haphtaroth were selected from the Book of Ezekiel, sixteen from Isaiah, nine from Jeremiah, fifteen from the Minor Prophets (one at least from all except Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah and Haggai), three from Joshua, three from Judges, six from Samuel, ten from First Kings, and five from Second Kings. No Prophet, except Isaiah, was more highly honored in this respect than Ezekiel. (c) Aside from the Law and Jonah, only three other books were wholly read in the public services of the Temple. These were all from the Hagiographa, and were: Ecclesiastes, read at the Feast of Tabernacles; the Song of Songs, read at the Feast of the Passover; and Esther, at the Feast of Purim. There is evidence that the book of Esther was thus read as early as the middle of the second century B.C. (d) Parts, at least, of Chronicles were read to the High Priest during his preparation for the functions of the day of Atonement.<sup>82</sup> (e) Although the Book of Proverbs was not read in the public services, it is cited in the Mishna for proof texts more frequently than any other book of the Hagiographa, except the Psalter. E.g., in *Aboth* from sections iii. 14 to vi. 10 inclusive, there are citations of Proverbs iv. 2, xvi. 32, viii. 21, 14, xi. 22, iii. 35, iv. 22, 9, iii. 2, 8, 16, 18, i. 9, xvi. 31, xvii. 6, vi. 22, viii. 22, xvi. 3.

12. The Old Testament Books as given in the principal Greek Manuscripts. (1). They all agree in the number and order of the Pentateuch, to wit: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy. (2). For the rest of the books, the order is as follows: (a). For Codex Vaticanus: Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Kingdoms a-d, Paraleipomenon a-b, Esdras a-b, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Asma (the Song), Job, Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom of Sirach, Esther, Judith, Tobit, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah,

<sup>81</sup> See the conspectus of the Haphtaroth at the end of any good edition of the Hebrew Bible.

<sup>82</sup> See *Kippurim*, i. 6.



Malachi, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Baruch, Lamentations, Epistle of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel. (b). For Codex Alexandrinus: "Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Ruth (together books 7), Kingdoms a-d, Paraleipomenon a-b (together six books); Prophets 16, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Isaiah (the) Prophet, Jeremiah (the) Prophet, Baruch, Lamentations (of Jeremiah), Epistles of Jeremiah, Ezekiel (the) Prophet, Daniel (+ Prophet, 16 in *catalogue*), Esther, Tobit, Judith, Ezras a the Priest, Ezras b the Priest, Maccabees a-d, Psalter, Job, Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, Songs of Songs, Wisdom of Solomon (the Panaretos), Wisdom of Jesus son of Sirach, Psalms of Solomon. (c). For Codex Sinaiticus, so far as known: "Paraleipomenon a-(b), Esdras (a)-b, Esther, Tobit, Judith, Maccabees a-d, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Lamentations of Jeremiah, . . . Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Psalms of David, Proverbs (+ of Solomon in *subscrip.*) Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Wisdom of Jesus son of Sirach, Job. (d). For Codex Basiliano-Venetus: Joshua, Ruth, Judges, Kingdoms a-d, Paraleipomenon a-b, Esdras (a)-b, Esther, . . . Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Wisdom of Jesus son of Sirach, Hosea, Amos, Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Baruch, Lamentations, Ezekiel, Daniel, Tobit, Judith, Maccabees a-d.<sup>33</sup>

13. (1) The Armenian version has the following order: "Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Kings 4, Chronicles 2, Esdras 1 and 2, Nehemiah, Esther, Judith, Tobit, Maccabees 1-3, Psalms, Proverbs, Koheleth, Song of Songs, Wisdom, Job, Isaiah, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Jeremiah, Lamentations, Daniel, Ezekiel." In an Appendix, after the New Testament, it adds Sirakh, IIIrd Ezra, Manasseh, IIIrd

<sup>33</sup> For these lists, see Swete's *Introduction to the O. T. in Greek* and Ryle's *Canon of the O. T.*

Corinthians, John?, and the Prayer of Eithami.<sup>33b</sup> (2). The Ambrosian codex of the Harclensian Syriac contains the following: Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, the Two Wisdoms, the Twelve Prophets, Jeremiah (with Baruch, Lamentations, and the Epistle), Daniel (with Susanna and Bel), Ezekiel, Isaiah. (3). The order in several fragments of the Itala is as follows: (a). In the Fragmenta Wirceburgensia: Hosea, Jonah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Lamentations, Ezekiel, Daniel, Bel. (b). In the Fragmenta Weingartensia: Hosea, Amos, Micah, Joel, Jonah, Ezekiel, Daniel. (c). In the Fragmenta palimpsesta Vaticana: Hosea, Joel, Amos, Jonah, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Zechariah. (d). In the Fragmenta Stutgardiana: Amos, Ezekiel, Daniel.<sup>34</sup>

14. The lists in the Greek fathers are as follows:<sup>35</sup>

(1). Origen: Joshua the son of Nun, Judges, Ruth, Kings a-d, Paraleipomenon a-b, Esdas a-b, Book of Psalms, Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Isaiah, Jeremiah with Lamentations and the Epistle in one, Daniel, Ezekiel, Job, Esther. And beside (*hexo*) these, is the Maccabees.

(2). The list of Athanasius is the same as that of Origen as far as the Song of Songs. After that we have: Job; Prophets,—the Twelve, Isaiah, Jeremiah and with him Baruch, Lamentations, Epistle, Ezekiel, Daniel. There are also other books beside these, not canonized by the fathers, but approved to be read with those now listed: Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom of Sirach, Esther, Judith, Tobias.

(3). The list of Cyril of Jerusalem: The first books, the five of Moses: Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut.; and besides, Joshua the son of Nun (and) the book of Judges with Ruth; and of the remaining historical books, Kingdoms 4, Esdras 2, Esther (twelfth); and there are found five poetical books, Job, the book of Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs (seventeenth book); and in addition five

<sup>33b</sup> See the edition of the Old Armenian Bible published in 1804.

<sup>34</sup> See Swete's *Introduction*, pp. 96, 97.

<sup>35</sup> For Melito, see above under 7.

prophetical (books), one of Isaiah, one of Jeremiah with Baruch and Lamentations and the Epistle, Ezekiel, Daniel (twenty-second book).

(4). There are three lists of Epiphanius, no two of them alike. (a). Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Job, Psalter, Prov. of Sol. Ecc. Song of Songs, Kingdoms 4, Chron. 2, The Dodekapropheton, Isaiah the Prophet, Jeremiah the Prophet with Lamentations and his Epistles and Baruch, Ezekiel the Prophet, Daniel the Prophet, Esdra 2, Esther. (b). Five Law books (the Pentateuch and the Nomothesia Genesis-Deuteronomy). Five Poetical books. (Job, Psalter, Prob. of Sol. Ecc. Song of Songs'.) Another Pentateuch, called Grapheia, and by some Hagiographa (Joshua the son of Nun, the Book of Judges with Ruth, Chron. 2, Kingdoms a, b, Kingdoms c, d). The Prophetical Pentateuch (the Dodekapropheton, Isa. Jer. Ezek. Daniel). Two others (two of Esdra, called one, Esther), that of Solomon called the Panarete; the book of Jesus the son of Sirach. (c). The Law as in a. The (book) of Joshua the son of Nun, Job, Judges, Ruth, the Psalter, Chronicles 2, Kingdoms a-d, the book of Proverbs, the Preacher, the Song of Songs, the Dodekapropheton, of the Prophet Isaiah, of Jeremiah, of Ezekiel, of Daniel, of Esdra a, b, of Esther.

(5). The list of Gregory of Nazianzus. The twelve historical books, Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Josh. Jud. Ruth, Acts of Kings, Chron. Esdras. Five poetical books, Job, David, three of Solomon, -Ecc. Song, Proverbs. Five prophetical books, the Twelve, -Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Jonah, Ob. Nah. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Mal. -Isa. Jer. Ezek. Daniel.

(6) The list of Amphilochius. The Pentateuch, Creation (ktisis), Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Jos. Judges, Ruth, Kingdoms a-d, Chron. a, b, Esdras a, b, Five poetical books, Job, Psalms, Three of Solomon,—Prov. Ecc. Song of Songs. The Twelve Prophets,—Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Ob. Jonah, Nah. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Mal. The four



Prophets,—Isa. Jer. Ezek. Daniel. To these some adjudge Esther.

(7) The list of Pseudo-Chrysostom. The historical (part). The Octateuch,—Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua the son of Nun, Judges, Ruth. The Kingdoms a-d, Esdras. The advisory (symboleutic) part, as the Proverbs, the Wisdom of Sirach, the Preacher, the Song of Songs. The prophetic (part), as the sixteen Prophets. Ruth(?) = Job(?), David.

(8). The Synopsis, revised by Lagarde. The Mosaic. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. The others, Joshua the son of Nun, Judges, Ruth—the Octateuch. The Tetrabasilion. a, b, c, d, Chronicles a, b, Esdra a, b, Esther, Tobit, Judith, Job. Of Solomon, Wisdom, Proverbs, Ecc. Song of Songs. The Twelve Prophets, Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Ob. Jonah, Nah. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Mal. The four great Prophets, Isa. Jer. Ezek. Daniel. The end of the sixteen Prophets. Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach.

(9) The list of the anonymous Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila. The Mosaic Pentateuch, Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. The son of Nun, the Judges with Ruth, the Chronicles, a, b, of the Kingdoms a, b, of the Kingdoms c, d, Job, the Psalter of David, the Proverbs of Solomon, the Preacher with the Songs, the Dodekapropheton, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Esdras, Judith, Esther. Apocrypha: Tobias, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach.

(10) The list of Junilius. Histories (XVII): Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Josh. Judges, Ruth, Kingdoms I-IV (many add: Chronicles 2, Job 1, Tobias 1, Esdras 2, Judith 1, Esther 1, Maccabees 2). Prophecies (XVII): Psalms CL, Hosea, Isaiah, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi. Proverbs (II): Proverbs of Solomon, Jesus son of Sirach. (Some add the book of Wisdom, and the Songs of Songs). Dogmatics (I): Ecclesiastes.

(11) The list of the Pseudo-Athanasius. Gen. Ex. Lev.

Num. Deut. Joshua the son of Nun, Judges, Ruth, of Kingdoms a, b, of Kingdoms c, d, of Chronicles a, b, Esdras a, b, the Davidic Psalter, the Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes of the same, Song of Songs, Job, Twelve Prophets numbered as one: Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Ob. Jonah, Nah. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Mal.; and besides these, four others, Isa. Jer. Ezek. Dan. And beside these, there are other books as follows: Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom of Sirach, Esther, Judith, Tobias, four books of Maccabees, the Psalms and Ode of Solomon, Susannah.

(12) The list of Leontius. The Historical Books (12): Gen. Ex. Num. Lev. Deut. Joshua the son of Nun, Judges, Ruth, the Words (logoi) of the Kingdoms a-d, Chronicles, Esdras. The Prophetical (Books) (5): Isa. Jer. Ezek. Dan. the Dodekapropheton. The Paranetic (Books) (4): Job, Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, the Psalterion.

(13) The list of John of Damascus. The First Pentateuch, which also is Nomothesia. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. The Second Pentateuch, which is called Grapheia, but by some Hagiographa: Joshua the son of Nun, Judges with Ruth, of Kingdoms a, b, of Kingdoms c, d, of Chronicles a, b. The Third Pentateuch, the Poetical (sticherai) Books, that of Job, the Psalterion, Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes of the same, the Song of Songs of the same. The Fourth Pentateuch, the Prophetical,—the Dodekapropheton, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel. Two Others: Book of Esdra a, b, Esther. The Paranetic, that is, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Wisdom of Jesus.

(14) The list of Nicephorus. (A) Writings approved by the Church and canonized: Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Josh. Judges and Ruth, of Kingdoms a, b, of Kingdoms c, d, Chronicles a, b, Esdras a, b, Book of Psalms, Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Job, Isaiah the Prophet, Jeremiah the Prophet, Baruch, Ezekiel, Daniel, the Twelve Prophets. Together the 22 books of the Old Testament. (B) Books that are disputed and not approved by the

Church. Maccabees 3, Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom of the son of Sirach, Psalms and Odes of Solomon, Esther, Judith, Susanna, Tobit which also is Tobias.

(15) List of the Canons of Laodicea. Genesis of the World, Exodus from Egypt, Leviticus, Numbers, Deut. Joshua the son of Nun, Judges-Ruth, Esther, of Kingdoms a, b, of Kingdoms c, d, of Chronicles a, b, Esdras a, b, the Book of Psalms, Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Job, Twelve Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Baruch, Lamentations and Epistles, Ezekiel, Daniel.

(16) List of the Apostolic Canons. Five of Moses (Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut.), Joshua the son of Nun, Ruth, four of Kingdoms, two of Chronicles, two of Esdras, Esther, three of Maccabees, Job, Psalter, three of Solomon (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs), one of the Twelve Prophets, Isaiah one, Jeremiah one, Ezekiel one, Daniel one. Besides, learn by inquiry, that your youths learn the Wisdom of the very learned Sirach.

(17) The list of the Cod. Barocc. Concerning the books of the LXX and those not included in them. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua, Judges and Ruth, of Kingdoms a-d, Chronicles a, b, Job, Psalter, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Esdras, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Joel, Jonas, Obadiah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel. . . . And in addition to the LXX, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Wisdom of Sirach, of Maccabees a-d, Esther, Judith, Tobit.

(18) The list of Ebeyesu. Gen. Ex. the Book of Priests, Num. Deut. Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Samuel, of Kings, Book of Dabariamin, Ruth, Psalms of David the King, Proverbs of Solomon, Koheleth, Song of Songs, Son of Sira, Great Wisdom, Job, Isaiah, Hos. Joel, Amos, Obad. Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Hab. Zephaniah, Hag. Zech. Mal. Jer. Ezek. Daniel, Judith, Esther, Susanna, Esdras, Daniel Minor, Epistle of Baruch, Book of the Tradition of the Elders, Proverbs of Joseph, History of the sons of Samona, the Book of Maccabees (I-III).



(19). The list of Hilary. I-V. The five books of Moses. VI. Joshua the son of Nun. VII. Judges and Ruth, VIII. of Kings 1, 11, IX. of Kings 3, 4, X. Chronicles 1, 2, XI. Accounts (sermons) of the days of Esdras, XII. Book of Psalms, XIII-XV. Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs. XVI. The Twelve Prophets, XVII-XXII. Isaiah, Jeremiah, with Lamentations and Epistle, Daniel, Ezekiel, Job, Esther, (XXIII-XXIV. Tobias, Judith).

(20) The list of Ruffinus. The five books of Moses (Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut.), Joshua the son of Nun, Judges along with Ruth, Kings IV, Chronicle (=Book of Days), of Esdras 2, Esther, of the Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, the Twelve Prophets, one book), Job, Psalms of David, of Solomon 3 (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs). Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom of Sirach (=Ecclesiasticus), Tobias, Judith, the books of Maccabees.

(21) The list of Augustine. Histories. Five of Moses (Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut.), Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Ruth, Four books of Kings, Two books of Chronicles, Job, Tobias, Esther, Judith, Two books of Maccabees, Two books of Esdras. Prophecies. The book of the Psalms of David, Three books of Solomon (Proverbs, Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes), Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, The Twelve Prophets (Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habukkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi), The volume of the four Major Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Daniel, Ezekiel).<sup>36</sup>

(22) The list of Innocent I. The five books of Moses (Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut.), Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Four books of Kings, Ruth, Sixteen books of the Prophets, Five books of Solomon, The Psalter, Histories: Job, Tobias, Esther, Judith, Two books of Maccabees, Two books of Esdras, Two books of Chronicles.

(23) The list of the Pseudo-Gelasius. Five books of Moses, Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua son of Nun,

<sup>36</sup> The twelve Minor Prophets and the four Major are embraced by Augustine under the phrase "proprie prophetæ".

Judges, Ruth, Four of Kings. Likewise the books of the prophets, sixteen in number (Isa. Jer. Ezek. Dan. Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Obad. Jonah, Nah. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Mal.), two of Chronicles, 150 Psalms, three books of Solomon (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs), Book of the Wisdom of the son of Sirach, Another following book of Wisdom, Likewise of Histories: Job, Tobias, Esther, Judith, two books of Maccabees.

(24) The list of Cassiodorus. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua son of Nun, Kings I-IV, Chronicles I, 2 Psalter, Five books of Solomon (Proverbs, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs), Prophets (Isa. Jer. Ezek. Dan. Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Obad. Jonah, Nah. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Malachi which also is Angelus), Job, Tobias, Esther, Judith, Esdras two books, two books of Maccabees.

(25) The list of Isidorus. 1. Five books of Moses. 2. Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Ruth. 3. Four of Kings, Two of Chronicles, Tobias, Esther, Judith, Esdras, Two Books of Maccabees. 4. Prophets: One book of Psalms, Three books of Solomon (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs), Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, sixteen books of Prophets.

(26) The list of Mommsen. The canonical books: Gen. Ex. Num. Lev. Deut. Joshua son of Nun, Judges, seven books. Ruth, Four of Kings, Two of Chronicles, Two of Maccabees, Job, Tobias, Esther, Judith, 151 Psalms of David, of Solomon, of the Prophets: Isa. Jer. Daniel, Ezekiel, The Twelve.<sup>87</sup>

(27) List in the Codex Claromontanus. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Ruth, Four of Kings, the Davidic Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Wisdom, Wisdom IHU (i.e. of Jesus ben Sirach), Twelve Prophets: Hos. Amos, Micah, Joel, Obad. Jonah, Nah. Hab. Zeph. Hag. Zech. Mal. Isa. Jer. Ezek. Daniel, Maccabees, First, Second, and Fourth, Judith, Esther, Job, Tobias.

<sup>87</sup> From this list I have omitted some irrelevant matter.

(28) List of the Liber Sacramentorum. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua, Judges, Books of Women: Ruth, Esther, Judith, two books of Maccabees, Job, Tobias, Four of Kings, Sixteen books of Prophets, Five of David, Three of Solomon, One of Esdras. The books of the Veteris make in number XLIII.

(29) The list of the Council of Carthage. Gen. Ex. Lev. Num. Deut. Joshua son of Nun, Judges, Ruth, Four books of Kings, Two books of Chronicles, Job, the Davidic Psalter, Five books of Solomon, Twelve books of Prophets, Isa. Jer. Ezek. Daniel, Tobias, Judith, Esther, Two books of Esdra, two books of Maccabees.<sup>37a</sup>

15. The Old Syriac version, called the Peshitto, has an order differing from all others. It puts Job before the Psalter and gives a unique arrangement of both the major and minor Prophets.

## 2. *The Use*

Since Mr. Bevan has appealed to the Haphtaroth, or selections from the prophetic books, to be read on the Sabbaths and feast days, as evidence that the book of Daniel was not in existence when these selections were made, it seems best to give a list of these Haphtaroth so that the evidence may be forthcoming for the discussion of this view, which will be given later.

(1). 1). The blessing before the reading of the Haphtaroth reads: "Blessed art Thou, Jehovah our God, the king of the world, who hast chosen good prophets and accepted their words, which were spoken in truth. Blessed art Thou who didst choose the Law and Moses thy servant and Israel Thy people and the prophets of truth and righteousness." 2). The blessings after the reading are: (a). "Blessed art Thou Jehovah our God, king of the world, rock of all the ages, righteous in all generations, the faithful God, who sayeth and it is done, speaketh and it stands fast; for all

<sup>37a</sup> For the most part, these lists have been translated from the originals as given in Swete's *Introduction to the O. T. in Greek*, pp. 198-214.



his words are truth and righteousness." (b). "Faithful art Thou, Jehovah our God, and faithful are thy words, one word of thine shall not return back in vain; for a faithful king art Thou, O God. Blessed be Thou, Jehovah, the God who is faithful in all his words." (c). "Comfort Thou Zion, for it is the house of our life. And for humility of soul do Thou save quickly in our days. Blessed be Thou, Jehovah, who rejoicest Zion with her sons. Make us to rejoice, O Jehovah our God, through Elijah the prophet thy servant, and through the house of David thine anointed, quickly let him come and let our heart rejoice. Upon his throne let not a stranger sit, and let not others inherit again his glory; for by thy holy name hast Thou sworn to him, that his light shall not be quenched for ever and ever. Blessed be Thou, Jehovah the shield of David." (d). "For the Law and for the service and for the prophets and for this Sabbath day, which Thou hast given to us, O Jehovah our God, for sanctification and for rest, for glory and for beauty; for all, O Jehovah our God, we are thanking Thee, and blessing Thee. May Thy name be blessed by every living one for ever and ever continually. Blessed be Thou Jehovah, who sanctifiest the Sabbath."<sup>87b</sup>

(2). The Haphtaroth selections in use among the modern Hebrews are as follows: 1). From Joshua. a. i. 1-18. b. ii. 1-24. c. v. 2-vi. 27. 2). From Judges. a. iv. 4-v. 31. b. xi. 2-31. c. xiii. 2-25. 3). From First Samuel. a. i. 1-ii. 10. b. xi. 14-22. c. xv. 1-22. d. xx. 18-42. 4). Second Samuel. a. vi. 1-29. b. xxii. 1-59. 5). From First Kings. a. i. 1-31. b. ii. 1-12. c. iii. 15-28. d. v. 26-vi. 13. e. vii. 13-26. f. vii. 40-51. g. viii. 2-21. h. viii. 54-66. i. xviii. 1-39. k. xviii. 46-xix. 21. 6). From Second Kings. a. iv. 1-23. b. iv. 42-v. 19. c. vii. 3-20. d. xi. 17-xii. 17. e. xxiii. 1-27. 7). From the First part of Isaiah. a. i. 1-28. b. vi. 1-13. c. x. 32-xii. 6. 8).

<sup>87b</sup> These prayers have been translated from the *Seder Birekhot Hahaphtarot* of the Jewish Year Book of Adelbert della Torre, published at Vienna in 1861, p. 50.

From Isaiah ii. a. xl. 1-26. b. xl. 27-xli. 16. c. xlii. 5-21. d. xliii. 21-xliv. 23. e. xlix. 14-li. 3. f. li. 12-lit. 9. g. liv. 1-10. h. liv. 11-lv. 5. i. lv. 6-lvi. 8. k. lvii. 14-lviii. 14. l. lx. 1-22. lm. lxi. 10-lxiii. 9. n. lxvi. 1-24. 9). From Jeremiah. a. i. 1-ii. 3. b. ii. 4-28, iv. 1, 2. c. vii. 21-viii. 12. d. viii. 13-ix. 23. e. xvi. 9-xvii. 14. f. xxxi. 2-20. g. xxxii. 6-27. h. xxxiv. 8-22. i. xlvi. 13-28. 10). From Ezekiel. a. i. 1-28. b. xvii. 22-xviii. 32. c. xx. 2-22. d. xxii. 1-16. e. xxviii. 25-xxix. 21. f. xxxvi. 16-36. g. xxxvi. 37-xxxvii. 14. h. xxxvii. 15-28. i. xxxviii. 18-xxxix. 16. k. xliii. 10-27. l. xlv. 15-31. m. xlv. 16-xlvi. 18. 11). From Hosea. a. ii. 1-22. b. xi. 7-xii. 12. c. xii. 13-xiv. 7. d. xiv. 2-10. 12). From Joel. ii. 1-27. 13). From Amos. a. ii. 6-iii. 8. b. ix. 7-15. 14). From Obadiah i. 1-21. 15). From Jonah. i. 1-iv. 11. 16). From Micah. v. 6-vi. 8. 17). From Habakkuk. ii. 20-iii. 19. 18). From Zechariah. a. ii. 14-iv. 7. b. xiv. 1-21. 19). From Malachi. a. i. 1-ii. 7. b. iii. 4-24.<sup>38</sup>

(3). In addition to the Haphtaroth in use among the modern Jews, which are to be found listed with their corresponding sections from the Law in the conspectus of the appendix of our Hebrew Bibles, the following Haphtaroth in use among the Karaites and the earlier Jews are mentioned in an article by Prof. A. Büchler in volume six of *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, pp. 1-73. 1. a. Joshua iii. b. iv. 1-15, 3-18. c. xiv. 6. e. xvii. 4. f. xxi. 41. 2. Judges ii. 7. b. xi. 16-26. c. xviii. 7. d. xix. e. xix. 20. 3. I Sam. ii. 21-28. b. vi. 6. c. xii. 3-xiv. 2. d. x. 24. e. xv. 2. 4. I Kings. iv. 20. b. x. 9. c. xvii. 24. 5. II Kings xii. 14, 23. b. xx. 8. 4. ii. Sam. v. 13-vi. 1. b. xi. 5. c. xiii. d. xvi. 21. 7. Isaiah, First Part. a. iv. 6. b. xxvii. 6. c. xxix. 8-14. d. xxx. 15. e. xxxii. 18. xxxiii. 17. f. xxxiv. 11. g. xxvii. 31-37. h. xvii. 14-xviii. 7. 8. Second Part. a. xlii. 12-17.

<sup>38</sup> For the list here given, see the Conspectus Haphtararum in the Appendix to any good edition of the Hebrew Bible.

b. xliii. 1-7. c. xlvi. 3. d. xlviii. 12. e. xlix. 9-13. lxiv. 1. f. lxv. 10. g. lxv. 23-lxvi. 8. 9. Jeremiah. xii. 15. b. xiv. 19-22. c. xxix. 8. d. xxx. 10-16. e. xxxviii. 8. 10. Ezekiel. xii. 20. b. xvi. c. xx. 41. d. xiv. 11. e. xlv. 1. f. xlv. 12. 11. Hosea xii. 4-13. 12. Joel iii. 3. 13. Amos i. 3-15. 14. Micah. ii. 12. b. vi. 3-vii. 20. c. vii. 9. 15. Nahum i. 12-ii. 5. 16. Zephaniah i. 12. b. iii. 9-19. 17. Zech. x. 6-11.

(4). 1. In Luke iv. 17, we are told that Jesus "went to the synagogue, as was his wont every Sabbath day, and stood up for the purpose of reading. And there was given to Him the book of the prophet Isaiah, and He opened the book, and found the place where it is written: The Spirit of the LORD God is upon me" &cet. 2. In Acts xii. 14, 15, we are told that Paul and Barnabus went into the synagogue at Antioch, and, after the reading of the Law and the Prophets, Paul, on the invitation of the rulers, stood up to make an exhortation. 3. In Acts xiii. 27, we are told that the Prophets were read every Sabbath day.

#### DISCUSSION

In discussing the assumptions of the critics with regard to the historicity and date of the Book of Daniel on the basis of the evidence just given above, I shall consider first the relation between the dates of the books of the Old Testament and their position in the present Hebrew Canon. All of the critics argue as if the presence of Daniel among the books which by us are called Hagiographa is a sure indication of the lateness of its composition. That this is not the case, I shall proceed to show, first, by a consideration of the Law; and, secondly, by a consideration of the rest of the books of the Old Testament. In the course of this discussion of the main proposition assumed by the critics, I hope to make it plain, that not merely it, but also the other assumptions and conclusions with regard to the date of the Book of Daniel in so far as they are derived from its position in the present Hebrew Bible, are false.



First, let us take the order of the books in the Pentateuch. According to the order in all Hebrew and Greek manuscripts that contain the Pentateuch, the books were arranged in their present order, that is, the order of the historical sequence of the events and of the supposed order of the codes of law contained in them. Genesis gives the history from the creation to the establishment of Israel in Egypt; Exodus and Leviticus, the account of the exodus and of the events and laws connected with Sinai; Numbers, the story of the wanderings; and Deuteronomy, a résumé of the history and of the laws enacted up to the arrival of the children of Israel at Sinai. The oldest evidence for this order is to be found in the works of Origen from the middle of the third century A.D. The only list of the books of the Law antedating this, is that given by Melito, Bishop of Sardis, from the latter part of the second century A.D.; but it gives the books in the order Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, Leviticus, Deuteronomy. Since Melito and Origen, these two earliest witnesses for the order, number, and names, of all of the books of the Law, thus differ as to their order, it is manifest that at the time when they wrote their order had not yet been fixed. The relative position of a book in the so-called earliest Canon had, therefore, nothing essential to do with its canonicity.

Again, according to the radical critics, the Hebrew Pentateuch was not finished till after the time when the translation of the Seventy was made.<sup>39</sup> Dividing the main sources of the five-fold book of the Law into the Jehovistic, Elohist, Deuteronomistic, and Priestly portions, denoted respectively by J, E, D, and P, they place J somewhere between 850 and 625 B.C.; E, at about 750; D, at or shortly before 621; and P, at 444 B.C.<sup>40</sup> The canonization of D was made in 621 B.C., and that of P in 444 B.C.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Cornill, *Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament*, p. 474.

<sup>40</sup> *Id.* p. 91.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.* p. 472.

The whole work was put together in its present form about 400 B.C., though additions and corrections were made even subsequently to the time of the Seventy;<sup>42</sup> that is, after 280 B.C. The redactor Rp, who is said to have put J, E, D, and P together, excluded from and added to the original documents whatever he pleased, and put them together in the order that seemed to him to be best. But this order, while chronological according to the time at which the books purport to have been written, is not chronological according to the time at which the critics say that they were written; for Rp puts the laws of P before those of D, although according to the modern critics of the Wellhausen school, D was written about two hundred years before the writing of P.

It will be noted, also, that even though the five-fold division of the Law cannot be traced back farther than Philo,<sup>43</sup> and even though it may have existed only a short time before the time when the version of the Seventy was made,<sup>44</sup> this does not affect the fact that in the Pentateuch as far back as we can trace it,<sup>45</sup> the P laws preceded the laws of D in the document as it came from the hand of Rp.

Further, since the critics claim that D was canonized before P, it follows that the position of a book in the Canon, or in a part of the Canon, was not always, or necessarily determined by the time of its canonization, or by the time of its composition. So, then, the position of Daniel in the present Hebrew Bible has not necessarily anything to do with the time of its composition, or of its canonization.

It will be noted that I have written "present Hebrew Bible"; for there is no evidence to show that any old Hebrew manuscript ever contained the books of the Old Testa-

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<sup>42</sup> *Id.* p. 474.

<sup>43</sup> *De Abrahamo*, I.

<sup>44</sup> Cornill, p. 28.

<sup>45</sup> The Samaritan Hebrew text and Targum, as well as all the ancient versions, primary and secondary, and all the lists of the books of the Law, early and late, unite in placing D after P.

ment Canon as they are arranged in our Hebrew Bibles as now printed. Nor did either of the great schools of Hebrew manuscripts, the Spanish, or the German-French, or the Massoretic, have the books arranged as they are now printed; nor are they printed in the order given in the Talmud. Nor do they follow the order of the earliest printed Hebrew Bibles, such as the *Editio Princeps* of Bomberg, which put the five Megilloth immediately after the Pentateuch. Our Bibles agree with the Spanish and Massoretic manuscripts in the order of the Prophets, but with the German and French in the Hagiographa. The order of the Talmud differs from that of the early printed Bibles and from that of the editions in use at present. It differs, also, in the order of the books both in the Prophets and the Hagiographa from the Massoretic, Spanish, and German-French manuscripts. The Peshitto Syriac version of the Prophets differs in the order of the books both in Prophets and Hagiographa from every one of these Hebrew orders. The lists of Melito, Origen, and Jerome, all of whom derived their information from the Hebrew scholars of their respective times, give an order differing from one another and from all the Hebrew manuscripts, lists, and versions. Moreover, no one of the great Greek uncials, Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, Alexandrinus, and Basiliano-Venetus, agrees in order with any other one of them, or with any one of the Hebrew or Syriac sources. And lastly, of the many lists of the Greek and Latin Fathers and Synods, no two are found to agree with each other; nor does anyone of them agree with any other list from any other ancient source.

In short, of forty-three lists given above, no two present exactly the same order for the books comprising the Old Testament Canon; so that it can be affirmed positively that the order of those books was never fixed by any accepted authority of either the Jewish or Christian church.

When we leave the order and come to the names, numbers and divisions, or groupings, of the books of the Old Testament, we find no evidence, except in the case of the



Law, that the position of the book of Daniel had anything to do with its date. The earliest witnesses give the names of the divisions as follows:

1. The Prologue to Ecclesiasticus, (1) The Law, the Prophets and Others that followed their steps. (2) The Law and the Prophets and the other ancestral books. (3) The Law and the Prophecies and the rest of the Books.

2. Second Maccabees says that Nehemiah gathered together (1) the books concerning the kings and prophets, (2) those of David, and (3) epistles of kings concerning votive offerings.

3. Philo says that the Therapeutae received (1) the Law, (2) and the oracles uttered by the prophets, and (3) the hymns and other (writings) by which knowledge and piety are augmented and perfected.

4. Luke xxiv. 44 speaks of (1) the Law, (2) the Prophets, and (3) the Psalms.

5. Josephus divides the books into (1) the Law, (2) the Prophets, and (3) the remaining four, containing hymns to God and precepts concerning the conduct of human life.

6. Melito gives (1) the Five of Moses, (2) Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Kings, Chronicles, (3) Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song, Job, (4) Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, The Twelve, Daniel, Ezekiel, (5) Esdras.

7. Baba Bathra speaks of (1) Moses' "own book", (2) of the Prophets, of whom he names eight, not including Daniel, and (3) of the Hagiographa, of which it names eleven.

8. Origen names (1) the five books of the Law, (2) six historical books, counting the four of Samuel and Kings as one, Judges including Ruth, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles as one each, (3) Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song, (4) Isaiah, Jeremiah with Lamentations and the Epistle as one, Daniel and Ezekiel (the Twelve having been dropped from the list, probably through an error of some copyist), (5) Job, Esther, and (6) outside (*hexo*) these is the Maccabees.

9. The four great Greek uncials give only the names of the books, but no names of divisions, except that A heads the names of the Prophets with the phrase "The sixteen Prophets", among which it puts Daniel. If it be allowed to indicate divisions based on the order and character of the books, they would be as follows: (1) For B, (1) the Law, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy. (2) Historical books, Josh., Jud., Ruth, Kingdoms 4, Chronicles 2, Ezra 2. (3) Poetical books, Psalms, Prov., Ecc., the Song, Job, Wisdom, Sirach. (4) Esther, Judith, Tobit. (5) The xii, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Baruch, Lamentations, Epistle, Ezek., Dan. (2) For S, (a) the Law, of which, however, only Genesis and Numbers remain. (b). Historical books, of which remain Chronicles, Ezra-Neh., Esther, Tobit, Judith, and four of Maccabees. (c) Proph. books, Isa., Jer., Lam., Joel, Obad., Jonah, Nahum, Hab., Zeph., Hag., Zech., Malachi. The other books have been destroyed. (d). Poetical books, Psalms, Prov., Ecc., Song of Songs, Wisdom, Sirach, Job. (3). For A, (a) the Law, Genesis of the World, Exodus from Egypt, Lev., Num., Deut. (b). Historical books, Josh., Judges, Ruth, Kings 4, Chron. 2. (3). Prophets 16, the Twelve, Isa., Jer., Baruch, Lam., Epis., Jer., Ezek., Daniel. (d). Esther, Tobit, Judith, Ezras a, Ezras b, Maccabees 4. (e). Poetical books, Psalterion, Job, Prov., Songs, Wisdom, Sirach, Psalms of Solomon. (4). For Bas.-Ven. (a) the Law, Lev. Num. Deut. (all that remain). (b). Josh., Ruth, Judges, Kingdoms 4, Chron. 2, Esdras 2, Esther (lacuna). (c). Poetical books, (Psalms), Job, Prov., Ecc., Song, Wisdom, Sirach. (d). Prophetical books, the Twelve, Isa., Jer., Bar., Lam., Ezek., Daniel. (e). Tobit, Judith, Maccabees 4.

10. The principal Greek lists make, or imply, the following divisions: (1). Melito: Law 5, History 5-9, Poetry 5, Prophecy 5, Others 1. (2). Origen: Law 5, History 6-11, Poetry 4, Prophecy 4, Others 1-2. (3). Athanasius: Law 5, History 6-11, Poetry 5, Prophecy 5, Others 5. (4). Cyril: Law 5, History 6-12, Poetry 5, Prophecy 5. (5).

Epiphanius a: Law 5, History 3, Poetry 5, History 2-6, Prophecy 5, Others 2-3, Extra 2. (6). Epiphanius b: Law 5, Poetry 5, Hagiographa 5, Prophecies 5, Others 2, Extra 2. (7). Epiphanius c: Law 5, History 3, Psalms 1, History 2-6, Solomon's Works, Prophecies 5, Others 2-3. (8). Gregory Naz.: History 12, Poetry 5, Prophecy 5. (9). Amphilochius: Law 5, History 6-11, Poetry 5, Prophecy 5, Proverbs 2, Extra: Esther. (10). Pseudo-Chrysostom: Octateuch, History 2-5, Admonitory 4, Prophecy 16, Extra 2. (11). Synopsis: Octateuch; History 12, Solomon 4, Prophecies 12, Major Prophets 4. Extra Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach. (12). Dialog. Tim. et Aquila: Mosaic Pentateuch, History 5, Poetry 4, Prophecy 6, Additional 2. Extra 3. (13). Junilius: Histories xvii, Prophecies xvii, Proverbs ii (Additional ii), Dogmatics i. (14). Pseudo-Athanasius: Law 5, Histories 7-11, Poetry 5, Prophets xii, Four others besides—the Major Prophets, Beside these, viii books. (15). Leontius: The Historical Books 12, the Prophetical 5, the Paranetic, 4(5?). (16). John of Damascus: First Pentateuch, or Nomothesia; Second Pentateuch, or Hagiographa; Third Pentateuch, or the Poetical Books, Fourth Pentateuch, or the Prophetical. Others 2. Extra: Two. (17). Nicephorus: Law 5, History 6-10, Poetical 5, Prophetical 6. Antilegomenoi: 8-10. (18). Ebeyesu: Law 5, History 6, Poetical 7, Prophets 16, Others 12. (19). Canons of Laodicea: Law 5, Historical 7-11, Poetical 5, Prophetical 5. (20). Apostolic Canons: Five of Moses, Historical 14, Poetical 5, Prophetical 5. Extra: The Wisdom of the very learned Sirach. (21). List in Cod. Baroc.: Law 5, Historical 4-9, Poetical 5, Esdras, Prophetical 16, . . . Extra 6-9. (22). Hilary: Five books of Moses, Histories 6-9, Poetical 4, Prophets 12. Six other prophets, among which are included Lamentations and Epistle of Jeremiah, Job, and Esther. Extra 2. (23). Rufinus: Five books of Moses, Historical 6-10, Prophets 5, Poetical 5. Extra: 5-8. (24). Augustine: Histories 16-22, Prophecies 22. (25). Innocent I.: Five books of



Moses, Historical 4-7, Prophets 16, Books of Solomon 5, Psalter, Histories 7-10. (26). Pseudo-Gelasius: Books of Moses 5, Historical 4-8, Prophets 16, Chronicles 1-2, Poetical 6. Likewise, histories 5-6. (27). Cassiodorus: Law 5, Historical 3-7, Poetical 6, Prophets 16, Others 6-8. (28). Isidorus: Five books of Moses, Historical 10-15, Prophets 22 (including the 5 poetical books). (29). Mommsen's List: Heptateuch(?), Historical 15, Major Prophets 4, Prophets 12. (30). Codex Claromontanus: Law 5, Histories 7, Poetry 6, Prophets 16, Additional 8 (including Job and Esther). (31). Liber Sacramentorum: Law 5, Historical 13, Prophetical 16, Davidic 5, Solomonic 3, Esdras= xliii books. (32). Council of Carthage: Law 5, Histories 5-9, Poetry 7, Prophets 16. Others 5-7.

A review of the testimony just given will show that only one witness puts the book of Daniel under any other heading than that of the Prophets. This witness is the *Baba Bathra*, a work not written till about A.D. 200, and deemed by the critics as so unreliable that they reject all that it says in the immediately succeeding context about the writers of the various books of the Old Testament. All of the witnesses who derived their information from Jewish sources antedating this time, place Daniel among the Prophets,—Philo, Matthew, Luke, Josephus, and Melito. Even Origen and Jerome who studied with the Jewish Rabbis of their time, place Daniel among the Prophets. It is proper, therefore to conclude that the fact that the later Jews placed Daniel among the *Hagiographa* has nothing to do with the questions of its canonicity and date.

Having thus considered the main charge against the early date of the book of Daniel based upon its position in the present Hebrew Bibles, I shall next devote myself to some subsidiary questions more or less relevant to the main charge, and which the critics bring forward to support it.

The late Dr. Driver says, that "the age and authorship of the books of the Old Testament can be determined (so far as this is possible) only upon the basis of the internal

evidence supplied by the books themselves, by methods such as those employed in the present volume; no external evidence worthy of credit exists."<sup>46</sup> If this proposition were true, it might be well to ask why, then, Dr. Driver considered it necessary to present eleven pages of historical and philological reasons, alleged to be derived from, or supported by, evidence external to Daniel, in order to show that it could not have been written in the sixth century B.C. The most admirable thing about Dr. Driver, and that which gained for him his exalted position in the scholarly world, was the masterly manner with which he essayed to support his judgments based upon the internal evidence of a book by evidence external to the book itself. What I object to in the case of Dr. Driver and his followers, is that they seem to seek in every possible way to pervert the internal and external evidence as to the Canon in general, and as to the canonicity and date of Daniel in particular, so as to confirm their own preconceived opinion as to what they ought to be. For as to the internal evidence, no one can doubt that the book of Daniel claims on the face of it to be genuine. It purports to make known to us the deeds of Daniel and his three companions and the visions of the last named. It relates itself to the history of the sixth century B. C. That it is full of alleged miracles and of accurate and detailed predictions, is not internal evidence against its historicity or date; for the histories of the Old and New Testaments, as well as those of Ashurbanipal, Nabunaid, and Alexander, are full, also, of alleged miracles and predictions. The only thing for us to do is to recognize the internal testimony at its face value and to test this testimony by means of all the external evidence that is relevant and available. In the case before us, the specific charge is made, that the book of Daniel cannot be genuine, because the book itself claims to be, in large part at least, a work from the sixth century B.C., whereas its position in

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<sup>46</sup> See the Introduction to the *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, p. xi.

the Canon indicates that it cannot have been written before the second century B.C. To support this charge, it is alleged that the part of the Old Testament which in our present Hebrew Bibles is called the Prophets, embracing only Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve Minor Prophets,—eight books in all according to the reckoning of the ancient authorities—, was canonized and closed at, or before, the year 200 B.C.

Now, since all admit that the Prophetical books were canonized before 200 B.C., and called the Prophets, the only question at issue is as to the correctness of the use of the word "closed" as applied to the books called Prophets. Is there evidence to prove that the eight books named in *Baba Bathra* were then canonized, and called Prophets, and that afterwards no book, or part of a book, was ever added to, or taken away from, the eight that were thus canonized and named Prophets? If this can be proven it would have to be admitted that the book of Daniel cannot have been among them. If, on the other hand, it can be shown by external evidence, that the division of the Old Testament Canon called the Prophets contained at an earlier time than that at which the *Baba Bathra* was written more books than the eight named in its list, it follows that Daniel may have been one of these books. For some reason, known or unknown to us, it may have been removed from an earlier position among its fellow prophets; but the fact will be patent that its later position among the *Hagiographa* would not indicate that the book was not in existence before 200 B.C.

There are five prime witnesses, antedating the time at which the first sketch of the *Mishna* was written, and they all testify clearly that an eight-booked Canon of the Prophets was not in existence in the time at which they wrote. These witnesses are the Prologue to *Ecclesiasticus*, Philo, Luke, Josephus, and Melito. I shall discuss them in the order, Josephus, Luke, Philo, the Prologue to *Ecclesiasticus*, and Melito.

Josephus is the principal witness, because he states expressly that the Jews had only twenty-two canonical books.



Of his twenty-two books he specifies five as constituting the Law and four as containing "hymns to God and precepts for the conduct of human life". These last were probably the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. This would leave Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Ezra-Nehemiah, Chronicles, Esther, Job, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and the Twelve Minor Prophets, as the thirteen others,—he having counted Ruth as part of Judges, Nehemiah as one with Ezra, and Lamentations as belonging to Jeremiah. Job was accounted a prophetical book, as in Ben Sira, xlix. 9.

Now, whatever may be thought about the opinion of Josephus about the time when the last of the prophetical books was written, seeing that this opinion is expressed about events which happened 500 years before his time, there is no reason to doubt that in telling of the number and divisions of the books held sacred by the Jews of his time, no witness could possibly be better. For he was a priest of the royal Asmonean line, educated in all the wisdom of the innermost circles of Jewish scholarship, possessed of the official Temple copy of the original Hebrew Scriptures, which had been taken from the Temple and presented to him by Titus himself. He certainly would not in a controversial treatise, like that against Apion, where he challenges the world to dispute his statements and constantly appeals to written documents and to the acknowledged current opinions of the contemporary Jews,—he certainly would not have dared to divide the books of the Jews as he does, unless that division was the one accepted by the learned Jerusalem scholars of his day. And in this division he certainly places Daniel in the second of the three divisions, which embraced all the books except the Law and the Poetical books.

The next Jewish testimony is that of Luke xxiv. 44, where Jesus is represented as saying, "All things must be fulfilled, which are written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me". This

passage from Luke's Gospel I am not introducing in evidence as the infallible statement of an inspired book, nor as having back of it the authority of an infallible man, nor even as having ever been said by Jesus at all; but simply as an ordinary statement of the writer of this book, called the Gospel of Luke. It is admitted by all the leading critics that this book was written before or about the year A.D. 70.<sup>47</sup> And no text is better supported than that of this verse.

What, then, does this verse prove? It proves that in the time when Luke wrote, the Jews divided the books of the Old Testament into three parts, the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms. Everyone admits that by Law the five books of Moses are meant. In view of the statement of his contemporary, Josephus, it would be most natural to suppose that by Psalms he means what Josephus includes in his third division, that is, the books called by us, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs. In the Prophets, there would be included the other thirteen books which Josephus embraces in his second division, including, of course, Daniel. That the writer of Matthew's Gospel, also, considered Daniel to be among the prophets is supported by Mt. xxiv. 15, where we read of "the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet".

Dr. Driver, in his discussion of the Canon in the opening chapter of his *Literature of the Old Testament*, as well as in his chapter in the same volume on the book of Daniel, studiously avoids all reference to this testimony of the New Testament books to the opinions of the Hebrew writers as to the Old Testament Canon. He appeals at length to the Talmud, Josephus, Ben Sira, 2 Maccabees, and the 4th Book of Ezra; but passes by in silence the testimony of the New Testament, of Melito, and of all Christian writers! One might understand the motive for this in a Jew, but it is hard to understand what possible motive a Christian can have in thus ignoring the testimony of writings whose date

<sup>47</sup> McClymont, *Baird Lectures*, pp. 142 f.

is certainly as determinable as that of 4th Ezra, 2 Maccabees, or the Talmud, and whose veracity as respects the point here at issue can not be questioned.

Professor Cornill, indeed, goes one step farther than Dr. Driver; for he says that "Jesus cannot be appealed to as witness for the Old Testament Canon".<sup>48</sup> This is a confusion of the point in discussion. If he means that we have no written testimony by Jesus Himself as to the Old Testament Canon, no one has ever claimed as much. But if he means that we have less direct and reliable testimony as to what Jesus thought about the Old Testament Canon than we have in regard to what other Jews of his time thought, Josephus and the New Testament writers alone excepted, why does he not state where it is found? I know of none such. He goes on to say, "He (i.e., Jesus) indeed lived and moved in the holy literature of Israel, towards which he did not take up any different position from that of his Jewish contemporaries, and, in fact, in his days almost the same books were counted as Holy Scriptures as are found in our Old Testament".<sup>49</sup> How does he know that Jesus took up the same position as his contemporaries? He can know it only from Josephus, Philo, and the New Testament, as far as contemporary written testimony is concerned; and, as we have seen, Josephus and the New Testament both have three divisions of the Canon and both place Daniel among the Prophets. Jesus, therefore, must have done the same, Professor Cornill himself being witness.

Professor Cornill proceeds further to state that "in fact in his days almost the same books were counted as Holy Scripture as are found in our Old Testament".<sup>50</sup> This will be readily admitted by all, except for the word "almost". The only ground for the insertion of this limiting particle is that the Sanhedrin, said to have been held at Jamnia at some time between A.D. 70 and 100, expressed itself in favor

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<sup>48</sup> *Introduction*, p. 482.

<sup>49</sup> *Id.*, pp. 482, 483.

<sup>50</sup> *Id.* p. 483.



of the canonicity of certain books whose right to a place in the Canon had been disputed. To which it may be said that no contemporary testimony bears witness to any such Sanhedrin or to any such dispute. Any knowledge that such a Sanhedrin was ever held is due to a tradition among the Jews first put in writing about A.D. 200. A writer who ignores the testimony of Melito and Origen and subjects to severe criticism the testimony of the New Testament and Josephus, should not be so ready to accept an unwritten tradition of the Jews!

But even granting that some books were disputed at A.D. 100, or at the time of Rabbi Akiba, at A.D. 135, or at any other time, let it be remarked that *Daniel was not one of the books disputed*. Let it be remarked again that Ezekiel was one of the disputed books. If Ezekiel, a book which all the critics say was in the second part of the Canon,—a part which, they say was canonized by 200 B.C.,—could be disputed as late as A.D. 100, 300 years after it was canonized, and 650 years after it was written, how does it follow that the disputing of the canonicity of Esther, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs shows in the opinion of the critics that they were written late? At any rate, how does the disputing of one or all of these books affect the canonicity of Daniel, a book that, so far as we know, was never disputed?

But not only was the book of Daniel not disputed, but Daniel himself was held by Josephus to have had "strange revelations made to him and those as to one of the greatest of the prophets" (*Antiq.* X. x. 1. 7). And with the writers of the New Testament, and from all accounts, with the Lord Himself, Daniel was among the greatest in his influence, being referred to or cited by them more than a hundred times.

The next Jewish testimony to the Old Testament Canon is to be found in Philo Judaeus, who flourished about A.D. 40. In describing the Therapeutae, he says that "they receive the Law, and the Oracles uttered by the Prophets, and the hymns and the other (writings) by which knowledge and

piety are augmented and perfected".<sup>51</sup> In this statement, the hymns are evidently the Psalms, and the other writings possibly Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs, corresponding to the "rules of life for men," of Josephus.

At any rate, it seems certain that the only place for Daniel in this list is among the Prophets.

The fourth direct Jewish witness to the three-fold division of the Old Testament books is to be found in the Prologue to the Greek translation of Jesus ben Sira, made by his grandson of the same name. This Prologue was most probably written in 132 B.C. He mentions the threefold division three times. First, he says that "many and great things have been delivered unto us by the law, the prophets, and the other (books) which follow after them". Secondly, he says that his grand-father Jesus had given himself to "the reading of the law and the prophets and other ancestral books"; Thirdly, he speaks of "the law itself, and the prophets, and the rest of the books".

Since he intimates nothing as to the character of the contents of the second and third parts nor as to the number of books in each, it is simply a matter of conjecture as to where he may have put Daniel. It seems likely that he placed it in the second division rather than in the third, in view of the fact that the next witnesses in point of time (that is, Philo, Luke, Josephus, and perhaps the writer of the Martyrdom of Isaiah), all put it there; and further, in view of the fact that never till the Talmudical period do we find Daniel placed anywhere else.

Certainly, at least, no laws of evidence will permit the critics to force Daniel into the third division on the ground of testimony which was written from 200 to 500 years later than the time when this Prologue was written.

The fifth first-class witness is Melito, bishop of Sardis at about A.D. 180. He says that he desired to make an accurate statement of the ancient book as regards the number and order of the books and that when he had gone to

<sup>51</sup>*De Vita Contemplativa*, ii, 475; vd. Budde, *Kanon*, p. 56.

the East and come to the place where the things (recorded in them) were preached and done, he learned accurately the books of the Old Testament and sent the names of them in a letter to his friend Onesimus. In the list of these names he gives the Prophets as consisting of the following: Isaiah, Jeremiah, the Twelve, Daniel, Ezekiel (and) Esdras.

Some doubt may be felt as to whether he meant to put Esdras among the Prophets; but there can be none as to Daniel, because it precedes Ezekiel. Further, it will be noted that Melito does not put Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings among the Prophets; but puts them, followed by Chronicles, after the Pentateuch and before the Psalms of David. It is scarcely possible, in view of his deliberate and voluntary statement that he had carefully investigated as to the number and order of the books, that he would have intentionally made a false list of them, especially in view of the fact that such a falsehood could so easily have been exposed. We are justified, therefore, in concluding that at his time there was either no fixed order and number of books in the division of the Prophets; or that, if there were, in holding that it was afterwards changed.

All the direct evidence, then, that precedes the year 200 A.D., supports the view that Daniel was in the earliest times among the Prophets. Further, this conclusion is supported by all the direct evidence outside the Talmud, which is later than A.D. 200. Thus Origen, at A.D. 250, and Jerome, at A.D. 400, both of whom were taught by Jewish Rabbis and claim to have gained their information from Jewish sources, put Daniel among the Prophets and separate the strictly prophetical books from those which are more properly called historical.

And, lastly, all the Greek uncials and the Greek and Latin fathers, unite in placing Daniel among the Prophets and in separating the Prophets from the Historical Books.

Nor can the view that Daniel was originally among the Prophets be successfully impugned on the ground that other testimony, mostly late and indirect, indicates the contrary.



Appeal has frequently been made to the Sanhedrin or assembly of Rabbis held at Jamnia some time between A.D. 70 and 100, as having first settled authoritatively for the Jews the extent of their Canon. This testimony, however, is rendered less valuable owing to the fact that it is not contemporaneous, i.e., we have no *written* records referring to any such Sanhedrin going back beyond the two tractates of the Mishna called Yadaim and Idayot, which were written about 200 A.D. However, admitting that the testimony is genuine, what does it prove? Simply that certain books had a right to be held as canonical. These books were Ezekiel, Proverbs, Esther, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, Jonah, and Ruth. With regard to Jonah no technical phrase is used; with respect to Ezekiel and Proverbs, the question was whether they should be *hidden*; with regard to the four others, whether they *defiled the hands*. With regard to the meanings of these two terms, the following may be said. First, *Genaz*, in the technical sense in which it is used in the discussion of the Canon, means "to withdraw from use".<sup>52</sup> "The Talmudical view is that canonical books may *not* be 'hidden', for this is only done in the case of books which are really offensive".<sup>53</sup> The books which the Rabbins 'hide' (*genaz*) are always such the contents of which were regarded as objectionable, that is, heretical".<sup>54</sup> The word would be inapplicable if applied to the books of the Hebrew Canon, or to the books of the Apocrypha".<sup>55</sup>

Secondly, with regard to the phrase, "defile the hands", the author accepts the definition of this term given by Professor Robertson Smith and elaborated by Professor Karl Budde in his work entitled, *Der Kanon des A.T.*, (p. 3-6). Professor Budde first rejects the opinion of Buhl that it was meant by this phrase to guard against the profane use of worn-out (abgenutzte) rolls of the Scriptures; and the

<sup>52</sup> See Oesterly, *The Books of the Apocrypha*, p. 183.

<sup>53</sup> *Id.*, p. 184.

<sup>54</sup> *Id.*, p. 185.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.*, p. 185.

opinion of Strack and others that by this phrase it was meant that the Holy Scriptures, as unclean, should always be kept apart so as not to be exposed to harm resulting from touching consecrated corn or from eating by mice; and the opinion of Geiger, that holy books written upon the skin of unclean animals were alone to be declared unclean. "All such explanations", says he, "are contradicted by Yad. III. 4, where the question especially is decided whether the margins and back sides of the rolls made the hands unclean. In all these explanations, this question is never raised. It deserves to be noticed rather, that to the Holy Scriptures alone tradition ascribes a rendering of the hands unclean,—their touch making necessary a ritual washing of the hands". The Pharisees (under protest from the Sadducees)<sup>56</sup> attributed to the holy books such a high degree of holiness that whoever touched them dared not touch other things before he had observed the same ritual hand-washing as if he had touched something unclean. The correlative term for this kind of uncleanness of the hands is holiness". "In accordance with this view, the Old Testament books are called in the Mishna 'the holy books'; or 'books of holiness' ". "For these two attributes, holiness and uncleanness of the hands, are expressed at the same time and indeed only of a wholly limited number of writings, that is, the canonical".<sup>57</sup>

See also Dr. Oesterley's discussion of this term in *The Books of the Apocrypha*, pp. 175-182, where he says. "Defilement arose from the fact that the canonical books were 'holy', and holy things defiled by touching them. Compare Lev. x. 10, where holy=unclean. According to Lev. xvii. Aaron washed after coming out of the most holy place and taking off his holy garments. So since sacredness was imputed to the canonical books, contact with them necessitated a washing of the hands; and therefore anyone who touched a sacred book was said to be defiled."

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Yadayim*, iv. 6.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Yadayim*, iii. 5.

It is necessary to observe in connection with this phrase (1) that only the Aramaic part of Daniel is spoken of in the Talmud as defiling the hands, it being taken for granted that the Hebrew portion did; (2) that the Aramaic portions of Ezra are said in the same passage to defile the hands; (3) that Ezekiel, one of the Major Prophets and one cited already as a prophet by Jesus ben Sira, was disputed; (4) that Jonah, one of the Twelve, a portion of the Canon recognized again by Jesus ben Sira, was possibly another one thus disputed; (5) that Proverbs, which all authorities acknowledge to have been one of the four books of Josephus' third division, and also to have been used by Ben Sira, is another of them; and (6) that Ruth, the composition of which Cornill puts in the time of Ezra-Nehemiah, is also disputed.

So, then, the fact that the right of a book to a place in the Canon was disputed by some Jewish scholars does not prove that it had not been received as canonical before the time even of Ben Sira, the critics themselves being judges; for they all place Ezekiel and nearly all place Jonah, in the second, or prophetic division, which they state to have been "closed" about 200 B.C. And, if this be so of books whose right to be in the Canon was disputed, how much more must it be true of a book like Daniel where right to be in the Canon was never denied.

Again, there is certain evidence in I Maccabees, also, that Daniel existed before the time of the Maccabees. For from the speech given in chapter II, 51-60, we learn, (1) that the author supposes that the story of Daniel and his three companions was known to the Jews before the rebellion under the Maccabees commenced. (2) That he considered Daniel and his companions to be as historical as Abraham, Joseph, Phinehas, Joshua, Caleb, David, and Elijah. (3) That a writer who was almost certainly a contemporary of most of the events that he narrates would scarcely have treated the information of a book of fiction written in his own age (i.e., if we date Daniel in 164-5 B.C., and I Maccabees between 125 and 100 B.C.) as affording a fitting climax for a stirring



exhortation such as Mattathias is said to have made to his compatriots. The writer must have believed that the stories of the fiery furnace and the lions' den were known not merely to Mattathias but to those whom he addressed. As this address was made in the year 169 B.C., it is evident that the stories must have been in existence long enough to have been learned by Mattathias and his followers and also to have been accepted by them as true histories of what had occurred. Otherwise, to have placed the reference to them in the climax of his address would have weakened and made ineffective the force of his argument.

To use a phrase of Mr. Bevan's it is marvelous that no reference to Daniel is to be met with in 1 Maccabees. Notwithstanding that this first book of Maccabees is supposed by the critics to have been written at this time for the consolation of the Jewish patriots, this exact and sympathetic narrative never so much as alludes, except in the passage cited above, to either the book of Daniel or its author! The failure to mention the writer of Daniel might be pardoned, inasmuch as he evidently intended that his work should be accepted as a production of the supposititious Daniel, whom he so often represents as speaking in the first person. Whether it was originated in the sixth or in the second century B.C., it is remarkable, however, that the writer of Second Maccabees takes no notice of it, and the writer of First Maccabees cites it but once. It is another remarkable fact that First Maccabees mentions no divisions of the Old Testament Canon except the Law.

Next, the Epistle of Aristeas, which was written about 200 B.C., shows no knowledge on the part of the author of any divisions of the Old Testament except the Law. This bears upon the controversy about Daniel only in so far as it shows that the omission of all references to books of the Old Testament and to persons and events mentioned in them does not prove that the author who fails to mention them was not cognizant of their existence, or that the books did not actually exist.

Again, the greatest of Jewish extra-canonical writings known to us, coming from pre-Maccabean times, is the book of Ecclesiasticus by Jesus ben Sira. The prologue to this work, written by a second Jesus ben Sira, the grandson of the first, has already been considered. In the original work itself, we have a direct reference once to the Law of Moses (xxiv. 23), and many statements which show a knowledge of its contents. Many of the heroes of Israelitish history whom the author celebrates in his song of praise (xliv-1), are those whose merits are depicted in the Law. As to the prophetic books he shows his knowledge of the book of Joshua in his account of Joshua and Caleb (xlvi. 1-10), refers to Judges (xlvi. 11, 12), to Samuel the prophet (xlvi. 13-20), to Nathan and David (xlvii. 1-11), to Solomon (xlvii. 12-23), to Rehoboam and Jereboam the son of Nebat (xlvii. 23), to Elijah (xlviii. 1-12), to Elisha (xlviii. 12-14), to Hezekiah (xlviii. 17-22), to Isaiah (xlviii. 20-25), to Josiah (xlix. 1-4), to Jeremiah (xlix. 6, 7), to Ezekiel (xlix. 8), to Job (xlix. 9), to the Twelve (xlix. 10), though he mentions none of them by name. Of the books afterwards classed among the Hagiographa, he mentions Job and Nehemiah and makes several citations from the parts of Chronicles which are not found among the parallels in Kings. He probably refers, also, to Ezra in xlix. 14, and possibly to Daniel in xlix. 10.

Nowhere in Ecclesiasticus do we find any knowledge of a threefold, or fourfold, division of the Old Testament; nor any intimation that the division of the Prophets had been closed; nor any indication, except perhaps in his use of the Law, of his having considered some books more sacred than others. Besides, he elaborates the praises of Simon the High Priest more than those of any of the great men of Israel whose records are found in the books of the Old Testament Canon. It is a remarkable fact that he does not pay any regard to the great men who had exercised their functions outside the bounds of the land of Israel, such as Jonah at Nineveh, Daniel in Babylon, and Mordecai in Persia. In

speaking of Abraham, he does not refer to his coming out of Ur of the Chaldees, nor to his visit to Egypt. In speaking of Jacob, Joseph, and Aaron, he says nothing of the land of Egypt; nor does he intimate that Moses had ever been in Egypt, saying simply of the wonderful deeds done by him there, that "God gave him might in terrible wonders", and that "through the word of his mouth he caused signs to happen quickly, and caused him to be strong before the king". Of all the foreign kings mentioned in the Old Testament, he refers to but two—once to Pharaoh and once to Sennacherib. As far as Daniel is concerned, therefore, and the foreign kings among whom he labored, it is entirely in harmony with the plan of the work of Ben Sira, that no one of them should be noticed. This silence does not show that Ben Sira did not know about them. It was simply his determination to ignore them. Whether the books containing mention of one or all of them were among those deemed canonical by the Jews of his time, does not appear in any suggestion of his work. It will be noted especially that Ben Sira calls Job a prophet (xlix. 8), and that he places him between Ezekiel and the twelve Minor Prophets.

Another piece of circumstantial evidence with regard to the Old Testament Canon is to be found in the second chapter of Second Maccabees, where the author quotes a letter written in 124 B.C. as saying that Jeremiah the prophet gave them that were carried away the Law, charging them not to forget the commandments of the Lord, and exhorting them that the Law should not depart from their hearts and speaking of the things that were reported in the writings (or official archives) and commentaries (or memoirs) of Nehemiah; and how he, founding a library, gathered together the books of the Kings and the Prophets (Syr. "those of the Kings and those of the Prophets"), and those of David, and the epistles of the Kings concerning the holy gifts (Gk. *anathemata*; Syr. "offerings and sacrifices"); and that Judas in like manner gathered together all the things that had escaped (Syr. "had been scattered"), on ac-



count of the wars which we had: and they are still with us. Further in chapter xv. 9, Judas Maccabeus is represented as comforting the people out of the Law and the Prophets, and with putting them in mind of the battles which they won afore.

This book of Second Maccabees was probably written sometime in the first century B.C. and professes to be an epitome of an earlier work by Jason of Cyrene, unfortunately lost, but to which the author of the epitome attributes an exact handling in a work of five books of every particular of the wars of the Maccabees.

The author of this letter contained in 2 Maccabees seems to have divided the Jewish literature of Nehemiah's time into five or six parts, (1) the Law, (2) the books concerning Kings and Prophets, (3) the memoirs of Nehemiah, (4) the epistles of the Kings, and (5) the books of David. The Syriac version separates the Kings (which it renders kingdoms) from the Prophets, thus making six divisions. Of these divisions, three and four were added in the time of Nehemiah, and would be probably the subject-matter of our books of Ezra and Nehemiah. The books of David would be what Luke calls the Psalms. If Daniel were anywhere in any of these divisions, it would be in the second division of the Greek text, and in the second of its two sub-divisions in the Syriac version, that is, in the sub-division which concerned the Prophets.

It is true that the author of 2 Maccabees never mentions Daniel, nor does he refer to any of the events or persons recorded in his book. This, however, is more extraordinary, if the book of Daniel were written in the second century B.C. than if it had been composed four centuries earlier.

The next Jewish witness to the Canon is the Martyrdom of Isaiah embedded in the larger work called the Ascension of Isaiah. According to Prof. C. H. Charles, this work was probably known to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who seems to quote from it in Heb. xi. 37. If

so, it will have been written before A.D. 70. In Book iv. 21, 22, he speaks of the Psalms, which he makes to include the Parables<sup>58</sup> of David and the Proverbs of Solomon and the words of Korah, Ethan, and Asaph; and proceeds to speak of the words of Amos, Hosea, Micah, Joel, Nahum, Jonah, Obadiah, Habakkuk, Haggai, Zephaniah, Zechariah, and Malachi, and of the words of Joseph the Just,<sup>59</sup> and of the words of Daniel.

In this list, it will be observed that Daniel comes after the Minor Prophets and not among the Hagiographa; also, that the Twelve are arranged in an order not to be found elsewhere in any source. This unique arrangement shows conclusively that the books of the Old Testament were not fixed as to their positions when the book of the Ascension of Isaiah was written.

Attention should be called also to three other items of indirect evidence as to the Old Testament Canon. One is that to be derived from the Massoretic notes to be found at the end of most of the books of the Old Testament. Among these notes is usually one telling of the number of Sedarim, or sections, in each book. Thus, Genesis is said to have 43; Exodus, 29; Leviticus, 23; Numbers, 32; Deuteronomy, 27; Joshua, 14; Judges, 14; First and Second Samuel together, 34; First and Second Kings, 35. So, the number of Sedarim

<sup>58</sup> In the Ethiopic original, the word for psalms "mazameret" is clearly the equivalent of the Hebrew "miznor". The words, parables and proverbs, in Charles version are translations of the same word "mesaleyata" of the original, the equivalent of the Hebrew "meshalim". While more commonly used for the proverbs of Solomon, it is employed also in Psalms xlix. 4 and lxxviii. 2, and in Job xxvii. 1 and xxix. 1 in the sense of 'songs', or 'poems'.

<sup>59</sup> Prof. Charles thinks that this probably refers to an extra-canonical book of antichristian character. In connection with the name of Daniel, it would be more natural to refer them to the well known Joseph of Egypt, who like Daniel was a great interpreter of dreams. One is tempted to believe that the Ethiopic text has made a mistake of putting Joseph for Job. In the book of Job, i. 1, Job is called "the just". The letters for s and b are almost exactly alike in Ethiopic. If Job be the true reading, he would be classed among the Prophets, as in Ecclesiasticus xlix. 9, in the Hebrew and Syriac recensions.

is given at the end of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Job, Psalms, and Proverbs. The twelve Minor Prophets, Ezra and Nehemiah, and First and Second Chronicles, have one each between them. Now, of the five Megilloth, only Esther and Ecclesiastes have a statement of their Sedarim. In the case of Ruth and Lamentations, this was doubtless because when the Sedarim were made and counted, the former was still united to Judges and the latter to Jeremiah. As to the Song of Songs, it would seem as if it in like manner had been counted with Ecclesiastes; since the Sedarim are given but once for the two books. The Talmud and all the ancient lists except Augustine and Junilius place Ecclesiastes before the Song. Augustine agrees with the Spanish and Masoretic manuscripts in giving the opposite order. The printed Bibles follow the German and French manuscripts in giving the order of their use in the yearly festivals, that is, the Song of Songs, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther. Junilius has a singular division and classification of his own into *Historia*, *Prophetia*, *Proverbia*, and *Dogmatica*; putting the Law, Ruth, Esther, and Job in the *Historia*, the Psalms in the *Prophetia*, the Song of Songs in the *Proverbia*, and classing Ecclesiastes all by itself as *Dogmatica*. He attempts apparently to arrange his so-called *Prophetia* in a chronological order, resulting as follows: Psalms, Hosea, Isaiah, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi.

Since the arrangement is thus so obviously due to an attempt to give a combined logical and chronological arrangement, his testimony on this point should be ruled out. This will leave Augustine as the only ancient source placing Ecclesiastes after the Song of Songs. But Augustine, like Junilius, has an arrangement all his own; for he divides all the books into *Historiae* and *Prophetae*. Among the *Historiae*, he counts the five of the Law, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, four of Kings, two of Chronicles, Job, Tobias, Esther, Judith, two of Maccabees, and two of Esdras. Among the



Prophetae, he counts the Psalms, Proverbs, the Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, the Twelve (Minor Prophets), and the four Major Prophets in the order, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Daniel, Ezekiel. It will be seen that he has invented an order for himself differing from all others, following the freedom of his own will without regard to the authorities that preceded him. Yet, it is noteworthy that the Massoretic and Spanish manuscripts have the same order as that of Augustine; and since the Massoretic manuscripts have transmitted to us the Massoretic notes, including the numbers of the Sedarim, the note giving the number of the Sedarim of the combined book is placed properly in our Bibles after the book of Ecclesiastes.

The testimony of the Massoretic notes on the Sedarim would indicate that these notes were made at a time when the Jews still counted Ruth as a part of Judges and Lamentations as a part of Jeremiah; and also, that when they were made, they counted Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs as one book. If Ruth and Lamentations could, after the time when these notes were made, be separated from among the Prophets, so also could Daniel and Esther be thus separated. The evidence goes to prove that the position and divisions of the books as at present constituted has nothing necessarily to do with their age and canonicity.

A second piece of circumstantial evidence bearing upon the date of Daniel is that suggested by Mr. Bevan when he says that Daniel may not have been admitted to the Canon because no selection from it appears in the Haphtaroth, or lessons read on Sabbaths and feast days in the Temple and synagogues. It must be admitted that no selection from Daniel is found in these lessons as read at present; but this is no proof that Daniel did not exist, or was not deemed a prophet, when these selections were made.

For, first, no one knows when these selections were first made and used. The earliest mention of their use is to be found in Luke iv. 16, where it is said that Jesus read in the synagogue on the Sabbath day the passage of Isaiah

beginning with the words; "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me." But, since the Jews of the first century A.D. certainly acknowledged Daniel to be a prophet, they cannot have failed to make a selection from his prophecy because they did not consider him to be a prophet.

If, however, it be said that the selections from the Prophets must have been made long before the first century A.D., I admit that they most probably were; but this is no proof that the book of Daniel did not exist when they were made, or that it was not then placed among the Prophets, or even that selections from it were not at that time read in the synagogue services. For Büchler and others have shown beyond a doubt that three times as many passages were once read as are read today, that the limiting of the length to be read was late, and that passages from some of the prophets from which there are at present no selections were once read. The evidence collected above goes to show that only such sections were selected as magnified the Law and the Sabbath and the nationalistic hopes and aspirations of the Jews. Most of them have some readily visible point of contact with the portion of the Law which was to be read on the day for which the particular Haphtara was selected. Thus at the feast of the passover, such portions of the prophetic books as Joshua v. 2-vi. 27 which recounts the great passover at Gilgal, and 2 Kings xxiii. 1-27 which tells of the great passover of Josiah, were read. For Exodus xxv-xxx. 10, which gives the plan of the tabernacle, or Exodus xxxv-xl, which give an account of the completion of the tabernacle, the portions chosen as Haphtaroth are from 1 Kings v. 26 to vii. 51. For the passage, Ex. xxx. 11 following, which tells about the golden calf, the appropriate Haphtara is the account of the controversy between Elijah and Ahab recorded in 1 Kings xviii. 1-39. The account of the spies of Jericho is read with Numbers xiii, which tells of the other spies who were sent to spy out the land. The Haphtaroth, then, were selected with a regard to the appropriateness of their

contents for the occasion, and for the portion of the Law which they were meant to illustrate. Those who made the selections were the judges of what they deemed to be appropriate. Some of us might differ from these judges as to the aptness of some of their selections. We might even go so far as to contend that some of their principles of selection were wrong. We might have taken one from Haggai, which they apparently did not. We might have retained one, or more, of the portions which once were read from Zephaniah and Nahum, which the modern Hebrews have rejected. We might, possibly, have found some portion in Daniel appropriate to be read, which they apparently did not find. But the fact remains that the selection of the Haphtaroth had nothing to do with the age or canonicity of the books nor, as far as we know, with the position of a book among the divisions of the Old Testament as they were constituted at the time when these Haphtaroth were chosen. Did Mr. Bevan ever attempt to select a few passages from the book of Daniel which he thinks more appropriate for reading in the services of the synagogue on any given occasion, or along with any particular portion of the Law, than that which as a matter of fact is now employed? I for one think that the Jews have done about the best that was possible in harmony with the principles upon which they acted in the making of their choice.

Further, it seems to me that what we have just learned about the Haphtaroth affords the best explanation possible for the reduction of the number of the books in the prophetical division from its earlier number as given by Josephus to the number as derived from the list of prophetical books as given in the Mishna, that is, from 13 to 8. When once the Haphtaroth had been selected, a reason would at once be apparent why the books in which they were contained should be put and kept together for readiness of use in the services of the synagogue; just as in later times the five Megilloth were put together for the same purpose, or, as in the modern Vienna edition of Adelbert della



Torre, we find the Hebrew Torah, the Targum of Onkelos, the Five Megilloth, and various prayers and comments published in one volume, together with the appropriate Haphtaroth.

Such considerations as this last lead us naturally to the evidence as to the divisions and arrangements of the Old Testament books to be derived from the way in which we know that ancient books were written. In the pre-Christian times books were written upon tablets of clay or stone, or upon rolls of papyrus, or skin; so that instead of one book, the Old Testament contained from 22 to 39 books according to the number of rolls upon which it was written. These books could be arranged in any order that suited the good pleasure of their owner. According to any system of arrangement, logical or chronological, the Law would naturally be put first; but the lists show that even here Melito and Leontius placed Numbers before Leviticus. The early editions of the printed Bible put the Megilloth immediately after the Law, though all the manuscripts, versions, and ancient lists, either put them all together in the third part of the Canon, or some among the Prophets, and some among the Poetical books. This will account, also, for the fact that no two ancient sources agree as to the order of the books. As the lists have been handed down to us, it would be impossible for any one to say where certain books might be found. Job, for example, is placed by Cyril and by Epiphanius (in one of his three lists) immediately after the Law; whereas in the Codex Sinaiticus, it is the last book of all. Ruth, Lamentations, Chronicles, Esther, Psalms,—all shift their positions according to the pleasure of the owner, or the writer of the list. Some books, never acknowledged as canonical by the Jewish church, such as Tobit, Judith, and Wisdom, became mingled in certain collections of private owners of religious literature with the Holy Books, and in this manner probably they at first assumed a semi-canonical character, and were afterwards listed by their indiscriminating possessors among the can-

onical books. In the case of Daniel, however, it is found in all lists and sources, in all ages, always among the canonical books, and always in the ancient sources among the Prophets, except in the list found in the Baba Bathra.

### CONCLUSIONS

The evidence given above and its discussion permit only of the following conclusions:

1. That the position of a book in the Hebrew Canon was not determined by the time at which it was written.
2. That the position of a book in the list of the Mishna, or of the Hebrew manuscripts, versions, and editions, does not determine the time at which it was admitted to the Canon.
3. That all the earlier Hebrew sources, and all the Greek, Latin, Syriac, and Armenian sources put Daniel among the Prophets.
4. That Daniel's genuineness, or its right to be in the Canon, was never disputed by the ancient Jews or Christians.
5. That there is no external evidence, direct or indirect, except the argument from the silence of Ecclesiasticus, that Daniel was not composed till the time of the Maccabees.
6. That the silence of Ecclesiasticus is more than offset by the silence of First and Second Maccabees, and of all other sources, as to the origination of any such book, or the existence of the author of any such book, at the time of the Maccabees.
7. That there is no direct evidence of the existence of a threefold division earlier than the prologue of Jesus ben Sira, written in 132 B.C.
8. That the absence of any selection from Daniel in the Haphtaroth does not prove that the book of Daniel was not in existence, or acknowledged as canonical, when the Haphtaroth were chosen.
9. That Daniel was always considered by Josephus, and

by the writers of the New Testament, to be a prophet, and that his book was placed by the same authorities among the prophetical books.

10. That all the early Hebrew authorities which place Daniel among the Prophets, agree with the Mishna in holding to a threefold division of the Canon.

11. That the testimony that we possess does not show that the second part of the Canon was closed before the books of the third part were all written.

12. That the assumption that the division of the Hebrew Canon called the Prophets in our present editions of the Hebrew Bible was doubtless formed prior to the Hagiographa, is unfounded, inasmuch as there is no evidence that this division as it is now made was in existence before the second century A.C.

13. That all witnesses agree in putting the Law first; and that Melito and Leontius alone change the order of the books of the Law, in that they put Numbers before Leviticus.

14. That not one of the ancient witnesses puts the five Megilloth together, not even the Talmud.

15. That in nearly all the lists, the five poetical books are placed together.

16. That the only great difference of order between Philo, Luke, and Josephus, representing the earliest Hebrew arrangement, and the early Christian lists, arises from the fact that the former put the poetical books at the end, whereas the latter usually place them before the sixteen books of the Prophets.

17. That the books of the Old Testament Canon were never authoritatively and fixedly arranged in any specific order, either by the Jews, or by the Christians.

18. That the order has nothing to do with the canonicity, nor necessarily even with the date of a book.

19. That length, supposed authorship, subject-matter, and convenience, as well as the material upon which a book



was written, were the potent factors in all the ancient arrangements of the books.

20. That since the modern Jews have changed the position of Ruth, Lamentations, and Esther, to suit their convenience in the public service, there is every reason to believe that their so-called book of the Prophets was collected together into one for the same reason; and that the omission of Daniel from this collection had nothing to do either with its age or canonicity, but simply with the fact that it was not employed in these public services.

21. That all the testimony that the ancient Jewish and Christian sources give, bearing upon the time of the composition of the Old Testament books, is consentient in granting the claims of the books themselves as to their historicity, genuineness, and authority.

22. That the determining factor in the canonization of a book was its supposed age and author, and its agreement with the Law.

23. That in accordance with these rules Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Maccabees, and other apocryphal books were rejected from the Canon.

24. That those who rely upon documentary evidence, cannot escape the conclusion that the indictment against the Book of Daniel on the ground that it is not among the Prophets is false; and that in so far as the age and canonicity of the book of Daniel are assailed on the ground of its position in the Canon, the old view stands approved.

*Princeton.*

ROBERT DICK WILSON.

## PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF REVELATION<sup>1</sup>

It has been supposed since modern philosophy began that its independence of Christian theology was absolute and final; that no union of this theology with other sciences was possible which would oblige philosophy to take account of any data exhibited by this particular science. Robert Flint has said that "the fusion of theology and philosophy was the distinctive feature of mediaeval Christendom; their separation has been a marked characteristic of modern Christendom. Even when both have been occupied with religious inquiries and thoughts of God, they have kept apart; they have often coöperated but seldom commingled." And yet the scholastic fusion was not a confusion of the two domains in science. Philosophy was subordinated to the service of theology, but had its own distinct place and function as a natural theology complementary to revealed, and much else. In fact, as Flint has said in another place: "The separation of natural and revealed theology was virtually the work of the scholastics." The distinction was much emphasized in the treatise by Raymond of Sebonde.<sup>2</sup> Historians of philosophy often make this total separation of philosophy from dogmatic theology the most distinctive mark of modern philosophy properly so called, and identify this separation with the emancipation of philosophy from all authority but that of reason.

Bacon himself emphasizes in the strongest way the isolation of what was called revealed theology by including all other sciences in philosophy, and then setting philosophy over against this form of theology as making the two chief divisions of all science. He had no hostility to theology, and was better versed in it than many professional theol-

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<sup>1</sup> This article is in direct sequence to the article on Charles Woodruff Shields, published in this REVIEW, October, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> See Flint's two articles on "Theism", and "Natural Theology", *Encycl. Brit.*, 9th edition.

ogians. Henry B. Smith speaks of "Lord Bacon, whose philosophy is better known than his more profound theology."<sup>3</sup> Unhappily, in these days, his philosophy itself is more often misjudged than understood. Philosophy he regarded as science in its most universal form, and Christian theology as valid science in its most transcendental form; but the two were kept severely apart, because their combination had involved some serious abuses. The breach, thus begun, was deepened by Hobbes and Descartes, and has grown wider to this day.

Theologians themselves have commonly accepted this isolation of theology, and Henry Drummond says that "Science has taken theology at its own estimate. It is a thing apart. The spiritual world is not only a different world, but a different kind of world, a world arranged on a totally different principle, under a different governmental scheme."<sup>4</sup> This certainly was not the conception entertained by Bishop Butler, nor by some other great theologians; but it has been widely entertained. Drummond then says that "the facts of the spiritual world are as real to thousands as the facts of the natural world, and more real to hundreds." But he supposes that theology has never applied to its facts the conception of law which alone makes science possible. Yet, hopeful of the future, he says again that "as the highest of the sciences, theology, in the order of evolution, should be the last to fall into rank. It is reserved for it to perfect the final harmony."

Like Aristotle so Bacon by reflection on all common experience would have philosophy reach the knowledge of God as its highest attainment. But the form of revelation Christian theology assumed was so exalted and exceptional that he saw no way of coördinating this science with the rest in the general domain of philosophy. Nor has any one else seen plainly how this might be done unless Shields alone; who, getting his own first inspiration in philosophy

<sup>3</sup> *Faith and Philosophy*, 1877, p. 142.

<sup>4</sup> *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, 1883, Introduction.



from Bacon, has healed the breach that Bacon made, and has completed the unification of all science. Yet it is commonly recognized to-day that all philosophy must culminate in a philosophy of religion; that in a cosmic scheme of thought this constitutes the highest province; that the highest plane of experience belongs to religion, at least to religion at its best, and that a philosophy of religion must be based on all the facts entering into this experience.

Again, by many writers on the philosophy of religion it is held that all religion is a reaction of the human mind to some form of revelation; thus distinguishing the psychological fact of religion from a revelation which, in some sort, is objective to the apprehending mind, and a part of its experience. Orr says: "There is probably no proposition on which the higher religious philosophy of the past hundred years is more agreed than that all religion originates in revelation." Then commenting upon this fact Orr says: "With respect to this universalizing of the idea of revelation . . . the general principle on which it rests may be granted, with one important qualification, viz. that all true religion originates in revelation. For it is not here to be overlooked that 'religion' is a wide word, and covers much which is self-evidently false, foolish and superstitious—in no way the product of revelation, either general or special, but the outcome only of man's wayward and unbridled phantasy."<sup>5</sup> In so far as religion and revelation are correlative there can be no philosophy of religion which is not at the same time a philosophy of revelation, and of all the facts that enter into either term. Thus if divine revelation is an experienced fact, then, whatever form it may assume, revelation as such becomes a problem of philosophy, inseparable from the cardinal problems of knowledge and being. It is in this relation that Shields has placed them.

It is also commonly acknowledged that a cosmic philosophy must seek to interpret, in terms of reality and adequate reason, the whole of human experience as one whole,

<sup>5</sup> James Orr, *Revelation and Inspiration*, 1910, pp. 2, 4.

in the unity and coördination of its parts. From such a philosophy, aiming to be inclusive of all experience, no one province of experience can be legitimately excluded. That philosophy must reckon with the whole of experience is, indeed, not questioned, but only what is the experience, and whether this or that alleged experience is real. Has Christian theology any facts of which philosophy must take cognizance? A recent theologian of great learning, thoroughly acquainted with modern thought, who also did good work in philosophy, asserts that "Theology has facts of its own which the sciences are as much bound to respect as it should respect the facts of other science."<sup>6</sup>

But it is objected that philosophy recognizes no authority save reason, that reason is its own authority; that the sciences deal exclusively with experienced facts, while the so-called science of theology is built on authority of an outward sort. Yet if philosophy means to explain experience it must first know what the experience is that requires explanation. It must get its data from the several sciences, historical, observational, experimental, in which experience is organized. Experience reaches all such sciences in the form of testimony given by those persons to whom the experience belongs. All such testimony is authority, universally recognized as such, the maximum authority going with the maximum experience. Hence all these sciences rest proximately on authority, and philosophy itself is beholden to authority in the same way, and to the same extent, as the several sciences that supply its data. Authority is just as indispensable as reason itself to all human culture, in its effort to assimilate the experience and wisdom of mankind. "Science compensates the inequalities of individual experience by reënforcing it with the aggregate of all other experiences."<sup>7</sup>

A wholly false issue has been often raised between liberty

<sup>6</sup> George P. Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*, 1896, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> William T. Harris, *Psychological Foundations of Education*, 1898, p. 2. Cf. pp. 149, 254.

and authority in science, philosophy and life; also between authority and reason. There is no true liberty either of action or thought without some authority even of an outward sort:

Nur das Gesetz kann uns die Freiheitgeben. [Goethe.]

Nor is any sound reasoning possible which rejects the authority of good testimony to facts. Because authority has been misused, a blind attack is made on the very principle of authority; as if all authority were intrinsically bad, none good. This has had disastrous effects not only in morals, in the state and in theology, but in every science, and in philosophy. It can issue in nothing short of anarchy at last, when, regardless of evidence, every man thinks only what is right in his own eyes. Yet those who have most to say against authority merely substitute one authority for another, a new for an old. Many who reject the united testimony of the weightiest witnesses mankind has ever known to facts of the religious order, yield a most uncritical submission to those scholars and men of science whom, in the discord of modern testimony, they like best. It is usually acknowledged that the Bible writers have produced a body of testimony which, in religious matters, represents a maximum experience, and that they share in one general conception of the world and man. Yet their united testimony is discredited by appealing from their competence as witnesses to the more competent authority of some modern men of learning who, at best, cannot pretend to be primary witnesses in the premises disputed, and have far less religious experience to aid their judgment.

Christian theology has always claimed to be an historical science based primarily on the experienced facts of an overt revelation, and proximately on the sifted and co-ordinated testimony of men purporting to be primary participants in the experience, primary witnesses to the facts, with their immediate associates and successors. In all its leading elements the testimony constitutes a strong con-



sensus, which has been much disputed but never disproved; and this consensus is accompanied by an enormous range of corroborative evidence always too little known to the objectors. But whether the testimony be accepted or rejected the function of authority in Christian theology is precisely the same as in any historical or empirical science. It may be very much higher in degree, and must be so if the united testimony is accepted, than it is in any other science. The authority of a divine revelation is not lessened because the revelation is an experienced fact. Apart from experience it could not be recognized at all. But the function of authority in theology as a science does not differ in the least from its function in any science, or in philosophy itself.

Self-evident reason is, indeed, its own authority, needing no outside support; but reason is seen to be self-evident only in the presence of given terms, and terms of experience are given to science on the authority of testimony alone. The famous saying of Lessing is entirely correct, but has been ambiguously applied: "Accidental truths of history never can become the proof of necessary truths of reason." From this it has been inferred by those who discredit the testimony of Scripture that they are exempt from all necessity and obligation to depend on that testimony for the requirements of either philosophy or religion. The self-evident truth which, apart from that testimony, is accessible, is held enough for these requirements. Thus if God, freedom and a future life are necessary implications of the moral law and cosmic order, why should either philosophy or religion be concerned with the disputed claims and teachings of the Bible?

Now, contingent facts are not the proof of necessary truth, but they supply the conditions whereby necessary truth is reached. "A priori principles are only discovered a posteriori."<sup>8</sup> What the necessary truth in any given case may be depends, not for its truth but for its recognition, on

<sup>8</sup> Samuel Tyler, *The Progress of Philosophy in the Past and in the Future*, 1858. Second edition, enlarged, 1868, p. 179.

the terms of experience involved. Truths of reason are first learned in connections that experience supplies, and constitute its self-evident presuppositions. Experience and history determine the whole direction and emphasis of our knowledge, and the greater the experience given, past or present, so much the more can reason learn from it. Change, diminish or enlarge the experience, and the lesson is correspondingly affected. If God, freedom and a future life are necessary presuppositions of experience in its most ordinary forms, these presuppositions can only be multiplied and enriched when to common experience is added all that highest plane of experience reported in the Bible, and attested by a company of witnesses who, in mutual concurrence and moral weight, have surpassed all other witnesses that ever lived in their influence for good upon mankind.

Experience brings to necessary truth recognition and corroboration, but does not strictly prove it, nor add to its truth. So too a necessary truth never can disprove a truth of fact. Lessing probably had in mind the distinction made in the *Monadology* of Leibnitz between contingent facts of experience and the universal truths of reason. The distinction was first plainly made by Plato; but neither Leibnitz nor Lessing seems to have clearly understood the connection between these orders of truth. Kant saw that necessary truth, the truth of pure reason, is only seen to be self-evident under given terms of experience; but even Kant was not wholly consistent in his account of it, and did not fully apply this insight in the domain of religion. In this field his results were conditioned by a rigid exclusion of nearly all that experience which makes the foundation of theology in its specifically Christian form. Lessing's maxim by misuse has been the keynote of transcendentalism, German and American. It has permitted or fostered an illegitimate isolation of rational intuition from experience whenever experience is conveyed in testimony that is hostile to some prepossession. Transcendentalism is that exaggeration of reason which flouts experience whenever experience or testi-

mony stands in the way of some favorite prepossession, but gladly uses experience whenever it agrees with this mental bias. Empiricism exaggerates the sufficiency of concrete experience while blind to its necessary presuppositions. Only in a just combination of these opposites can a just philosophy be had.

An American form of Lessing's saying is the often quoted declaration of Lucretia Mott: "I will take truth for authority, not authority for truth." But how much truth could any human being find by reasoning from private experience alone, and rejecting all that is learned on the testimony of others? All reasoning is determined by such facts of experience as are recognized, whether the reasoning be good or bad. All such facts outside the individual experience are taken on the testimony or authority of others. Nine tenths of all that most persons know is, in this way, derived from authority; and the more learned any one is, so much the more has been taken on the testimony of others. Men boast of being free thinkers, which means that they are moral agents responsible for what they think. The Bible addresses every man as a free thinker, responsible because free to take heed how he hears, and weigh evidence. The words quoted from Lucretia Mott show even better than the words of Lessing the spirit and fallacy of transcendentalism, a defiant self-confidence, and a failure to discern the normal relation of self-evident truth to just testimony and experienced fact. Truths of reason are learned as the necessary implications of experience, and so far as they concern reality in no other way. They are less or greater in content according to the experience received. To know them rightly we must first know the experience in which they are involved, and so far as possible the whole of that experience. This means that induction must go before rational intuition, an adequate induction precedes any adequate metaphysics. In a very special measure is this the case with the implications of causality. If the world-ground is a divine Being standing in causal relation to the world-



order, this Creator can only be known by what He has done within the experience of man; and by all that He has done, if we want a knowledge that is sufficient. All that natural history and human history and private experience can teach regarding the phenomenal world-order carries some necessary implications regarding the noumenal world-ground.

If therefore the overt revelation attested in the Bible is a fact of actual experience, then reason, science and philosophy cannot afford to overlook this fact. It is not enough for philosophy to claim that, apart from this disputed fact, God, freedom and the future life may be known as necessary postulates of experience, and as the universal factors of religion. We need all that experience, and the whole of experience, can teach of these high truths, not merely a part.

For Kant these three postulates were self-evident and absolutely true, but only in their most attenuated form. When a little before his death an intimate friend "asked him what he promised himself with respect to a future life, he appeared absorbed, and after reflecting answered, 'nothing certain'. Sometime before he was heard to reply to a similar question by saying 'I have no conception of a future state'. Upon another occasion he declared himself in favor of a kind of metempsychosis."<sup>9</sup> That there is a God Kant was profoundly convinced, not only on moral grounds but also on teleological, despite his criticism of this argument from ends.<sup>10</sup> The ulterior purpose of his whole critical labor was to establish this truth. Yet when all was done how little light he had!

"When we reflect on the course of reasoning in his work on religion, his frequent assertions that reason alone can

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<sup>9</sup> Philip Albert Stapfer on Kant, *Biblical Repertory*, Vol. IV, 1828, p. 338. This article on Kant by Professor Stapfer of Paris was translated and prefaced by Dr. Charles Hodge. It comprises fifty-two pages, and is probably the first large account of Kant's life and philosophy published in America. The *Repertory* is only the first title and form of the *Princeton Review*.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. R. A. C. Macmillan, *The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy. A Study in Kant's Critique of Judgment*. 1912.

give us no certainty as to the severity or indulgence with which God will treat the violations of his law; that he could not conceive how man without extraordinary divine assistance can restore to the good principle the ascendancy over his actions, and the exclusive authority which it has lost; that no one can prove either the impossibility or improbability of a revelation,—when we reflect on these opinions so eminently favorable to the idea of the intervention of God, as directing and seconding the moral education of man, we are astonished and afflicted to find in certain parts of this work, and everywhere in the memories of his friends, his repugnance to admit the supernatural origin of Christianity.”<sup>11</sup>

The Scriptures purport to exhibit the highest plane of human experience, a plane transcending all that philosophy has usually surveyed, yet a plane of actual experience. If good reasons can be given for accepting the united testimony of its writers, philosophy has no right to ignore that testimony, and can only be measurably completed by its full recognition. Such reasons can be given, and have been given, ample, cogent, unrefuted and irrefutable. At least, for those who so believe the duty and scope of philosophy ought to be plain. Philosophy aims to effect a synthesis of all knowledge, and should exhibit the several parts of knowledge in the cumulative order and proportion required by the unity of science. In no other way can philosophy adequately show the unity of the world and of its ground with the true order and character of both. Any thing less than this must be a truncated philosophy at best, or an ascent of reason that never arrives at the top, and loses the best vision and glory of the climb.

The testimony of the Bible writers to the highest experience of the human race, and the implications of that experience, has already exerted the most important influence of any testimony in our hands on the whole history of mankind. This testimony is coherent and impressive be-

<sup>11</sup> Stapfer, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

yond all example, and ought not to be lightly set aside because it conflicts with some favorite prepossessions of the age, and presents an experience that is not common to the whole human race. The testimony, if true, has the most momentous value for all knowledge and life; and the least philosophy can do is to give it adequate consideration.

Moreover, the place of reason in theology, like that of authority, is identical with its place in every other science of experience. The data of theology are received on authority and addressed to reason, and by reason they must be interpreted, exactly as in any other science. But as the scope of theology is far more comprehensive than that of any other special science, the range of reason demanded for the interpretation of its data is correspondingly enlarged. The powers of human reason have never been more eminently exercised than they have been in theology, and the frailties of human reason which the age-long development of theology has exposed are the same frailties exposed in every science. Butler says: "I express myself with caution lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is indeed the only faculty we have to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself; or be understood to assert that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false from internal characters."<sup>12</sup>

If the testimony used in theology has been often misinterpreted or disputed, so has been the case in every science. Such dispute is not only inevitable with the present limitations of human nature, but is even indispensable to the correction and perfection of all doctrine. No good synthesis ever yet was made in any science of experience without adequate examination and combination of some thesis and antithesis going before. The best formulas of old theology and new science have alike been forged, not only in the midst of controversy, but also through its aid and stimulus. The greatest words of Christ and His chief apostles were frequently called out by contradiction. The

<sup>12</sup> *Analogy*, Pt. ii, Ch. iii.



old paradox of Heraclitus still holds good: "Opposition brings men together; out of discord comes the fairest harmony, and all things have their birth in strife." "Were there no injustice men would never have known the name of justice."<sup>13</sup> It is in the necessities of rational self-defense that the science of theology has had its source, its development and improvement; and this is largely true of philosophy and every science.

What sort of philosopher is that who cannot tolerate contradiction, and meet it with an even face, and learn from it aspects of truth that he can never otherwise acquire? The man of science, theologian or philosopher, who cannot profit from contradiction, and will not patiently weigh it in just scales, is not worthy of his profession. The man of science, theology or philosophy, who cannot welcome contradiction to gather all the truth it has to yield, and take his honey from the lion's mouth, cares less for truth than for his own opinion. For Plato, says Schwegeler "the notion of antithesis is the soul of philosophical method." "The only light of any truth," says Ferrier, "is its contrasted error."

In the last chapter of his *Introduction to Philosophy*<sup>14</sup> Ladd says: "Each extreme moreover contains to some extent the corrective for the other. The history of speculative thinking, and of its results in the formation of philosophical systems, shows this process of reciprocal limitation and correction constantly going on. The clear, self-conscious effort of modern philosophy is directed toward a reëxamination of the ground so as to secure, in a more comprehensive and tenable form, the statement of the results of analysis. But it also aims at ultimately combining and

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<sup>13</sup> Sidney Lanier, the poet, reminds us in his work on Shakespeare that music is a result of opposition. "A tense string set in vibration produces music by the opposition of a longitudinal and transverse force. So the transverse force of the human will, acting upon the longitudinal strain of the natural instincts of man, can, when properly applied, produce moral harmony and ethical music."

<sup>14</sup> (1890.)

systematizing these results so as to attain a true and comprehensive view of the principles of all knowledge and all being."

Shields has exemplified this whole process in one treatise, his *Philosophia Ultima*, which, in serving the ends of an organon, exhibits in due order the leading problems and alternative solutions found in cosmology, noetics, ontology, and the relation to all other science of theology, just as the unification of all science in philosophy, or first function of philosophy, demands. For if philosophy is a science of sciences, the terminal form of science, seeking a cosmic synthesis of all experience to determine the presuppositions of the whole, then philosophy cannot rightly ignore any facts of theology for which a consensus of weighty testimony is presented; and must treat disputed testimony in this science with the same impartiality of honorable judgment which is due to such testimony in all science. Nor can theology afford to lose the benefits to be had from a critical comparison of its data and its dogmas with the results of all research, and from that logical coördination with all science which philosophy should be able to effect.

The hasty inductions of Biblical data by which the testimony of Biblical writers often is misjudged, not only by its opponents, but by its believers, and the equally hasty inductions from history and nature by which that Hebrew testimony is opposed, betray alike the infirmities of human reason, and obstruct alike the just consideration of such scientific values as the ancient record may possess. To this unfortunate, if not reprehensible, propensity, whether in men of theology or any science, the *Philosophia Ultima* offers a noble contrast and corrective. And although in the absence of final revision the work may be found to contain some faults of detail, its main argument and function are not thereby greatly impaired for the reader who will be at the pains to master it; but he will be richly rewarded for his pains. The successive volumes of this treatise have not lacked for exceedingly high appreciation

of its incidental values, nor for criticism of its real or supposed defects. But the scope of the work is too large to admit of adequate interpretation from one reading, and hitherto no one seems to have pointed out what its central function and chief value are.<sup>15</sup> Although dealing incidentally with all the larger problems of philosophy, there is only one problem that the author makes peculiarly his own, the problem preliminary to all others, or that of an organon. The central function of the *Philosophia Ultima* is not to elaborate an affirmative system of noetics, ontology nor of cosmology, nor even a philosophy of religion, though all of these subjects receive illuminative discussion; but to elaborate an organon of research which shall exhibit the unity of science. This fact its readers should continually keep in mind. The work is a propaedeutic to philosophy showing the normal connections between all the several fields of knowledge, the right order and methods of research, the practicable integration of experience, whereby the cumulative bearings of totalized experience on the ulterior and final problems may be found; showing how the problem of world-

<sup>15</sup> Yet one reviewer of the first volume (third edition) gets close to this central function in the words italicized below. He says: "Incidentally the student gets a complete classification of all knowledge. The work as a whole is a wonder of patient acumen and catholic comprehensiveness, and might be taken by theologians, men of science, and even metaphysicians, for a joint base and starting point. . . . The volume is peerless in our literature, and proves once more that, in the last resort, religion and science, history and metaphysics are necessarily one. . . . Theologians will not fail to study it . . . but it is particularly desirable that men of science and students of natural history should read and digest this inspiring work" (*The Beacon*, Boston, June 2, 1888). Again a reviewer of the first two volumes said that "in a work of such magnitude, and of such encyclopedic compass, it is easy to misconceive the purpose of the writer, and even to dismiss with a sneer the great enterprise of a philosophical scholar, who, without formally professing to do so, has really been compelled by the very nature of his task to take all knowledge for his province" (*The Examiner*, New York, July 18, 1889). This very just remark was exemplified in several instances, and also the saying of Henry Drummond that "no class of works is received with more suspicion, I had almost said derision, than those which deal with science and religion" (*Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, Preface).



order, the phenomenal and empirical order, precedes the problems of world-ground, of reality as such, of revelation as such, and even of knowledge as such; how this problem of the phenomenal order can best be handled for the purposes of philosophy; how the phenomenal world-order must include the whole range of phenomena known to actual experience, whatever the phenomena may be; how this entire range of experience can best be epitomized on the principle of proportional representation, to constitute a cosmic conspectus, and meet the requirements of philosophy; how following the description of experience comes the explanation of experience in metaphysical terms of the three cardinal problems of knowledge, being and revelation, to which all other problems of philosophy are corollaries or subordinate.

The author does not pretend to answer all the questions that he raises, but to show in due order what the leading questions are with which a cosmic philosophy is bound to deal, and how they ought to be approached. This he does, as may elsewhere be shown, in a way not only more comprehensive, but also more practical and effective than has ever been exhibited hitherto. In so doing, he has indeed provided "a joint base and starting-point" of research as above suggested, for theologians, men of science and metaphysicians. He says himself that "the final philosophy, as presented in this work, could not claim to contain that finished system of perfected knowledge which might be grasped by omniscience alone, but simply to project an ultimate or ideal scheme of research" (II. 4). In short he gives us the right point of departure and order of advance for philosophy in its largest, cosmic sense, whenever induction makes the sole foundation. In 1861, or long before Wundt, he first projected a scheme which should "unite the general cognitions obtained by the particular sciences into a consistent system", in order, with Brodbeck and Schleiermacher, "to make the organism of thinking a true representation of the organism of the world".<sup>16</sup> Thus he fills out Bacon's ideal of

<sup>16</sup> Quoted by Ladd, *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 52, 50.

a Globus Intellectualis. As is said of Socrates, so may be said of Shields: "His grand effort, like that of Bacon, is to furnish men a correct method of inquiry rather than to apply that method."<sup>17</sup> Many scholars might well be employed in applying this method in different departments of special research, or in the wide domain of philosophy at large.

As the several sciences organize particular departments of experience, so philosophy, in its largest sense, must organize the sciences in their logical relation to each other, find the sciences that best represent the whole of knowledge, and in those sciences find the facts and questions that have the largest bearings on the ulterior problems common to all. In other words, the first thing philosophy should do is to organize its data, and so do this as to secure (1) an integral view of the whole field of experience, (2) a proportional attention to its several departments and details, and (3) a clear discrimination of those leading questions which are common to all departments, and which bear most directly on the cardinal problems of world-order and metaphysics. It is said of Hegel that "he finds the sciences fragments of one symmetrical system of thought and reality"; and that "the recognition of all known truth in its necessary unification will continue to be the prerogative of the few".<sup>18</sup> Philosophy cannot properly aim at anything less than a synthesis of man's total experience to find the primary implications of the whole. But the synthesis should yield a just knowledge of first principles, and not be deduced from first principles assumed in advance as already settled. Before the meaning of experience as a whole can be adequately inferred, the totality of experience must needs be passed in review. If any part of experience be excluded from review the interpretation will accordingly suffer. If there be any way by

<sup>17</sup> Benjamin F. Cocker: *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, 1870, pp. 319, 329.

<sup>18</sup> Gabriel Campbell, "Philosophy in America", *Bib. Sacra*, July, 1885, pp. 511, 525.

which the sum of human knowledge can be so expressed as to serve the ends of impartial philosophy, that way should be made plain in a preliminary organon of research; and it is only by means of such a synthesis that "the incommensurableness of nature is brought down to our capacities".<sup>19</sup> This is precisely the work that Shields has accomplished more completely than was ever done before. By means of such an organon the specialist in every science can learn the logical relation of his own department to the whole of knowledge; and in an age of excessive specialization, with its narrowing effect upon the student's mind, nothing is more needed than such an organon in the interest of higher education.

To counteract the abuses of specialism was one aim of the *Philosophie Positive*. The great service of Comte consists in his work for the unification of empirical science, and for the clear recognition of the fact that all science is one. This service is now widely recognized and, apart from the estimate made by Shields, has perhaps its best and also most critical appreciation in the *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, by John Fiske.<sup>20</sup> With all its value the work of Comte is exceedingly defective and deficient, and came to be widely supplanted by that of Spencer. Other British thinkers before Spencer, and particularly Bacon and Coleridge, entertained high ideals of the unity in philosophy of all science; but no thorough synthesis was made. The best service rendered by the *Synthetic Philosophy* of Spencer lies in the profound impression it has produced of the unity pervading all nature and all science; and of the fact that the successive orders of phenomena are connected by a law of development. His conception of this law may be largely wrong, ignoring some of the principal factors by which it is conditioned. But that there is a cosmic law of evolution both Spencer and Hegel have done much to make plain. The Bible also has a law of cosmic evolution, considerably antedating modern science and all too little known, deserving

<sup>19</sup> Robert Flint, *Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum*, 1904, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Two volumes, 1874; new edition 1894.



the most careful attention on its own merits, even if it should be nothing more than an ancient hypothesis of world-order.<sup>21</sup>

The *Synthetic Philosophy* of Spencer was announced in outline in 1860, only a few months before Shields' early pamphlet; but each man's project was independent of the other, and their later enterprise contemporary. Both men had found a rough model for their synthesis in Comte; though Spencer disowned all obligations, and could bear no rival near his throne. "He alone of British thinkers," said George Henry Lewes, "has organized a system of philosophy"; and when this remark was made it was largely true. William James says that "Herbert Spencer brought us back to the old ideal of philosophy, which, since Locke's time, had well nigh taken flight; the ideal namely of a completely unified knowledge, into which the physical and mental worlds should enter on equal terms. This was the original Greek ideal of philosophy to which men surely must return."<sup>22</sup>

But the organization of knowledge effected by Shields was begun at the same time, and profited from all foregoing efforts in a measure that Spencer did not attempt; is a more complete and better synthesis than his in several significant respects to be elsewhere shown, and outlines a grander cosmos than Spencer ever conceived possible. Shields does not offer in detail a constructive scheme of the world, first deduced from speculative premises, now already overthrown, and then supported by induction of the sort Carlyle has called attorney logic; but he shows us how to arrive at a just scheme of the world by the use of pure induction impartially ap-

<sup>21</sup> A good introduction to this Biblical study may be found in a book by Tayler Lewis, published first in Schenectady and London, 1855, and later in Edinburgh and New York, entitled *The Six Days of Creation, or the Scriptural Cosmology; with the ancient idea of Time-Worlds, in distinction from Worlds in Space*. There is much else bearing on the same topic. See also D. L. Holbrook, *The Panorama of Creation*, published by the *Sunday School Times*, Philadelphia, 1909.

<sup>22</sup> *Memories and Studies*, by William James, 1911, pp. 107-142.

plied to such data as are adequately attested in each department of experience up to the highest.

It has been charged against this treatise that while purporting to represent philosophy it is only an apologetic; and even as such some think it much belated. Philosophy, it is said, has nothing to do with apologetics. This in fact is the chief objection which has been brought against the work; and already it is largely answered in what has here been said regarding the cosmic scope of philosophy, and the place in it, and in theology, of both authority and reason. The objection betrays not only a superficial reading of the treatise but a misunderstanding of apologetics, of philosophy and of the man. A brief notice of his Paddock Lectures, published in 1900, goes still further, asserting that this was merely such a book as might have been written by an intelligent clergyman thirty years before, or about 1870; and might benefit those, but only those, who had not faced the problems of modern philosophy, science and historical criticism.<sup>23</sup>

The writer of this notice of course had not read the *Philosophia Ultima* in the two volumes previously published, did not know that the premises of the book in his hands were the reasoned conclusions of the foregoing treatise, and was not aware that the writer of the treatise in his own acquaintance with the modern problems named, and with the vast literature of apologetics, not only old but new, was the peer of any man who ever lived; very well known to be such by all scholars who had carefully read his treatise, or who had been much associated with their author. Whatever provocation for the reviewer's words may appear to a hasty reader of the Paddock Lectures, or the third volume considered by itself alone, no excuse could ever be found for applying them to the main work of which these volumes form an unfinished part.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Biblical World*, Chicago, 1901 (xvii), p. 235.

<sup>24</sup> Among philosophical theologians of recent years no man was better equipped than Dr. Samuel Harris of Yale, author of *The Philo-*

Many calls for a new apologetic come from persons who have never mastered the old, who do not know how very much of it is just as serviceable today as ever, who have scarcely mastered any one of its numerous divisions or classic works; and who, when writing new apologetics often travesty the old. But those who know apologetics best, both old and new, have least occasion to apologize for accepting Christianity in its most Scriptural and self-consistent form. It need not be denied that in the *Philosophia Ultima* an apologetic is involved as an important factor of the whole

*sophic Basis of Theism and The Self Revelation of God.* He said of Shields' treatise that no other man in this country could have written it. This was said to his son-in-law, Prof. Edward Coy, who repeated it to the present writer. Dr. Harris reviewed in *The New Englander* the first volume on its first appearance. Among philosophical scholars of the transcendental school no American was more accomplished than George Ripley, founder of Brook Farm Community, translator of Cousin and Jouffroy, editor of many European classics, author of a *Philosophy of Religion*, and long famous as literary editor of the *New York Tribune*, where he reviewed Shields' work, Jan. 2, 1878. He says: "In the course of his work Dr. Shields endeavors to cover the entire ground of philosophical speculation, and it must be admitted that he has left but few points of magnitude unnoticed. . . . He betrays an extensive range of philosophical studies, a remarkable familiarity with the successive aspects of speculation, and a rare power of perception and appreciation of different systems and theories, as well as a transparent lucidity in the exposition of opinion. Whether for wealth of erudition, clearness of apprehension, or perspicuity of statement no recent publication of the American press is more conspicuous than this volume." Nor in these respects and several others can any issue of the American press in the intervening years since this estimate was penned, outrival the *Philosophia Ultima*. The present writer, who was a pupil of Dr. Shields in the year 1871-2, has examined some sixty or seventy reviews and notices of the *Philosophia Ultima*, finding among the best those published in Boston by *The Beacon*, June 2, 1888, Vol. I; June 1, 1889, Vol. II. *The Congregationalist*, Oct. 3, 1889 (both volumes), and probably written by Morton Dexter; *The Christian Register*, Oct. 10, 1889, probably written by Samuel Barrows. Also *The Examiner*, July 18, 1889. Good reviews were written by Drs. Samuel Osgood (*Evening Post*), John Hall, Henry van Dyke, Sr. A long and scurrilous attack appeared in *The Saturday Review*, London, written apparently by a Spencerian agnostic. The philosophical values of the treatise were discerned by none more clearly than by George Ripley in the whole review from which a passage is here quoted.



discussion. The author wished to show that philosophy must be Christian if it would be just to all the facts of human experience; that it cannot be just on any other terms; but it was chiefly philosophy, not apologetics that he was writing.

Philosophy assumes the unity of all science, and demands the integration of all experience, to reflect the unity of the world and of its ground. Incidentally to its leading aim philosophy must allow and even require a critical defense of any or all disputed data that it proposes to employ, to classify and to explain. Otherwise it would either ignore important data, or uncritically assume whatever may appear from any source agreeing with the predilections of the thinker. The philosopher must defend whatever position he assumes, and that is all an apologetic means, whether in the interest of Christianity, of bare theism, of pantheism or agnosticism, as the case may be. The whole philosophy of Herbert Spencer is an apologetic for agnosticism of a violent and intensely dogmatic kind. He has to assume a kind of omniscience to prove that neither himself nor anybody else knows God or ever can. All evidence to the contrary is either misrepresented or suppressed. Yet Spencer did not state his own case more justly than Shields did for him, who also could well appreciate the magnitude of Spencer's effort and his powers.

Why should it be entirely philosophical to defend a position that makes for theism, as Kant, for one, undertook to do, and unphilosophical to defend a position that makes for theism of a distinctively Christian kind, provided any suitable facts appear? Kant himself asserted regarding these facts that neither their impossibility nor their improbability could be proved. Agnostics regard Spencer as more philosophical in defending a position that makes for metaphysical ignorance and confusion than any defender of theism can be. Frederick Harrison thinks Comte far more philosophical than Spencer because Comte will have no metaphysics at all, at least none visible on the surface. But the Christian who can show good reasons for assuming

an overt revelation centering in Christ is viewed as unphilosophical if he exhibits the evidence of such a fact in an effort to determine the actual world-order and the predicates of reality. Thus a merely Kantian theist may regard the Christian theist as unphilosophical for using data rejected by the first to reach a higher form of theism than Kant discerned. Spencer, who was ignorant of Kant, and rejected important facts that Kant employed, regarded any man as unphilosophical who defended any kind of theism at all; and Comte, had he known the system of Spencer, would have scorned the rags of metaphysics that Spencer retained to cover his philosophical nakedness, preferring for himself a strictly philosophical state of nature.

It is only experience with which philosophy is concerned at all, but it must be the whole of experience, so far as good attestation can be found. All the more unusual forms of experience have been disputed, and unless philosophy weighs the evidence it cannot ascertain what experience has been. The fact that serious testimony is disputed does not exempt philosophy from the obligation to give it such examination, even though this unbelief may be the academic vogue. Philosophy cannot bear the suppression of evidence in any department of experience and still continue faithful to its mission. The philosopher who denies an impartial hearing to testimony in matters of religion has no more right to be called a lover of wisdom than if he refuses such attention to conflicting evidence in physics, biology or psychology. His business is to know the salient facts wherever found, whatever they may be, and however they may conflict with his own prepossessions. He should spare no pains to sift the evidence that he may coördinate facts of each kind with the facts of all kinds in a cosmic synthesis of experience; and it is only by more or less disputed testimony that facts of any kind ever reach philosophy at all.

If disputed facts can be honestly presented and judicially maintained it is plain that such a defense can be legitimately subordinated to the ends of a general cosmic theory. Phi-

losophy aims at such a theory, and cannot afford to exclude from its cosmic survey any facts for which good evidence exists, or for which competent testimony is presented. It is a peculiar glory of Christianity, as a system of religious life and teaching, that always from the beginning it has addressed its claims to man considered as a rational being, able and responsible to weigh evidence; and from the beginning to the present time Christianity, in its Scriptural form, has maintained a reasoned defense of these claims, suited to each successive time and place, powerfully effective in overcoming opposition in the past and in promoting the rational intelligence of faith. "The Christian apologists who for nearly three centuries from Justin Martyr to Augustine assailed the popular system with such force alike of reason and eloquence"<sup>25</sup>—these men began that reasoned defense of Scriptural Christianity, as a strictly rational system, which has never long lacked for such defenders to this latest day. It was not left, as often is pretended, for Spinoza, nor for the Deists, to introduce reason into religion. Athanasius and Augustine were no less great philosophers than theologians, and by these men chiefly the foundations were laid of philosophy as Christian.<sup>26</sup>

Such a defense of Christianity, subordinated wholly to the ends of philosophical research, is involved in the whole structure of Shields' organon, making it the organon of Christian philosophy by eminence. As such it has never been equalled nor approached. But aside from this service to Christianity, and despite some large deficiencies and minor defects, it has not been approached in value merely as an organon of research. This may be shown in another place. On the supposition that Scriptural Christianity has

<sup>25</sup> John Cairns, *Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century, as Contrasted with its Earlier and Later History*. Being the Cunningham Lectures for 1880. New York, 1881, p. 18.

<sup>26</sup> The evidence for this in the case of Augustine has been made luminously plain by Dr. B. B. Warfield in two articles on "Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority" in *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, July and October, 1907.



any good evidence at all to show for itself, that evidence should be problematically stated in any philosophical propaedeutic which may aim to unite all means of knowledge in all fields of knowledge. Some initial hypothesis, or working theory, is invariably required to secure the best results of all induction; and a philosophy proceeding from the integration of experience to its interpretation in terms of ultimate reality and reason, is well warranted in using as a working theory any assumption for which so much evidence has long been found as theism, or even the Christian revelation. But in philosophy such assumptions must of course be used not as final dogmas, but as working theories until their vindication is measurably complete. Their philosophical vindication can only be completed at the end and not the beginning of induction; an induction which shall include, together with the empirical evidence, a consideration of the grounds that may exist for an antecedent presumption whether favorable to the theories or hostile. Life, indeed, cannot ordinarily wait for the completion of philosophy; although a philosophy once reached may greatly help, as it may also hinder life. Life demands a shorter road to truth; and much less evidence makes a sufficient ground for faith in God and in Christ than suffices for philosophy.

In the *Philosophia Ultima* both theism and the Christian revelation in its Scriptural form are assumed, not dogmatically, but problematically, pending the whole development of the discussion.<sup>27</sup> It is shown that these assumptions are made reasonable by the evidence accumulated in all former times, and they accumulate new evidence of a most impor-

<sup>27</sup> The present writer has the author's word for it that he intended these assumptions to be thus understood, as problematically not dogmatically used. In the treatise at large the fact will be obvious to any careful reader; and if any passages convey a different impression, the author's intention would have been made more explicit and unmistakable had the purposed revision of his volumes been carried out. The section most at fault in this regard is probably the Introduction of the first volume, which conveys a somewhat misleading impression of what follows in its philosophical character. This section was rewritten before the author's death.

tant kind by the whole progress of the argument in this treatise. When the author's survey of the sciences and statement of the metaphysical problems is completed, near the conclusion of his second volume, then, and not sooner, these assumptions are regarded as validated and established theories required by the whole philosophical approach to a general theory of the world and man, and ready to be applied to all secondary questions and details of research in every science. At this point ends the theoretical division of his work. Philosophy has been shown as a true Science of Sciences, a terminal and universal science, wherein all the particular sciences are united, their normal and reciprocal relations to each other defined, and their relation to the higher problems of knowledge, being and revelation as such. What follows is a Logic of the Sciences to show how a Theory of the Sciences can be applied to all the details of research for the purpose of constructing a sufficient account of the world-order as preliminary to a sufficient conception of the world-ground.

The fact that the Christian revelation in its Scriptural form is doubted or denied by many persons who have not mastered its proof, is no good reason why a master in all branches of that proof should not show its due place in philosophy. The objections made to the claims of this overt revelation were better understood by Shields than by most of the objectors; for he saw every objection in the perspective of its total history, with all the answers historically rendered. The rational defense of this revelation he viewed as "the highest branch of applied logic" (II. 434), while the prevailing justice and magnanimity of his attitude toward all opponents, the insight, accuracy and fairness generally shown in characterizing the most varied and contradictory positions, have been cordially acknowledged by most of his reviewers, and those most widely removed from him in their own opinions. Regarded merely as an historical statement of the conflict between the sciences and theology during the whole Christian era, and especially the last three centuries,

nothing more just to all parties in this dispute was ever written.<sup>28</sup>

Whether an overt revelation, such as Scripture records, has indeed been given to mankind, and received in the experience of good witnesses, this is certainly a question in which philosophy is concerned, and to which philosophy has already offered many replies. For Shields, the problem of revelation as such is just as much a problem of philosophy as that of knowledge as such; and these two problems are not only reciprocal with each other, but equally related to the central, highest problem of being as such, or problem of reality, with its corollaries in ethics, aesthetics and religion. He says: "As we proceed it will be found that a science of the sciences must involve in its logical structure, not only a theory of knowledge and a theory of being, but also a theory of revelation as consequent and complementary to the other two theories. And these theories are to be formed, as all science is formed, inductively and experimentally; not by any one mind evolving them from its own consciousness as sheer speculations, but by many collective minds through many generations, framing and testing one hypothesis after another in the progress of research and of thought; that is to say, in the history of philosophy as the general science, or science of sciences. Moreover philosophy in attaining these three theories will accomplish her three traditional aims as a science of knowledge, as a science of being, and as a science of things divine and human" (II. 295).<sup>29</sup> It is not strange that a German reader of the *Philosophia Ultima* declares in the *Göttingische*

<sup>28</sup> To quote only one tribute to this effect from many: *The Open Court* bore witness that "notwithstanding this difference of opinion in a point of fundamental importance, we pay, and gladly, the tribute of our heartiest admiration to the sweet purity of tone, the liberality and impartiality of spirit, that pervade the work." In this impression agreed Unitarians, Roman Catholics, and reviewers of all the leading Christian denominations. Probably its strongest statement was made by the transcendentalist George Ripley in other passages of the review already quoted.

<sup>29</sup> This last definition of philosophy has come down to us from Cicero.



*Gelehrte Anzeigen* that "the noble enthusiasm of the author makes a thoroughly pure impression upon the reader; since even though one should find occasion for extended doubt and dissent, one must still be delighted, not only by his distinguished learning, his comprehensive, clear judgment, and his lucid, expository method, but also by his devout feeling and his warm heart. It is moreover a matter of peculiar interest at the present moment that the great problem of this work should have been grasped in America, and particularly by our author, who devotes a portion of his treatise to the indications that the western hemisphere, as well as the present age, can alone fulfil the conditions of the Final Philosophy." That this would prove to be the case was also the opinion of Cousin, expressed in his *Introductory Lectures* of 1828.<sup>80</sup>

What to say of revelation was a serious question with Lessing and Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Hegel, all of whom had their philosophy of religion. Lessing made some good suggestions on the function of revelation in the education of the human race, suggestions which might have been much better had their author better discerned the actual

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<sup>80</sup> A translation of these lectures by Henry Gotfried Linberg, was published in Boston in 1832, under the title, *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, by Victor Cousin. A second translation of these lectures, together with the lectures of 1829, was made by O. W. Wight, and published in New York in two volumes in 1852, entitled *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy*. Cousin makes the whole development of philosophy a closed circuit in three principal periods and fields, Oriental, European and American. He believed that the final synthesis of philosophy would be effected in the western hemisphere. He does not name the region, but describes the conditions unmistakably in the sixth, seventh and eighth lectures of the first course. Shields in 1861 is perhaps the first, after Cousin in 1828, to appreciate the fact that in philosophy, as in other things, America is preëminently the heir of all the ages; and that here all past philosophy must be assimilated and reproduced in some new and living form. His is the first American treatise (Vol. I, 1877, Vol. II, 1889, Vol. III, 1905) after Noah Porter's *Human Intellect* (1868), to be based on a large acquaintance with the whole past history of philosophy and science. On the perennial problems of philosophy he has focussed the whole light of past discussion.

scope and nature of that revelation which the Scriptures report. Certainly that revelation in both its primary and its written form has been the supreme instrument of education available to man. But, as Canon Liddon says in *Some Elements of Religion*: "In view of moral evil revelation must be not only illuminative but remedial." Lessing and Kant both doubted the Christian revelation in its Scriptural form, and yet both men plainly assert that it could not be disproved. In one luminous moment Lessing exclaimed of the apostles and first Christians that the men who thus prevailed must have had a true resurrection behind them to account for all that followed.<sup>31</sup> Can a philosopher believe the Gospel record of Christ's resurrection to be historically valid, and yet think philosophy, which seeks to unite in one synthesis all knowledge, has nothing to do with such a fact? Is not our conception of the world-ground philosophically reached as an implication of the world-order we suppose to exist? Must not a world-order in which an event like the resurrection of Christ is possible and present be wholly different from one in which it is impossible or even absent? But on the supposition that this event occurred must it not be in accord with the actual world-order? Can anything belong to actual experience which does not also belong to the world-order? We may not be able to make the needed adjustment. Many facts of experience, and many discoveries of science, are beyond our present power of adjustment to the plan of the world, yet we must suppose that plan is large enough to include all actual events. It must cover all experience though not limited to experience. What is called the modern view of the world is thought to exclude the alleged resurrection as impossible. But the modern view of the world is a dissolving view, subject to much future revision, like the frequent revision of the past. It is already beset with contradictions and mysteries beyond number, which are freely acknowledged to be such among men of science. The advance of science involves a continual revi-

<sup>31</sup> Cairns, *op. cit.* 180.

sion, enlargement and enrichment of the current world-view. Not a few discoveries have been made which prior to discovery, and even after that, have been denied as impossible on the ground of conflict with the laws of nature and order of the world. The advance of knowledge is effected through a persistent attestation of facts often long discredited, even for centuries before they are commonly believed.

It is said that the leading idea of D. F. Strauss was the irreconcilable opposition between the ancient and modern views of the universe. He staked his whole conception of world-order on this crucial problem of Christ's resurrection. In effect he made all the claims of naturalism against supernaturalism stand or fall with this one alleged event, which he finally calls a world-historical humbug, and which the critical historian, Arnold of Rugby, calls the best attested fact of history. The entire Bible is in keeping with the resurrection of Christ. Aside from the very personality itself of Christ, His resurrection is the supremely crucial instance of that divine revelation by intervention of which the whole Bible is a record. A Christianity which not only admits this event, but founds all its claims on this event, as the first known exponents of this faith plainly do, must of necessity be an essentially different kind of religion, having a wholly different world-order, and a different character in God, from one that flouts the intervention of God in this world as an arbitrary, unnatural, unreasonable, uncalled for proceeding. But such is the connection of this one event with the whole Scriptural conception of the world before and after as to make the resurrection a key and test of that whole conception. The acceptance of this one event makes reasonable, if not necessary, an acceptance of the whole universe of Scripture. For, as may elsewhere be shown, the Bible has its own universe, one self-consistent view of the world, physical and metaphysical, historical and predictive, one coherent and sublime conception, whether truth or fable, pervading



the entire canon of its writings, though progressively developed in them from first page to last.

If divine intervention occurs in a single instance our whole conception of world-order and world-ground must be conformed to that event; and philosophy cannot escape the question whether that recognized instance may not be only the conspicuous illustration of a method that enters into the whole plan of the world. There are those to whom the resurrection of Christ "is a miraculous occurrence which stands out solitary in the long record of time."<sup>32</sup> But nothing can be more unlikely than one, sole instance of divine intervention in the whole scheme of the known universe. If a series of instances in the physical order and in history culminates in such an event as Christ's resurrection, and is confirmed and illustrated by that, then the whole method must be found to enter far more deeply into the world-order than would otherwise ever be supposed. It may even yet appear that initial causality proceeding from the ground of the world, together with the genetic process sustained and directed by that same power, are integral, alternate and complementary factors in that whole world-order which so-called naturalism would reduce to an exclusively genetic process.

But it may be rightly said, and in effect is said by the apostles Peter and Paul, if the record of their words be true, that the resurrection is only the most conspicuous outward sign of a far greater miracle than itself, that of Christ's own personality, or the incarnation.<sup>33</sup> The editor just now quoted goes on to say: "His mighty works were not the miracles on which faith builds its invincible peace; he was himself the miracle on which the faith of humanity rests, on a foundation more massive than the round world itself." But it has been well said by another that His miracles are "the logical expression of his person, or, as

<sup>32</sup> See a notable Easter editorial in *The Outlook*, New York, April 15, 1911, p. 806.

<sup>33</sup> Acts ii. 32-6, Romans i. 3-4.

Athanasius puts it, 'in rational sequence' with that person and mission".<sup>84</sup> The miracle of His personality requires the external miracles as its suitable insignia, to make His real nature and office unmistakably known; and in the editorial, quoted this view is practically accepted.

Certainly no outward miracles could ever alone warrant the confidence claimed and rewarded by the New Testament Christ; and yet if all the personal claims were really uttered by Him which the Gospels report, such miracles are indispensable to support His claims. If they were not performed they should have been performed. The character alone cannot support the claims. If there was no exhibition of powers commensurate with the claims then the character itself is discredited by these claims; which uttered by any other man today would put him in an asylum for the insane. The primary ground of confidence in the Christ of Scripture lies in the amazing and unparalleled fact that these personal claims and teachings, and character and powers are all perfectly in keeping with each other. No inequality nor want of harmony appears in the supreme personality of history, but a perfect unity and self-consistency and proportion in all His words and works and ways, in His expressed prerogatives, manifest powers and actual influence on mankind to this day. Whether fact or fiction, everything said of Him, in Scripture, makes a perfectly self-consistent representation, a single portrait, such as would seem to be its own best evidence of agreement with the reality. Theodore Parker said it would take a Jesus to forge a Jesus. But remove the miracles, and the unity of portraiture is gone. With the miracles we must remove the claims, those words of transcendent self-assertion which in any other man would mark the paranoic. And when we have eliminated both the miracles and the claims, how much is left from which to judge what manner of man He was, and who can tell what He ever said or did? Miracle so interpenetrates the whole Gospel record that it cannot be re-

<sup>84</sup> Hitchcock, *Christ and His Critics*, p. 148. Cf. Orr, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

moved without throwing into utmost confusion the report of Christ's teachings and His personal claims. What then becomes of the massive foundation for faith in such an idealized personality?

It is widely asserted at the present time "that the Christian religion is essentially independent of miracle".<sup>35</sup> Not so thought Lessing nor Spinoza. As God can only be known by what He has done, and is best known in the measure that we know His works, whether in ourselves, in other men or the physical world, it is plain that if by the power of God the Gospel miracles were actually wrought, they must reveal aspects of His nature and relation to men, which in their absence never could be learned. "All that man does contributes to a revelation of human nature in its entirety."<sup>36</sup> And all that God does, so far as it falls within the cognizance of His rational creatures, contributes to the revelation of His nature. In no other way can we know either man or God than by what they have done. Those who witnessed the miracles of Christ saw in them all, we are told, the glory of God. If those miracles occurred, and we no longer see that glory, it would seem as if we need to have something done to our eyes—something prescribed in Rev. iii. 18.

Spinoza had a very different view of the importance to Christianity of miracle; for he said to Bayle, or Bayle reports, that "if he could have persuaded himself of the resurrection of Lazarus, he would have broken in pieces his whole system, and embraced the common faith of Christians".<sup>37</sup> In his case miracle had vital importance, not only for Christianity, but for philosophy; since the fact of miracle, once admitted, means a different world-order and a different world-ground than could ever be suspected in its absence. The miracles of Scripture imply the action of

<sup>35</sup> George A. Gordon, *Religion and Miracle*, 1909, p. 167.

<sup>36</sup> W. T. Harris, *Psych. Foundations*, p. 375.

<sup>37</sup> Art. "Spinoza", in *Bayle's Dictionary*, quoted by Cairns, *op. cit.*, p. 48.



initial causality on the part of God. Theism is the doctrine of a self-determining personal Absolute in whom the power of initial causality resides in the absolute measure. A naturalistic theism assumes the same power in God, but denies its exercise, unless in some connection with the origin of the present world-order; assumes an eternal and omnipotent will as the ground of the world, and denies that absolute will ever functions as a free agent. This conception, it is true, is seldom maintained with entire self-consistency, but in the measure of consistency it has this form. And this conception easily fades out into that of an impersonal world-ground, constituting the sole reality in all phenomena, the dynamic element and sole agent in all action. The colors and shades of pantheism vary like the chameleon. There is always a self-existing Absolute exercising power; but everything done in the universe is done by this sole being, and the universe is only this being in action:

*Jupiter est quodcunque vides. (Lucan.)*

This Absolute, whether conceived in terms of substance, of power, of thought, or even of will as in Schopenhauer, is always, in effect, impersonal; for the reason that, although called absolute, and usually supposed, in theory, as with Spinoza and Spencer, to have infinite powers and attributes transcending all that are recognized by man, yet this Absolute is practically limited to modes of action that permit of no alternative, nor choice, nor freedom. This Absolute is no less fated than its phenomenal products, and might as well not be absolute at all; yet the world-ground, under whatever conception, is necessarily self-determined and free as the best philosophy has recognized since Plato. Not all pantheists call themselves by this name; perhaps few have done so. Spencer certainly did not, and yet this is what his teaching comes to. Spinoza did not, for the term had not then been invented, and probably was not used before 1720. Yet pantheism had prevailed for many centuries in India,

and was known in China, Persia, Greece and Egypt, and far back in ancient Babylon.

Thus a true theism changes to pantheism through the intermediate conception of a God who never intervenes. This change can be observed in historical instances; as in the case of John Toland, to whom the term pantheism is first due, and who, objecting to Spinoza, became a pantheist himself. On the supposition of a *primaeval* theism, such as the Bible writers all assume, though this has been denied—every assertion of fact is now denied—the early and prevailing combination of pantheism and polytheism among ancient races may in this way be accounted for.<sup>38</sup> Nothing can be more natural than the association of pantheism and polytheism with a resultant divorce of religion and morals. For when the Supreme Being ceases to be an object of worship, and is regarded as wholly inapproachable, and usually as unknowable, the religious instinct must be met by other and inferior deities believed to be accessible and responsive; deities that are supplied from several sources, and largely reflect the character of the worshippers. These for the more ignorant may constitute the only gods, while more cultivated minds may regard themselves as irresponsible incarnations of the only being.

The theory of the ethnic religions presented in the first chapter of Romans is in accord with the entire Bible. In the Psalms the nations are said to have forgotten God, whom once they knew, and it is predicted that they will yet return to the God they have forgotten. In the statements of Paul, both in Romans and in Corinthians, the apostle would

<sup>38</sup> Speaking of the time between Noah and Abraham, Orr says: "In this period mankind again multiplies, and is distributed in its families and nations throughout the earth. This, according to the Bible, takes place in connection with the judgment of Babel. The divine providence fixes the bounds of the nations (Gen. x, Deut. xxxii. 8, Acts xvii. 26)." "The period is marked by the growing obscuration of the consciousness of God—that confusion of God and the world which is the root error of heathenism—and the loss of the sense of the unity of God in polytheism (Josh. xxiv. 2). Hence the need of a new beginning in special revelation, in the call and covenant of Abraham." *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

seem to have in mind certain leaders of thought in early times, men professing themselves wise, learned men of their day, with whom a general apostasy began. They were men who had every reason and opportunity to know God, but who, in their unrighteousness, held down, held back, or suppressed the truth—the worst possible instance of a *suppressio veri*; who while knowing God, glorified Him not as God, nor gave thanks, but became vain in their reasoning and their senseless hearts were darkened, with all the results in thought and conduct familiar to the entire pagan world, and too well known elsewhere. They exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator. Professing themselves wise they became fools, so that the world, through its own wisdom, knew not God, became agnostic in respect of the Supreme and must be recovered to God through, what the world considered, the foolishness of preaching. Men had reaped what they had sown, and through this universal law of moral equation God, who certainly acts by law, had made foolish the wisdom of the world.<sup>39</sup> The apostle is not disparaging philosophy, as will elsewhere be shown. He disparaged no philosophy but that which is contrary to Christ, and held men responsible for a true philosophy.<sup>40</sup> The whole Scripture gives the strongest possible encouragement to the right pursuit of philosophy. But on the supposition that an early apostasy from the original faith began in this way, divine intervention and instruction would inevitably grow less frequent, and in time be suspended altogether in its obvious forms while men were still left with the witness of God in their common experience of conscience, the world-order, and the indications frequently recognized among Pagan writers of a moral government over the nations.

Deism is thus the first remove from a true theism. It recognizes one supreme God who never intervenes. All

<sup>39</sup> Romans i. and 1 Cor. i.

<sup>40</sup> Col. ii. 8; Rom. i. 20. Acts, xiv. 14-17; xvii. 22-29.



the post-Kantian forms of naturalistic theism are only variations of deism, sometimes improvements, a higher deism; and deism is still the best name for them all. Like pantheism the term is of British origin, due to Charles Blount, and his posthumous *Oracles of Reason*, first published in 1695. Kant is sometimes called the destroyer of deism; but he only reconstructed the arguments. His three postulates are taken over bodily from the deists, and put on a stronger basis. The teleology of the third Kritik is that of all philosophy since Socrates, shared by Kant with the deists, but again profoundly reconstructed. The three postulates, and this teleology were for Kant the elements of a universal natural religion, having which we do not need to call in the aid of revelation by miracle. In the content of his creed, and the new support he found for it, Kant is in fact the greatest deist of them all. As a sufficient account of religion deism in England had been overthrown by the massive learning of its clerical opponents, the impregnable argument of Butler, and the Evangelical revival.<sup>41</sup> But Kant put its chief postulates on a new foundation, and gave it a new lease of life that still continues. It has returned to England, and spread through English-speaking lands. Its fundamental tenet is a divine revelation in conscience and the world-order, with the denial of revelation by intervention. In all Christian churches, until recently, this denial of the overt revelation, as distinguished from formal atheism, has constituted infidelity.

Pantheism is the second remove from a true theism. In it, divine personality, the godhead, so plainly seen by Socrates and Paul in the things that are made, becomes dispersed and dissolved in the totality of things. The world-ground from having been a qualitative Absolute, and the perfect form of personality, becomes a quantitative Abso-

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<sup>41</sup> As an example of strictly scientific reasoning by induction, Butler's *Analogy* never was surpassed. It is a far stronger argument than Darwin's in *The Origin of Species*; and as being valid from its premises was granted even by Huxley and John Stuart Mill.

lute, and that indifferent identity of things that Hegel calls "the night in which all cows are black". In the pantheism of Egypt a cow among other animals was worshipped as a sufficient symbol of deity. In no proper sense can such an Absolute be either worshipped or known. It is only an inscrutable essence of things, and food for metaphysical speculation of the least profitable kind. An attenuated form of theism may indeed be philosophically warranted by common experience, without any appeal to the miraculous revelation. But theism cannot permanently survive the denial of divine intervention. It has been kept alive to this day among men solely by the influence of the Hebrew and Christian faith in a God who has always intervened, who still intervenes, and who has sometimes done this in a miraculous way.

Spinoza was entirely right in thinking that if the resurrection of Lazarus is an historical fact then the Scriptural form of Christianity must be true; and the whole world-order must be conformed to that fact, conditioned by that revelation, and very different from what he had otherwise supposed. He discredited all the miracles of Scripture on the ground that the universe exhibits a rational and immutable order, to which events so highly exceptional could not be conformed. So think most objectors to miracle, but the supposition is gratuitous. If the world-ground is a rational being the most immutable plan might easily cover all the miracles of Scripture and a million more. We have only to suppose that the self-determining Absolute saw fit to provide in the constitution of the universe for acts of initial causality conducive to the moral ends He had in view. If such acts reveal no less His freedom and transcendence than His goodness and severity, we have only to recall that self-revelation is presumably His end. The fact that such acts are infrequent and exceptional may be due to the moral conditions encountered. Under moral conditions either better or worse they might appear an every-day affair; and so long as human science aims to control the laws of

nature only through their more complete observance, it is obvious that the being through whom those laws exist has no need to set aside the law in order to produce what effects He will. The Chinese say that if you know how a thing is not hard; if it is hard then you don't know how. Nicodemus asked, How can these things be? He simply did not know how; but that did not alter the facts, and Christ knew how. Most persons who ride in a trolley car or speak through a telephone cannot tell how the thing is done, and the best electrician does not fully understand it.

Many facts of the world-order have been discovered since Spinoza lived which he would have thought quite contrary to that order. Human experience is not commensurate with the world-order, and what is highly exceptional to experience may be far from exceptional to that order in the fundamental principle involved. But experience itself is continually enlarging, and now embraces much that even fifty years ago, or ten years ago, would have seemed to contradict the laws of nature. Most great discoveries have been ridiculed when first announced, or in advance, and many long after the discovery is made. If the world-order is God's plan, whatever acts He employs would be in keeping with His general plan; but what that plan is He doubtless knows better than we do. In His own plan God cannot be supposed to interfere, though men are strongly inclined to think that what interferes with their own wishes, opinions and ordinary experience, interferes with the plan of the world. Miracles wrought by the power of God could never be an interference with the world-order, and should never be so called. We can only learn what the world-order is by taking account of all actual events. This was plain even to Huxley who in 1887 wrote as follows: "Nobody can presume to say what the order of nature must be. All that the widest experience, even if it extended over all past time and through all space, that events had happened in a certain way could justify, would be a proportionally strong expectation that events will go on so happening, and



the demand for a proportional strength of evidence in favor of any assertion that they had happened otherwise. It is this weighty consideration, the truth of which any one who is capable of logical thought must surely admit, which knocks the bottom out of all a priori objections either to ordinary miracles or the efficacy of prayer, in so far as the latter implies a miraculous intervention of a higher power. No one is entitled to say a priori that any given so-called miraculous event is impossible, and no one is entitled to say a priori that prayer for some change in the ordinary course of nature cannot possibly avail. The supposition that there is any inconsistency between the acceptance of the constancy of natural order, and a belief in the efficacy of prayer is the more unaccountable, as it is obviously contradicted by analogies furnished by every-day experience."<sup>42</sup>

Originative acts may form an integral part of God's whole plan; and if the world-ground is a personal being this may be reasonably expected. Moreover they must be so employed if God, a Moral Absolute, would make any adequate revelation of Himself to His moral creatures. Omnipotent energy joined to absolute wisdom would employ initial causality when and where and how the general plan and purpose of work required. If such a power produces finite moral agents, and would be known to those agents as their moral original, Creator and Redeemer, no means of self-revelation could be half so effective as evidence of initial action on the part of that power which has produced the order of the world. This has been obvious to men of science in large numbers, and of the highest rank, but usually those who have read the Scripture, as well as nature, with due care. The fact that other men of science, who have taken no pains to master the principles and laws of the higher revelation, are ready to repudiate its miracles, does not point them out as competent judges in the premises. There are well attested and fully accepted facts in every science the full relation of which to the order of the world no man of

<sup>42</sup> *Science and Christian Tradition*, 1893, p. 133.

science can yet discern. But Pascal, who was eminent in science, and also was deeply acquainted with Christ, said that not to know Christ was not to know the order of the world. For all that any man of science knows to the contrary Christ may be the key to the whole world-order. Through Christ, the apostle said, all things consist, or hold together.<sup>43</sup>

Spinoza was strongly impressed with that ethical personality of Christ which is now said to be a sufficient ground of faith; but nothing short of miracle would have convinced him that the Christ of the Gospels was altogether real. The ethical personality of Christ is learned from the entire Gospel representation as it stands. As a mental impression it is effected by the *ensemble*, and has no reality apart from the miracles that support the claims which are ascribed to Christ's own lips. How can the unqualified faith required by Christ in the Gospels be given to a highly fictitious and idealized character, who at best was a deluded man, misconceiving the history of His own nation, the order of nature, and the very nature and conduct of God Himself?

A God who never intervenes for ends of self-revelation, mercy and judgment, is a very different being from the only God recognized by the only Christ we know anything about. Yet many pulpits made famous and glorious in the past by a gospel of divine intervention in man's behalf, are now occupied by clergymen who, in the name of Christ, preach Easter sermons without a resurrection, and view with incredulity and repugnance the very notion of a divine being who by initial action does but exercise the first prerogative of a moral agent, and thus reveals Himself plainly to His moral offspring. The apostle Peter was once believed to have written the words: "For we did not follow cunningly devised fables when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ; but we were eye wit-

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<sup>43</sup> Col. i. 17.

nesses of his majesty."<sup>44</sup> It is conceded in science that maximum authority accompanies the maximum experience. But these preachers reduce to a fable the united testimony of the most impressive witnesses the world has known to the fact of God's revelation by intervention. Some minor miracles they are indeed willing to admit, provided the phenomena do not indicate intervention, but only some products of the genetic process which have not yet been explained in terms of law. The supposition of initial action on the part of God they cannot abide, even to raise from the dead that Lord of life who was ignominiously slain for their redemption. They have no doubt that His soul survived this execution; but so far as they are concerned He will stay slain, and in this world will get no vindication. Their comfort is that as Christ doubtless still survives, an immortal but disembodied spirit, somewhere in space, they also may survive. On no account would they have Him visibly return to earth in glorified body and royal state, for they are not prepared to meet Him in that way. They may indeed repeat the apostles' creed, but to every clause of it give a private interpretation.

The divine agency emphasized in miracle is not so much immediate agency as initial agency. In Scripture the immediate agency of God is connected with all the most common phenomena of nature; and so far as the prevailing language of Scripture requires the only real second causes may be finite wills. The least common denominator of all the Bible miracles is not immediate action, but initial action. Initial causality is always represented as revealing, in a way that otherwise could not clearly be revealed, the transcendent freedom and power and the mind of God, but never represented as opposed to the order of the world; while the fact that a fixed and rational order belongs to the world is recognized in Scripture by many indications that are too often overlooked. It is not more clearly recognized in Aristotle than in Scripture. The world-view of Scripture is far more

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<sup>44</sup> 2 Pet. i. 16.



often travestied than understood, and invites attention on its own merits, quite apart from the authority which it may claim. Without assuming this authority in advance, it can be gathered by adequate attention, and an open mind, just as the world-view of Homer or Dante may be learned; and but one world-view pervades the whole of Scripture, although it is only gradually shown.

Huxley saw that the miracles require initial action, and that although this means volitional action, they would not necessarily oppose the order of nature. He rests the whole question of their occurrence on testimony, and denies that the testimony is adequate. But to this testimony he gave no adequate attention, never saw the profound coherence of the whole, the self-consistent world-view of all Scripture, its concurrence with all duly attested facts in science, nor its moral fitness to the needs of man. He did not see that the whole Bible is the context of every part, and that only in the light of the whole can a just interpretation of particular portions be made. Yet in a superficial way he recognized the fact that the Bible has one world-view of its own, and of this he was the most brilliant and effective antagonist the last century produced.

In the Book of Acts (iv. 16) we are told that "with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus", who after that event had shown Himself alive to the apostles "by many infallible proofs" (i. 3). Paul wrote to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xv. 13-15) that "if there be no resurrection of the dead then is Christ not risen. And if Christ be not risen then is our preaching vain, and your faith is vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ; whom he raised not up if so be that the dead rise not." In the first volume of his *History of the Church*, F. C. Baur wrote: "What the resurrection was in itself lies beyond the sphere of historical inquiry. Historical contemplation has only to keep itself to this point, that for the faith of the disciples the resurrection of Jesus became

the most fixed and incontrovertible certainty. In this faith Christianity first secured the firm foundation of its historical development."<sup>45</sup>

The whole question of an overt revelation may be rightly staked, as Strauss, in effect, has done, on this one crucial event; and the primary proof of this historical event lies where Huxley has placed it, in adequate testimony, both direct and circumstantial. The apostles, by their own confession, were false witnesses, if the resurrection of Christ did not occur; and not only the apostles, but the entire body of first Christian believers through whose absolute unanimity of testimony to this fact Christianity was carried into all the empire of ancient Rome, and survives to this day. It was the testimony of persons living close to the event, many of them acquainted with the apostles, testimony sealed by the blood of countless martyrs to what was either an historical event or an hallucination; martyrs of the most exalted character, whose faith and example have been reproduced in all subsequent time. It is not strange that Lessing once, considering these facts, exclaimed that the men who thus prevailed must have had a true resurrection behind them. Although he himself remained a rationalist, and probably became a pantheist, he regarded the orthodox Lutherans of his time, as being, with whatever faults, more self-consistent and intellectually worthy of respect, than the rationalizing theologians led by Semler. Of these he wrote to his brother, in 1774, that "their attempts to explain away miracles only weakened their cause, and in seeking to make men rational Christians they made them highly irrational philosophers".<sup>46</sup>

The new rationalists say that the old rationalism was deadly to ideals;<sup>47</sup> but an hundred years after these words of Lessing, Strauss had reached the same conclusion regarding the new rationalists that Lessing had expressed about

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in R. S. Storrs' *Divine Origin of Christianity Seen from its Historical Effects*, 1884, p. 636.

<sup>46</sup> Quoted from Cairns, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>47</sup> Edward C. Moore, *An Outline of the History of Christian Thought Since Kant*, 1912, p. 34.

the old. In 1873, in *The Old and New Faith*, Strauss said that "if the old faith is absurd so is the modernized, that of the Protestanten Verein and the Jena Declarationists. The old Bible faith only contradicted reason, not itself. The new contradicts itself in all its parts."<sup>48</sup> In the opinion of Strauss the old Bible faith contradicts reason because it asserts miracle, or a divine revelation by intervention. But the new Bible faith, which was only a new rationalism, was full of compromise, and haggled over the resurrection; and Strauss had no doubt that all Scripture stood or fell with this event. He saw that the Bible presents a single world-view of its own, which view he considered utterly irreconcilable with the view he supposed modern science to require.

Kant held to the culpable sinfulness of all mankind, beginning in a wilful lapse from normal; the original moral state having been normal; he also held to the absolute sinlessness of Christ—two conceptions with large implications for revelation, to be elsewhere considered. Fichte began his career by composing in an eight day's fury a *Kritik of all Revelation*, to show how unnecessary and incredible was the kind of revelation which the Bible pretends to report. But he lived to acknowledge that reason has need of some such testimony as we find in Scripture, and to say that "a Higher Being undertook the charge of the first members of the human race, just as an old and venerable document, containing the deepest and sublimest truths, represents him to have done; and to this testimony all philosophy must in the end revert".<sup>49</sup> Schelling spent long, silent years repenting the incontinent pantheism of his youth, and then trying to restate in terms of supernatural revelation the naturalistic speculations of his untempered days.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Cairns, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

<sup>49</sup> Quoted by Theodor Christlieb in *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, 1874, p. 79.

<sup>50</sup> Perhaps no American scholar has been more intimately acquainted with Schellings' early and late product than Henry B. Smith, whose article on Schelling is superior to most short estimates of this thinker. Cf. *Appleton's New American Encyclopedia*, "Schelling."



Hegel makes so vast demands on patience before he can be rightly understood that he has been amply repaid, with misunderstanding. And yet those who have studied him most deeply seem to find him the most fecundative and illuminative mind of the century past. The Bible itself is much misunderstood for want of patience, and is not so foolish a book as it has frequently been made to look. Stirling, the British expositor of Hegel, asserts that "Hegel, all consideration of his principle and method apart, has produced on all human interests, theoretical, practical, and aesthetic,<sup>51</sup> a body of generalized knowledge, which for comprehensiveness and accuracy, for power of penetration and power of reduction, has never been approached."<sup>52</sup> Such a man's view of revelation ought to be considered. It is certain that Hegel reacted from some revolutionary ideals of his own youth, and current in that time. He became a defender of the established church and state, viewed not only as a necessity to the social order, but as a legitimate expression of the reason that constitutes the cosmic order. In politics he was a liberal conservative, advocating constitutional government; and in all things state and church and doctrine he emphasized the value of order and organization.

Hegel is commonly called a pantheist; but he was not so regarded by his own family, nor by the students who stood nearest to him in his later years, who were best acquainted with his total output, who edited his complete works and wrote his life.<sup>53</sup> All these, and several of his first and best

<sup>51</sup> Following the Kantian division of knowledge in the three *Kritiken*.

<sup>52</sup> Schwegler's *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*, translated by J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1868, p. 465.

<sup>53</sup> *The Life of Hegel* by Rosenkranz appeared first in 1844; and in 1848 was the basis of an admirable account of the life and character of the philosopher, by James W. Alexander, in *The Princeton Review*. The same year, 1848, saw published the first intelligent accounts in this country of Hegel's philosophy. One was a volume by J. B. Stallo, a political exile from Germany, who many years later was American minister to Italy. It was called *General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature*. The second account was prepared anonymously by Henry B. Smith for a volume by Frederick H. Hedge, on *Prose Writers of Germany*. Dr. Hedge of Harvard, himself a highly proficient scholar in the literature of Germany, asked Dr. Smith to prepare this section on

expositors in Great Britain and this country, with Vera the Italian, have considered Hegel as being not only a theist, but fundamentally and sincerely Christian in his convictions and philosophy. His system and significance as a whole can never be comprehended from the isolated study of a part, nor from those interpretations which he would have rejected altogether, and did reject.

Hegel broke with Schelling when Schelling became unmistakably a pantheist. He revolted from Spinoza, and set forth Christianity as the absolute religion. However imperfect his success, it was yet his aim to give philosophical expression to some fundamental truths that Christianity teaches in a historical form. A weighty reconstruction of the theistic argument was the last work of his life; and so far from being a pantheist, his most eminent, learned, critical and profound American expositor, William T. Harris, would seem to make it plain that the refutation of pantheism enters as a fundamental purpose into Hegel's whole philosophical task.<sup>54</sup> In his *History of Philosophy*

the express ground that Dr. Smith was then the best qualified man in the country to do it. This brief account of Hegel was read not long after by Henry C. Brockmeyer of St. Louis, who became an ardent Hegelian, and who first interested William T. Harris in Hegel. In 1867 Dr. Harris founded his *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the first of the kind ever published in the English language; and through this journal, became for some years the leading American expositor of the German systems following after Kant.

<sup>54</sup>W. T. Harris, *Hegel's Logic*, 1890, *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy*, 1889. *Psychological Foundations of Education*, 1898. Articles on Hegel, and Philosophy, in *Johnson's Cyclopaedia*, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, St. Louis, 1867-1887, *passim*. Also, McBride Sterrett, *Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, 1891. William James, in *The Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1908, says: "Any author is easy if you can catch the center of his vision. From the center in Hegel came those towering sentences of his that are comparable only to Luther's, as where speaking of the ontological proof of God's existence from the concept of him as the *ens perfectissimum* to which no attribute can be lacking, he says: 'It would be strange if the notion, the very heart of the mind, or, in a word, the concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to embrace so poor a category as Being, the very poorest and most abstract of all; for nothing can be more insignificant than Being' " (i.e., mere Being without predicates). This comment of

Hegel asserts that philosophy and supernaturalism in religion agree in substance and are only different in form; whereas rationalism in religion is opposed to philosophy in both form and matter. He thought the dogmatic presentation of Christianity had indeed become wooden and lifeless; but he strongly objected to a theology without historical and dogmatic content, reduced to Schleiermacher's ground of feeling, and left at loose ends.<sup>55</sup> Stirling says that Hegel believed the resurrection of Christ,<sup>56</sup> and we are told that when he lay dying, like Sir Walter Scott, he would have no book read to him but the Bible. Doubtless his views of Scripture were too lax to please the stringent Hengstenberg, between whom and Schleiermacher Hegel stood, acceptable to neither; all three men teaching at the University of Berlin. Nor did he please the greater part of his American critics in the past, by whom he was very commonly travestied; though some large amends for these former travesties have been made in recent years by some half a dozen American scholars at the head of whom stands William T. Harris, and among the latest President John Grier Hibben.

The philosophy of Hegel is confessedly difficult to understand, and exceeding few are the students who have taken pains to master his entire output. It is better to suppose we have not understood him than to give him an interpretation which was repudiated not only by those persons who were best acquainted with the man, but by the author himself. He seems to have accepted the historical fact of an overt revelation, and this is the prior question in the whole problem—whether indeed an overt and explicit revelation,

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James is the more interesting from its source in one calling himself a radical empiricist; though it might be shown that the idealism of Hegel meant reality and the empiricism of James was only the vestibule to his unfinished metaphysics.

<sup>55</sup> Cairns, *op. cit.* p. 165. Cf. William Wallace on Hegel in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1879.

<sup>56</sup> Schwegler, *op. cit.* p. 440.



such as the Old and New Testaments record, has entered into the historical experience of mankind, or must be rejected in compliance with the strident and intolerant demands of naturalistic reasoning in these days. Butler writes in the *Analogy*: "Religion came into the world prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain it, and even prior to all consideration whether the revelation be uncorruptly handed down" (Pt. i, Ch. iii). "The only question of the truth of Christianity is whether it be a real revelation, not whether it be attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for" (Pt. ii, Ch. iii).

On the supposition that the Christian revelation has entered the actual experience of mankind in the manner described by the primary documents of the Christian faith, then beyond doubt it is the most momentous part of human experience, and philosophy cannot ignore it without proving recreant to its own mission. For the interpretation of experience in terms of reality and sufficient reason is conditioned on the completeness with which the integration of experience is effected. Again, if the Christian revelation, as recorded in the Christian canon, does in fact constitute a valid means of any knowledge of the universe and God, which is otherwise beyond our reach, philosophy cannot disregard it without being false to its own mission. Since it is the business of philosophy to exemplify the unity of learning, to unite all means of knowledge in all fields of research in their mutually complemental and corrective relations, in order to gain a just and synthetic view of the world and man, with an adequate conception of their necessary pre-suppositions in that Absolute Being whereby both world and man exist.

There can be but one universe, and whatever methods of revelation are employed, they must, beyond question, be in keeping with the order of this universe. But what that order is can be learned only from human experience in its total range, and the range of experience can be learned only from

the concurrent testimony of good witnesses. From such testimony must philosophy take all its facts. No human testimony ever was presented so wonderfully united, so morally exalted, so solemnly impressive, so powerfully effective in the enlightenment of man's intellect and rectification of his will as the collective testimony of the Bible writers to the experienced fact of an overt revelation. Therefore we have good reason to believe that this overt revelation is a fact of experience, an integral factor in the world-order, and a means of knowledge that philosophy cannot honestly ignore. Philosophy must bend to the facts, and bend to all the facts, not bend the facts to please our predilections. Philosophy must integrate experience and find a sufficient reason for the whole, or fail of its mission. The largest fact of human experience is Christ, and philosophy must be Christian, must conform to Christ, or absolutely fail to render a sufficient reason. It cannot be Christian and repudiate the world-order involved in the whole recorded testimony and career of Christ. In all the words ascribed to Him but one world-order can be found, one self-consistent and sublime conception pervading all His words, exemplified in all His claims, His function and career. The scope of philosophy must be commensurate with the totality of experience, and the facts of experience from the least and lowest to the greatest and highest must be reviewed in their totality and unity, and in the natural order of their importance and ascent. The concurrent testimony of honest witnesses must be seriously weighed, however strange the contents of the testimony may appear. The sciences and philosophy are dependent on such testimony for all the material of experience, for every fact they recognize and use. This is the only way in which facts of any kind reach the sciences or philosophy. There is no escape from testimony as the only available means of acquiring data. Always and everywhere good testimony is authority, and apart from such authority no science of experience is possible. Incessant use of authority, whether

good or bad, is involved in all philosophy, though the philosopher may think as freely as he will. He is free to choose among authorities, and to interpret their testimony as he will; but he can never be rid of authority, nor rid of responsibility in free thought. Because he is free to think therefore he is responsible, if the universe has a moral order.

Thus all matters of fact are received in the sciences and philosophy upon faith in the testimony of witnesses, all rational insight is conditioned by the testimony received, and all men are free to accept or reject the testimony offered. Even the testimony of Christ is forced upon none, but freely offered to our acceptance or repudiation. The contradiction in this matter between faith and unbelief could scarcely be more plainly shown than in these words from Emerson's *Oversoul*: "The faith that stands on authority is not faith. The reliance on authority measures the decline of religion, the withdrawal of the soul. The position that men have given to Jesus now for many centuries is a position of authority." So would transcendentalist and mystic alike have insight independent of all testimony, experience or reason but their own and consider valid no religious faith but such as one private experience may produce.

Not only is Christ the largest fact in the experience of mankind, but in the conviction of all who have known Him best He is also the highest witness to the truth. In this agree those who during His ministry were his nearest associates, and those who in all after times have made the largest proof of His reported testimony in their lives, who have most completely acted on it and lived by it. All these, with one consent, attach finality to the testimony of Christ as the testimony of a competent witness. There is much good testimony to which finality cannot be attached; but the Christ of Scripture invariably assumed finality for His own testimony in its whole extent, and this has always been accorded Him by those who would seem to know Him best. In any case, the recorded testimony of Christ involves a per-



factly coherent conception of the universe, physical and spiritual, historical and moral, past and future. This conception is supported by the concurrent testimony of all the Hebrew prophets and apostles, constituting a consensus of which the moral weight never was surpassed and never equalled. These witnesses supplement each other in many matters of detail, but never contradict each other in any leading feature of their world-view. All the principal witnesses of this extraordinary group claim an experimental contact with the supernatural which qualifies them for the testimony given, and this claim in its highest possible form is made by Christ.

The world-view of all Scripture is the world-view of Christ Himself, by whom it is assumed, enlarged and even exemplified. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee", He is reported to have said, "we speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness. If I have told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things?" Was Jesus Christ a competent witness in the matters that His testimony covers, and has philosophy nothing to do today with the world-view that such a consensus of testimony presents? Cannot the *Weltanschauung* of Jesus Christ be stated in terms that will command the respectful attention of masters in science and doctors in philosophy today? Is Christ indeed the Master of our schools, or not? When the Son of Man cometh shall He find faith on the earth?

If this is not a naturalistic universe, it is supernaturalistic; and the sooner this is recognized in philosophy the better. Naturalism is not an observed fact but an hypothesis of world-order based on highly contradictory data, yet frequently assumed with dogmatic finality as an irrefutable result of science to which all science and philosophy must be conformed. Any philosophy using this assumption as its major premise is a dogmatic system from the outset in the worst sense. The mark of a self-consistent naturalism is the complete elimination of initial causality from all physical and human history. All phenomena are the necessitated

product of natural antecedents without a beginning, and even human action is wholly of this sort. No event originates in a free and strictly spontaneous will choosing between possible alternatives of action. Personality in the higher, moral sense, has no reality in God or man. All liberty in man is an illusion, God Himself is nothing more than Fate. But the key of this whole universe is Christ.

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HENRY WILLIAM RANKIN.

## CRITICAL NOTE

### VON SODEN'S TEXT AND MATTHEW I. 16\*

The small edition (Handausgabe) of von Soden's Greek New Testament is a reprint of the large edition with an abbreviated critical apparatus. Both the text and the apparatus rest upon and express the results of von Soden's theory of the history of the text embodied in the three volumes of his *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, 1902-1910. This theory is based upon a very comprehensive examination and analysis of the materials for the criticism and history of the text. Indeed the increase and present extent of the primary materials—the Greek manuscripts—have induced von Soden not only to adopt a new system of symbols for convenient designation but also to reduce their citation in the critical apparatus mainly to the categories under which the materials are distributed by his theory. Information concerning this theory of the history of the text is given in a brief introduction; and this is followed by a statement of the principles upon which the critical apparatus is constructed and an explanation of the symbols employed.

After tracing the growth of interest in the authentic text of the New Testament in the second century which culminated in Tertullian and Origen, von Soden points out the fact that the influence of these two men in textual matters was profound. Their text was successful against that of Tatian, Marcion and a second century recension of Acts, though later texts were not free from mixture from these and other sources, especially the free citations of the early fathers, the Latin, Syriac and possibly the Sahidic versions, and from local text forms (lectionaries). About the end of the third century three efforts were made to purify the text; in Alexandria by the Hesychian recension (H), in Caesarea by the Palestinian recension (I), and in Antioch by the recension of Lucian (K). The primary task of textual criticism is to establish the text of these three recensions. Back of this

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\* *Griechisches Neues Testament*. Text mit kurzem Apparat (Handausgabe). Von HERMANN FREIHERR VON SODEN. Göttingen. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. xxviii, 436. M. 4. 20, geb. M. 5.



where they differ, the question of origin and value must be investigated. The original form of each recension can be fixed only by means of its history. Each seems to have established itself in its own region; and there is no manuscript containing an earlier text. The H-text did not spread beyond Egypt; and it has withstood the introduction of K-readings better than I. Its chief representatives are  $\delta 1$  (B),  $\delta 2$  (N)—derived from a common ancestor  $\delta 1-2$ .  $\delta 1$  is the purest;  $\delta 2$  has occasional I and K readings, and this is true to a larger extent also of  $\delta 3$  (C),  $\delta 48$  (33 etc.);  $\epsilon 014$  (W, the Freer manuscript of the Gospels in Washington) is a good witness in Lk and Jn. Others of diminishing purity are  $\delta 6$  ( $\Psi$ ),  $\epsilon 26$  (Z),  $\epsilon 56$  (L),  $\epsilon 76$  ( $\Delta$ ), etc. The history of I and K is much more complex. There is no manuscript of I as pure as the oldest representatives of H; but there are a number of good witnesses—36 manuscripts in the Gospels and 14 in the Apostle whose text is not a compromise. K-readings have entered, but in different places so that the reconstruction of the common archetype (the I-text) can be made without serious difficulty. In the Gospels a number of manuscripts constitute a group, I<sup>a</sup>, very close to I— $\delta 5$  (D),  $\alpha 1001$  (E Acts),  $\epsilon 014$  (W), in Mk,  $\epsilon 050$  (Tiflis). Others show greater admixture of K and strikingly form groups representing distinct types of this mixed text—due probably to the influence of editions issued from certain centers in the fifth or fourth centuries. The later history shows the increasing intrusion of K-readings. In the Gospels there are nine such groups which again divide into sub-types. Those which preserve the I-text best are I<sup>a</sup> and I<sup>b</sup>. In the Apostle there are only two types which divide into two sub-types I<sup>ba</sup> I<sup>bb</sup> I<sup>ca</sup> I<sup>cb</sup>; and there are certain material changes probably due to an early edition of the Catholic Epistles and Paul as in the case of Acts. Reckoning mixed texts to I, K becomes a fixed quantity like H. Its representatives are later and in large number. Twelve manuscripts have a fairly pure K-text and form a group, K<sup>1</sup>— $\epsilon 014$  (W) in Mt,  $\epsilon 051$  (Tiflis),  $\epsilon 55$  (E),  $\epsilon 61$  ( $\Omega$ ), etc. The oldest witness of the K-text is the Peshitta, made by Rabbula (411-435), for what is not K—and that is little—is retained out of pious regard for the earlier Syriac version. From the tenth century the great majority of Greek manuscripts contain

the K-text in a slightly modified form (K<sup>\*</sup>) as compared with K<sup>1</sup>, due to a last weak concession to I. In the twelfth century a Church edition of K was made for lectionary purposes (K<sup>\*</sup>) including a few I-readings and certain orthographical peculiarities. This revised K-text dominates the later manuscripts. There is also a group of manuscripts representing the type of text contained in the Complutensian Polyglot which is designated K<sup>c</sup>.

The text which von Soden seeks to establish is thus the I-H-K-text lying back of the three great recensions. The principles upon which his text is constructed are the following:

1. In orthography and purely linguistic matters uniformity is maintained except when recensions differ, in which case decision is based on the second and third principle. Punctuation and divisions of the text are uniform and without regard to the punctuation and divisions in the manuscripts. Accents and breathings follow the accepted rules.

2. When the readings of the recensions are certain, the reading supported by two recensions is generally adopted.

3. If two recensions have a reading which agrees with a parallel, the reading of the third which differs from the parallel is preferred, with exceptions.

4. The reading supported by Tatian is at once subject to the suspicion of departing from the original text. Only in the event of two recensions agreeing with Tatian and the dissenting recension agreeing with a parallel is the latter adjudged secondary; and this remains the case even when the former reading also agrees with a parallel.

5. When early, certainly mutually independent witnesses—whether they be only patristic writers or versions—agree in a reading which differs from Tatian, this reading requires serious consideration for the text even when all three recensions agree with Tatian.

It is generally conceded that von Soden and his helpers have made a most important contribution to our knowledge of the materials upon which a critical text must be based. It will also be admitted that von Soden has given a good account of the history of the K-text. The association of the H-text with Egypt and the wide influence of the I-text appear to be well established. There is room for more serious doubt however

about other matters of vital importance touching the value of K for the reconstruction of the earlier text and in regard also to the history of the text prior to the time to which von Soden assigns the origin of the I and H recensions. Does I in the Gospels preserve I-H-K better than any other recension? H admittedly does so in Paul. Are the textual phenomena in the period prior to the three recensions explicable by I-H-K and Tatian, Marcion and some edition of Acts and the Epistles? Is our knowledge of Tatian's text sufficient to bear the critical structure built upon it?

It is not possible to enter into details; yet there is one matter which although apparently based on a formulated principle can not but cause some uneasiness about the application of the principle, granting its validity. In Mt. i. 16 von Soden inserts in his text the reading supposedly underlying the rendering in the Sinaitic Syriac,—a reading which is not found in any primary authority. Von Soden's decision was foreshadowed in *Die Schriften*, I. ii. p. 1574 (cf. p. 1585) where he argued that the differences in Mt. i. 16-25 between Sy<sup>a</sup> and Sy<sup>b</sup> show the influence of Tatian in a tendency in Sy<sup>a</sup> to eliminate Joseph, a similar tendency being responsible likewise for the change in verse 16 from the text of Sy<sup>a</sup> to that of Sy<sup>b</sup>.<sup>1</sup> In support of his text von Soden adduces Sy<sup>a</sup> Barsalibi; against it, all others omit  $\text{ܐܝܫܐ ܕܝܫܥ}$ ; then follow the variants of I<sup>a</sup> as if Sy<sup>a</sup> Tert H I, K, the variants in the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila, the reading in the genealogy added in the Arabic version of Tatian's Diatessaron and the reading in Aphraates. The variants have been discussed by Merx,<sup>2</sup> who defends the reading of Sy<sup>a</sup> against the weight of evidence and understands it in a natural sense, and by Zahn<sup>3</sup> who defends the H-text—according to von Soden's majority rule, the I-H-K-text—against both I<sup>a</sup> and Sy<sup>a</sup>. Of von Soden's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Burkitt, *Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe*, 1904, ii. pp. 220f.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Evangelium Matthaeus*, 1902, pp. 5 ff. Cf. Schmiedel, *Encyclopedia Biblica*, art., "Mary", iii. pp. 2961 f. Heer, *Biblische Studien*, xv (1910) pp. 154 ff, defends the text of Sy<sup>a</sup> but understands it in a legal sense; cf. also Jochmann, *Biblische Zeitschrift*, xi (1913), pp. 161 f., and Mader (*ibid.*), pp. 281 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Einleitung i.d. N.T.* 1907, ii. p. 298; *Das Evangelium d. Matthäus*, 1903, p. 65, n. 34; cf. Grosheide, *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, xlix (1915), pp. 100 f.



decision Bousset writes:<sup>4</sup> "I add a few examples of the application of rule 5. To our amazement von Soden reads Mt. i. 16, 'But Joseph, to whom was betrothed Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus.' Here von Soden has simply decided according to the rule that a widely current reading (we find it now, as is well known, entire [only Sy<sup>a</sup>] or in part attested in the Greek Codex 050, a portion of the Ferrar group, Old Latin, Syriac) must be received into the text even against the three great recensions if its wide currency can not be explained by Tatian's influence. This last [qualification] is excluded in this instance since we know that the genuine Tatian certainly did not include the genealogy." Von Soden's fifth rule requires serious consideration for a reading even if found only in the secondary evidence—patristic writers or versions—provided the witnesses are early, mutually independent and agree against Tatian. This can not be affirmed directly of the reading whose serious consideration has resulted in its incorporation in the von Soden's text. It is supported by one early secondary witness (Sy<sup>a</sup>) and, according to von Soden, by a late (12th Century) Syrian bishop, Barsalibi. Von Soden rightly follows Burkitt rather than Conybeare in interpreting the evidence in the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila; and he is quite silent about Irenaeus—a silence which Conybeare's attempt to extort from Irenaeus knowledge of such a reading would scarcely have broken.<sup>5</sup> But is von Soden right in citing Barsalibi in support of the Sy<sup>a</sup> reading? It does not seem to me that he is; and it is quite possible that his error had its origin in adopting as a fact what Burkitt unfortunately formulates as an alternative possibility. After quoting a "passage from the still unpublished Commentary of Barsalibi (on Matt. i. 18: cf. Dudley Loftus, *Trans.* p. 33)" Burkitt says:<sup>6</sup> "Whether this be Barsalibi's own comment on the Peshitta text, or a quotation from some ancient writer who had before him a text like that of S, it is after all a sound exposition of the general meaning

<sup>4</sup> *Theologische Rundschau*, xvii (1914), p. 150.

<sup>5</sup> *Zeitschrift f.d. N.T. Wissenschaft*, xiii (1912), pp. 171 f; cf. also Bacon, *American Journal of Theology*, xv (1911), pp. 83 f., especially pp. 92 f.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 266.

of the passage Matt. i. 16 ff. . . ." The possibility that Barsalibi may have quoted from some ancient writer who had before him a text like that of Sy<sup>6</sup> is based on the words translated by Burkitt (or Dudley Loftus) thus: "And when it comes to Joseph it says 'Whom begot the Messiah'". The Commentary of Barsalibi has since been published<sup>5</sup> and it appears that the passage here quoted from his comment on the Peshitta text of Mt. i. 16 follows a long comment on the Peshitta text of Mt. i. 16.<sup>6</sup> Moreover it is at least doubtful

<sup>5</sup>Burkitt gives a slightly different rendering of the passage in Westcott and Hort, *The New Testament in the Original Greek*, ii. 289, p. 291; but he does not alter the words "whom begot" or their treatment as a quotation.

<sup>6</sup>*Corpus Script. Christ. Orient. cur. CAESAR, Script. Syri. Diapatri Bar Salibi*, ed. L. SODANUS, 1906.

<sup>7</sup>Sellnick, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 f. Barsalibi's comment on Mt. i. 16 is not free from obscurity but its main purport is plain. It begins thus: "Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary from whom [dunkh] was born Jesus who is called the Messiah. But this 'from whom' (dunkh),—if it had not been supplied with a point, it might have been believed of the Messiah that he was born from Joseph. But the point however which is before the word dunkh shows that he was born from the Virgin and not from Joseph. But according to the meaning of the Greek version it is not so written [i.e. the difference in gender does not depend as in Syriac upon the diacritical point] but Joseph the husband of Mary *mw hi d* [from that one (from) whom—apparently attempting to reproduce the explicitness of the distinction in Greek by the resolution of dunkh into its constituent elements and by the substitution of the demonstrative pronoun in which the feminine differs from the masculine in radical structure, for the personal suffix of the preposition where the difference depends on the presence or absence of the diacritical point] Jesus was born. Thus if instead of [the] *hi d* [d] of *hi* Matthew had written *mw* [w], it might indeed have been believed that he was the son of Joseph. But in as much as he wrote *hi* and not *mw hu* he makes it known that he was born from the Virgin and not from Joseph." From this it appears that Barsalibi's thought is fixed solely on the difference in meaning that would have resulted from the use of a different pronoun. There is no indication that he knew textual variants in the voice of the verb or in its subject or, indeed, in the pronoun. In commenting on i. 21 Barsalibi says (*ibid.*, p. 79): "But she shall bear a son. It does not say 'to thee' because the bearing was not to him but to the whole world; and again, since he did not draw near at all in his birth, it says not 'to thee'". Both Sy<sup>6</sup> and Sy<sup>7</sup> have the reading which Barsalibi, following the Peshitta, denies to Matthew. The argument however does not suggest knowledge of a textual variant and in the comment on i. 25 (*ibid.*, pp. 82 f.) no al-

whether the relative particle "d" after the verb rendered "it says" is properly translated by "who" and made part of a quotation. It is more natural and certainly grammatically possible to render it as a conjunction.<sup>10</sup> If the sentence were rendered "And when it comes to Joseph it says that he begat the Messiah", the words would express Barsalibi's summary statement of Matthew's account in the genealogy of Joseph's relation to the Messiah.<sup>11</sup> After his full discussion of this relation

lusion is made to the reading "to him" which is distinctive of Sy<sup>a</sup>. It is probable that Barsalibi is simply following an exegetical tradition (cf. Chrysostom, ed. Field, i. p. 49: *τέζεται, φησιν, υἱόν· οὐκ εἶπε, τέζεται· σοι, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς, τέζεται, μετῴρων αὐτὸ θεῖς· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐτικτεν, ἀλλὰ τῇ οἰκουμένη πάσῃ*. Cramer, *Catenae* i. p. 11: *οὐκ εἶπε δὲ τέζεται σοι υἱόν, ἀλλὰ "τέζεται," ἵνα μὴ πάλιν τίς αὐτὸν ἐκ τούτου πατέρα ὑποπτεύσῃ*. *Opus imperfectum*, ed. Montfaucon, vi. p. 756: "non dixit pariet tibi filium, sicut ad Zachariam". Theophylact, ed. Humphrey, p. 22: *οὐκ εἶπε δὲ, τέζεται σοι, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τέζεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ ἐτικτεν ἀλλὰ τῇ οἰκουμένη πάσῃ*). In the comment on i. 25 (*ibid.*, p. 86) a Greek codex is quoted and the meaning, apparently, rather than the exact wording of its text is given. Burkitt (*op. cit.* ii. p. 190) thinks that the citations from "the Greek" in Ephraim are "citations from memory of the Evangelion da-Mepharreshe"; but this can scarcely be the explanation here (cf. Burkitt, *ibid.*, ii. p. 257).

<sup>10</sup> Nöldeke, *Kurzgefasste Syrische Grammatik*,<sup>2</sup> 1898, p. 288, § 367.

<sup>11</sup> The reference to the word "husband" [*b'la*] in the context shows that Barsalibi has in mind the Peshitta text of i. 19—which here agrees with Sy<sup>a</sup> against Sy<sup>c</sup> and Tatian—rather than the text of i. 16 where the word for husband is *gbrh*. In spite of the apparently unnatural change in the subject and voice of the verb in his reference to i. 16 his comment is concerned not with this but with the meaning of the word "husband" in relation to the supernatural mode of the Messiah's birth. But perhaps this change was not felt to be unnatural in such a context; and this may account for the presence of the masculine pronoun in a text so late as the genealogy added in the Arabic Diatesaron (cf. Ciasca, *Tatiani Evangeliorum Harmoniae Arabice*, 1888, pp. ix and 6 (Arabic text) note; Hogg, *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, ix (1900), p. 45, n. 6. Ciasca gives only the text of A (the Vatican MS) but Burkitt (*op. cit.*, ii, p. 264) reports that the genealogy in B (the Borgian MS) "contains no ancient element of text"). Freedom in summarizing i. 16 appears also in Aphraates for it is not likely that the form in which he gives it is a reproduction of a variant in his text of the Gospel. The context in Aphraates moreover is not unlike the context in Barsalibi. In the conclusion of his discussion of the last section of the genealogy he says (Griffin, *Patrologia Syriaca*, I. ii, 1907, p. 63, *De Acino*, xx): "And Matthan begat Jacob. And Jacob begat Joseph. And Joseph was called the father to [I] Jesus Christ. And



and in view of the context in which this statement occurs, its meaning could not well have been misunderstood. But there is at least no clear indication that Barsalibi is here quoting from another whose opinion had been formed by dependence on a text of the Gospel like that of Sy<sup>a</sup>. There remains then only the solitary witness of Sy<sup>a</sup> and von Soden's rule which specifies early, mutually independent witnesses does not require for this even serious consideration. Bousset's defence of von Soden's text is however not direct. In spite of his amazement he recognizes in von Soden's decision the mechanical operation of a rule; but the rule, according to Bousset, habilites the whole because it accredits the part. But surely this is strange. Rule 5 however does not apply. The part, or the reading supposedly derived from Sy<sup>a</sup>, has attestation in an important type of the I recension and should fall under rule 2. So far from exemplifying rule 5 von Soden's text in this instance affords "un cas important où toutes ces règles sont violées."<sup>12</sup>

In other matters of large import von Soden's text does not differ from a critical text like that of Westcott and Hort. The text of the Gospel of Mark ends with xvi. 8—the variant endings being printed in different type. This is the case likewise with Jn. vii. 53-viii. 11. Von Soden's treatment of the Western Non-Interpolations is discussed in *Die Schriften*, I. ii. pp. 1570 ff. The multitude of errata in the larger work as in the smaller edition of the text is regrettable.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Jesus was born from Mary the Virgin, from the seed of the house of David, from the Holy Spirit, as it is written: 'Joseph and Mary his betrothed, both of them from the house of David'. And the Apostle testifies that Jesus Christ was from Mary, from the seed of the house of David, in the Holy Spirit. Joseph was called father to Jesus although He was not from his seed". Again in chapter xxi (*ibid.* pp. 66 f) Aphraates traces the generations from Adam and concludes: "Matthan, Jacob, Joseph, and Jesus, the Son of God, who was born from Mary the Virgin. And Joseph was called his father".

<sup>12</sup>Lagrange, *Revue Biblique*, x (1913) p. 522; cf. Lietzmann, *Zeitschrift f. d. N.T. Wissenschaft*, xv (1914), pp. 323 f; Hoskier, *Journal of Theol. Studies* xv (1913-14), pp. 307 f.

## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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### APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*The Psychological Aspects of Christian Experience.* By RICHARD H. K. GILL, A.M., Ph.D. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1915. 8vo, pp. 104.

It is the purpose of this interesting and able little book "to study from the standpoint of psychology the mental developments and changes accompanying the various phases of Christian experience, and induced by them, with as impartial view as possible, in order that we may be better able to guide the intellect in healthy moral channels." Our author's leading principle is "attention". "The greatest problem of religious life, psychologically, is", as he believes, "control of the attention." In this he is, doubtless, correct; and also in what might be called his second principle, that attention should be controlled, first of all and above all, through the intellect as distinguished from the feelings. We can not endorse every sentence, and we certainly can not take Dr. Gill's doctrinal position; but we can and we do gladly pronounce his discussion as well worth reading.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Is Death the End?* Being a statement of the arguments for Immortality; a Justification, from the Standpoint of Modern Science and Philosophic Thought, of the Immortal Hope; and a Consideration of the Conditions of Immortality and Their Relation to the Facts and Problems of Present Human Existence. By JOHN HAYNES HOLMES, Minister of the Church of the Messiah, New York. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: The Knickerbocker Press. 1915. 8vo, pp. 382.

As the title of this book indicates, it is an attempt to consider the old but ever new problem of immortality in the light of modern thought both in science and philosophy. The author starts by pointing out that we must accept as our definition of immortality that it "is the survival of the human soul after the dissolution of the body in its full retention of conscious identity". Then in a chapter entitled Intimations of Immortality there are presented parts of the teleological and moral arguments for immortality. In this connection he presents the arguments that if there is a conservation of force in the physical world, so there must be a persistence of spiritual values; and also, accord-

ing to an idealistic interpretation, that if a world with any meaning is to survive, man must live forever. Next, the argument from Evolution is presented. The writer argues that since nature has been at work for millions of years producing her highest product, man, it would be an irrational universe if he were to perish forever after a few brief years. The writer now takes up the argument from scientific research; and decides that since the psychical researchers have not succeeded in "isolating spirit communication as the sole and only cause of that which they observe", their contribution to the doctrine in question is not very conclusive. Having given these arguments, the writer goes on to show how he has made a proof of immortality. He argues that just as the scientist by logical inference must postulate the ether to explain certain physical phenomena, so we are justified in postulating immortality as the only rational explanation of all the facts of life. The rest of the book is taken up with problems growing out of the subject. He shows that immortality can not be conditional but must be enjoyed by all. Then follow discussions of the questions, "What will Immortality be like?", "Is Immortality Desirable?", "Mortal or Immortal: Does it make any Practical Difference?"

After having read this book what impresses us most of all, perhaps, is the wide acquaintance with and the full appreciation of all that is new in modern thought. The author shows a wide knowledge of modern science. He shows a marked ability to take these new views of science, assimilate them, and then use them in a most telling way to illumine the doctrine of immortality. It is in interpreting the new and in applying it to familiar themes that he excels. He not only shows a wide acquaintance with modern thought, but also manifests marked ingenuity and subtlety in finding in these new doctrines fresh light and added proof of immortality. He makes an especially telling use of the doctrine of Evolution. His book is really "shot through and through" with this hypothesis. He presents most effectively and sympathetically the argument for immortality from Evolution; and when he discusses the nature of immortality, he says that according to the law of continuity the next world will only be another stage in the soul's evolution. Then his treatment of the Results of Psychical Research and their bearing on Immortality is scholarly, logical and acute. He gives a good history of the work of the society and presents the evidences of their work in a fair-minded way,—but decides that the phenomena are of the "earth, earthy" and not such as we would expect to be manifested from a higher world, and clinches his argument by pointing out that so long as earthly causes will suffice, we are not warranted in asserting that heavenly forces are needed to explain the data.

Another good feature of the book is the style in which it is written. The reader will never "doze" while perusing these pages. The book fairly bristles with good illustrations not only from science but from literature, and with forceful and illuminating figures. The style is



always vigorous, lively and stimulating. The author especially excels in the massing of short, exclamatory sentences that give peculiar power and eloquence to what he is saying. There are passages of high literary excellence in this volume.

And now we would point out the few weaknesses in the book. It seems to us that the very feature that constitutes the chief excellence of the work (its full appreciation of modern science) by being carried too far makes a defect in the argument. In other words, the writer is so whole-hearted in his acceptance of certain modern views that he gives up or endangers certain truths that are absolutely essential not only to a belief in immortality but in any spiritual values whatever. Thus because he follows the new psychology in its dictum that the self, as knower, is only a series of states of consciousness, he gives up altogether the metaphysical argument for immortality from the nature of the soul. And yet, unless we really have a self that preserves its identity in the midst of all the changes of consciousness, I do not feel that any further discussion of immortality is necessary,—for an immortality in which we did not preserve our true identity would be valueless and irrational. Then the doctrine of Evolution, which he follows very closely throughout his book, often comes up to "plague" him. Besides being an ardent devotee of science, the writer is also a believer in the spiritual values of life. But on any causo-mechanistic scheme of Evolution in which there is no discontinuity, it is hard to see how these high spiritual ideals are developed at all in the world. Thus in his chapter on Conditional Immortality, where he is proving that eternal life is for all, he is forced to meet the argument of the strict evolutionist who says that according to the law of the survival of the fittest, only the worthy will persist, while the unfit will be annihilated. He attempts to meet this objection by showing how in the evolutionary process another law, the law of altruism is evolved,—and he argues that, according to this law which is regnant in the world today, even the unworthy will be given immortality. The weak point in the argument to us is the attempt to evolve this higher law out of a process in which the law of the survival of the fittest is operative. To transmute selfishness into unselfishness even by the aid of the laws of sociability, imitation and self-love is always a difficult, and as it seems to me an impossible task for the evolutionist. When once we have made the law of "tooth and claw" operative in the world's history—on a scheme of naturalism—it seems to me the natural course to allow this law to be operative even today, and to say that now might makes right. In his argument for a universal immortality Dr. Holmes proceeds, we believe, upon theses that are untenable. We accept, of course, the truth that none are to be annihilated,—but we would prove this fact upon premises different from his. He argues, that all men will have eternal life from the principles that God is all love with no flaming justice; that there is due to every man a second chance; and that the purpose of punishment is purely redemptive. In the first place, we fail to see where the author

gets any ground for the belief that God is ruled in his actions solely by love. Surely nature does not give him any grounds for believing in such an indulgent, tender-hearted God with no element of justice in His character; and certainly the Bible gives us a picture of no such a God. Then his principle that all men are due a second chance may follow naturally from our philosophies and from our ideas of the fitness of things, but the Scriptures give us no grounds for such a hope. Finally his argument in this chapter proceeds upon the principle that the purpose of punishment is the redemption of the criminal. Now this idea may be held in some of our states today,—but it is contradictory to the teachings of the Bible. The Scriptures represent God's punishment of the wicked as penal, and as due to their sins. Lastly, in his chapter on What Will Immortality Be Like, he argues that according to the law of continuity, Heaven will be only another stage in the soul's evolution. While this reasoning is ingenious, we believe that it overlooks a radical distinction between the soul's transformation at death and at any other evolutionary step in the process. At death, we believe, there is to be a complete purifying of the soul from sin—and this differs from any other changes that may have taken place in it.

In conclusion, we believe that this book would be improved by a greater conciseness both of treatment and of style. In places the very richness and ornateness of the language are carried too far, at least in a philosophic discussion of this kind.

Princeton

CECIL V. CRABB.

*The Layman Revato; A Story of a Restless Mind in Buddhist India at the Time of the Greek Influence.* By EDWARD P. BUFFET, 804 Bergen Avenue, Jersey City, N. J.

The Layman Revato lives at Rojagaha—the place that the Buddha had most nearly called his home. The story opens with him debating with Bharadvajo and Kondanno, two mendicants, on a very subtle point in moral casuistry, as to whether he should resign his receivership of Royal Customs. In regard to this very matter Revato decides to go to see the King, Asoko, at the Capital, Pataliputta. On his journey he comes across a servant who is being cruelly tortured because he made love to a certain lady in a harem. This vision of human anguish exercises a profound influence over the soul of the Layman.

Having arrived at Pataliputta, he meets Prote, the daughter of the Grecian architect, Diomedes. Then he goes to an island to inspect the Parayana Sangharama (the buildings and enclosure of a monastery), upon which the architect Diomedes is working. While here the young Buddhist catches a vision of an entirely different world from his own—"the world of art". Having met Diomedes, he is invited to visit his home. When he goes to the home of the Greek he has an entirely different revelation of a realm of values entirely different from his own. He sees the novel inventions of their science; hears read the classic lines

from their literature; receives some insight into the works of their great philosophers (Heraclitus, Socrates and Aristotle). Revato finds that upon the dissolution of the soul at death (the very point combatted by Aristotle), Buddha constructs his system. With this revelation of a new world of values and of an entirely new viewpoint from his own, the soul of the young man is thrown into a state of turmoil and conflict. Shall he follow the ideal of the East of asceticism, self-repression, renunciation, of the will to refrain? Or shall he accept the philosophy of the West of Aestheticism, of self-expression, of realization, of the will to act? That is the conflict in his soul. Then there is enacted by him, as by Buddha, the Great Renunciation—and tossing away his gem graven with the Greek girl—he leaves the city and goes back to his old home and his own ideals. But even while at home, having received the vision of a New Way, he is still unsatisfied with the traditional teachings of Buddha. He tries to get peace by a traditional method of the church. And so he goes into the forests and makes use of a certain breathing exercise. But it is all in vain. Impelled now by his vision of Greek culture, he hurries to Pataliputta to find his Greek friends. Finally during a terrible flood he finds Diomedes in his architectural triumph, the Monastery, preparing to burn it and flee. Revato is left on the Island by the Greeks because he persists in staying behind to find his dog. The Layman is carried away by the flood. Later he is cared for in his weakened physical condition by the monks. Here the great conflict between the two ideals still goes on—and this continues until his soul drifts out upon "the shadowy Great Ocean". The epilogue tells us of two Christian travellers who three centuries later visited the monastery—and are told the story by the abbot of the Layman Revato and his spiritual struggles. The Abbot decides that had he known Christ the discordant motives within him might have been harmonized.

The principal excellence of this book is the vividness and force with which it sets forth the two ideals of Buddhism and of Greece. By his conversations in the story, by the incidents described, by the very atmosphere that pervades it, we are made to see and even feel most forcefully the problems of the Indian religion. The great questions arising out of birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation and despair are brought most forcibly before the reader. He is made to understand, as perhaps he never did before, the great Ideal of Buddhism, that, "All our selfish motives must be dried up, our anxious projects abandoned; for these are streamlets tributary to the river of life which continually flows into the ocean of Sangsara." Almost as strikingly is the viewpoint of the religion of Greece presented. We see that for the Greek pain is the "stuff" of which happiness is made; that life is only a happy abandon of oneself to pleasure, with the one great passion for joyous achievement and appreciation of the beautiful. The making clear of these two contrasted viewpoints of East and West, as we have said, seems to us to be the strongest feature of the book. The writer shows



a wide acquaintance with the two religions, and quotes most widely to support his various positions. But he has done more than merely state the positions of the two world viewpoints and give citations from their literature—he has imbibed the very spirit of their respective systems and has breathed this into the characters that represent the two standpoints.

The next best feature of the book, as it seems to us, is the portrayal of the character of the Layman Revato. The author shows here considerable ability as a delineator of character struggle, and as an analyzer of the various motives that arise in the human soul. He opens up the soul of Revato for us and lets us see there the hesitation, the indecision, the clinging to the traditions of the past and the reaching out for new ideals. His psychological analysis of this tempest-tossed soul with its procrastinations and its doubts is a strong piece of work.

There is very little adverse criticism that one can make of this book. We would, however, call attention to one or two positions that are taken in the Epilogue with which we can hardly agree. Here it is said that Christ has been expressed "anticipatorily" in Buddha. Now while we recognize the greatness of this prophet in many respects, yet we do not believe that it can be said that he anticipates the Christ. Their agreements are rather in matters that are for the most part accidents in the Christian system! while as to the essence of their respective religions, their differences are most radical and profound. With no clear belief in any supreme God at all, Buddha could hardly be said to anticipate the One who came to reveal the Father. Since the idea of Sin with the prophet of India is that it consists in desire of any kind with no reference to its being an infraction of the law of God, he can hardly be said to presage in this respect the Nazarene. Then with Buddhism Salvation consists in an escape from the endless chain of lives and in an entering into Nibbana, a state of non-existence, or of "being blown out". It is needless to say that such an idea of Salvation differs from the Christian conception of it as pardon and cleansing from sin. Seeing then that the religion of Buddha differs in toto from Christianity on the three fundamental doctrines of God, sin and salvation, it seems to me that it is inaccurate to say that Buddha anticipates Christ. When two religions differ entirely as to their fundamentals, then their agreements in non-essentials does not render the two systems alike.

We would criticize one other point, in the epilogue. It is there said "that if Revato could have learned the doctrines of your Enlightened One, the discordant motives which sounded within him might have been brought into harmony". Now if this means that Revato might have given up his past doubts and questionings and accepted Christ as his Saviour, then we have no quarrel with the statement. But if, on the other hand, the writer means that Revato would have seen in Christ a philosopher in whom these two standpoints of Self-Expression and Self-Repression were synthetized, then we cannot accept such a state-

ment. That this is his position is practically evident from another quotation where it is agreed, in regard to these two tendencies, "that in your Enlightened One they both must have dwelt, and for once lived at peace". Now we cannot agree that Christ was merely a thinker in whom these two diverse tendencies of East and West were harmonized. His mission was entirely a different one from harmonizing Greek and Indian philosophy—however important such a synthesis may be in the history of thought.

In conclusion, we would say that we would recommend this book to those who wish to get a clear idea of the two systems of thought. The "story-element" in the work is a relatively minor one. It does, however, enable the writer to set forth his position more vividly and even more accurately than he could have done in a purely philosophical discussion. Moreover, it adds some interest to the work. This book shows the result of much careful thought and of much reading. While some few of the chapters may be a trifle heavy, yet a perusal of the entire work will well repay anyone in giving him a clear conception of the problems of thought of the third century before Christ.

Princeton

CECIL V. CRABB.

*Introduction à L'Histoire des Religions.* Par RENÉ DUSSAUD. I-VI, 1-292. Paris: Ernest Leroux, Editeur, 28 Rue Bonaparte, VI<sup>e</sup>. 1914.

This introductory volume to the Bibliothèque Historique des Religions is intended to guide the student through the maze of fact and fancy which religious research has discovered, to bring him into touch with the most important problems, to introduce him to the "comparative method" in order that he may make judicious use of it.

The problem of Comparative Religion, first formulated in the eighteenth century, is, "What is the principle, if any, common to all religions?" The present volume begins with a rapid sketch of the various answers. Naturism, the theory of Depuis, Adalbert Kuhn, and Max Müller, that all religions have originated in the contemplation of the great phenomena of nature, is dismissed, because, as Andrew Lang pointed out, the solar hypothesis on which it rests is arbitrary and the linguistic parallels in the names of the deities is inexact. Animism, the theory founded by Tyler, supported by Herbert Spencer, and perfected by Mannhardt, that religion originated in the veneration of spirits, explains to be sure many facts, but is inadequate in dealing with others and so is not ultimate. Preanimism was used by Marett in 1900 to supply this defect. Other theories lay stress on the sociological aspect of religion, they show how a common ritual with its sacred things binds a community into a church. These theories however are vague in their notion of what constitutes a sacred thing. Therefore our author turns to Totemism, a phenomenon first studied by the missionaries in the eighteenth century, but first

used in the explanation of religion by Robertson Smith. Briefly, the theory is that the same life flows in the clan and in the totem; this life is the object of worship; from it all the varying phenomena of religion may be organized and explained. This theory may be termed Panvitalism.

The remainder of the book is taken up with the application of this theory. The Soul is that portion of the principle of life which is conceived to exist in each individual. The gods of nature are the personifications of the principle of life as it appears in nature. The gods of the group are the personifications of life as it exists in the family or tribe. Fetiches, amulets, and idols are material representations of the principle of life. The sanctuary and its cultus grow from the sacred spot where the principle of life manifests itself. Sacrifice in all its diverse forms is a concrete effort to gain increase of life. Prayer is the oral participation in life. The worship of the dead originates in the belief in the continued existence of the soul and the conviction that it is not separated from the life of the group. Initiation and Consecration are to admit to communion in life; Sin and Taboo arise from trespass on the privileges of life; Myth and Dogma and Moral Notions arise from the intellectual elaboration of the concept of life.

It will thus be seen that here we have a simple principle consistently developed as an explanation of the manifold facts with which the science of religion deals. Each division of the subject is illustrated by an astonishing number of apposite citations. The defect of the treatise is that it attempts to explain all religion from below upwards. This may serve in the case of religion that represents man's effort to grope after God if haply he may find him; it does not explain the religion that came down from above, the religion that is organized by God's reaching after man and finding him.

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GEORGE JOHNSON.

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## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Religious Development between the Old and the New Testaments.* By R. H. CHARLES, M.A., D.Litt., D.D., F.B.A., Canon of Westminster. (Home University Library of Modern Knowledge). New York: Henry Holt and Co.; London: Williams and Norgate. No date. Pp. 256, with index.

Canon Charles is well qualified to produce a popular book on the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament, because in addition to his admitted leadership in the criticism of this literature he has a pleasing style and a just judgment of what the ordinary reader can



best assimilate. If he had confined himself to his last two chapters—those describing the two classes of books just named—or at most to these chapters plus his chapter on Prophecy and Apocalyptic, with selected paragraphs from the chapters on the Kingdom, the Messiah and the Future Life, he would in our judgment have produced a better balanced book and one more suited to the title it bears. When he unfolds the development of these doctrines and others within the Old Testament according to an artificial scheme that is no longer tenable, he goes afield; and when he inserts a chapter simply designed to bolster up the programme of the broad church party in the Church of England (chap. vi) he is the special pleader, not the historian.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

*Our Knowledge of Christ.* An Historical Approach. By LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER, Assistant Professor of Biblical Instruction in Princeton University. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1914. Pp. ix, 166. Price, \$1.00 net.

The significance of Professor Miller's little book, which is a reprint of four articles in the *Biblical World*, is not in any claim to profound scholarship or striking originality, but in its attempt to show that the modern or so-called "liberal" view of Christ and the Bible is not destructive of the older evangelical experience and piety. The author has a sincere respect for "the spiritual power and intellectual honesty" of many who retain the older views, and speaking of the religious atmosphere in which he was reared, he remarks: "I owe too much to my upbringing to be able, even if I wished, to deny the spiritual value of that heritage." While recognizing the spiritual power which resided in the older ideas of religion, Professor Miller has nevertheless found these ideas, he intimates, "increasingly unsatisfying". Historical study, he tells us, "has forced many good and sincere Christians (himself, we may infer, among the number) to alter greatly their views regarding the Bible, including the Gospels and the life of Christ". The author recognizes the dangers to faith and morals which are involved in a radical readjustment of religious views, but he reassures those who may find the conclusions of his book to be negative by saying: "I can only say that these conclusions form a basis on which I have been able to maintain a vital, positive faith in Christ as Master, Lord and Saviour." His sole purpose in writing the book has been "to advance the interests of Christ's Kingdom among men" (extracts quoted from the preface).

Notwithstanding his confession already quoted, the impression gained from reading the four chapters on "The Source of Our Information concerning Jesus", "The Life of Jesus", "The Teaching of Jesus" and "The Divinity of Christ", is that of one who has drifted from the old moorings, but has not yet found any secure anchorage for his faith. In spite of his evident intention to be "modern", we venture to suggest that a more patient first-hand investigation of the Scrip-

tural material and a more diligent reading of the latest critical authorities might have saved him from making some sweeping statements which bear the marks of carelessness or immaturity. It is scarcely true, for example, that in the Synoptic Gospels "the idea of the Holy Spirit is rarely found" (p. 153), when the Spirit is mentioned at least ten times in Matthew, six times in Mark, and twelve times within the first four chapters of Luke in connection with the Forerunner, the conception or birth, the baptism, the temptation and the preaching of Jesus. Again it scarcely gives a correct impression of Paul's teaching to say that "he cut himself off, in large part, from the details of Jesus' historical career", and that the burden of his thought was "the heavenly Christ", whom he "everywhere subordinates" to God, even the Father to whom he shall deliver up the Kingdom (pp. 136, 137). Paul's thought of Christ went beyond this conception of a heavenly being both on the human and the divine sides. Again, of the four Gospels it is said without qualification that "they were all written forty to seventy years after the death of Jesus" (p. 4). It seems to be forgotten that the most influential of modern critics, Harnack, now dates the writing of Luke before the conclusion of Paul's trial at Rome. Professor Miller would place Matthew and Luke "between the years 75 and 90 A.D." (p. 26); while in recent discussion the question as to Luke is whether it was written before the year 63 (with Harnack), or after 93, when Josephus composed his *Antiquities* (with Burkitt and Moffatt). It is an over-statement, once more, to say of the so-called Logia-document that "it is undoubtedly the document referred to by Bishop Papias of the second century in these words: 'Matthew composed the Logia in the Hebrew language, etc.'". It is because Papias' meaning is doubtful that it is now usual to call the hypothetical discourse document "Q" instead of "Logia". Wernle (*Syn. Frage*, p. 118) is sure that Eusebius, in quoting Papias, and Papias himself meant our Matthew by the term Logia. It is scarcely correct to say of Paul that "his whole theological position seems to forbid the idea that the physical body has anything to do with the resurrected state" (pp. 35, 36). It will be remembered that Paul said that Christ was buried and rose the third day and appeared to Cephas, and Professor Miller himself says that "the signs and portents, the empty grave, the definite period of three days, the physical appearances, the forty-day period and the ascension—all these phenomena are definitely bound up with a physical explanation of the resurrection" (p. 80). Paul was asking with what bodies the dead were raised, and when he speaks of a "spiritual body" he plainly does not mean no body at all. It is perfectly clear that the bodily resurrection of Christ, however unacceptable to modern thought, was with Paul the keystone of the arch of faith, and it would be in the interests of fairness and honesty to recognize that fact. Even apart from this passage in 1 Corinthians, other indirect references to the resurrection in which it is spoken of as the reversal of burial (Rom. vi. 4; Col. ii. 12), leave no doubt of Paul's

conception of the bodily resurrection of Christ (see Bishop Ely: *The Gospels in the Light of Hist. Crit.*, 1914, p. xxi).

Professor Miller's treatment of Jesus' own words about his resurrection throws light upon the method of his "historical approach". After quoting the three passages in which Jesus speaks of his death and rising again "after three days" (Mk. vii. 31-37; ix, 9-10; x, 33-34), the author is at pains to add that the verses which speak of the resurrection "merely record what, in the light of their experiences, later disciples thought he must have said" (p. 70). The prophecy of the resurrection is reduced to this, that "Jesus' own thought must have run out beyond his own death", and that he must have imparted to his followers "whatever he had within him of faith, hope and encouragement" (p. 71). But surely the saying of Jesus about his death and resurrection is as well authenticated as any saying in the Gospels. The prophecy of his rising again on the third day, or after three days, is repeated three times in three of the Gospels (Mt. xvi. 21; Mk. viii. 31; Lk. ix. 22; Mt. xvii. 23; Mk. ix. 31; Mt. xx. 19; Mk. x. 34; Lk. xviii. 33; Lk. xxiv. 7); it is connected with the most impressive scenes in the ministry, the confession of Peter and the Transfiguration; it is organically united with the most profound and self-evidencing ethical teaching; and it is supported by other indications of its correct transmission (Jn. ii. 19; Mt. xxvi. 61; Mk. xiv. 58; Mt. xxvii. 40, 63; Mk. xv. 29; Mt. xii. 40). The words of a Lenten sermon come under our eye as we write: "We have no other record of Christ than the record of the Gospels. In simple fairness to Christ we should take the record as it stands, or throw it away altogether and create a Christ of our own." The "Resurrection", we are told, may have been "a spiritual appearance", such as is testified by the Society for Psychical Research, or a psychologically caused vision, the result of reaction from the deep depression which followed the Crucifixion. "For a modern man," it is remarked, "the choice appears to lie between these two views"—that is, between the theory of apparition and that of hallucination. The touchstone of truth becomes acceptability to the modern man, and historical evidence to what is not thus acceptable is thrown out of court.

How then are we to interpret the death of Jesus under the theory, to which the author appears to incline, that the resurrection was an hallucination? "Jesus' death has been theologized out of all true perspective. The unalterable fact that it was the climax of his life of love and service has thereby been attested, but often in unmeaning, if not actually anti-ethical, terms. We do not have to be trained theologians to understand either the necessity of the Cross or its main significance. The essential values of this supreme event lie near the surface, but they also run down deep into the very heart of the meaning of life" (p. 80). Nothing, so far as we have seen, is said about the connection of the Cross with the forgiveness of sin, and we are at some loss whether to regard the words quoted as simply "un-



meaning" or as actually offensive to those who, like Paul, glory in the Cross of Christ. If the main significance of the death of Christ is in the example it furnishes of devotion to the truth ("Jesus maintained his cause to the very end, battling in virile fashion against his enemies, etc." page 79), we cannot see that it was after all the supreme example of such heroism or devotion. The death of Socrates was calmer, and the death of Stephen was more triumphant.

After reading the previous chapters it is rather surprising to find that Professor Miller is a defender of the "divinity of Jesus", a rôle in which, it must be confessed, he is not very convincing. "Let us, therefore, for entirely practical reasons, put forth an account of the intellectual process by which a modern man, with full recognition of the results of science and of historical criticism, may defend his faith in the divinity of Jesus" (p. 158). He tells us that the problem of the divinity of Christ "is, in the first instance, an historical problem" (p. 132). When we look, though, at the historical chapters, we find that he has eliminated from the record of the Gospels most, if not all, that might be the basis of fact upon which an inference to the divinity of Christ might be drawn. The supernatural element is eliminated from the resurrection of Jesus, and "it is not unlikely that he was the son of Joseph and Mary" (p. 51). Miracles, except those of healing which the modern man can accept, are viewed with suspicion. We must not indeed allow science to dictate our religious beliefs, but on the other hand we should be "keen to reject the false identification of belief in the supernatural with either physical miracle or belief in biblical miracles *per se*" (p. 44). Belief in the divinity of Jesus is not founded upon his own assertions, for in the first place his words have been to some extent altered in transmission, and in the second place "it is not so essential as many think to know what Jesus taught regarding himself" (p. 46). It seems strange that in the chapter on the teaching of Jesus, where the attempt is made to select "thoroughly representative" passages from his teaching, no mention is made of Matthew xi. 27f. (Luke x. 22) which, as interpreters of all schools are coming to see, contains the essence of the Johannine theology. Perhaps it is not important to know even what Jesus thought about himself. The inference to divinity even in the modern sense can scarcely be from the character of Jesus, for "Jesus was certainly not careful to insist on his complete infallibility in all departments of knowledge or of life, else he would never have said, 'Why callest thou me good? None is good save one, even God'" (p. 147). If Jesus was not infallible in all departments of life, as the inference seems to be, it is confusing to hear: "Must not our God be like Jesus of Nazareth? He cannot be inferior to him and remain God; nor can we easily imagine a quality of life superior to that of Jesus. Thus the usual form of the problem is reversed. The modern question is not, 'Is Jesus like God?' but rather, 'Is there a God of the same quality of life as that possessed by Jesus?' God is the  $x$ , the unknown quantity which we are seeking to determine, and it seems

most reasonable to hold that Jesus is the known factor through which we are enabled to solve the problem" (p. 161).

But did Jesus really think that God was like himself, or is this an insight revealed only to the modern man? The case is simplified if he said with full understanding of its meaning, and if he had a right to say: "No one knoweth the Son save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him"; or if he said: "No one cometh unto the Father but by me. He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." But this would imply a view of his person unacceptable to the modern man.

We are assured that Professor Miller's view of the person of Christ is "modern", but just what his view is it is difficult to determine. He disclaims alike Arianism and Athanasianism, and while sympathizing with historic Trinitarianism rather than with Unitarianism (p. 154), he declares that the issue between the two presents a "false dilemma". He uses, it is true, "many of the time-worn terms that have been hallowed by Christian usage". "We may call him Messiah, the Christ, the Son of God, the Revealer, the Savior, Lord, and Master" (p. 162). And yet these terms need to be so much qualified and toned down, to be used "with intelligence, discrimination, and yet with a whole-hearted self-commitment", that they somehow do not ring quite true. His minimizing attitude toward the Gospel record seems to involve inevitably a minimizing attitude toward him of whom the record speaks. When we hear such expressions as "God is continually incarnating himself in human life", or that Jesus is "the supreme incarnation of the God-life in man", we feel that there is no essential difference between his theological attitude and that set forth by the American Unitarian Association of Boston (see pamphlet on "Unitarian Principles"): "Unitarians are often charged with denying the divinity of Christ. They do not deny, but declare it. They declare the divinity of his lessons of love, the divinity of the soul that felt them, the divinity of the man who lived them. But by the same principle they declare the divinity of all souls that feel it and of all the men who live it." Professor Miller must feel himself that the "complimentary" view of the divinity of Christ, as his in our judgment may properly be called, is inadequate as an expression of Christian experience, and is distasteful to the deepest Christian sentiment. However sincere and however rhetorically expressed the compliment may be, it is at best a poor substitute for adoration and worship; and the compliment, with its suspicion of a minimizing and patronizing attitude, comes with bad grace from one who really calls upon the name of the Lord, and looks to him with reverence, trust and gratitude as divine Redeemer and indwelling Lord.

There are some good remarks in the chapter on the teaching of Jesus, and it is refreshing to find that the author ventures at one point to diverge from the modern point of view. "There has been a vast deal of faulty interpretation of the teaching of Jesus in favor of social conceptions that are wholly modern. . . . Jesus' teaching was primarily

individualistic but affords ground for, and imparts a great impetus to, an extended social application" (p. 128).

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*A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research.* By A. T. ROBERTSON, M.A., D.D., LL.D., Professor of Interpretation of the New Testament in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. Hodder & Stoughton. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1914. Pp. xl, 1360. \$5.00 net.

Dr. Robertson's *Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament* was reviewed in the PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. vii, 1909, pp. 491-493, and the German edition of the same work *ibid.*, Vol. xi, 1913, pp. 129 f. The present grammar marks an important advance not only in content but also in form. The faults of style which we ventured to point out in the case of the *Short Grammar* have now for the most part been eliminated; the author's short, pithy sentences have been largely freed from the abruptness and obscurity which formerly marred their effect. Still more important, of course, is the advance in content; instead of a brief work intended to be "an intermediate handy working grammar for men familiar with the elements of Greek both in school and in the pastorate"—and rather too ambitious, we may add, to serve that modest purpose—we have now at last the long-awaited complete grammar where the author's learning has been allowed full scope.

An adequate review of so important a reference work would be possible only after years of actual use; at present we can only indicate briefly the essential character of the book.

Dr. Robertson has produced far more than a mere descriptive grammar of the New Testament; he has endeavored throughout to view New Testament usage in the light of the entire development of the Greek language and even of the Indo-European languages in general. In particular, of course, the non-literary papyri are regarded as of prime importance. This thoroughly historical aim and spirit of the book invites comparison with the works of J. H. Moulton and Radermacher, but Dr. Robertson's grammar is more comprehensive than theirs, and seeks to combine the historical discussions with material suitable for reference. It cannot be maintained that the ideal of such a grammar has been altogether realized—Dr. Robertson himself would no doubt be the last to make any such claim—but at least a notable beginning has been made. A certain amount of repetition could not be avoided in the arrangement of the vast material; but the exceedingly wide reading of the author in modern philological discussion has combined with his own researches to produce a book that is at least worthy of careful attention.

The elaborate introduction sets forth the author's views with regard to the Koiné and the place of the New Testament within it. Dr. Robertson agrees with Moulton and Deissmann and many other recent



investigators in connecting the language of the New Testament primarily with the non-literary development of the Koiné, but also admits, perhaps more adequately than some investigators, the influence of the Semitic languages.

Dr. Robertson has in this book made the most elaborate single contribution to New Testament grammar which has yet appeared; the work is the product of a vast deal of industry and reflects credit upon American scholarship. If the vastness of the material has strained the author's powers of arrangement and classification, such difficulties were perhaps unavoidable in so unprecedented and so comprehensive a work. Finally the thoroughly reverent attitude of the grammarian and his sensible views with regard to the authorship of the New Testament books must be noticed with special satisfaction.

The book seems to be admirably printed; such a high degree of accuracy could not have been attained without the most conscientious attention to details.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

*Friedrich Blass' Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch.* Vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage besorgt von ALBERT DERBUNNER, Dr. phil., Lehrer an der evangelischen Predigerschule in Basel. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. xvi, 346.

Despite recent researches, the well-known work of the late Professor Blass is still the best New Testament reference grammar, at least for the average student. The appearance of a new edition, therefore, is to be greeted with satisfaction. Dr. Debrunner has undertaken an extensive revision, and thus helped to preserve the usefulness of the admirable book.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

*The Gospel according to St. Mark.* Edited by the REV. A. PLUMMER, M.A., D.D., formerly Master of University College, Durham, and sometime Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. With Maps, Notes and Introduction. Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges. General Editor: R. St. John Parry, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1914. Pp. lvi, 392. Price 4/6 net.

Dr. Plummer's qualities as an expositor of the Gospels are well known from his commentaries on Matthew and Luke. This edition of Mark, though limited by the purpose of the series, is useful and instructive. It contains an introduction, the Greek text—in general "the text of Westcott and Hort", "but not quite exclusively"—expository notes, an appendix on the addition to Mk. xvi. 14 in the Freer MS (W), indices, a plan of Herod's Temple, and two maps,—one of the Sea of Galilee and

the surrounding country, and one of Palestine in the time of Christ. In the introduction matters concerning the origin, character, transmission and interpretation of the Gospel are discussed. The statements of fact cover what is essential and the expressions of opinion are carefully formulated and in the main reasonable. The treatment of the integrity of the transmitted text is clear and its conclusion sound, although the discussion of the historical problem concerning the origin of the long ending is meager. The section on the text of the Gospel enters somewhat into detail, yet says nothing about the work of von Soden and fails to include the *Freer MS (W)* in the list of uncials—an omission which is not adequately supplied in the Appendix. The statement about the Syriac version (pp. liii) is obscure and might easily mislead the uninformed by its failure to make clear the distinction between the date of the *Sinaitic and Coptic MSS* and the date of that form of the Syriac version of which they are the representatives. The beginning of the second missionary journey of Paul can hardly have been as late as 52 (p. xiii) since the Delphi inscriptions show that the first half of that year was either the beginning or the end of Gallio's proconsulship in Achaia. The passage from Irenaeus (iii.1, cited on p. xvi) is not accurately translated though the sense is correctly given. The authorship of the Gospel is rightly assigned, in accordance with early tradition, to Mark, who wrote most probably in Rome and for Gentile (Roman) Christians. The principal source of the Gospel was Mark's reminiscence of Peter's discourses; but there may have been other sources,—other eye-witnesses, Mark's own experience, and incidental knowledge perhaps of Q. Dr. Plummer does not favor the recent theories of an Aramaic original or of various strata and redactions. The Gospel is dated after the death of Peter, between 65 and 70 and preferably nearer the later date—in which those who favor the early date of Acts and still think of Mark as a literary source of Luke will have difficulty in concurring.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

*The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians.* Edited by the REV. J. O. F. MURRAY, D.D., Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge. With Notes and Introduction. Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges. General Editor: R. St. John Parry, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1914. Pp. ciii, 150. Price 3/6 net.

This is a good commentary, compact but rich in content, the result of long, careful, sympathetic study and presented in a form which arouses interest, opens long vistas and delightfully guides into the heights and depths of Paul's thought. The Introduction is comprehensive and in essentials sufficiently complete. The evidence for and the arguments against Pauline authorship are examined with thoroughness

and weighed with clear historical insight. Details are not neglected; nor the larger background of idea, germinal and developing expression, formal and thought affinities. In this manner instructive sections are devoted to distinctive conceptions: *ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, ἡ πρόθεσις τῶν αἰώνων*, the doctrine of the Church and *ἐν Χριστῷ*. The second is distinctly stimulating; and the last modifies and supplements Deissmann's discussion in certain important respects. Pauline authorship being established, the Epistle belongs in the group with Col. and Philm., probably later than Phil.; was written from Rome—the Ephesian imprisonment hypothesis of Deissmann and others is improbable—and sent as a circular letter—a “pastoral”—to predominantly Gentile churches in the Lycus valley including Ephesus. The effect of the Epistle is traced in 1 Pet. and the Apoc. and certain Johannine affinities are pointed out. The text adopted is that of Westcott and Hort; but the variants in von Soden's text are recorded, analysed and estimated. Compared with the text of W-H, von Soden's has twenty-two variants; of these eight are marginal readings of W-H; fourteen are passed over by W-H, for three of which von Soden has the support of Tischendorf, leaving eleven that are new. The conclusion of the textual discussion is stated thus (pp. xcivf): “When we survey the series as a whole there can be no doubt that the ‘internal evidence of readings’ is distinctly unfavorable to the genuineness of the new readings. If they are a fair sample of the result of the application of von Soden's principles, his work will prove of far more value as a collection of materials for Textual Criticism than as a guide to the formation of a sounder Text.” The exegetical notes are brief but clear. Here also the plan of the Introduction has been followed with advantage and Additional Notes of greater length are devoted to *χάρις, οἰκονομία-οἰκονόμος, τὸ αἷμα τοῦ χριστοῦ, ὁ πατήρ τῆς δόξης, πλήρωμα, ἐνεργεῖν-ἐνεργεῖσθαι, σφραγίζεσθαι, ὁ χριστός*, and the Sources of St. Paul's Teaching with regard to the Place of the Unity of the Church among the Objects of the Passion. A list of words and indices, English, Greek and Hebrew, conclude the volume.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

*Jesus and the Future.* By EDWARD WILLIAM WINSTANLEY, Trinity College, Cambridge. VI., 415 p. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913.

Dr. Winstanley's book has developed from a series of lecture-sermons. Originally attributing the apocalyptic element in the eschatology of Jesus to the misunderstanding of the reporters the author has, since the study was begun, abandoned his former view and come to regard this element as authentic, representing the actual setting of Jesus' teaching. This change of view has not been without its influence on the author's work as it lies before us. For the new position cannot be said to have been consistently maintained. Repeatedly the author is obliged to make, in what the Synoptists report as



Jesus' words, allowance for the prepossession of their up-bringing, for "the crude apocalyptic tendencies" of a Matthew.

Winstanley covers in his book the following subjects: The Kingdom of God, The Son of Man, Resurrection and Life, Judgment and its Issues, Eschatological Teaching as a Whole, The Johannine Interpretation, and Some Practical Reflections. A word on these to illustrate some of his conclusions. With regard to the Kingdom of God Winstanley holds that Jesus did not conceive of it as present but future. At most it is only potentially present. Passages which imply its actual existence Winstanley interprets as having reference to the ethical characteristics of those fitted for citizenship, or else they are shown to be not in harmony with the general trend of Jesus' teaching. The title Son of Man Dr. Winstanley will not attribute to the reflection of the early church but believes Jesus used and applied it to Himself. It is Messianic, though in the early chapters of Mark it simply means "man". In the passage in which Jesus declares as Son of Man to be Lord even of the Sabbath, the distinction between man and Son of Man would "in the original conversation be pointless". As to the Resurrection Winstanley observes that "the only resurrection worthy of the name is that of the just". The term "eternal" is said to be nowhere predicated of the existence of the wicked.

Great value, according to the author, attaches to the Johannine Gospel. It is a revelation on a grand scale of the Synoptic teachings. Eschatology has almost vanished from it. The idea of a future kingdom as adopted by our Lord, John, we are told, rejects, and the religious, philosophical term Life, a present not a future reality, takes its place. The passage: "They that have done good shall come forth unto the resurrection of life" Winstanley calls "inconsistent and probably secondary". The same transmutation of time-conception, we are told, has taken place with reference to the title Son of Man, Judgment, etc. This brings us to the author's last chapter containing his practical reflections. The real importance of Winstanley's book is to be found here. He continues the alleged revaluation of the Gospel by the Fourth Evangelist and brings it up to date by reinterpreting the Gospel for the modern man with his modern evolutionary world-view. Dr. Winstanley undertakes to show what is the *bleibende Bedeutung* of the Gospel. He succeeds in a measure, and a great deal of what he says is excellent and to the point, but the Gospel has become a *ἑτέρον εὐαγγέλιον*.

Grand Rapids, Mich.

R. JANSSEN.

*Christ the Creative Ideal.* Studies in Colossians and Ephesians. By REV. W. L. WALKER. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1913. vi, 236.

A well-written book, its capable author moving with ease in the theological and philosophical literature, particularly of the liberal type, familiarizing us with his non-materialistic evolutionary views, with

the present state of religious unrest, a faith that has suffered shipwreck or else has come to regard the traditional conception of Christ and Christianity as out of harmony with scientific truth, attempting to modernize the teachings doctrinal and practical of Colossians and Ephesians to meet the needs of those adrift on dark and stormy waters—all this and more Walker's book stands for. Let us see what are some of the teachings it brings. With reference to Walker's view of Christ we are assured that as a certain lower life culminated in man, so a certain human life culminated in Him. It is as the *true man* that His claim on our attention consists. If He is thus held forth we shall have a revival of religion. The Divine working had reached its destined goal in His organism, as it has not reached in ours. It is just this difference between Christ and us—not in respect of the ideal of our life, but of its attainments. Still Walker does not consider it possible that as evolution proceeds more Christs may appear. Why? Because God has in Christ attained the ideal and has returned to Himself. [The author warns us elsewhere, p. 189, that His being absorbed in the Deity must not be taken in a pantheistic sense.] But may we not conceive of God as reappearing for a higher reason still, in a higher human form, meeting still higher needs? As to Christ's resurrection we are told that "it is impossible for us to conceive of Him as being at once Divine and permanently embodied", page 123. The account of the bodily ascension at the end of Mk. "does not belong to that Gospel", the closing verses of Luke are "omitted by some ancient authorities", and the narrative in the opening chapter of Acts is of "too dubious authority to be founded on". Christ put off that body and the Church is henceforth His body. Such a resurrection as the early Christians believed in does "not commend itself to our minds today". "In these Epistles there is no mention of a resurrection of Christians". As to the author's views on life after death—divine grace is operating in the world beyond, page 209. Even we who believe shall need the further action of grace after death. An element of that "glory" into which Christ has entered is likely this: to bring those who have died, the lost, to God. "All have been representatively reconciled in Christ and all shall yet be so in actual fact", and these all include men and angels. Satan and his throng? It would also seem that Walker is inclined to take the view that in the distant ages the animal world will approach to personality.

*Grand Rapids, Mich.*

R. JANSSEN.

*John Baptist and His Relation to Jesus.* By ALBAN BLAKISTON, M.A.  
J. & J. Bennett Ltd., London. Pp. 273.

The question which Blakiston attempts to answer in this book is "What was John Baptist's place in History?" The assumption is made at the outset that students of Christian origins have not been prepared to accord to the Baptist the place he deserves. The real

cause of this, it is held, is in the Biblical record itself, which purposely seeks to obscure the Baptist's character. This tendency discoverable in the sources, the author thinks, is made the more probable by the existence of a Baptist sect in conflict with the early Christian Church upon a most fundamental point of her teaching.

Blakiston takes the central incident of the Baptist, John's meeting with Jesus, as the starting-point for his study, working from there both backwards and forwards. In the preaching of John he thinks almost the sole factor is that of repentance, Matthew's "For the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand" being editorial. Confession of sin is made to *precede* the rite of baptism. This is stated with great confidence, cf. pages 16, 25, 46. It might be well to point out here that the Synoptic record nowhere thus represents it. The participle employed is the present *ἡμετέρας*, and follows *ἡμετέρας* in all the passages in which it occurs. It would seem that the being baptised constituted itself a confession of sin.

We next have a chapter on John's religious genius. The discussion here is based mainly on the passage dealing with the question of fasting. What Jesus says in this connection is meant, we are told, to bring out the contrast in spirit between Himself and the Baptist, the latter as well as the Pharisees adhering to a system of religious ideas that is outworn. Blakiston incidentally remarks that Matthew represents John as himself sending his disciples to put the question to Jesus. This I think is purely an assumption not even suggested in Matthew's gospel. Luke's addition: "No man having drunk old wine, etc.", is to be considered in the light of "an apologia for the Baptist, indicating that Jesus and his forerunner are parting company."

A further chapter takes up the question of John and the Elijah. Blakiston first prepares an expurgated text (Matt.) removing what he regards as editorial additions or as resting on ill-founded tradition, and then reaches the conclusion that John's being the Elijah—the Baptist, according to Blakiston was not proclaimed Elijah during his lifetime either by the people, his own disciples, or Jesus—was both his strength and his weakness. The victim of his preconceptions and doubting Jesus' Messiahship he remained less than "he that is but little in the Kingdom of Heaven". The author's interpretation of "and wisdom is justified, etc." is novel to say the least. "Wisdom", it is held, refers to the self-sufficient righteousness of the Pharisees, and "her children", consequently, to those whose frame of mind is just this righteousness.

The other chapters of the book are The Antecedent of the Baptist, The Evidence of the Fourth Gospel, John and the Baptists in the Acts, The Growth of the Baptist sect, The Political, Social, and Religious Background, and The Life of John Baptist. A word or two on these must suffice here. The Gospels' story of John's infancy is not to be regarded as history but of the nature of a beautiful idyll. The



Baptist's prophetic career previous to "his new enterprise" of heralding the greater Prophet extended over several years. In the Fourth Gospel some undesigned contradictions enable us to disengage the figure of the Baptist from the setting in which he is placed. Blakiston is puzzled over the fact that John's denying that he is the Elijah and his claim that he is "the voice, etc." is in accord with the historical data of the Synoptists. On the whole the treatment of the person of John is idealistic in the Fourth Gospel and at the expense of history. In the Acts Blakiston finds verification of his previous conjectures, such *e.g.* as that neither Jesus nor His disciples baptized during his lifetime—the *argumentum e silentio* of the Synoptists, we are told, pointed to the same conclusion—and that this absence of this supposed Messianic trait in Jesus was the real cause of the Baptist's doubt. Further, the case of Apollos is said to prove, as was the author's previous contention, the rise of a wide-spreading body of disciples of John. At Corinth may have been the chief center of the Baptists, but they as yet did not identify the Baptist with the Messiah. The Hemerobaptists and Dositheans, whose origin is to be traced back to John, regarded their founder as the Messiah.

The author's theological position, as is apparent from the above notices, is thoroughly "modern". From this standpoint the book, it must be owned, has considerable merit. It breathes the spirit of research. It is, furthermore, well written and throughout stimulating. Very few corrigenda occur in the main part of the book. חֲזָקָה, page 90 is of course a typographical error. In the Appended Notes which cover over fifty pages mistakes are somewhat more frequent in the quotations from the Greek sources.

*Grand Rapids, Mich.*

R. JANSSEN.

*The Distinctive Ideas of Jesus.* By CHARLES CARROLL ALBERTSON, Minister of the Lafayette Avenue Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1914. Pp. 148. 75 cents.

Dr. Albertson is known as a man of broad culture, an eloquent preacher and a Bible student of insight, and in the present little volume he has given us in an attractive style the fruit of his thought and study.

The distinctive ideas of Jesus, presented in a popular rather than an academic form, are God's Solicitous Fatherhood (God seeking the lost), Humanity's Eternal Value (the value of that which is lost), Jesus Christ's Mediatorial Ministry (the method by which the lost may be restored), The New Birth of Manhood (the new life of the returned prodigal), Love as the Law of the New Man (the supreme motive of the restored and reborn), and the Unbroken Continuity of Life (immortal fellowship with God). The treatment of these themes is suggestive rather than exhaustive, but the points are well made, and the author's choice of illustrations and quotations is especially

happy. A comparison between Christianity and other religions is prominent throughout the discussion. The chapter on "New Life from God" shows the author's insight, and closes with the statement that "the spaciousness and beauty of that new life in God to which we are called may only be imagined by the amplex, and glory of His life through Whom we enter into the life of God."

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

*The Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Including Its Relation to the Developing Christology of the Primitive Church.* By HARRIS LACHLAN MACNEILL, PH.D., Professor of New Testament Language and Literature, Brandon College, Brandon, Manitoba. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament. Second Series. Vol. II, Part 4).

Dr. MacNeill offers us in this monograph a very thorough, almost exhaustive, study of the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The discussion draws within its scope practically the whole teaching content of the Epistle, since it is all more or less closely related to the Christology. Hence not merely the student of Christology but also the student of the Epistle in general will find much in it that is clarifying and helpful. The author is thoroughly familiar with the older and more recent work done in the exposition of Hebrews and admirably succeeds in organizing and presenting his material. That he does not fully succeed in reproducing the peculiar Christological idiosyncrasy of the Epistle is due not to any defect in his work, but rather to the method of approach pursued. In Hebrews the Christological element is not the dominant element: it is shaped by the soteriological element rather than that it shapes the latter. To understand the document fully it would be necessary to bring out how such a Christology was bound to arise out of such a general milieu of teaching. While good remarks to this effect are scattered through the discussion, the total impression produced in this line is not sufficient. We also must consider it a drawback that the exposition has been worked into an a priori scheme of the development of Christology in the primitive church as the sub-title indicates. This scheme is nothing but the old liberal scheme according to which the sonship of Jesus was at the first purely ethico-religious or at the most Messianic, and that the transcendental aspect which it bears in most of the New Testament writings shows the result of a gradual deifying process. For Hebrews this has the result that the author of the Epistle is credited with a reluctance explicitly to apply the term "Son" to the pre-existent state. Also a tendency is discovered to emphasize the true humanity of Jesus as counterbalancing the transcendental aspect of His person, somewhat after the manner in which the Synoptical Gospels are believed to have conserved the true human Christ to the

church. We confess that of a reluctance to carry the sonship back into the pre-incarnate and pre-mundane life of the Saviour we are unable to find any trace in the Epistle. On the contrary the document appears to us in this aspect even more explicit and emphatic than the Pauline teaching. And as to the emphasis on the identification of Christ with human nature, this also is motivated not by any desire to tear down or offset the divine aspect, but arises purely from soteriological considerations, both the human and the divine natures being essential to the Savior's revealing and priestly function. The modern aversion to finding the doctrine of the two natures in the New Testament can not but obscure the facts especially where a writing like Hebrews with pronounced theological proclivities is concerned. Why the coördination of the two natures should have been more impossible to the writer than to coördination of the two offices of revealer and priest which he consciously makes in several passages, it would be hard to explain.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

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## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*Die ältesten Apologeten.* Texte mit kurzen Einleitungen herausgegeben von EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1915. Pp. xi, 380. Price 7.40 M.; gbd. 8.40 M.

The editor of the *Index Patristicus* and the *Index Apologeticus*, both indispensable, has now issued an edition of the early Apologists, giving a critical text with brief apparatus and literary references. It contains the following: Quadratus, Fragmentum; Aristides, Apologia; Justinus, Apologia; Justinus, Appendix; Justinus, Dialogus; Tatianus, Oratio ad Graecos; Melito, Fragmenta; Athenagoras, Supplicatio pro Christianis; together with an index nominum and an index locorum. The literary remains of the Apologists prior to Irenaeus, except Theophilus, are thus brought into this volume,—or slightly more (the Eusebian Fragments of Melito) than the material covered in the *Index Apologeticus*. In brief introductions the more important facts about each author and the authorities for the text are stated. In the writings of Justin the text is based on the Paris MS and its variants carefully recorded in the critical notes. The text is well printed—in clear type and attractive format. Quotations are underlined—surely a good method and one that might be more generally adopted. The edition should be in the hands of all students of early Christian literature.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

*Soziale Ethik im Judentum.* Herausgegeben vom Verband der Deutschen Juden. Zweite Auflage. Verlegt bei J. KAUFFMANN, Frankfurt am Main. 1914. 135 S.



This interesting and instructive volume was published by order of the "Verband der Deutschen Juden" at their fifth convention in Hamburg, November 9, 1913, with the object of proving that the fundamental principles of social morality, approved even if not realized by present-day civilization were first taught to mankind by Judaism. There are nine essays in the book. *The Creation of Fellowman*, by Leo Baeck, Berlin; *State and Society*, by Simeon Bernfield, Charlottenburg; *Right and the Administration of Justice*, by Bernhard Breslauer, Berlin; *Charity*, by Juda Bergmann, Berlin; *Woman in Judaism*, by Max Eschelbacher, Düsseldorf; *Education and School*, by Moritz Güdemann, Vienna; *The Instruction of the People*, by Philipp Bloch, Posen; *The Sabbath*, by N. A. Nobel, Frankfurt am Main; *The Kingdom of God*, by Hermann Cohen, Berlin. The notes, consisting of references to the Bible and to Jewish literature, in support of the statements made in the essays, are printed at the end of the book.

There is a wealth of interesting material in these essays which can be cited merely in brief allusions following the order given above. Greek Philosophy discovered man and defined him over against nature; it was reserved for the genius of Israel to discover fellow-man. For the Jew the state means the sovereignty of God. In such a state right makes might. The old Babylonian and Egyptian laws make mention of charity only here and there; the Jewish laws are filled from beginning to end with the spirit of compassion. The world stands on three things: doctrine, worship, love. In European languages, two different words are used to distinguish man and wife; the Hebrew terms emphasize the unity of human nature in spite of the difference of sex. Judaism never exalted love apart from marriage, as did the minnesingers; woman was not honored as virgin, but as wife and mother. Next to monotheism, nothing characterises Judaism so much as the impulse to mental culture. While the Bible says little about education, it says much about the value of children, and education naturally follows from such assertions. The Hebrew had no names but numbers for the days of the week with the exception of the seventh for which the name Sabbath was used. God rested on that day from His creative activity and thus the Hebrew who worshipped God in a special manner on that day was taught that his God, unlike the pantheistic-mythological divinities of heathendom, was not engaged in eternal warfare with other deities nor with the powers of nature in order to maintain Himself. The Jew was to work six days, because work ennobles. At the same time work may absorb the personality; hence, one day was given to rest and the recovery of personality. Israel's mission is to extend over the earth the faith in God's unity; Messiahship is a name for the realization among men of the morality of Jehovah; the kingdom of the Messiah is in this sense the Kingdom of God.

The book is marked by an entire absence of polemic tone; everything that could possibly offend modern taste is carefully avoided; each author strives to present his topic in the most winning and persuasive manner

possible. This is at once the strength and the weakness of the volume, for it raises the doubt that what we have here is not Judaism in its entire development but an interpretation of selected aspects which commend themselves to the modern world largely because the greatest of Abraham's seed—Himself rejected by His brethren and not once mentioned in this book—has already spread them among men through the Gospel and His Church. It is a strange revelation of the illiberalism of liberalism when one whom the world considers the greatest representative and the culmination of the Hebrew genius should be so completely ignored in essays of this sort. Nevertheless, those who are interested in learning how to appreciate sympathetically the ethical viewpoint of modern Judaism may be safely recommended to read this book.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Seyyèd Ali Mohammed dit Le Bab, Le Béyan Persan.* Traduit du Persan par A. L. M. NICHOLAS, Consul de France à Tauris. Tome deuxième 1-174; Tome troisième 1-162; Tome quatrième 1-185. Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner, 13 Rue Jacob. Tome deuxième et tome troisième, 1913; Tome quatrième, 1914. 3 fr. 50 chaque.

The Babi-Baha'i movement claims millions of adherents. Its claim is extravagant but it has its following not only in Persia where it originated and in Syria, its present centre, but also in Burma, India, on the continent of Europe, in Great Britain, and in the United States. Its representatives are carrying on an active and apparently successful propaganda. It has a strange resemblance to Christianity and for this reason if for no other claims the attention of the student of religion.

What then is Babi-Baha'ism? The answer to this question takes us back over a thousand years into the history of Mohammedanism. Was Mohammed the last of the Prophets? Most of his followers believe that he was. The Shi'a Moslems, however, while formally agreeing with this, claim that after Mohammed came twelve Imams or personal representatives of God starting with 'Ali, the prophet's son-in-law, and continuing in this line until the twelfth withdrew from the world in A.D. 873. Thereafter for seventy years there was a period of "Minor Occultation" during which communication was maintained with the Imam by means of one Bab (Gate) after another until these also ceasing there began the "Greater Occultation" a period to continue, so the Shi'as held, until another Gate or Bab should reappear. About 1840 these Messianic hopes gained strength in Persia. The Shaykhis, another Mohammedan sect, proclaimed the coming of a Bab in advance of the Imam who was soon to appear. In a short time this Bab was manifested in the person of Mirza 'Ali Muhammad of Shiraz, a Sayyid or descendant of the Prophet. His personal

character and poetical gifts soon gained him many followers. Gradually the Bab let it be known that he was the Imam whom he proclaimed. The movement prevailed in spite of persecution and suffering which culminated in the martyrdom of the Bab in 1852 at Tabriz.

The writings of the Bab have been superseded in the propaganda by the writings of the two later leaders: Baha'u'llah (Light of God) who until his death in 1897 did so much for the cause that he is entitled to be called its second founder, and his son 'Abdu'l-Baha the present head of the movement with residence at Haifa. Nevertheless, the student of religion may wish to consult at first hand the literary product of the original founder and this is accessible in the present translation of the Bayan (Exposition). He will be introduced to *le jargon Babi* and will be led to understand how this religion fulfils at least one present day condition of advance in many circles—obscure and mystical speculation concerning God with philanthropic tendencies.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Histoire de L'Antiqué*. EDUARD MEYER. Tome premier. Introduction a l'étude des sociétés anciennes. (Évolution des groupements humains). Traduit par MAXIME DAVID. Paris: Librairie Paul Guenther, 13 Rue Jacob, VI 1912. I-VIII, 1-284. 7 fr. 50.

This volume is a French translation of the original work in German of Professor Meyer, corresponding to Band I, Erste Haelfte, of the third German edition. It considers three topics, Political and Social Evolution, Intellectual Evolution, and History and Political Science. While the translation has all the lucidity and ease of the language in which it is issued, nevertheless the American student will doubtless prefer to consult the original.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*The Armenian Awakening*. A History of the Armenian Church, 1820-1860. By LEON ARPEE. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1 Adelphi Terrace. 1909. Pages XI., 235. Price, \$1.25 net; postpaid, \$1.36.

A record of what is clearly an important period in the development of Armenian Christianity. Founded by Gregory the Illuminator (258-342?), the author calls the Armenian Church "the first national Christian church of the world" (p. 2). Prevailing ritualistic and oriental, this church rejected the *filioque*, but branded itself as schismatic in its adherence to the Monophysite heresy. The political history of Armenia in its relation to Turkey, Russia and England is traced, also the points of agreement with and difference from Romanism, and the Romanist emancipation of the Armenian Church. Paulicianism (Chap. 5), in the seventh century and following, had its part in



the Armenian awakening. Its doctrinal statement in *The Key of Truth* was Unitarian and as to ritual almost Puritanic, so that the Paulician movement in Armenia became, as Mr. Arpee says, a precursor of European Protestantism (pp. ix, 91).

The work of reform involved the labors of the first missionaries in the Turkish empire, sent out in 1815 by the Church Missionary Society (Anglican) and in 1818 by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Among these were William Goodell (1831), H. G. O. Dwight (1832), and Cyrus Hamlin (1840). The inevitable persecutions were encountered, the chief opposition to a Protestant Armenian Church being Matthew, the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople, and (1858-1865) Catholicos of all the Armenians. Nevertheless evangelical missions arose and rapidly developed under efficient leadership. It was Matthew, representing the genius of intolerance within the Orthodox Church, together with other contributing causes, which led to the founding of an independent Protestant Armenian Church (Chap. 8). And all this was one with the struggle for democracy against the civil-ecclesiastical oligarchy, issuing in the Constitution of 1860, with beneficent though temporary results in social, political and religious conditions. The full text of the later restored Turkish Constitution (1876) appears in Appendix II.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

*How Europe Was Won For Christianity.* Being the Life-stories of the Men Concerned in Its Conquest. By M. WILMA STUBBS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 309. With 16 full-page Illustrations. \$1.50 net.

In twenty-five chapters Miss Stubbs recounts the missionary conquests of Europe from the time when St. Paul obeyed the Macedonian vision to the labors of the Moravians and others, closing with the work of William Carey in India. With the beautiful touches of a missionary historian who has enough poetic imagination to impart color and vividness to her picture without detracting aught from historic veracity, we are made to see Wulfila the Bishop taking an Arian Christianity to the Goths in the last days of the Emperor Constantine. We see St. Patrick (373-463), though not himself Irish, strengthening the already existent but feeble Christianity in Ireland and bequeathing to the world his great *Confession*, from which extracts are given in Appendix III. We see Ninian, Kentigern, and Columba in Scotland, with the latter's celebrated monastery at Iona; and Severinus, the hermit-missionary in Noricum (ancient southern Austria). We see the Irish monk Columbanus with his companion Gallus following the upper Rhine to Lake Zurich, but driven eastward by the unwelcoming Zurichers to Lake Constance and Bregenz, and the founding of the famous monastery of St. Gall on the Steinach. In the labors of Augustine of Canterbury we listen to the story of

the conversion of Æthelberht, the Saxon king, and the humble beginnings of Canterbury Cathedral. Then follow Paulinus in Northumbria, which was to give its Bede and Alcuin to the Church; "the gentle Aidan" and Cuthbert of Lindisfarne. A chapter (12) is given on "England's Lesser Apostles," among them: Melitus, Cedd, Felix, Birinus, and Wilfrid of York. In Friesland we have Amandus, Bishop of Utrecht, St. Eligius, Wilfrid of York (as above), Willibrord, and Willehad. A chapter for Winfrid, known to us better as Boniface, the apostle to Germany, with his monastery at Fulda. Then come Ansgar of Hamburg, the brothers Cyril (Constantine) and Methodius of Thessalonica among the Slavs, and the first part closes with a notice of some of the martyred missionaries, notably Trudpert in the Black Forest, Kilian in Franconia, the Saxon brothers Hewald in northern Germany, Wenceslaus, Adelbert, Archbishop of Prague, and the Wendish emperor Gottschalk.

All the above occupies the first part of the book, under the general caption of "The Age of Heroes." Part II., on "Darkness and Day-break," takes up St. Francis of Assisi. Raymund Lull, Bartholomé de las Casas, the Jesuits Loyola, Xavier *et al.*, Hans and Gertrude Egede in Greenland, Count Zinzendorf and the Moravian missionaries, and closes with Ziegenbalg, Plütschau, Schultze, Schwartz, and Carey in India. Five appendices are added at the close of the book, the last being a chronological table from St. Paul to William Carey.

Miss Stubbs has told a wonderful story and told it well. What she has here gathered together some have doubtless read before as separate accounts. But it is surely a mental stimulus and a matter that brings joy to all who love the Lord in sincerity and in truth, to have these wonderful works of God so comprehensively set forth, a sort of missionary procession, moving in the slow but triumphant redemption of Europe out of the barbaric shadows of ancient and mediaeval paganism into the purer light of modern Christianity. And this triumph, it is well to recall, came not by force of human armament, but by an industrious and courageous devotion to the essential facts of our faith.

*Langhorne, Pa.*

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*The Plan of Salvation.* Five Lectures Delivered at the Princeton Summer School of Theology, June 1914. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, A Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1915. 12mo; pp. 144.

This book is made up, as the title page intimates, of five lectures delivered at the Princeton Summer School of Theology, June 8-12, 1914.

They are designed to give a comprehensive survey of the varying conceptions which have been held by any large parties in the church concerning God's procedure in saving men.

In the first lecture these differing conceptions are passed in rapid review, in an ascending order. First the fundamental opposition of Naturalism and Supernaturalism is pointed out; then the division among the Supernaturalists between Sacerdotalists and Evangelicals is indicated; next the Universalistic and Particularistic varieties of Evangelicals are distinguished; and lastly the several kinds of Particularists are intimated. The outcome is to fix on Infralapsarian Calvinism as the only tenable conception. This lecture is accompanied with a tabular arrangement of the several views which is supposed to facilitate their understanding.

The subsequent lectures more fully explain the several generic views. The Naturalistic view is taken up in the second lecture under the name of Autosoterism. It is shown how widely spread Autosoterism is among the churches, despite their universal official proclamation of Supernaturalism. The outcome is, however, to exhibit Autosoterism as essentially anti-Christian. The third lecture discusses Sacerdotalism and points out its implication of a mechanical action of the Holy Spirit in salvation. The inconsequences of Universalistic Evangelicalism are exposed in the fourth lecture. In the fifth, Calvinism is presented as the only consequent Supernaturalism, the only thorough Evangelicalism, and the only rational Universalism; as, in a word, the conservator of Christianity in its purity as over against defection from its fundamental principles on this side or that. The several varieties of Calvinism are distinguished and reasons assigned for preferring Infralapsarianism, as over against whether Supralapsarianism on the one side or Post-redemptionism in any of its forms on the other.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*Jesus and Politics.* An Essay Toward an Ideal. By HAROLD B. SHEPHEARD, M.A. With Introduction by Vida D. Scudder. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 681 Fifth Avenue. 1915. 8vo; pp. xxxii, 145.

This is an earnest and interesting, but somewhat disguised plea for Christian Socialism. The author believes that Christ's plan was that men should "be whole and poor", having no property of their own but enjoying the wealth of the world as the common property of all; that this social ideal can be attained only as the State shall combine the rapidly forming trusts and herself assume control of all things; and that, consequently, it is the duty of all who would have Christ's will done on earth to enter politics and so seek to bring in the Christian state. Those of us who know something of the history of socialistic movements will not be surprised to hear Mr. Shephard characterize justice as "that second-rate virtue which Jesus never praised", to find



him decrying all creeds but his own socialistic one, and to discover not one reference to the Holy Spirit as necessary to wisdom and strength in political as in other reforms. This attitude, however, impresses us as being as damaging as it is not unexpected.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*Christ or Napoleon—Which?* A Study of the Cure for World Militarism and the Church's Scandal of Division. By PETER AINSLIE, Minister Christian Temple, Baltimore. Author of "God and Me", "My Brother and I", "The Message of the Disciples", etc. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1915. 8vo; pp. 96.

This is an earnest and strong plea for universal and premanent peace and for visible as well as spiritual church unity. It is weakened by the mysticism which the author avows and by the disregard of the primacy of justice which he reveals. Christian feeling can be discriminated as such only by Christian doctrine and peace which does not rest on justice is wrong.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Jesus as He Was and Is.* A Modern Attempt to set forth the Abiding Significance of Jesus Christ. By SAMUEL G. CRAIG, A.M., B.D., Minister of the North Presbyterian Church of Pittsburgh. New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo; pp. 288.

The functions of the pastor and the doctor are happily combined in the minister of the North Church of Pittsburgh. Mr. Craig, in the Preface of his volume, speaks of these discourses as "Sermon-Lectures", and they deserve the title. Their solid substance and attractive literary form will recall to some of the older members of his congregation the angelic Doctor, A. A. Hodge, who was the first pastor of the church, and gave many a course of Sermon-Lectures which attracted and fascinated the leading minds of all the region round about. Dr. Warfield, who succeeded Dr. Hodge in his Chair at Princeton, and who writes an introduction to the volume, was once a regular attendant of the church while Professor in the Western Theological Seminary, and an occasional preacher in it, and he also illuminated the great themes which Mr. Craig now discusses. Such a set of "Sermon-Lectures" suggests that Mr. Craig still has hearers who hear with the spirit and understanding.

The chapters of the book discuss, with unusual clarity of style, keen insight and cogent logic, the burning issues of modern theological controversy with such simplicity of manner that the uninstructed might fancy that it is easy to write such sermons. But it is not easy, as

everyone knows who has ever tried. A too small book-shelf will hold those which have been recently written on the conservative side of the great debate. Deniers or questioners of the true Deity of Christ, and the inspiration of His Word, by the amount of their literary output, put us to shame who ought to have been more prompt and faithful in re-affirming the ancient faith of His people. We congratulate Mr. Craig and his congregation, that he has done his work so well.

The fifteen sermons all revolve about Jesus. It seems inevitable that we should speak of Him as the Gospels do, as "Jesus", yet we confess to a certain shrinking from following even this biblical *usus loquendi*. The cant of rationalism affects an over-use of the word "Jesus", when "Lord Jesus" would be more fitting. Mr. Craig discusses, in successive chapters: (1) Jesus and His Place in the Christian Religion. (2) Whence came Jesus? (3) Why Jesus came. (4) Jesus as King. (5) Jesus as our Example. (6) Jesus as a Preacher. (7) Jesus as a Miracle-Worker. (8) Jesus as a Healer. (9) Jesus as One Who Died. (10) Jesus as the Regenerator of Character. (11) Jesus as the Regenerator of Society. (12) Jesus as a Man and as a Friend. (13) Jesus as a Judge. (14) Jesus and His Place in the Cosmos. (15) Jesus as the Coming One.

These topics might all be treated, and often have been, by those bent on evading the real issues. Mr. Craig, on the contrary, faces them calmly, quietly, sometimes almost too quietly for one whose blood tingles when he thinks of the baseness with which Christ is wounded in the house of his friends. But, for the purpose of these "Sermon-Lectures", it was no doubt wiser to hold in check even righteous abhorrence. The very first sentence in the book shows how serious the matter is: "The center of controversy to-day among those who call themselves Christians has to do with the place that Jesus Himself occupies in the religion that He founded." What an extraordinary situation it is in which, to-day, we find ourselves! Not long ago, we might have adopted Livy's phrase, *jam primum omnium satis constat*, but now, the very truisms of the centuries are written with interrogation marks. Was there ever a Jesus? Is He the Jesus of the Gospels? Or must we bow to the mock Jesus whose portrait is now being painted by those who think themselves better artists than the evangelists were? These are questions which any minister at any moment must be ready to face, and he will need all his piety and all his learning to do it well. Mr. Craig does face them with courage and address, and although we might suppose that a church so schooled in the fundamentals would not need it, even there, no doubt, the germs of evil may poison the atmosphere. This necessitates sharp and exact definition, discriminating exposure of error, adjustment of the old formulas to the precise need of the hour, so that the things most surely believed may be more surely believed than ever before. The virus of pantheistic Rationalism is very catching, and Mr. Craig, who preaches, as his predecessors have done at times, to an audience partly of theologues

and theological Professors, does well to give them strong meat. He makes no parade of his reading, but, evidently, he has read and thought for himself, and can say at the close of the chapter: "To perceive, however, that Jesus is the object of religion, is to perceive that He is the living One in whose hands are the issues of life, and hence that the attitude we take up toward Him is indeed a matter of weal or woe, of heaven or hell, of life or death."

The argument follows the sinuous windings of the rationalistic line of battle with persistence and skill; driving the foe from their trenches, vindicating at every point that Jesus is the object of the Christian religion and not its mere subject—showing that the Gospels picture Him as He was and is, and do not present a mirage of the truth without body or substance. With this beginning, the preacher follows the topics given above and clears the ancient landmarks of the faith from the rubbish that critical vandalism has encumbered it with. The rationalistic positions are clearly and fairly stated, and convincingly refuted without heat of passion, in the dry light of fact and in the sober garb of truth.

We have space only for some samples: The chapter on "Jesus as One Who Died", seems to us peculiarly strong. Mr. Craig grounds himself on the classic passages which affirm the primacy of the Cross in the scheme of saving grace, but his citation of them is not *pro forma*; they are not mere proof texts, but woven into the substance of his own reasoning. "Now what was true of the New Testament Church is scarcely less true of the Church of all ages. No important branch of the Christian Church has ever assigned to the death of Christ a place of subordinate importance. Whether we have regard to the writings of their representative theologians, or whether we have regard to the statements of their official creeds, or whether we have regard to the thoughts embodied in their songs and hymns it is clear that they are all agreed in assigning to the death of Christ a place of central importance. Catholics and Protestants unite in recognizing the Cross as the symbol of Christianity, and in singing the praises of the 'Lamb that was slain'."

It will be seen, therefore, that although Mr. Craig, in the title of his book, and his Preface, claims that it is a "modern attempt to set forth the abiding significance of Jesus Christ" (p. viii.), his is the modernity which rests back squarely and unmistakably upon the fundamental verities. He is both a traditionalist and a modernist in the best senses of these much-abused words. He does obeisance to the Scriptures as the norm and warrant for all doctrines, but proceeds on the principle that Scripture is corroborated by the faith which it created and nurtures. It is in this that the strength of the book lies. The Bible, the Church and the Reason stand in their appointed relation to each other. The written word is supreme; it is handed down to us by the church which believes it; and it issues in these lectures and elsewhere, in a reasoned faith. In the chapter just cited, as in all the others, the



author opens to us the Scriptures with an insight and understanding that give the reader a comfortable sense that his feet are on the rock. He quotes from modern writers, Dr. Denny, Dr. Dale and Dr. Fairhairn; but one never loses for a moment, the feeling that this is a Biblical theology in the most exact sense with which he has indoctrinated his people. Almost any chapter would afford illustration of his method, which is carried consistently throughout the volume.

In the chapter on "Jesus as a Preacher" (pp. 116-117), we read: "The question that is constantly at issue has to do with the question whether the Christian or the non-Christian is justified in believing as he does. All Christianity asks for, from this point of view, is a fair hearing and a just verdict. Otherwise, ignorance is the mother of Christian devotion and Christian churches asylums for the feeble-minded. The first charge we bring against the non-Christian is that he is irrational. We believe in Christ because it is the only rational thing to do."

The chapter on "Jesus as a Miracle-Worker", carries the author into the regions where controversy is no longer merely an affair of the schools alone, but has been taken up by popular novelists, writers in the "flash" magazines, and be it said with reverence, the infallible theologians of the secular Press, who rushing in where angels fear to tread, settle the matter by a criterion of truth found rather "Inside the Cup", than inside the Bible. Mr. Craig wisely disdains conducting his argument on quite this level, but takes a foeman worthy of his steel: "Professor Foster of the University of Chicago even goes so far as to say that a man cannot be intellectually honest and at the same time believe in miracles." To this, Mr. Craig replies (p. 131): "Miracles enter into the very substance of Christianity, so that Christianity without its miracles would not be Christianity at all." And again, on page 139: "The miracles of Christianity are organically united. Taken together they form a system that finds its center in the great fact of redemption and so a system that finds its center in Christ himself." He argues his case with vigor.

In the last three lectures, Mr. Craig traverses the familiar ground of eschatology; familiar, that is, to those who have always believed in the value of truth in the whole and not merely in its easiest parts; though, of course, much less to those who have drunk in the spirit of denial and ground their hopes for the future not on established fact or divine promise, but on pride and presumption. Mr. Craig makes no attempt at eloquence, but continues his argument with his wonted calmness, citing the Scriptures with point and effect, and letting them carry their own message.

The fifteenth chapter deals with what we must regard as "the fly in the ointment" of a considerable section of present-day thinking which, in general, belongs on the right side of the fence. Our Pre-millennial friends are so good, so devout and so generally right, that we must not do more than wish, and perhaps pray, that they may come to

a fuller knowledge of the truth (as they, no doubt, pray for us), and be thankful that Mr. Craig, in addition to the other virtues and graces of his book, has not spared to point out the serious reasons why the analogy of faith and reason and the specific teachings of the New Testament, lead to a sounder conclusion than theirs.

We can give no more than an impression of the value of these Sermon-Lectures, which are entitled to a high place in the theological literature of the day. They may perhaps be passed over in silence by those who fancy they have dethroned the truth as it is in Jesus, and that we are dependent on the latest and most audacious loop-the-loop flights of theological aeroplaning. We await the result with little doubt as to the final crash, and are content to follow the more sober guidance of Mr. Craig. He maintains his balance, and though without high flights, is on *terra firma*.

Dr. Warfield's introduction to the book is after his manner. With unwonted fervency of eloquence he expounds the verse "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day and forever"—a fit prologue to such a book. Ministers, elders and Sunday School teachers would find it profitable to read—or, better, study—the whole book.

New York.

JOHN FOX.

*My Sermon-Notes.* By C. H. SPURGEON. Fleming H. Revell Co. Four vols. 1912. Pp. 389, 378, 381, 405.

This work comprises "a selection from outlines of discourses delivered at the Metropolitan Tabernacle, with anecdotes and illustrations"; equally divided between the Old Testament and the New. The same method is pursued throughout—a brief introduction, a minute analysis of the text, followed by illustrations drawn from various sources. We are impressed anew with Spurgeon's marvellous homiletic fertility, his ingenuity, sometimes strained, in drawing from the text all that it may possibly contain. In the hands of an ordinary preacher an analysis less detailed and exhaustive would ordinarily be more effective. He would find Spurgeon's method as cumbrous as David found the armor of Saul. This indeed Spurgeon recognizes. "These outlines were not written to be used as they are. True, they may be filled up with choice original matter, and employed as frameworks in their present form; but more probably they will be taken to pieces and built up in another shape, or they will be cut into halves, or portions of them will be united with other materials" (2: VI). The evangelical and evangelistic spirit is everywhere apparent, and the Gospel is presented in its simplicity and power.

Admirable as these volumes are in many respects, they should be used with caution. The better helps of this kind are, the more readily do they lend themselves to abuse. Spurgeon has himself sounded a note of warning in the preface to every volume. "I have prepared these frameworks, not to encourage indolence, but to help bewildered indus-

try; and I hope that I have not written so much as to enable any man to preach without thought, nor so little as to leave a weary mind without help" (1:6). "I hope to lend a handful of chips or shavings, or, if you will, a bundle of fire-wood, to a brother with which he may kindle a fire on his own hearth, and prepare food for his people. Possibly a lazy brother may boil his own pot with my sticks, but even that I shall not deplore so long as the food is well cooked. Should I be so unfortunate as to be a helper to the utterly idle man, by tempting him to gather no fuel of his own, I shall not even then view the matter with despair, for perhaps the idler may burn his fingers in the operation; and I shall fall back upon the consideration that he would have taken wood from some other pile if he had not met with mine" (2:VI). "I hope and believe that these notes will not be of much use to persons who fail to think for themselves. . . . My outlines are meant to be aids to preparation, and nothing more" (3:V). "It was never my design to help men to deliver a message which is not their own. It is ill when prophets steal their prophecies from one another, for then they are likely—all of them—to become false prophets. But as the young prophet borrowed an axe of a friend, and was not censured for it so long as the strokes he gave with it were his own, so may we refrain from condemning those who find a theme suggested for them, and a line of thought laid before them, and with all their hearts use them in speaking to the people. This should not be their custom: every man should have an axe of his own, and have no need to cry, 'Alas, Master! it was borrowed'; but there are times of special pressure, bodily sickness, or mental weariness, wherein a man is glad of brotherly help, and may use it without question. For such occasions I have tried to provide" (4:VIII).

The fact that it was necessary to repeat the warning so frequently indicates how real is the danger. The occasional use of helps of this kind may be justified, but *occasional* easily slips into *habitual*. When Henry Ward Beecher was asked, "What do you think of the benefit of using books of sermon-plans?" he replied, "They will help you when you know how to use them; that is, when you don't need them. Before that don't smother yourself with them" (Yale Lectures, I, p. 236).

In Vol. 3, page 50 *Hames* is thrice written for *Harms*.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Paul's Message for To-day.* By J. R. MILLER, D.D., George H. Doran Co. 1914. Pp. 270. \$1.25 net.

The book is divided into two parts. 1—The Message of Paul's Life. The course of it is traced from his conversion to his journey to Rome, and apt and helpful lessons are drawn at every step. 2—The Message of his Letters. Passages are selected from a number of his Epistles, and the great truths contained in them are applied to the conditions of our own time.



The volume is written in the clear and flowing style that is familiar to multitudes of readers everywhere, and the teaching throughout is comforting, helpful, gracious. Dr. Miller's rare power of illustration and application finds ample scope in this study of the great apostle.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Fifty-two Story Talks to Boys and Girls.* By REV. HOWARD J. CHIDLEY. George H. Doran Co. Pp. 126. 75 cents net.

The increased attention given to the children in the services of the Church is a wholesome sign. Sermons to children are taking a recognized and important place in homiletic literature.

Mr. Childley has well named his addresses story talks and not sermons. They are very brief, covering generally not more than two pages, and many of them are concerned simply with questions of manners or morals. There is a notable absence of the religious appeal, and of Scripture, in a large part of the talks, and this is the most serious defect of the volume. The preacher should never fail to lay the basis of morals in religion.

The style is terse and clear, and truth is often put in a striking way. Why is Oliver Cromwell dubbed, *Sir?* (p. 36); and is it true that comets "never have trees or flowers on them because they are 'tramp stars'?" (p. 17).

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The Gospel of the Sovereignty, and other Sermons.* By REV. J. D. JONES, M.A., B.D. George H. Doran Co. 1914. Pp. 328. \$1.50 net.

This volume is composed of twenty-three sermons. The first, from which the title is taken, dwells upon the thought of the Divine Sovereignty as peculiarly needed in this age when "to a large extent we have lost the sense of *religious awe*, of *reverence*, and of *godly fear*". It is well said, "A genial humanitarianism will never carry a Church to victory" (p. 6). The sermons are strong and clear, dealing with great themes in a straightforward, manly, Scriptural fashion. The chief defect of style is the inordinate use of *I*, which occurs in a single sermon no less than forty-five times.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The New Testament in Life and Literature.* By JANE T. STODDART. Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. Pp. 508.

This is a companion volume to *The Old Testament in Life and Literature*, by the same author; and is similar to Prothero's *Psalms in Human Life*. The New Testament as a whole and The Gospels are treated in the opening chapters. Then the several books are taken in order, and various passages are illustrated from history and from all forms of literature. Books of this kind furnish the most impressive witness to the richness, variety, and power of the Scripture. We see

why it has played so large a part in the history of the race. Men and women of all classes and conditions, of all peoples and tongues, have found here unfailing guidance and comfort and strength. Faith is strengthened as we mark how impregnable is the rock on which it builds.

The work is well done. Of course no book of this kind may pretend to be exhaustive, but the field covered is very broad. The preface suggests how great was the labor involved. "The material has been gathered in my private reading, spread over a number of years, and nothing whatever has been borrowed from anthologies or homiletic sources. Foreign literature has again been largely used, and with a few exceptions mentioned in the foot-notes all translations have been made at first hand." A copious Index of Texts, a Short Index to the Gospel Story, and a General Index, place this ample store of material within easy reach of the reader.

*Princeton.*

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

## GENERAL LITERATURE

*Money and Transportation in Maryland 1720-1765.* Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science under the Direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy and Political Science. Series XXXIII, No. 1. By CLARENCE P. GOULD, Ph.D., Michael O. Fisher Professor of History in the University of Wooster. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1915. 8vo; pp. 176.

"This study forms the second installment of what is intended to be ultimately a complete economic history of Maryland between 1720 and 1765. The first part, entitled *The Land System in Maryland, 1720-1765*, appeared in the Johns Hopkins University Studies, Series XXXI, No. 1. Work on the Agricultural System is now under way."

If we may judge of the series from the number before us, it will be both exceedingly interesting and exceedingly able.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Social and Labor Needs of Farm Women.* United States Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary. Report No. 103. (Compiled in the Office of Information, G. W. Wharton, Chief.) Extracts from letters received from farm women in response to an inquiry, "How the U. S. Department of Agriculture can better meet the Needs of Farm House Wives", with special reference to the provision of instruction and practical demonstrations in home economics under the act of May 8, 1914, providing for coöperative agricultural extension work, etc. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1915. Pp. 100.

A just and, therefore, valuable presentation of the peculiar difficulties and needs of farm women. These difficulties would seem to be long hours, inefficient help, and isolation from church and social privileges.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Domestic Needs of Farm Women*; Report No. 104. *The Educational Needs of Farm Women*; Report No. 105. *The Economic Needs of Farm Women*; Report No. 106. Pamph., pp. 88, pp. 100. United States Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1915.

Even if these papers did not contain much valuable information as to existing conditions and many useful hints for the amelioration of these, they would be well worth while because of the importance of the question to which they call attention.

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*A Public Recreation System for Newark*. Suggestions and Recommendations by the City Plan Commission. Pamph., pp. 30. Newark, N. J.: L. J. Hondham Printing Co. 1915.

The importance of the question discussed in this informing and interesting pamphlet all must admit; but the reviewer hopes that some will be ready to dissent with him from the statement on page 19, that "of all forms of healthful play the world seems never yet to have found one better than the dance."

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Financial Administration of the Colony of Virginia*. By PERCY SCOTT FLIPPIN, PH.D., Professor of History and Economics in Central University of Kentucky. Series XXXIII No. 2, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science under the Direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy, and Political Science. Pamph., pp. 95. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1915.

Like the other papers of these series which from time to time have been noticed in this REVIEW, this is packed with well digested and arranged information not hitherto made available.

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, April: BENJAMIN W. BACON, Jewish Interpretations of the New Testament; SHIRLEY J. CASE, Religion and War in the Graeco Roman World; HENRY P.



SMITH, Protestant Polemic against Roman Catholicism; CLYDE W. VOTAW, Gospels and Contemporary Biographies; EDWARD C. AMES, Mystic Knowledge; WILSON D. WALLIS, Missionary Enterprise from the Point of View of an Anthropologist.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, April: M. R. JAMES, Recovery of Apocalypse of Peter; ARTHUR C. A. HALL, Father Benson; G. H. BOX, Some recent Contributions to Old Testament Studies; WILBERFORCE JENKINSON, Old London Churches in Tudor and Stuart Literature; ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, The English Church and English Character; J. H. BERNARD, Christian Miracles.

*Constructive Quarterly*, New York, June: W. P. DUBOSE, Why the Church—in Christianity; C. S. W. HORSEFIELD, National Contributions to Christianity; ARCHBISHOP SÖDERBLOM, On the Character of the Swedish Church; LEONID TURKEVICH, Problems of the Eastern Church in America; JEAN RIVIÈRE, Religious and Catholic Awakening in France; H. K. ARCHDALL, Anglican Communion and Christian Unity; NEWMAN SMYTH, Christianity after the War; FRIEDRICH NIEBERGALL, Christianity Psychologically Examined; E. J. WIDDOWS, Authority and Orthodoxy; A. J. DESOPPER, Knowledge and Love; F. HERBERT STEAD, A Dynamic View of the Need of Christ; T. R. GLOVER, The Unexplored Factor in the Gospel.

*East and West*, London, April: DR. STILEMAN, Progress in Persia; DONALD FRASER, Devolution in Africa, an Argument and an Illustration; J. T. DEAN, Self-government in a West African Church; DR. DONALDSON, *Foreign Missions and the War*; H. P. K. SKIPTON, Christianity in India after the War; G. HIBBERT-WARE, Missionary Policy in the Telegu Country; D. W. MACGILLIVRAY, Missionaries and Newspapers in China and Japan; A. F. EALAND, Religious Education in India.

*Expositor*, London, April: G. G. FINDLAY, Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians; P. T. FORSYTH, Preaching of Jesus and the Gospel of Christ; FRANK GRANGER, Style of the Synoptic Gospels; T. H. WEIR, Sermon on the Mount; W. MONTGOMERY, St. Paul's Voyage and Shipwreck; J. W. HUNKIN, Judas Maccabeus and Prayers for the Dead; ALPHONSE MINGANA, A New Document on Christian Monachism. *The Same*, May: G. BUCHANAN GRAY, Interpretations of Jewish Sacrifice; P. T. FORSYTH, Preaching of Jesus and the Gospel of Christ; J. M. THOMPSON, Accidental Disarrangement in the Fourth Gospel; JAMES MOFFATT, Tertullian and Non-Resistance; G. A. COOKE, T. K. Cheyne.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, March: J. RENDEL HARRIS, An Unnoticed Aramaism in St. Mark; WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN, A Study in the Synoptic Problem; JAMES BAIKIE, Excavations at Babylon. *The Same*, April: THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES, Fresh Light on the Book of Daniel; JOHN PINKERTON, National Hate; EDWARD SHILLITO, Conflict in Prayer; S. H. HOOKE, Gog and Magog; A. E. GARVIE, In Praise of Faith. *The*

*Same*, May: J. A. ROBERTSON, The Tragic Schism, Can It Be Healed?; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, 'Breach for Breach'; J. A. F. GREGG, Use of the Old Testament; JAMES IVERACH, The Idealist Reaction against Science; S. J. CASE, John Mark.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, April: RUFUS M. JONES, Mysticism in Present-Day Religion; CLIFFORD H. MOORE, Ethical Value of Oriental Religions under the Roman Empire; WILLIAM F. LOFTHOUSE, The Atonement and the Modern Pulpit; EDWARD F. HAYWARD, Religious Reserve; JOHN W. BUCKHAM, Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought; EDWIN H. HALL, Sir Oliver Lodge's British Association Address.

*Hibbert Journal*, Boston, April: PROFESSOR BERGSON, Life and Matter at War; L. P. JACKS, Tyranny of Mere Things; EVELYN UNDERHILL, Problems of Conflict; PERCY GARDNER and A. W. F. BLUNT, Two Studies in German "Kultur"; HERMANN KEYSERLING, On the Meaning of War; MAUDE E. KING, Gothic Ruin and Reconstruction; E. F. CARRITT, "Shall We Serve God for Naught?"; M. W. ROBIESON, German Socialist Theory and War; J. M. SLOAN, Carlyle's Germans; C. MARSH BEADNELL, Mind and Matter; A. Hylozoistic View; LAIRD W. SNELL, The Method of Christian Science; FRANCIS E. CLARK, Christian Endeavour Movement; CECIL PRICE, The Boy Scouts.

*Hindustan Review*, Allahabad, March: WATSON SMYTH, Eight Months of War; K. VYASA RAO, Making of Public Opinion in South India; M. V. KIBE, Pros and Cons of the Permanent Settlement; MOHOMED SHAH DIN, History in Relation to Sociology; JASPER SMITH, Economic Position of Germany; S. SURYANARAYANAN, Natural Law—A Study.

*International Journal of Ethics*, Concord, April: HARRY A. OVERSTREET, Philosophy and the New Justice; F. MELIAN STAWELL, Patriotism and Humanity; RALPH B. PERRY, Non-Resistance and the Present War; C. DELISLE BURNS, Moral Effects of War and Peace; JESSIE TAFT, The Woman Movement and the Larger Social Situation; JOHN LISLE, Justification of Punishment; EDWARD C. BALDWIN, Permanent Elements in the Hebrew Law; W. M. SALTER, Nietzsche's Will to Power.

*Interpreter*, London, April: A. NAIRNE, Christ and the Word; V. F. STORR, Ethical Teaching of Nietzsche; R. H. KENNETT, "Proving of Things Not Seen"; F. R. BARRY, Tolstoy, Nietzsche and the Cross; WILLIAM WATSON, Resurrection of the Dead; A. D. MARTIN, The Cup; an Interpretation of the Lord's Sacrifice; A. C. BOUQUET, Concerning Sacred Books; GILBERT C. BINYON, An Essay on the Christological Problem.

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin, April: M. J. O'DONNELL, Domicile. The Historical Development of the Idea; STEPHEN J. BROWN, Realisation of God—Fides Quaerens Intellectum; E. F. SUTCLIFFE, St. Joseph's Trade. An Enquiry into the Evidence.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, April: JACOB Z. LAUTERBACH, Midrash and Mishnah. A Study in the Early History of the Halakah i; HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD, Immanuel of Rome and other Poets on the Jewish Creed; A. GUILLAUME, Further Documents on the Ben Meir Controversy; MAYER SULZBERGER, Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide. iv-v.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, April: F. CABROL, Dom Marius Férotin; A. SPAGNOLO AND C. H. TURNER, An Ancient Homiliary; W. H. FREER, Early Ordination Service; J. W. HUNKIN, The Synoptic Parables; W. EMERY BARNES, Judges 7:3—Two Passages in David's Lament; R. H. CONNOLLY, Nestorius's Version of the Nicene Creed; M. R. JAMES, Notes on Apocrypha.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, April: P. T. FORSYTH, Veracity, Reality and Regeneration; SAINT N. SINGH, Political Future of Islam; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Modernism and the Church of Rome; W. ERNEST BEET, Imperialism of Napoleon I; HAROLD M. WIENER, Mosaic Authenticity of the Pentateuchal Legislation; EDWARD J. BRAILSFORD, St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland; J. AGAR BEET, Christian Assurance and the Witness of the Spirit.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, April: G. H. GERBERDING, Can We Agree on a Standard Course of Theological Instruction?; E. F. BACHMAN, Training of Christian Workers in Germany; CHARLES R. KEITER, Mohammedan Missionary Problem; PERRY E. BAISLER, English Lutheran Opportunities in Canada; WILLIAM BRENNER, Mission of the Church; CHARLES M. JACOBS, Development of Luther's Doctrine of the Church; J. A. W. HAAS, Power of Christianity; CHARLES J. SMITH, Principles of War—War and the New Year; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Some Specimens of Liberal Biblical Criticism; C. F. PFATTEICHER, Ritschl and Mysticism; J. L. NEVE, The Son of God.

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## JESUS' MISSION, ACCORDING TO HIS OWN TESTIMONY

(SYNOPTICS)

Under the title of "*I came': the express self-testimony of Jesus to the purpose of His sending and His coming,*" Adolf Harnack has published a study of the sayings of Jesus reported in the Synoptic Gospels, which are introduced by the words "I came" or, exceptionally, "I was sent", or their equivalents.<sup>1</sup> These, says he, are "programmatic" sayings, and deserve as such a separate and comprehensive study, such as has not heretofore been given to them. In his examination of them, he pursues the method of, first, gathering the relevant sayings together and subjecting them severally to a critical and exegetical scrutiny; and, then, drawing out from the whole body of them in combination Jesus' own testimony to His mission.

It goes without saying that, in his critical scrutiny of the passages, Harnack proceeds on the same presuppositions which govern his dealing with the Synoptic tradition in general; that is to say, on the presuppositions of the "Liberal" criticism, which he applies, however, here as elsewhere, with a certain independence. It goes without saying also, therefore, that the passages emerge from his hands in a very mauled condition; brought as far as it is possible to bring them, even with violence, into line with the "Liberal" view of what the mission of Jesus ought to have been. It is reassuring, however, to observe that, even so, they cannot be despoiled of their central testimony. That Jesus proclaimed Himself to have come—to have been

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<sup>1</sup> *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1912, xxii, pp. 1-30.



sent—on a mission of salvation, of salvation of the lost, Harnack is constrained to present as their primary content. By the side of this, it is true, he places a second purpose—to fulfil the law, that is, to fill it out, to complete it. Accordingly, he says, Jesus' self-testimony is to the effect that "the purpose of His coming, and therewith His significance, are given in this—that He is at once Saviour and Law-giver". Behind both lies, no doubt, love, as the propulsive cause—"I came to minister"—and yet Jesus is perfectly aware that His purpose is not to be attained without turmoil and strife—"I came to cast fire upon the land and to bring a sword." These sayings, he remarks in conclusion, contain very few words; and yet is not really everything said in them? Shall we call it an accident that "under the superscription 'I came', the purpose, the task, the manner of Jesus' work, all seem to be really exhaustively stated, and even the note of a bitter and plaintive longing is not lacking"?

It seems to be well worth while to follow Harnack's example and to make this series of sayings in which our Lord's testimony to the nature of His mission has been preserved for us in the Synoptic record, the object of a somewhat careful examination. Approaching them free from the "Liberal" presuppositions which condition Harnack's dealing with them, we may hope to obtain from them a more objective understanding than he has been able to attain of how Jesus really thought of His mission.

# I

Our differences with Harnack begin with even so simple a matter as the collection of the passages. He discovers eight, as follows: Mat. x. 34 ff = Lk. xii. 51, 53; Mk. ii. 17 = Mat. ix. 13 = Lk. v. 32; Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28; Lk. xii. 49; Lk. xix. 10; Lk. ix. 56; Mat. v. 17; Mat. xv. 24. This list, however, seems to us to require a certain amount of correction.

(1) We are compelled to omit from it Lk. ix. 56, as,

despite the vigorous defence of its genuineness by Theodor Zahn,<sup>2</sup> certainly spurious.

Harnack's argument in its favor suffers somewhat from a confusion of it with some neighboring interpolations. Because he supposes himself to discover certain Lucan characteristics in these, he concludes that this too is Lucan in origin. Because some of them appear to have stood in Marcion's Gospel he assumes that this also stood in that Gospel. It is a matter of complete indifference, meanwhile, whether it stood in Marcion's Gospel or not. It may be urged, to be sure, that it is easier to suppose that it was stricken out of Luke because of Marcion's misuse of it, than that it was taken over into Luke from the Gospel of that "first-born of Satan". Meanwhile, there is no decisive evidence that it stood in Marcion's Gospel;<sup>3</sup> and, if it had a place there, there is no reason to suppose that it was taken over thence into Luke. It was, on the contrary, already current in certain Lucan texts before Marcion.<sup>4</sup>

The method of criticism which is employed by Harnack here,—a method with which Hilgenfeld used to vex us and of which Harnack and Bousset and Conybeare seem to have served themselves especially heirs<sup>5</sup>—is, let us say it frankly, thoroughly vicious. Its one effort is at all costs to get behind the total formal transmission, and in the attempt to do this it is tempted to prefer to the direct evidence, how-

<sup>2</sup> *Das Evangelium des Lucas* ausgelegt von Theodor Zahn, 1913, pp. 400 ff., 765 ff. The grounds on which the omission of the passage is justified are sufficiently stated by F. J. A. Hort, *The New Testament in the Original Greek*, [ii], Appendix, 1881 pp. 59 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Zahn, as cited, p. 767: "On the other hand we do not as yet know whether Marcion had this third questionable passage also (verse 56:  $\delta$  γὰρ υἱὸς . . . σῶσαι in his Gospel. Tertullian, however, had precisely this passage in his text. . . ."

<sup>4</sup> The character of its attestation implies as much. Accordingly Tischendorf remarks *ad loc.*: "It is unquestionable from the witnesses, especially the Latin and Syriac, that the whole of this interpolation was current in MSS. already in the second century."

<sup>5</sup> This vicious critical method is thetically asserted by H. J. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*, §49, ed. 2, p. 49. It has been recently defended in principle by G. Kittel, *TSK*, 1912, 85, pp. 367-373.

ever great in mass and conclusive in effect, any small item of indirect evidence which may be unearthed, however weak in its probative force or ambiguous in its bearing. The fundamental principle of this method of criticism naturally does not commend itself to those who have made the criticism of texts their business. Even an Eduard Norden sounds a salutary warning against it,<sup>6</sup> and the professional critics of the New Testament text reject it with instructive unanimity.<sup>7</sup> Nobody doubts that wrong readings were current in the second century and it goes but a little way towards showing that a reading is right to show that it was current in the second century. Many of the most serious corruptions which the text of the New Testament has suffered had already entered it in the first half of that century. The matter of importance is not to discover which of the various readings at any given passage chances to appear earliest, by a few years, in the citations of that passage which have happened to be preserved to us in extant writings. It is to determine which of them is a genuine part of the text as it came from its author's hands. For the determination of this question Harnack's method of criticism advances us directly not a single step, and indirectly (through, that is, the better ascertainment of the history of the transmission of the text) but a little way.

When, now Harnack deserts the textual question and suggests that it is of little importance whether the passage be a genuine portion of the Gospel of Luke or not, since in any event it comes from an ancient source, he completely misses the state of the case. This professed saying of Jesus has no independent existence. It exists only as trans-

<sup>6</sup> *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, p. 301: "The philologist knows from experience that the manuscript transmission must be given a higher value than the indirect."

<sup>7</sup> Cf. C. R. Gregory, *Prolegomena* to the eighth edition of Tischendorf's New Testament, *Pars Ultima*, 1894, p. 1138; *Textkritik des Neuen Testaments*, II, 1902, p. 754; *Canon and Text of the New Testament*, 1907, p. 422; E. Miller in Scrivener's *Introduction*, etc., ed. 4, II, pp. 188-9; Hammond, *Outlines*, etc., ed. 2, p. 66. On the general subject, see H. J. M. Bebb, in the Oxford *Studia Biblica*, II, 1890, p. 221.



mitted in Luke's Gospel. If it is spurious there, we have no evidence whatever that it was spoken by Jesus. It comes to us as a saying of Jesus' only on the faith of its genuineness in Luke. Falling out of Luke it falls out of existence. There is no reason to suppose that it owes its origin to anything else than the brooding mind of some devout scribe—or, if we take the whole series of interpolations in verses 54-56 together, we may say to the brooding minds of a series of scribes, supplementing the work one of another—whose pen—or pens—filled out more or less unconsciously the suggestions of the text which was in process of copying. The manuscripts are crowded with such complementary interpolations,—E. S. Buchanan, for example, has culled many instructive examples from Latin manuscripts<sup>8</sup>—and none could bear more clearly on its face the characteristic marks of the class than those now before us. "And when His disciples James and John saw, they said, Lord, wilt Thou that we bid fire to come down from heaven and consume them [as [also] Elias did]? But He turned and rebuked them and said, ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. [[For] the Son of Man came not to destroy [men's] lives, but to save them]."

(2) As an offset to the omission of Lk. ix. 56 we should insert into the list Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43.

This passage Harnack rejects on the ground that no reference is made to the mission of Jesus in Mark's "for

<sup>8</sup>In his *Sacred Latin Texts* (I, 1912; II, 1914, III, 1914) Buchanan is accustomed to give lists of striking readings occurring in the manuscript he is editing. Here are a few from the Irish codex, Harl. 1023: Lk. i. 57, And she brought forth *according to the word of God* a son; viii. 12, Take heed how ye hear *the word of God*; xi. 3, Give us today for bread, *the word of God from heaven*; xv. 29, But as soon as this *son of the devil came*; Jno. vi. 44, No man can come unto me except the Father which sent me *and the Holy Spirit* draw him; viii. 12, He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the *eternal* light of the life of God. See also *The Records Unrolled*, 1911. The parallel is made more striking by Buchanan's tendency to think such readings more original than those of the critical texts. The lengths he would go in this contention may be observed in his pamphlet: *The Search for the Original Words of the Gospel*, 1914.

to this end came I out", His coming forth from Capernaum alone being meant; while Luke's specific, "for therefore was I sent" is due merely to a misunderstanding on Luke's part of Mark's statement. The major premiss of the conclusion thus reached is obviously a particular hypothesis of the composition of the Synoptic Gospels and especially of the relation of Luke to Mark. On this hypothesis, Mark is the original "Narrative-Source", and the matter common to Luke and Mark is derived directly by Luke from Mark. We cannot share this hypothesis; the matter presented by both Luke and Mark seems to us rather to be derived by both alike from a common source (call it the "Primitive Mark"—*Urmarkus*—if you like) underlying both. But assuredly no hypothesis could be more infelicitous as an explanation of the relation of Luke to Mark in our present passage. If Luke is here drawing directly on Mark, he certainly uses a very free hand. The same general sense could scarcely be conveyed by two independent writers more diversely. This is apparent even to the reader of the English version, for the difference extends to the whole literary manner, the very conception and presentation of the incident. It is much more striking in the Greek, for the difference permeates so thoroughly the language employed by the two writers as to approach the limit of the possible. In the verse which particularly concerns us, for example, it is literally true that except at most the two words, translated diversely in the English version, in Mark "to this end", in Luke "therefore",<sup>9</sup> no single word is the same in the two accounts. If there is anything clear from the literary standpoint, it is clear that Luke is not here drawing upon Mark but is giving an independent account. In that case, Luke's report of what our Lord said cannot be summarily set aside as a mere misunderstanding of Mark.

It may still be said, of course, that what Luke gives us is a deliberate alteration of Mark. Something like this

<sup>9</sup> We give to *εἰς τοῦτο* the benefit of the doubt in Lk. iv. 43. Probably the right reading is *ἐπὶ τοῦτο*.

appears to be the meaning of C. G. Montefiori, who writes: "Luke's 'I was sent' (*i.e.* by God) is a grandiose and inaccurate interpretation of Mark's 'I came forth' (from the city)." Alfred Loisy traces at length what he conceives to be the transformation of the simple record of facts given by Mark into the announcement of a principle by Luke. "The difference between the historical tradition and the theological point of view", he remarks, "appears very clearly in the words of Christ; '*Let us go elsewhere . . . it is for this that I came out*'; and '*It must needs be that I proclaim to other towns the kingdom of God—I was sent for that*'." It is the same general conception that underlies H. A. W. Meyer's explanation that Mark's "expression is original, but had already acquired in the tradition that Luke here follows a doctrinal development with a higher meaning". And the step from this is not a long one to H. J. Holtzmann's representation of Luke's "I was sent" as a transition-step to the doctrinal language of John. Luke's language, however, bears no appearance of being a correction, conscious or unconscious, either of Mark's or anybody else's statement: it looks rather very much like an independent account of a well-transmitted saying of Jesus'. And we are moving ever further from the actual state of the case, in proportion as we introduce into our explanation the principle of a developing tradition with its implication of lapse of time. There is no decisive reason for supposing that Luke wrote later than Mark. And it is no less unjustified to describe his point of view than his Gospel as later than Mark's. The two Gospels were written near the same time,—Mark's being probably, indeed, a few years the younger.<sup>10</sup> They came out of the same circle, the mis-

<sup>10</sup> A Plummer's dating of Mark (*The Gospel According to Mark*, 1914), between 65 and 70 A.D., probably nearer the latter than the former date (we should say about A.D. 68), seems to us the only reasonable one: cf. Johannes Weiss, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, I,<sup>1</sup> 1906, p. 32 (cf. also p. 35): "about the year 70, probably somewhat earlier." On the other hand Harnack's later view of the date of Luke as prior to A.D. 63 seems to be not improbable.



sionary circle of Paul. And they reflect the same tradition in the same stage of development, if we may speak of stages of development regarding a tradition in which we can trace no growth whatever. If the element of time be eliminated, and we speak merely of differing temperaments, there might be more propriety in attributing a more theological tendency to the one than to the other. When a matter of historical accuracy is involved, however, Luke surely is not a historian who can be lightly set aside in his statements of fact. His representation that Jesus spoke here of His divine mission and not merely of His purpose in leaving the city that morning, makes on purely historical grounds as strong a claim upon our credence as any contradictory representation which may be supposed to be found in Mark, especially as it was confessedly no unwonted thing for Jesus to speak of His divine mission.

In point of fact, however, there is no difference of representation between Luke and Mark. Mark too reports Jesus as speaking of His divine mission. The possibility that he does so is allowed by Harnack himself, when he writes: "The probability is altogether preponderant that in the words of Jesus (Mark i. 38), 'Let us go elsewhere into the next towns that I may preach there also; for to this end came I forth', the 'came I forth' (*ἐξῆλθον*) has no deeper sense, but takes up again the 'went out' (*ἐξῆλθεν*) of verse 35: 'And in the morning, a great while before day, He rose up and went out [from Capernaum] and departed'." Others, making the same general contention, open the door to this possibility still wider. C. G. Montefiori comments: "'I came out'—*i.e.*, from the city. But the phrase is odd. Does it mean 'from heaven'? In that case it would be a late 'theological' reading." In similar doubt Johannes Weiss writes: "It is not altogether clear whether He means 'For this purpose I left the house so early', or 'For this purpose I have come out from God—come into the world' (it is thus that Luke understood the text)." Mark's meaning is, then, not so clearly that Jesus referred merely

to His coming out from Capernaum, nor indeed is it quite so simple, as it is sometimes assumed to be.

Harnack is scarcely right in any event in making the "I came out" of verse 38 both refer to Jesus' leaving Capernaum and resume the "He went out" of verse 35. It is not at all likely that the "He went out" of verse 35 refers to His leaving Capernaum. The statements as to Jesus' movements in verse 35 are remarkably circumstantial: they tell us that Jesus, having got up<sup>11</sup> before dawn, went out and went forth to a desert place. It is not the "went out" ( ἐξῆλθεν ) but the "went forth" ( ἀπῆλθεν ) which refers to His departure from Capernaum: the "went out" means that He "went out of doors", "out of the house". This is very generally recognized. It is recognized, for example by both Loisy and Montefiori, as well as by Holtzmann before them, all of whom understand the "going out" of verse 38 of "leaving the town". It is recognized also by Johannes Weiss, who saves the back reference to it of verse 38 by making the "I came out" of that verse too mean "from the house". Surely, however, it would be too trivial to make Jesus say: "It was for this reason that I left the house so early this morning—that I might preach also in the neighboring towns." Was He to visit all those towns that day, and therefore needed to make an early start? Mark apparently means us to understand, on the contrary, that the reason of His leaving the house so early was that He might find retirement for prayer. The "coming out" of verse 38 is then, in any case, not a resumption of that of verse 35, but a new "coming out" not previously mentioned. What reason is there for referring it back to the "going forth" ( ἀπῆλθεν, "departed") from Capernaum of verse 35? Would it be much less trivial to make Jesus say that He came out from Capernaum so early that morning to preach throughout Galilee than that He came out of the house for that purpose, The solemn declaration, "For to

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Holtzmann's note: "ἀναστὰς is to be taken here literally, therefore not merely as = ὀρθῶς." Cf. also G. Wohlenberg's note.

this end came I out" must have a deeper meaning than this. In point of fact He did "come" in this deeper meaning to preach; and He did fulfil this purpose and preached throughout Galilee as Mark had just duly recorded (i. 14). Is it not much more natural that He should have said this here, and that His biographer should have recorded that He said it, than that He should have said and been recorded as saying that He came out of Capernaum that morning early with this purpose in view? We cannot but think G. Wohlenberg right in pronouncing such an understanding of the declaration "superficial". Jesus seems clearly to be making here a solemn reference to His divine mission.<sup>12</sup>

(3) There is another passage with Harnack's dealing with which we cannot agree. This is Luke xii. 49-53.

Harnack rends this closely knit paragraph into fragments; discards two of its five constituent sentences altogether; and, separating the other three into two independent sayings, identifies one of these (verses 51, 53) with Mat. x. 34 ff and leaves the other (verses 49, 50) off to itself. This drastic treatment of the passage seems to have been suggested to him by the comment on it of Julius Wellhausen.<sup>13</sup> This comment runs as follows:

The three first verses do not square with one another. The fire which Jesus longs for is an abiding, universal effect, the baptism of death a passing personal experience, the prospect of which he dreads. What stands here is not: "My death is the necessary precondition of my great historical effect." Rather, the declarations of verse 49 and verse 50 are presented as parallel, although they are not so. Just as little is verse 50 homogeneous with verse 51. But neither do verses 49 and 51 agree together; the wished-for fire can have nothing to do with the terrible division of families. The whole of verse 50 and the second half of

<sup>12</sup> So J. A. Alexander, J. J. Van Oosterzee, E. Klostermann, H. B. Swete, A. Plummer, *et al.* Meyer *ad loc.* gives older names.

<sup>13</sup> A. Loisy appears not unwilling also to make a discreet use of Wellhausen's disintegrating criticism in his attempt to show how Luke concocted his narrative. Montefiori after reporting Wellhausen's criticism, expresses doubt regarding it, and then slips off into the lines of his favorite mentor, Loisy.



verse 49 are lacking in Marcion. In their absence, a connection would no doubt be instituted; the fire would be the inward war, and Luke would be reduced to Matthew (x. 34, 35). I have, however, no confidence whatever in this reading of Marcion's, but rather believe that Luke has brought together wholly disparate things according to some sort of association of ideas.

This slashing criticism Harnack reproduces in its main features, as follows:

Luke would undoubtedly have these two verses [verse 49 and 50] considered as fellows: they are bound together by  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ , are framed similarly, and close even with a rhyme. But their contents are so diverse as to interpose a veto on their conjunction. It has been in vain, moreover, that the expositors have tried to build a bridge between the two verses. Every bridge is wrecked on the consideration that the first verse refers to the action of Jesus, the second to something which threatens Him; for it is impossible to think in the second verse of baptism in general (Jesus' own baptism of suffering is meant, see Mk. x. 39), since the words, "How am I straitened, etc.", would then be wholly unintelligible or would have to be explained in a very artificial manner. The contention also that the eschatological idea connects the two verses is wrong; for the futures which the two verses contemplate are different. Add that the "fire" of the first verse has nothing to do with the "baptism with fire"; for Jesus could not say of that fire that He came "to cast" it upon the earth. It is therefore to be held that Luke who often follows external associations of ideas, has been led to put the two verses transmitted to him together by the similarity of their structure, and because some connection between fire and baptism hovered before his mind. He has similarly again made an arbitrary connection in the case of the next verse, when he adjoins the saying about peace and sword of which we have already spoken. This saying too can scarcely have been spoken in the same breath with ours, precisely because it exhibits a certain relationship with it but is differently oriented.

The superficiality of this criticism is flagrant. It owes whatever plausibility it may possess to the care which is taken not to go below the surface. So soon as we abstract ourselves from the mere vocables and attend to the thought the logical unity of the paragraph becomes even striking. Even in form of statement, however, the passage is clearly a unity. Harnack himself calls attention to the structure of verses 49 and 50 as a plain intimation that they form a

pair in their author's intention, and the bridge which he desiderates to connect them he himself indicates in the "but" by which the author, before the expositors busied themselves with the matter, expressly joins them. When Jesus had given expression to the pleasure that it would give Him to see the fire He had come to cast into the world already kindled, it was altogether natural that He should add an intimation of what it was that held this back—He must die first. And nothing could be more natural than that He should proceed then to speak further of the disturbance which His coming should create. It would be difficult to find a series of five verses more inseparately knit together. That such rents should exist between them as are asserted, and they be invisible to H. J. Holtzmann, say, or Johannes Weiss, neither of whom is commonly either unable or unwilling to see flaws in the evangelical reports of Jesus' sayings is, to say the least, very remarkable; and a unitary understanding of the passage which commends itself in its general features alike to these expositors and, say, Theodor Zahn, can scarcely be summarily cast aside as impossible. It is quite instructive to observe that the lack of harmony between verses 49 and 50, which is the hinge of the disintegrating criticism of the passage, is so little obvious to, say, Johannes Weiss, that it is precisely to the combination of these two verses that he directs us to attend if we wish really to understand Jesus' state of mind with reference to His death. "The parallelism of the fire and baptism, preserved only by Luke", he urges, "is one of Jesus' most important sayings, because we can perceive from it how Jesus thought of His end." "How Jesus really thought of His future", he says in another place, "a declaration like Luke xii. 49 f, perhaps shows".<sup>14</sup>

Looking, thus, upon Lk. xii. 49-53 as a closely knit unit, it would be difficult for us to accept Harnack's identification

<sup>14</sup> *Die Schriften*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> pp. 438 and 138. Weiss even speaks of Mk. x. 38 as "no doubt an echo of Lk. xii. 50" (p. 160), but it is not perfectly clear what he means by this (it is retained in the second edition).

of Lk. xii. 51, 53, torn from its context, with Mat. x. 34-36, also removed from its context; and the assignment of the "saying", thus preserved by both Matthew and Luke, to the hypothetical "Discourse-Source", which it is now fashionable to cite by the symbol Q. Even apart from this difficulty, however, the equation of the two passages would not commend itself to us. The phraseology in which they are severally cast is distinctly different. The decisive matter, however, is the difference in the settings into which they are severally put by the two evangelists. Both of the sections in which they severally occur, confessedly present difficulties to the harmonist, and the dispositions which harmonists have made of them in their arrangement of the evangelical material vary greatly.<sup>15</sup> It seems to be reasonably clear, however, that in the tenth chapter of Matthew and the twelfth chapter of Luke we are dealing with two quite distinct masses of material, spoken by our Lord on separate occasions. We may be sorry to forego any advantage which may be thought to accrue from the assignment of one of the sayings of Jesus in which He speaks of His mission to the hypothetical "Discourse-Source".<sup>16</sup> But we cannot admit that there is involved any loss of authenticity for the two sayings in question. We see no reason to suppose that the source or sources from which the two evangelists drew severally the sayings they have reported to us compared unfavorably, in point of trustworthiness as vehicles of the tradition of Jesus' sayings, with the hypothetical "Discourse-Source", from which they both some-

<sup>15</sup> For example, Edward Robinson, having placed Mat. x. 34 ff. in its natural position in his §62, preposits Lk. xii. 49 ff. to his §52. John H. Kerr, on the contrary, retaining the same natural position for Mat. x. 34 ff. (at his § 50), more correctly places Lk. xii. 49 ff. at his § 90. C. W. Hodge, Sr., *Syllabus of Lectures on the Gospel History*, 1888, p. 73, very properly speaks of Robinson's "dislocation" of the material of Luke as "the principal blot on his harmony": "he breaks up the connection just where commentators find a striking unity."

<sup>16</sup> Willoughby C. Allen and A. Plummer deny that Mat. x. 34 ff. and Lk. xii. 51 ff. come from Q. "Phraseology and context alike differ," says Allen. "The two evangelists draw from different sources."



times draw in common. On the whole the certainty that Jesus said what is here attributed to Him is increased by His being credibly reported to have said it twice in very similar language and to entirely the same effect.

We therefore amend Harnack's list at this point also, and instead of listing the two sayings as Mat. x. 34-36 = Lk. xii. 51, 53, and Lk. xii. 49, 50, give them as Mat. x. 34-36 and Lk. xii. 49-53.

As the result of this survey of the material, we find ourselves, like Harnack, with eight "sayings" at our disposal, although these eight are not precisely the same as those which he lists. Arranged, as nearly as the chronological order can be made out, in the order in which they were spoken, they are as follows: Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43; Mat. v. 17; Mk. ii. 17 = Mat. ix. 13 = Lk. v. 32; Mat. x. 34 f; Mat. xv. 24; Lk. xii. 49 ff; Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28; Lk. xix. 10.<sup>17</sup> Five of these sayings are found in Matthew; four in Luke; and three in Mark. As no one of them is found only in Matthew and Luke we need not insist that any of them is derived from the hypothetical "Discourse-Source" (Q), to which are commonly assigned the portions of the Synoptics found in Matthew and Luke but lacking in Mark. As all of these sayings are found in either Matthew or in Luke (and one in both) there seems to be no good reason, however, why some (or all) of them may not possibly have had a place in a document from which both Matthew and Luke are supposed to draw.<sup>18</sup> One is found

<sup>17</sup> Along with these there are certain other sayings which come illustratively into consideration. Primary among them is Mat. xi. 3 ff. = Lk. vii. 20 ff. which Harnack (p. 23) is tempted to include in the list itself as a ninth saying. Others are: Mk. xi. 9, 10 = Mat. xxi. 9 = Lk. xix. 38 = Jno. xii. 13; Mat. xxiii. 39; Mat. xi. 18, 19 = Lk. vii. 33, 34. Cf. also Mat. x. 40; Mk. ix. 37 = Lk. ix. 48; Lk. x. 16. There may be added [Mk. ix. 11 = Mat. xvii. 13; Mat. iii. 11 = Lk. iii. 16]. We have made some remarks on the general subject in *The Lord of Glory*, pp. 39 f., 76 f., 126 f., 190 f.

<sup>18</sup> We may quote here, say, Johannes Weiss, who says (*Die Schriften*,<sup>1</sup> I, p. 33): "Possibly there belongs to it yet many another [passage]"

in all three Gospels, one in Mark and Matthew, and one in Mark and Luke. These three at least, two of them very confidently in the form in which we have them, and the third (Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43) very possibly in one of the forms in which it has come to us, may be thought to have stood in the hypothetical "Narrative-Source" (*Urmarkus*). And it is possible that all the others may have stood in it too, since all the Gospels draw from it. Three are found in Matthew alone and two in Luke alone. These are at no disadvantage in point of trustworthiness in comparison with their companions which occur in more than one Gospel. Apart from the fact that they may have stood in any source from which their companions were drawn but did not chance to be taken from it by more than one evangelist, the determination that some of the sources used by the evangelists were drawn upon by more than one of them has no tendency to depreciate the value of those which were drawn upon by only one. No doubt the hypothetical "Narration-Source" which lies behind all three of the Synoptics is a very old document and is very highly commended to us by the confident dependence of them all upon it. There is no sound reason for assigning any of these Gospels to a date later than the sixties, and Luke and Matthew may easily have come from a considerably earlier date. A document underlying them all must have existed in the fifties and may be carried back almost to any date subsequent to the facts it records. But much the same may be said of a document underlying any one of the Synoptics: a document drawn on by one of them only may be just as old and just as authoritative as one drawn on by all of them. The matter of primary importance does not concern the particular hypothetical document—they are all hypothetical—from which it may be supposed that our Gospels have derived this saying or that. The disentangl-

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which is found only in Matthew, or only in Luke." As we ourselves believe that Mark also knew the "Discourse-Source", we might add also "or only in Mark."

ing of the hypothetical sources from which they may be supposed to have derived the several items of their narratives is a mere literary matter. We know nothing of these sources after we have disentangled them except that they all are earlier than the Gospels which used them; and that when the contents of each are gathered together and scrutinized, the contents of them all prove to be, from the historical point of view, all of a piece. This is the fundamental fact concerning them which requires recognition. The tradition of Jesus' sayings and doings, gathered out of earlier sources (written or oral) and preserved by the Synoptic Gospels, is a homogeneous tradition, and the original tradition. Behind it there lies nothing but the facts. Whether written down in the fifties or the forties or the thirties: whether some short interval separates its writing from the facts it records—say ten or twenty years—or no interval at all; no trace whatever exists of any earlier tradition of any kind behind it. It is for us at least the absolute beginning. In these circumstances we are justified in holding with confidence to all the sayings of Jesus transmitted to us in these Gospels. It is not that we cannot get behind these Gospels: it is that we can get behind them and find behind them nothing but what is in them.<sup>19</sup>

The term used by our Lord in these passages to express the fact of His mission is normally the simple "I came" (*ἦλθον*, Mk. ii. 17, Mat. v. 17, ix. 13, Mt. x. 34, Lk. xii. 49; cf. *ἦλθεν*, Mk. x. 45, Mat. xx. 28). But variations from this "technical term" occur. Once, after it has been once employed, it is varied on repetition to "the more elegant" (as Harnack calls it) term for public manifestation, "I came forth" (*παρεγενόμην*, Lk. xii. 49, 51). Once, in a parallel, the tense is changed to "I have come" (*ἐλήλυθα*, Lk. v. 32). Once the compound "I came out" (*ἐξῆλθον*, Mk. i. 38) is used. And in two passages, "I was sent"

<sup>19</sup> See the state of the case as presented in the PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1913, xi, 2, pp. 195-269.



(Lk. iv. 43, Mat. xv. 34; *cf.* Mk. ix. 37 = Lk. ix. 48, Mat. x. 40, Lk. x. 16) takes the place of "I came". In the majority of cases our Lord speaks directly of Himself as the one whose mission He is describing, in the first person: "I came", "I was sent", "I came out". In a few instances, however, He speaks of Himself in the third person under the designation of "the Son of Man"—"the Son of Man came" (Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28, Lk. xix. 10). There is a difference also in the nature and, so to say, the profundity of the reference to His mission. Sometimes He is speaking only of His personal ministry in "the days of His flesh", and the manner of its performance (Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43, Mat. xv. 24, *cf.* Lk. xix. 10). Sometimes His mind is on the circumstantial effects of the execution of His mission (Mat. x. 34 ff., Lk. xii. 49 ff.). Sometimes the horizon widens and the ultimate ethical result of His work is indicated (Mat. v. 17). Sometimes the declaration cuts to the bottom and the fundamental purpose of His mission is announced with respect both to the object sought and the means of its accomplishment (Mk. ii. 17 = Mat. ix. 13 = Lk. v. 32; Lk. xix. 10; Mk. x. 45 = Mt. xx. 28): "I came not to call the righteous but sinners"; "The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost"; "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." It should not pass without notice that it is in these last instances only that our Lord deserts the simple form of statement with the personal pronoun, "I came", and substitutes for it the solemn declaration, "the Son of Man came."

## II

In investigating the meaning of these sayings severally it is not necessary to follow carefully the chronological order of their utterance. In a broad sense they increase in richness of contents as our Lord's ministry develops itself. It was not until late in His ministry, for example, that our Lord spoke insistently of His death and His allusions

to His mission in His later ministry reflect this change. Nevertheless these sayings do not grow uniformly in richness as time goes on, and it will be more convenient to arrange them arbitrarily in order of relative richness of content than strictly to follow the chronological sequence. The order to be pursued has been suggested at the close of the immediately preceding paragraph.

## I

Mk. i. 38: And He saith unto them, Let us go elsewhere into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for to this end came I out.

Lk. iv. 43: But He said unto them, I must preach the good tidings of the kingdom of God to the other cities also; for to this end was I sent.

As reported by Mark, in this saying Jesus declares His mission in the briefest and simplest terms possible. It was just to preach. "For to this end came I out", He says; namely "to preach".<sup>20</sup> The context intimates, it is true, that this preaching was to be done in the first instance in the immediately neighboring towns: "Let us go elsewhere into the next towns that I may preach there also." It lay in the nature of the case that any preaching intended to extend over the land should begin with the nearest towns, and that these therefore should be particularly in mind in the announcement. But that the preaching was not intended to be limited to these "next" towns<sup>21</sup> is clear enough in itself, and is made quite plain (so far as the understanding of the reporter, at least, is concerned) by the next verse, which tells us what Jesus did by way of fulfilling the mission which He here announces: "And He went into their synagogues throughout all Galilee,<sup>22</sup> preaching and casting out

<sup>20</sup> Cf. G. Wohlenberg in *loc.*: "The *εἰς τοῦτο*, verse 38, means just the *κηρύσσειν* in general, not especially the *καὶ κηρύσσειν*."

<sup>21</sup> In the parallel, Luke says simply, "to the other cities," which suggests no other limitation than what Th. Zahn (p. 247) calls "the self-evident one" of "the other Jewish cities of Palestine."

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Mat. iv. 23: "And He went about in all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the good tidings of the Kingdom, and healing all manner of disease, and all manner of sickness among the

devils." Luke in the parallel, extends the boundaries even further. "And He was preaching in the synagogues of Judaea", he says,—but without prefixing the emphatic "all". By "Judaea" he means Palestine as a whole,<sup>23</sup> but, as the omission of the "all" already advises us, he does not intend to assert that there was no part of Palestine to which Jesus did not carry His Gospel, so much as that His mission was distinctively to Palestine.<sup>24</sup> In a word, Jesus announces His mission here as a mission to the Jewish people: He came out, was sent, to preach to the Jews.

The emphasis thus laid on preaching as the substance of Jesus' mission does not, however, so set preaching in contrast, say, to the working of miracles as to exclude the latter from any place in His mission. It has become fashionable in one school of expositors to see in the accounts which the evangelists give here a more or less complete misunderstanding of Jesus' motives in leaving Capernaum, although these are supposed nevertheless to shimmer through the narrative sufficiently to guide "the seeing eye".<sup>25</sup> When Jesus is represented as moved by a desire to preach in other places, less than half the truth, it is said, is told. What really determined His action was a desire to get away from Capernaum. And the reason for His desire to get away from Capernaum was that a thaumaturgical function had been thrust upon Him there. He fled from this in the night (Mk. i. 35). What He really announced in the words here misleadingly reported, was that His mission was to

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people." The emphasis in both Mark and Matthew is on the completeness with which Galilee was covered by this itinerant preaching.

<sup>23</sup> See especially Th. Zahn, p. 248, and pp. 61 f. Cf. A. Loisy, I, p. 462: "Luke has chosen a general term in order to signify that the mission of Jesus was for the whole country, conformably to what was said in verse 43 (B. Weiss, *Einleitung*, pp. 307-308)." Also, B. Weiss, C. F. Keil, Johannes Weiss *in loc.* Wellhausen: "Judaea (verse 44) includes Galilee in it: cf. i. 5; vi. 17; vii. 17, and D. xxiii. 5." Godet rejects the reading "Judaea" as "absurd."

<sup>24</sup> We are following Th. Zahn here (p. 248).

<sup>25</sup> So, e.g. H. J. Holtzmann, A. Loisy, J. Weiss. C. G. Montefiori draws back.



preach, not to work miracles. So far from permitting this to shimmer through them, however, the narratives of the evangelists flatly contradict it. Mark, for example, tells us that in leaving Capernaum Jesus did not leave His miracles behind Him: "And He went into their synagogues throughout all Galilee, preaching, and casting out devils." The parallel in Matthew (iv. 23) enlarges on this: "And He went about in all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues and preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of disease and all manner of sickness among the people." It may be easy to say, as Johannes Weiss for example does say, that such statements do not correspond with what really happened, and that Luke in his parallel account (iv. 44) has done well to omit them. But it is not so easy thus lightly to erase, not a couple of remarks merely, but the entire presentation of Jesus' work by the evangelists. According to their account, not merely at Capernaum in the beginning, but throughout His whole ministry, "mighty works" were as characteristic a feature of Jesus' ministry as His mighty word itself.<sup>26</sup> There is not the least justification in the narratives themselves, moreover, for the attempted rereading of their implications. There is no suggestion in them that Jesus was "betrayed into thaumaturgical works" at Capernaum. There is no hint that He was shocked or troubled by His abounding miracles there, or that He looked upon them as a scattering of His energies, or a diversion of Him from His proper task or as making a draft upon His strength. They are represented rather as His crown of glory. He is not represented as fleeing from them and as endeavoring to confine Himself to activities of a different nature. He is represented rather as looking upon them as the seal of His mission and His incitement to its full accomplishment. "I must needs preach in *the other towns*": "that I may preach there *also*". Not a contrast with His work at Capernaum,

<sup>26</sup> Cf. the conjunction of the two in Jesus' instructions to the Twelve, Mat. x. 5-8, and His reply to the Baptist's question, Mat. xi. 4-5.

but a repetition of it, is what He hopes for elsewhere. The whole contrast lies between Capernaum and the rest of the land: between a local and an itinerant ministry. What He had done in Capernaum, He felt the divine necessity of His mission driving Him to do also in the other cities. And therefore "He went into their synagogues throughout all Galilee preaching, and casting out devils". The ground of Jesus' leaving Capernaum lay, shortly, as Holtzmann recognizes it to be Luke's purpose to intimate, solely in "the universality of His mission".<sup>27</sup>

What Jesus came out to preach in fulfilment of His mission Mark's statement does not tell us. It says simply, "I came out to preach". But this is not to leave it in doubt. It was too well understood to require statement. Mark had just told his readers summarily that "after John was delivered up, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the glad-tidings of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye and believe in the glad-tidings" (*cf.* Mat. iv. 17). When he tells them now that Jesus announced His mission to be to preach, it is perfectly evident that it is just this preaching which he has in mind. The parallel in Luke declares this in so many words. "I must needs", Jesus is there reported as saying, "proclaim the glad-tidings of the kingdom of God, for to this end was I sent." The accent of necessity is here sounded. It were impossible that Jesus should do anything other than preach just this Gospel of the kingdom of God. His mission to this end lays a compulsion upon Him: He was sent to do precisely this, and needs must do it.<sup>28</sup> Jesus' mission is to preach a Gospel, the Gospel of the kingdom of God.

For Jesus so to describe His mission, clearly was to lay claim to the Messianic function. Preaching the glad-tidings

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<sup>27</sup> P. 333: "The ground of His flight, verse 43 finds in the universality of His mission."

<sup>28</sup> On the accent of "necessity" in Jesus' life, see Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, article "Foresight," at the beginning.

of the kingdom of God is the Messianic proclamation. The accompanying miracles are the signs of the Messiah. Accordingly when the Baptist sent to Jesus inquiring, "Art thou He that Cometh or look we for another?" Jesus replied by pointing to these things: "the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have the glad-tidings preached to them."<sup>29</sup> "He that Cometh" is a Messianic title, and therefore, as Harnack reminds us, those who heard Jesus say, "For I say unto you, ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say, Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord", understood Him to be speaking of the Messiah, and would have understood that just the same if the words "in the name of the Lord" had been wanting.<sup>30</sup> The question lies near at hand, accordingly, whether Jesus merely by speaking of "coming" "being sent" does not lay claim to Messianic dignity. In that case those terms would be used pregnantly. The Baptist "came", neither eating nor drinking, as truly as Jesus "came" eating and drinking (Mat. xi. 18; cf. xxi. 32). The prophet is "sent" as truly as the Messiah (Lk. iv. 26; Mat. xiii. 37 = Lk. xiii. 34; Jno. i. 6, 8, iii. 28). What the words openly declare is a consciousness of divine mission; and the two modes of expression differ according as the emphasis falls on the divine source of the mission ("I was sent") or on its voluntary performance ("I came").<sup>31</sup> Something more needs to be added, therefore, to mark the mission which they assume, plainly as Messianic. That

<sup>29</sup> Mat. xi. 3 ff. = Lk. vii. 20 ff. Harnack (p. 25) says: "The question whether the miracles which are enumerated are to be understood spiritually is to be answered in the negative for Matthew and Luke, and probably also for Jesus Himself." But that places Harnack in a quandary: "But that Jesus should have spoken here literally of raising the dead is nevertheless not easy to acknowledge."

<sup>30</sup> P. 1: Mat. xxiii. 39 = Lk. xiii. 35.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Th. Zahn's words *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*,<sup>8</sup> p. 610, distinguishing between "the execution of a commission laid on Him by God (Mat. x. 40, ὁ ἀποστείλας με, xv. 24; xxi. 37)" and "the purpose and meaning of His life comprehended by Himself (ἦλθεν)."



something more is added in the present passage by the purpose which is declared to be subserved by the mission. That purpose is the Messianic proclamation. He who came to preach the glad-tidings of the kingdom of God and who could point to the signs of the Messiah accompanying His preaching, has come as the Messiah.

Jesus, however, does not here say merely "I came". He says, "I came *out*", and the preposition should not be neglected. At the least it must refer to Jesus' coming publicly forward and entering upon the task of public teacher. J. J. van Oosterzee insists upon this sense: "The Saviour speaks simply of the purpose for which He now appeared publicly as a teacher."<sup>32</sup> That, however, in this Messianic context, appears scarcely adequate. We seem to be compelled to see in this term a reference to Jesus' manifestation as Messiah with whatever that may carry with it. This is apparently what C. F. Keil and G. Wohlenberg have in mind. According to the former, the phrase "I came out" is used here absolutely in the sense of coming into publicity, coming into the world; and if, he adds, we wish to supply anything we may add in thought *παρὰ* or *ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*—as we may find in Jno. xiii. 3; xvi. 27, 30. Similarly the latter considers the reference to be to Jesus' entrance upon His Messianic calling, and adds that it is not surprising if the expression tempts us to find in it an allusion to the coming forth from the Father such as John speaks of at xiii. 3; xvi. 27, 30; xvii. 8. Even if we follow this path to its end and say simply, with J. A. Alexander, F. Godet, A. Plummer, H. B. Swete and others, that when He says, "I came out" Jesus means, "I came out from God" or "from heaven" we are not going beyond the implications of the Messianic reference. If Jesus thought Himself the Messiah there is no reason why He may not be supposed to have thought of Himself as that transcendent Messiah which was "in the air" in "the days of His flesh". That He did think of Himself as the Transcendent Messiah is

<sup>32</sup> On Lk. iv. 43.

indeed already evident from His favorite self-designation of the Son of Man,—as reported by Mark as by the other evangelists. The Son of Man carries with it the idea of preëxistence. When then Mark records that He spoke of His mission as a "coming out", the phrase may very well come before us as the vehicle of Jesus' consciousness of His preëxistence; and F. Godet is speaking no less critically than theologically when he remarks that "Mark's term appears to allude to the incarnation, Luke's only refers to the mission of Jesus."<sup>33</sup>

When we say Messiah we say Israel. We naturally revert here, then, to Jesus' testimony that His mission was to preach the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to the cities of Judaea. He is obviously speaking not of the utmost reach of His mission, but of the limits of His personal ministry. His personal ministry, however, He describes as distinctively to the Jews. He "came out", He "was sent", to proclaim the glad-tidings of the imminence of that Kingdom to the people of God to whom the Kingdom had been promised. This was, in its external aspects, His mission.

## 2

Mat. xv. 24: And He answered and said, I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel.

What in the former saying is given a perhaps somewhat unarresting positive expression is in this saying asserted in a strong, almost startling, negative form. Jesus declares that His mission was not only to the Jews, but to them only. Denying a request from His disciples that He should exercise His miraculous powers for the healing of a heathen girl who was suffering from possession, He justifies the denial by explaining that His mission was not to the heathen but solely to the Jews: "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." The language in which He clothes this explanation had been employed by Him on a

<sup>33</sup> It is less obvious that the simple "I came" presupposes preëxistence as many commentators insist (*e.g.* A. Plummer, *Matthew*, p. 156, note 2, cf. A. M. McNeille on Mat. x. 40). But on this see below pp. 568, 581 ff.

previous occasion. When He was sending His disciples on their first mission He laid, first of all, this charge upon them: "Go not into any way of the Gentiles, and enter not into any city of the Samaritans; but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Mat. x. 5). The circumstantial negative clauses act as definitions of the language of the positive clause. This language is just as sharply definite in our present saying. Jesus declares that He has no mission to the heathen. His mission is distinctively to the Jews.

It may be possible to exaggerate, however, the exclusiveness of this declaration. After all, it has a context. And it should not be overlooked that despite the emphasis of His assertion that He had no mission to the heathen, Jesus healed this heathen girl. Nor can it quite be said that He healed her by way of exception; overpersuaded, perhaps, by the touching plea of her mother, or even, perhaps, instructed by her shrewd common-sense to a wider apprehension of the scope of His mission than He had before attained. When He threw Himself back on His mission, He invoked in His justification the authority of God.<sup>84</sup> And therefore, in adducing His mission, He employs the phrase "I was sent" rather than "I came". By that phrase He appeals to Him with whose commission He was charged, and transfers the responsibility for the terms of His mission to Him.<sup>85</sup> After this it can scarcely be supposed that

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<sup>84</sup> Montefiori is quite right in saying: "The explanation is that God had ordered this limitation."

<sup>85</sup> In only two of the sayings in which Jesus expounds His mission (Lk. iv. 43, Mat. xv. 24) is the form "I was sent" employed. It is perhaps not without significance that in the only one of these which has a parallel (Lk. iv. 43), it is not the simple "I came" which stands in this parallel (Mk. i. 38), but a form which more pointedly refers to the source of the mission in God ("I came out"). The "I was sent" is reflected in its active equivalent in the "Johannine" (Jno. xiii. 20) phrase of Matt. x. 40; Mk. ix. 37 = Lk. ix. 48; Lk. x. 16, in which the unity of the sent and sender is suggested. Note the emphasis placed on Jesus' employment of "I was sent" in our present passage by F. L. Steinmeyer, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, pp. 140 ff., and J. Laid-



He overstepped the terms of His mission, as He understood them, in healing the heathen child. In other words, when He declares, "I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel", He is not to be understood as declaring that His mission was so exclusively to the Jews that the heathen had no part in it whatever.

The whole drift of the incident as recorded whether by Mark or by Matthew bears out this conclusion. The precise point which is stressed in both accounts alike is, not that the Jews have the exclusive right to the benefits of Jesus' mission, but that the preference belongs to them. This is given open expression in Jesus' words as reported by Mark, "Let the children *first* be fed; it is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs." But it is equally the implication of Matthew's account.<sup>36</sup> Jesus does not suggest that the dogs<sup>37</sup> shall have nothing; but that they shall have only the dogs' portion. What the portion of the dogs is, is not here indicated. It is only intimated that they have a portion. The children have the preference, of course: but there is something also for the dogs. Jesus' whole conversation in this incident is certainly pedagogically determined. He employed the application of this heathen woman to Him in order to teach His disciples the real scope of His mission. There is no contradiction between His declaration to them that He was sent distinctively to Israel and His subsequent healing of the heathen child. He heals the child not in defiance of the terms of His mission, but because it fell within its terms; and He commends the mother because she had found the right way: "And He said unto her, *For this saying*, go thy way: the devil is gone out of thy daughter." A comment

law, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, p. 144. Th. Zahn remarks that here for the first time in Matthew is Jesus presented as the *ἀπόστολος* of God, and adds: "*cf.* xv. 24; xxi. 37 as correlate of the *ἡθρον* of v. 17; ix. 13; x. 34. Apart from John *cf.* Heb. iii. 1, Clem., 1 Cor. 42."

<sup>36</sup> This is solidly shown by Th. Zahn.

<sup>37</sup> It has been often pointed out that the use of the diminutive here softens the apparent harshness of the language. Shall we say "doglings"?

of Alfred Edersheim's sums up not badly the teaching of the incident: "when He breaks the bread to the children, in the breaking of it the crumbs must fall all around".<sup>39</sup>

Obviously what Jesus tells us here is very much what Paul tells us, when, summing up his Gospel ringingly as the power of God unto salvation to every one that believes, he adds, "To the Jew first and also to the Greek" (Rom. i. 16, *cf.* ii. 10). Many "Liberal" expositors therefore represent Mark as corrupting the record of Jesus' conversation when he puts on Jesus' lips a sharp assertion of this principle: "Let the children *first* be filled".<sup>39</sup> "If the Jews have only the *first* right", comments Johannes Weiss, for example, "it follows that the heathen too have a right. This is an echo from the Epistle to the Romans, i. 16,—the Jew first, then the Greek!"<sup>40</sup> It is not, however, merely in this sharp assertion of it that this principle is given expression in the narrative of the incident. It is present as truly in the account of Matthew as in that of Mark. The whole drift of both accounts alike—the climax of which is found not in any word of Jesus' but in a marvellous word of His petitioner's—is that there is something left for the dogs after the children are filled: "Even the dogs under the table eat of the crumbs of the children"; "even the dogs eat of the crumbs that fall from the table of their masters." Had there been no provision for the Gentiles, indeed, Jesus could scarcely have expected His disciples to recognize Him as that "One to Come" with whose mission there had from the beginning been connected blessings for the Gen-

<sup>39</sup> *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*,<sup>2</sup> II, 1883, p. 41.

<sup>40</sup> H. J. Holtzmann (p. 144): "*Let first* (πρῶτον = prius, maxim from Rom. i. 16; ii. 9, 10) *the children* (Israelites) *be filled*; this explanation, which still leaves room for the satisfaction of the mother, is simply lacking in Mat. xv. 26, and therefore the conclusion is commonly drawn that in the narrative of Mark we have a deliberate mitigation, a dependence upon the later, Pauline mission, and therefore secondary work (so Hilgenfeld, last in *ZWTh*, 1889, 497; B. and J. Weiss, *Jülicher, Gleichnisreden*, II, 256 f., even Wittichen 188, and with more reserve, Wernle, 133)."

<sup>41</sup> *Schriften*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> I, 1906, p. 128.

tiles also. The evangelists are not drawing from Paul when they represent Jesus as teaching that His mission was to Israel and yet extends in its beneficial effects to the world (*cf.* especially Mat. viii. 11; xxviii. 19).<sup>41</sup> Paul on the contrary is reflecting the teaching of Jesus as reported by the evangelists when, as Jesus proclaimed Himself to have been sent only to Israel, he declares Him to have been made a minister of the circumcision;<sup>42</sup> and when, as Jesus suggests that nevertheless there is in His mission a blessing for Gentiles also, he declares that by His ministry to the circumcision not only is the truth of God exalted and the promises unto the fathers confirmed, but mercy is brought to the Gentiles also (Rom. xv. 8 ff.).

How His mission could be distinctively for Israel and yet contain in it a blessing for the Gentiles also Jesus does not here explain to His disciples. He is content to fix the fact in their minds by the awakening object-lesson of this memorable miracle, in which His saving power goes out of Himself and effects its beneficent result across the borders of a strange land.<sup>43</sup> We can scarcely go astray, however, if we distinguish here, as in the case of Mark i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43, between His personal ministry and the wider working of His mission. When He says, "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel", He has His personal

<sup>41</sup> Wellhausen represents Mark as free from such universalizing utterances. Nowhere does it put such a statement as Mat. viii. 11 f. on Jesus' lips; and only in the eschatological discourse, Mk. xiii. 10, do we find a prediction of the extension of the preaching of the Gospel to the heathen attributed to Jesus. Montefiori adds xiv. 9. The implication is, of course, that neither of these passages is authentic.

<sup>42</sup> "Christ has become minister of the circumcised," comments H. A. W. Meyer; "for to devote His activity to the welfare of the Jewish nation was, according to promise, the duty of the Messianic office, comp. Mat. xx. 28, xv. 24."

<sup>43</sup> "It has been remarked," says Wellhausen (*Das Ev. Marci*, 1903, p. 60), "that this is up to now the only example in Mark in which Jesus heals from a distance, by His mere word." "This is the second example of a miracle wrought from a distance," says Loisy (I, p. 977). "The first was wrought on the centurion's son." Then he cites Augustine's remarks in *Quaest. Ev.*, I, 18.



ministry in mind. It will hardly be doubted that this was the understanding of the evangelist. C. G. Montefiori, for example, paraphrases thus: "His disciples shall convert the world; He Himself is sent only to Israel." "Jesus says that He has been sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel only. This looks like a 'narrow' tradition. But it is not. It is intended to explain the undoubted but perplexing fact that Jesus the universal Saviour and Mediator, did actually confine Himself to the Jews. The explanation is that God had ordered this limitation. After His resurrection, He will send His disciples to all the world."<sup>44</sup> Did Jesus Himself have no anticipation of this course of events, or purpose with reference to it? It should go without saying that, just because He conceived His mission as Messianic, He necessarily conceived it both as immediately directed to Israel, and as in its effects extending also to the Gentiles. That was how the mission of the Messiah had been set forth in those prophecies on which He fed. We cannot be surprised, then, that it is customary to recognize that it is to His personal ministry alone that Jesus refers when He declares that He "was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel".<sup>45</sup>

The messianic character of His mission is already implied in the terms in which He here describes it. When He speaks of "the lost sheep of the house of Israel", His mind is on the great messianic passage, Ezek. xxxiii., xxxiv., in which Jehovah promises that He Himself will feed His sheep, "and seek that which was lost"; and that He will "set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them,

<sup>44</sup> Vol. II, pp. 657, 658.

<sup>45</sup> So from Augustine and Jerome down. H. A. W. Meyer expresses the general opinion when he says: "It was not intended that Christ should come to the *Gentiles* in the days of His flesh, but that He should do so at the subsequent period (xxviii. 19) in the person of the Spirit acting through the medium of the Apostolic preaching (Jno. x. 16, Eph. ii. 17)." Cf. Th. Zahn: "His personal and immediate vocation." Also, R. C. Trench, *Notes on the Miracles of Our Lord*, second American ed., 1852, p. 274; J. Laidlaw, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, 1890, p. 252; A. Edersheim, *Life and Times*, etc.,<sup>1</sup> 1883, II, p. 40.

even my servant David; he shall feed them and he shall be their shepherd".<sup>46</sup> When, with His mind on this prophecy, Jesus spoke of His mission as to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel" it may admit of question whether the genitive is epexegetical or partitive,—whether He conceives His mission to be directed to Israel as a whole, conceived as having wandered from God, or to that portion of Israel which had strayed<sup>47</sup>—but it can admit of no question that He conceived of those to whom His mission was directed as "lost". He thought of His mission, therefore, as distinctively a saving mission, and He might just as well have said, "I was sent to save the lost sheep of the house of Israel." Harnack is quite right, therefore, when, after calling attention to the adoption of the language of Ezek. xxxiv. 15, 16, he adds: "And the mission to the lost sheep contains implicitly the 'to seek and to save'." How He is to accomplish the saving of the lost sheep of the house of Israel, Jesus does not in this utterance tell us. He tells us only that He has come, as the promised Messiah, with this mission entrusted to Him,—to save these lost sheep.

## 3

Mat. x. 34 ff.: Think not that I came to cast peace on the earth; I came not to cast peace but a sword. For I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law: and a man's foes shall be they of his own household.

<sup>46</sup> Observe the address of the petitioner in our passage (Mat. xv. 22), "O Lord, Son of David", which is not repelled by Jesus. "Spoken by a heathen", remarks Edersheim (ii, p. 39), "these words were an appeal, not to the Messiah of Israel, but to an Israelitish Messiah". They supply the starting point for a conversation, however, in which the Messiah of Israel brings relief to the heathen.

<sup>47</sup> That in Mat. x. 6, "the lost sheep of the house of Israel", the genitive is not partitive seems to be shown by the contrast of verse 5: the disciples are to go, not to Gentiles or the Samaritans, but to Israel, described here as "lost sheep". Cf. H. A. W. Meyer *in loc.*: "Such sheep (ix. 36) were *all*, seeing that they were without faith in Him, the heaven-sent Shepherd." The same phrase in Mat. xv. 24, in a similar contrast (with the Canaanitish woman), might naturally be held to be used in the same broad sense. Israel as a whole in that case would be the "lost sheep".

In this context Jesus is preparing His disciples for the persecutions which awaited them. They must not think their case singular: their Teacher and Lord had Himself suffered before them. Nor must they imagine that they are deserted: the Father has not forgotten them. And after all, such things belong in their day's work. They have not been called to ease but to struggle. Strife then is their immediate portion; but after the strife comes the reward.

When Jesus introduces what He has to say with the words, "Think not", He intimates that He is correcting a false impression, prevalent among His hearers (*cf.* v. 17).<sup>48</sup> His reference can only be to expectations of a kingdom of peace founded on Old Testament prophecy.<sup>49</sup> Since these expectations are focussed upon His own person He is obviously speaking out of a Messianic consciousness; and is assuming for Himself the rôle of the Messiah, come to introduce the promised kingdom.<sup>50</sup> Of course He does not mean to deny that the Messianic kingdom which He has come to introduce is the eternal kingdom of peace promised in the prophets. He is only warning His followers that the Messianic peace must be conquered before it is enjoyed. As His mind at the moment is on the individual, He describes the strife which awaits His followers in terms of the individual's experience. The language in which He does

<sup>48</sup> *Cf.* B. Weiss (Meyer, 9, 1898) and A. Plummer *in loc.*, and A. Loisy, i, p. 891.

<sup>49</sup> G. S. Goodspeed, *Israel's Messianic Hope*, 1910, p. 123: "All the seers of Israel look forward out of the present, whether gloomy or bright, to a golden age of peace." W. A. Brown, *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, III, p. 733a: "Among the blessings to which Israel looks forward in the Messianic Times, none is more emphasized than peace." *Cf.* A. Loisy, i, p. 891.

<sup>50</sup> Neglecting this, Harnack speaks inadequately when he writes: "This discourse is not Messianic in the literal sense—even John the Baptist could, it would appear, have said it—but in the burden of the discourse and in the saying, 'I came for this purpose', there lies a claim which soars above the prophets and the Baptist. For Jesus implicitly demands here that the severest sacrifices be made and the enmity of the nearest kindred be incurred, *for the sake of His person.*"



this is derived from an Old Testament passage (Micah vii. 6) in which the terrible disintegration of natural relationships incident to a time of deep moral corruption is described. The dissolution of social ties which His followers shall have to face will be like this. Let them gird themselves to meet the strain upon them loyally. For, as the succeeding verses show, it is distinctly a question of personal loyalty that is at issue.<sup>51</sup>

It should be observed that Jesus does not say merely, "Think not that I came to *send* (or *bring*) peace upon the earth", as our English versions have it. He says, "Think not that I came to *cast* peace upon the earth." The energy of the expression should not be evaporated (*cf.* vii. 6). What Jesus denies is that He has come to fling peace suddenly and immediately upon the earth,<sup>52</sup> so that all the evils of life should at once and perfectly give way to the unsullied blessedness of the consummated kingdom. Such seems to have been the expectation of His followers. He undeceives them by telling them plainly that He came on the contrary to cast a sword. Strife and struggle lie immediately before them, and the peace to which they look forward is postponed. The pathway upon which they have adventured in attaching themselves to Him leads indeed to peace, but it leads through strife.

When Jesus says that He came to cast a sword upon the earth and to set men at variance with one another, the declaration of purpose must not be weakened into a mere prediction of result.<sup>53</sup> He is speaking out of the funda-

<sup>51</sup> *Cf.* the excellent remarks of Th. Zahn, p. 415.

<sup>52</sup> So B. Weiss, *Das Matthaevangelium und seine Lucas-Parallelen*, 1876, p. 281, also in Meyer, 9th ed. 1898, and in *Die Vier Evangelien*, etc., 1900 *in loc.* So also H. J. Holtzmann, *Die Synoptiker*,<sup>2</sup> 1901, p. 235, who remarks: "Thus Jesus strikes out of the picture of the Messianic age, at least for the immediately following transitional period, the joy and peace predicted in Micah. iv. 3, v. 4, Zech. ix. 9, 10, and brings war into prospect in its stead, in reminiscence of Ex. xxxii. 27, Ezek. vi. 3, xiv. 17, xxi. 12."

<sup>53</sup> It is often so weakened. Thus *e.g.* A. Loisy: "The appearance of the Christ has therefore, for consequence—not for end, but the

mental presupposition of the universal government of God, which had just found expression in the assertion that not even a sparrow, or indeed a hair of our heads, falls to the ground "apart from our Father" (verses 29-31). The essence of the declaration lies in the assurance that nothing is to befall His followers by chance or the hard necessity of things, but all that comes to them comes from Him.<sup>54</sup> Not merely the ultimate end, but all the means which lead up to this end—in a linked chain of means and ends—are of His appointment and belong to the arrangements which He has made for His people. They are to face the strife which lies before them, therefore, as a part of the service they owe to Him (verses 37 ff.), their Master and Lord (verses 24 f.). This strife is not indeed all that Jesus came to bring, but this too He came to bring; and when He casts it upon the earth, He is fulfilling so far His mission. He "came", "was sent" (verse 40) to "cast a sword".

In this saying, too, we perceive, Jesus is dealing with what we may without impropriety speak of as a subordinate element of His mission. He does not mean that the sole or the chief purpose of His coming was to stir up strife. He means that the strife which His coming causes has its part to play in securing the end for which He came. When He said in Mk. i. 38 = Lk. iv. 43, "I came to preach", He was looking through the preaching, as means, to the end which it was to subserve. When He said in Mat. xv. 24 that He was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, He did not forget the wider end of which His ministry to Israel should be the means. So, when He says, "I came to cast a sword upon the earth", He is thinking of the strife which He thus takes up unto His plan not for

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Biblical language does not make a sharp distinction between the two—the division signified by the sword." Also, B. Weiss (Meyer, 9th ed., 1898): "What is the immediate, inevitable consequence of His coming, Jesus announces as its purpose." Cf. A. H. McNeille on Mat. x. 34.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. B. Weiss, *Das Matthauevangelium*, etc., 1876, p. 281: "It does not come like an unavoidable evil which is connected with the sought-for good, but it is foreseen and intended by Him."

itself but as an instrument by which His ultimate purpose should be reached. He tells us nothing of how long this strife is to last, or through what steps and stages it is to pass into the peace which waits behind it. Is He speaking only of the turmoil which must accompany the acceptance of Him as Messiah by His own people, involving as it does adjustment to the revised Messianic ideal which He brought?<sup>55</sup> Is He speaking in a "springing sense" of the ineradicable conflict of His Gospel with worldly ideals, through age after age, until at last "the end shall come"?<sup>56</sup> Or is He speaking of the "growing pains" which must accompany the steady upward evolution through all the ages of the religion which He founded?<sup>57</sup> The passage itself tells us nothing more than that Jesus came to cast a sword

<sup>55</sup> This appears to be A. Loisy's idea: "Because the proclamation of the kingdom has as its immediate effect (had not the Saviour found this Himself in His own home?) to cause discord in families—one accepting the faith, another rejecting it, and this discord placing believers and unbelievers at odds." See also C. G. Montefiori: "The sword does not mean war between nations, but dissension between families, of which one member remains a Jew, while another becomes a Christian."

<sup>56</sup> This appears to be A. Plummer's meaning: "So long as men's wills are opposed to the Gospel there can be no peace. . . . Once more Christ guards His disciples against being under any illusions. They have entered the narrow way, and it leads to tribulation, before leading to eternal life."

<sup>57</sup> Something like this seems to be Johannes Weiss' meaning: "This saying belongs to the most characteristic and the most authentic sayings of Jesus concerning Himself: 'I came not to bring peace on the earth but a sword.' Jesus must have felt deeply how utterly His proclamation stood in contradiction with what men were accustomed to hear and wished to hear. And what He Himself in His parental home seems to have experienced, that he foresees as a universal phenomenon which He portrays by means of words derived from Micah: a cleft is to go through families; and indeed it is to be the young generation which shall oppose the old ('three against two and two against three' says Luke: the wife of the son lives in the house of her parents-in-law). Jesus does not reprehend this, and offers no exhortation against loss of piety. He simply posits it as an inevitable fact. Thus it has always been a thousand times over; and it may be to the elders a warning and to the children a consolation, that even the Gospel of Jesus must create so painful a division."



upon the earth; that there were to result from His coming strife and strain; and that only through this strife and strain is the full purpose for which He came attainable. For what is more than this we must go elsewhere. Only let us bear well in mind that the note of the saying is not discouragement but confidence. There rings through it the "Fear not!" of verse 31. There underlies it the "I too will confess him before my Father in heaven" of verse 32. And it passes unobserved into the "He who loses His life for my sake shall find it" of verse 39, and the "whosoever shall give to drink to one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward" of verse 42. Jesus warns His followers of the stress and strain before them. But He does this as one who buckles their armor on them and sends them forth to victory. The word on which the discussion closes is "Reward".

## 4

Lk. xii. 49-53: I came to cast fire upon the earth; and how I wish that it was already kindled! But I have a baptism to be baptised with; and how am I straitened until it be accomplished! Think ye that I am come to give peace in the earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division: for there shall be from henceforth five in one house divided, three against two and two against three. They shall be divided, father against son, and son against father; mother against daughter, and daughter against her mother; mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law, and daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

To some of the questions started by Mat. x. 34 ff., answers are suggested by the present saying. Here too Jesus is protecting His followers against the false expectation which they had been misled into forming, that He, the Messiah, would at once introduce the promised reign of peace.<sup>58</sup> In repelling this expectation, His own claim to the Messianic dignity and function is given express intimation. He corrects, not their estimate of His person or vocation, but their conception of the nature of the Messianic

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Hahn's note *in loc.*

work. The language in which He makes this correction is very strong: "Ye think that it is peace that I am come to give in the earth. Not at all, I tell you; nothing but division."<sup>59</sup> The emphasis which, by its position, falls on the word "fire" in the first clause, corresponds with this strength of language and prepares the way for it: "It is fire that I came to cast upon the earth".<sup>60</sup> It is clear that the two sentences belong together and constitute together but a single statement. The "fire" of the one is, then, taken up and explained by the "division" of the other, just as the "came" (ἦλθον) of the one is repeated in the "am come" (παρεγενόμην) of the other, and the "cast" (βαλεῖν) of the one by the "give" (δοῦναι) of the other. The greater energy of the language in the former declaration is due to its being the immediate expression of Jesus' own thought and feeling: "It is fire that I came to cast upon the earth"; whereas in its repetition it is the thought of His followers to which He gives expression: "Ye think that it is peace that I am here<sup>61</sup> to give." What it is of chief importance for us to observe is that by the "fire" which He has come to cast upon the earth, Jesus means just the "division"<sup>62</sup> which He describes in the subsequent

<sup>59</sup> A. Plummer: "I came not to send *any other thing than* division." Th. Zahn: "Think ye that I am come to give peace on earth? No, I say to you, nothing else than division." Cf. 2 Cor. i. 13.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Plummer's note.

<sup>61</sup> παραγίνομαι, "to come to the side of", is, says Harnack, a "more elegant" word than ἔρχομαι, and Luke has varied the ἦλθον of verse 49 to the παρεγενόμην of verse 51 for the sake of better literary form. If Luke was really the author of all the nice touches with which he is credited, he would need to be recognized as one of the most "exquisite" writers of literary history. The variations of language between the parallel statements of verses 49 and 51 are grounded in the nature of the case and reflect the truth of life. It is better to explain παρεγενόμην as the natural phrase to express the disciples' thought of Jesus' "coming" relatively to themselves, than to give it with Thayer-Grimm the sense of "coming forth", "making one's public appearance" (Mat. iii. 1, Heb. ix. 11).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Loisy, p. 893: "In view of the expressions chosen and of the progress of the discourse, the fire is nothing else than the discord introduced into the world by the preaching of the Gospel, or, better still

clauses in much the same language in which He had spoken of it in Mat. x. 34 ff. That is to say, He has in mind, here as there, a great disarrangement of social relationships which He speaks of as the proximate result of the introduction of the Kingdom of God into the world.

No more here than there does Jesus mean to represent this discord which He declares He came to give in the earth, as the proper purpose or the ultimate result of His coming.<sup>63</sup> The strength of the language in which He declares it to be His purpose in coming to produce this dissension, shuts off, indeed, all view beyond. When He says, "Ye think it is peace that I am here to give on the earth. Not at all, I tell you: nothing but division", He is thinking, of course, only of the immediate results, and, absorbed in them, leaving what lies beyond for the time out of sight. The absoluteness of the language is like the absoluteness of the, "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." But something does lie beyond. This not only belongs to the nature of the case, but is already intimated in the last clause of the first sentence (verse 49): "It is fire that I came to cast on the earth, and how I wish that it was already kindled." Clearly Jesus did not long for the kindling of the fire for the fire's own sake; but for the sake of what would come out of the fire.

What this clause particularly teaches us, however, is that the fire which Jesus came to cast on the earth was not yet kindled. The clause is of recognized difficulty and has been variously rendered. Most of these renderings yield, however, the same general sense; and it is reasonably clear that the meaning is represented with sufficient accuracy by,

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perhaps the movement excited for or against the religion of Jesus by the Apostolic preaching, from which the discord arose."

\* Cf. Zahn, p. 516: "That the ultimate purpose of His life and work is to bring peace upon the earth, Jesus of course does not here deny" [*cf.* to the contrary, Acts x. 36, Lk. i. 79, Is. ix. 6. Eph. ii. 14-17], "but only that the intended and immediate consequence of His coming and manifestation is a universal condition of peace upon earth,—a thing which even the angels on the night of His birth did not proclaim. . . ."



"And how I wish that it was already kindled."<sup>64</sup> For even the fire which He came to cast upon the world, Jesus thus points to the future. Not even it has yet been kindled. The peace which His followers were expecting lies yet beyond it. He was not to give peace in the world but nothing but division: yet even the division was not yet come—for even that His followers were to look forward. He is, then, not accounting to His followers for the trials they were enduring: He is warning them of trials yet to come. He is saying to them in effect, "In the world ye shall have tribulation"; but the subaudition also is present, "But be of good cheer; I have overcome the world." These things He was speaking to them, therefore, that despite the impending tribulation, they might have the peace which they were expecting—at least in sure prospect.

From the strong wish which Jesus expresses that the fire which He came to cast upon the earth had already been kindled, Harnack takes occasion to represent Him as a disappointed man. Harnack explains the fire which Jesus says He came to cast upon the earth as "an inflammation and refining agitation of spirits", and discovers an immense pathos in Jesus' inability to see that it had as yet been kindled.

Jesus moved with pain, acknowledges that the fire does not yet burn . . . . What Jesus wishes, yes, what He speaks of as the purpose of His coming, He does not yet see fulfilled—the great trying and refining agitation of spirits in which the old is consumed and the new is kindled. That "men of violence" (*βασταί*) are necessary that the kingdom of God may be taken, He says at Mat. xi. 12. To become such a man of violence (*βασταῖς*) one must be kindled from the fire. This fire He fain would bring, He has brought; but it will not yet burn; hence His pained exclamation. Elsewhere, only in the saying about Jerusalem (Mat. xxiii. 37) does this pained complaint of the failure of results come to such sharp expression.

<sup>64</sup> So Kinuol, Olshausen, De Wette, Bleek, Meyer, B. Weiss, Holtzmann, Zahn. On this use of the *τέ* see A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek of the New Testament*, 1914, on Lk. xii. 49 as per Index, and Zahn *in loc.* p. 514, note 54. On the *εἰ ἤδη ἀνέφθη* see Zahn *in loc.* and note 53.

It is needless to point out that this whole representation is in direct contradiction with the context. Harnack has prepared the way for it by cutting off the context and taking the single sentence of verse 49 in complete isolation. In so doing, He has rendered it impossible, however, confidently to assign any particular meaning to that, in that case, perfectly insulated saying. It is in this state equally patient to a dozen hypothetical meanings. The sense which Harnack puts upon it is simply imposed upon it from his own subjectivity: he merely ascribes to Jesus the feelings which, from his general conception of His person and work, he supposes He would naturally express in such an exclamation. Fortunately, the context interposes a decisive negative to the ascription. We have here not the weak wail of disappointment, but a strong assertion of conscious control. That, indeed, is sufficiently clear from the declaration itself. When Jesus asserts, "It is to cast fire upon the earth that I came" it is anything but the consciousness of impotence that is suggested to us. And the note of power vibrating in the assertion is not abolished by the adjoined expression of a wish that this fire was already kindled. No doubt there is an acknowledgment that the end for which He came was not yet fully accomplished: He had not finished His work which He came to do. But this does not involve confession either of disappointment at the slowness of its accomplishment, or fear that it may never be accomplished. The very form of the acknowledgment suggests confidence in the accomplishment. When Jesus says, "Would that it was already kindled"! He expresses no uncertainty that it will in due time be kindled. And even the time, He does not put outside of His power. He even tells us why it has not already been kindled. And the reason proves to lie in the orderly prosecution of His task. "How I wish", He exclaims, "that it was already kindled! But . . . ." He himself is postponing the kindling: "But I have a baptism to be baptised with." The fire cannot be kindled until He has undergone His

baptism.<sup>65</sup> Its kindling is contingent upon that. No doubt He looks forward to this baptism with apprehension: "And how am I straitened till it be accomplished"! But with no starting back. It is to be accomplished: and His face is set to its accomplishment. The entire course of events lies clearly in His view, and fully within His power. He has come to cast fire on the earth; but one of the means through which this fire is to be cast on the earth is a baptism with which He is to be baptized. This baptism is a dreadful experience which oppresses His soul as He looks forward to it. He could wish it were all well over. But He has no thought of doubting its accomplishment or of shrinking from His part in it. It is a veritable pre-Gethsemane which is revealed to us here.<sup>66</sup> But as in the actual Gethsemane, with the "Let this cup pass from me", there is conjoined the, "Nevertheless not my will but thine be done."

That the baptism with which Jesus declares that He is to be baptized (*cf.* Mk. x. 38) is His death is unquestionable and is unquestioned. What we learn, then, is that the kindling of the fire which He came to cast upon the earth is in some way consequent upon His death.<sup>67</sup> Of the manner of His death He tells us nothing, save what we may infer from the oppression of spirit which its prospect causes Him. Of the nature of its connection with the kindling of the fire which He came to cast upon the earth He tells us

<sup>65</sup> So Holtzmann (p. 374), and Zahn (p. 515).

<sup>66</sup> *Cf.* *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 71 f.

<sup>67</sup> The "from henceforth" of verse 52 introduces no difficulty; *cf.* H. A. W. Meyer's comment: "Jesus already realizes His approaching death". "The lighting up of this fire," he remarks at an earlier point, "which by means of His teaching and work He had already prepared, was to be effected by His death (see ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν verse 52) which became the subject of offense, as, on the other hand, of His divine courage of faith and life (comp. ii 35)." A. Loisy is altogether unreasonable when he writes (p. 893): "In making Jesus say that the divisions will exist henceforth, 'from now', the evangelist appears to forget that, according to him, the fire of discord should be kindled only later, when the Saviour had been baptized in death; but with him the time when Jesus spoke and that of His death were almost confounded together."



as little. We may be sure, indeed, that the relation of the two events is not a merely chronological one of precedence and subsequence. The relation between such events cannot be merely chronological; the order of time which is imperative in the development of Jesus' mission can never be a purely arbitrary temporal order. We must assume that the death of Jesus stands in some causal relation to the kindling of the fire He came to cast on the earth. What this causal relation is He does not, however, tell us here. Can we think of His death as needed to prepare Him to execute His task of casting fire upon the earth? Shall we think of His death giving impressiveness to His teaching and example and so creating in all hearts that crisis which issues in the decision by which there is produced the division with which the fire is identified? Or are we to think of His death entering in some yet more intimate manner into the production of this crisis, lying in some yet more fundamental manner at the basis of His efficient activity in the world? Jesus is silent. He tells us only that His death has a part to play in the kindling of the fire which He came to cast upon the earth; and that before it—and that means without it—that fire cannot be kindled. He tells us that His death is indispensable to His work; but He does not explain how it is indispensable.

Meanwhile we are advanced greatly in our understanding of what Jesus means by the "fire", the "sword", the "division" which, according to His statement in Mat. x. 34 ff., Lk. xii. 49 ff., He came to cast on the earth. And our sense of His control over the events by which His mission is accomplished is greatly deepened. What He came to do, He will do; even though in order to do it, He must die: even though He die—nay, just because He dies—He will do it. He came to set the world on fire. He came to die that He might set the world on fire. He wishes that the conflagration was already kindled: He is oppressed by the prospect before Him as He walks the path to death. But let no man mistake Him or His progress in the performance

of His mission. His death, He will accomplish: the fire He will kindle. Men may fancy that He is come to give peace: not at all: nothing but division. That primarily. We shall see the whole world turned up-side-down (Acts xvii. 6). After that, no doubt, we shall see what we shall see. But the implication is express that, in whatever we shall see, will be included at least that peace which, after all said, lies at the end of the sequence.

## 5

Mat. v. 17, 18: Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil. For, verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished.

"Think not", says Jesus to His disciples, "that I came to destroy the law or the prophets." That is as much as to say that they were thinking it, or at least were in danger of thinking it.<sup>68</sup> And that is as much as to say that He was recognized by them as the Messiah, and that He was speaking to them on the presupposition of His Messiahship, and of His Messianic mission. On the basis of such a prophecy as that on the New Covenant in Jer. xxxi. 31 ff.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> It is unreasonable for Johannes Weiss (p. 246) to say: "The error that Jesus came to destroy the law and the prophets was no doubt current in the time of the evangelist in certain circles, but cannot be proved for the life-time of Jesus, at least in the case of His disciples." Harnack refutes Weiss on his own ground (pp. 19 f.): but no refutation is needed beyond the words themselves.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. F. Giesebrecht, *Com. on Jer.*, 1894, in *loc.*: "For Jeremiah, to whom it was a matter of course that the old covenant would not last forever, there can therefore lie in the future only a new covenant, as with Is. lv. 3; lix. 21, lx. 20, lxi. 8, and Ezek. xxxiv. 25, xxxvii. 26. The old covenant had proved its insufficiency by the people's not keeping it and not being able to keep it. And since every good and perfect gift comes from above, God must for the future give the strength which the people lack for keeping the law, or else no stable, abiding relation between God and the people is ever possible. The requirement envisaging the people now in external letters must become one with the mind and will of man. . . . He has not yet attained to the conception of a 'new heart', Ezek. xi. 19, xxx. 2 ff.; Ps. li. 12, although he thinks of an inward influencing of the heart by divine power, so that it acquires a new attitude towards the content of the law."

it was not unnatural to think of the Messiah as a new law-giver under whom "the old law should be annulled and a new spiritual law given in its stead".<sup>70</sup> This point of view, we know, existed among the later Jews,<sup>71</sup> and could hardly fail to have its part to play in the Messianic conceptions of Jesus' time. That Jesus needed to guard His disciples against it was, thus, a matter of course,<sup>72</sup> and it was most natural that He should take opportunity to do so after the great words in which He greeted them as the salt of the earth and the light of the world, and exhorted them to let their light so shine before men that their good works should be seen and their Father in heaven be glorified. In guarding them against it He declares, almost expressly following out the thought of Jeremiah's prediction with respect to the writing of the law on the heart (Jer. xxxi. 33), that He came not to abrogate but to perfect. Thus, in the most striking way possible, Jesus lays claim to the Messianic dignity.

Richness and force is given to Jesus' declaration, "I came not to destroy but to fulfil," by the absence of an expressed object. The object naturally taken over from the preceding clause is a double one, "the law or the prophets". The development in the subsequent verses deals only with the law. The statement itself stands in majestic generality. Jesus declares that His mission was not a destroying but a fulfilling one. In making this declaration, His mind was particularly engaged with the law, as the course of the subsequent discussion suggests; or rather with the Scriptures of the Old Covenant as a whole, thought of at the moment from the point of view of the righteousness which they inculcate, as the collocation of the "law" and the "prophets" in the preceding clause suggests. But His mind

<sup>70</sup> These words are quoted from A. F. Gfrörer, *Das Jahrhundert des Heils*, 1838, ii., p. 341.

<sup>71</sup> See Gfrörer as cited, and especially the citation (p. 342) from the book Siphra on Levit. xxvi. 9.

<sup>72</sup> H. A. W. Meyer states the matter excellently with respect to our passage.



is engaged with the law as an application<sup>73</sup> of the general principle asserted, rather than as exhausting its whole content. He presents Himself quite generally as not an abrogator but a perfecter.

The commentators are at odds with one another as to the exact meaning which should be assigned to the word "fulfil". Some insist that, in its application to the law, it means nothing but to do what the law commands: Theodor Zahn, for example, employing a lucid figure, describes the law—or more broadly the written Word—as an empty vessel which is fulfilled when it receives the content appropriate to it,—law in obedience, prophecy in occurrence.<sup>74</sup> Others urge that "to fulfil the law" means to fill the law out, to bring it to its full and perfect formulation:<sup>75</sup> Theophylact beautifully illustrates this idea by likening Jesus' action to that of a painter who does not abrogate the sketch which he completes into a picture. The generality of the expression surely requires us to assign to it its most inclusive meaning, and we do not see that Th. Keim can be far wrong when he expounds "to fulfil" as "to teach the law, to do it, and to impose it". It is clear enough from the subsequent context that when Jesus applied to the law His broad declaration that He had come not as an abrogator but as a fulfiller, He had in mind both the perfecting and the keeping of the law. In point of fact, He presents Himself both as the legislator developing the law into its fullest implications (verses 21 ff.), and as the administrator, securing full obedience to the law (verses 18-20). The two functions are fairly included in the one act spoken of by Jeremiah—whose prophecy we have seen reason to suppose underlay Jesus' remark—as writing the law on the heart. To write the law on the heart is at once to perfect it—to give it its most inclusive and most searching meaning—and to secure for it spontaneous and therefore perfect obedi-

<sup>73</sup> See Zahn's discussion here.

<sup>74</sup> P. 213f

<sup>75</sup> So H. A. W. Meyer, and A. H. McNeille.

ence. It is to obtain these two ends that Jesus declares that He came, when He represents His mission to be that of "fulfiller" with reference to the law.

Harnack, nevertheless, lays all the stress on the single element of legislation.<sup>76</sup> Jesus, he supposes, presents Himself here as law-giver; and what He declares, he paraphrases thus: "I came not to break, that is, to dissolve the law together with the prophets: I came not in general to dissolve but to consummate, that is, to make complete." He explains:

The exact opposite to *καταλύσαι* is to "establish", to "ratify". But Jesus intends to say something more than this. He is not satisfied, as Wellhausen finely remarks, with the positive but chooses the superlative. Not to ratify, that is to say, to establish (see Rom. iii. 31), is His intention, but to consummate. That could be done, with reference to the law, in a twofold manner, either by strengthening its authority, or by completing its contents. Since, however, the former cannot be thought of—because the law possesses divine authority—only the latter can be meant; and it is precisely this to which expression is given in verses 21-48. In this discourse the law is completed thus—that what "was said to them of old time" remains indeed in existence (*οὐ καταλύω*) but is completed by deeper and stricter commands which go to the bottom and direct themselves to the disposition, through which moreover it comes about that many definitions are supplanted by others. Those that are replaced do not appear, however, to be abrogated because the legislative intention of Jesus does not look upon the previous legislation as false but as incomplete, and completes it.

What is said here is not without its importance. Jesus does present Himself as a lawgiver come to perfect the law, by uncovering the depths of its meaning, and thus extending its manifest reach. How He, thus, as legislator brings the law to its perfection He shows in the specimen instances brought together in verses 21-48. But, saying this, we have said only half of what must be said. What Jesus is primarily concerned for here, is not the completer formulation of the law but its better keeping. And what He proclaims His mission fundamentally to be is less the perfecting of

<sup>76</sup> So also Wellhausen.

the law as a "doctrine" as Harnack puts it—"our verses [17-19] too are spoken by Him as *legislator*, that is, they contain a doctrine"—(although this too enters into His mission) than the perfecting of His disciples as righteous men (a thing which could not be done without the perfecting of the law as a "doctrine"). The immediately succeeding context of His proclamation of His mission as not one of destruction but of fulfilment, deals not with the formulation of the law but with its observance (verses 18-20).

"I came not", says Jesus, "to destroy but to fulfil,—*for* . . . ." And, then, with this "*for*", He immediately grounds His assertion in the further one that the whole law in all its details, down to its smallest minutiae, remains permanently in force and shall be obeyed. "For, verily I say unto you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one jot or one tittle shall pass away from the law until all [of them] be accomplished." This assertion is made with the utmost solemnity: "Verily, I say unto you"; and there are two elements in it neither of which should be allowed to obscure the other. On the one hand it is asserted with an emphasis which could not easily be made stronger, that the law in its smallest details remains in undiminished authority so long as the world lasts. Jesus has not come to abrogate the law—on the contrary the law will never be abrogated, not even in the slightest of its particulars—the dotting of an *i* or the crossing of a *t*—so long as the world endures. But Jesus does not content Himself with this "canonizing of the letter" as H. J. Holtzmann calls it, certainly without exaggeration. The law, remaining in all its details in undiminished authority, is, on the other hand, to be perfectly observed. Jesus declares that while the world lasts no jot or tittle of the law shall pass away—until they all, all the law's merest jots and tittles, shall be accomplished. He means to say not merely that they should be accomplished, but that they shall be accomplished. The words are very emphatic. The "*all*", standing in correlation with the "*one*" of the "*one jot*" and "*one tittle*", de-



clares that all the jots and all the tittles of the law shall be accomplished. Not one shall fail. The expression itself is equivalent to a declaration that a time shall come when in this detailed perfection, the law shall be observed. This amounts to a promise that the day shall surely come for which we pray when, in accordance with Jesus' instruction we ask, "Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done as in heaven so on earth". So far from coming to abrogate the law, He comes then to get the law kept; not merely to republish it, in all its reach, whether of the jots and tittles of its former publication, or of its most deeply cutting and widely reaching interpretation, but to reproduce it in actual lives, to write it on the hearts of men and in their actual living. "Therefore", He proceeds to tell His disciples (verses 19-20), the "breaking"<sup>77</sup> of one of the least of these—these jots and tittles of—commandments, and the teaching of men so, is no small matter for them. Their place in the kingdom of heaven depends on their faithfulness to the least of them; and unless their righteousness far surpasses that of the Scribes and Pharisees with all their, no doubt misplaced, strictness, they shall have no place in that kingdom at all.

In a word, we do not understand the nature of the mission which Jesus here ascribes to Himself until we clearly see that it finds its end in the perfecting of men. His purpose in coming is not accomplished in merely completing the law: it finds its fulfilment in bringing men completely to keep the completed law. If we speak of Him as legislator, then, we mean that He claims plenary authority with respect to the law. The law is His, and He uses it as an instrument in the accomplishment of His great end, the making of men righteous. He knows what is in the law, and He brings all its content out, with the most searching analysis. But this is but the beginning. He came to make this law, thus nobly expounded, the actual law of

<sup>77</sup> That λύση, verse 19, is "break", not "abrogate", the parallel ποιήση sufficiently shows.

human lives. Abrogate it? Nothing could be further from His purpose. He came rather to fulfil it, to work it out into its most wide-reaching applications, and to work it, thus worked-out, into men's lives. Those who are His disciples will not be behind the Scribes and Pharisees themselves in the perfection of their obedience to its very jots and tittles. But their righteousness will not be the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees. The difference will be that their obedience will not be confined to these jots and tittles. In their lives there will be "accomplished" the whole law of God in its highest and profoundest meaning. Their lives will be a perfect transcript in act of the law of God, a perfect reflection of the will of God in life. It is for this that Jesus says that He "came". When this complete moralization of His disciples shall be accomplished; how, by what means, in what stages this perfect righteousness is to be made theirs; He does not tell us here. He tells us merely that He "came" to do this thing: so that His disciples shall be truly the salt of the earth which has not lost its savor, the light of the world which cannot be hid.

## 6

Mk. ii. 17: And when Jesus heard it, He saith unto them, They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous but sinners.

Mat. ix. 12-13: But when He heard it, He said, They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick. /But go ye and learn what this meaneth, I desire mercy and not sacrifice: for I came not to call the righteous, but sinners.

Lk. v. 31: And Jesus answering said unto them, They that are whole have no need of a physician but they that are sick. I am not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance.

In the immediately preceding saying (Mat. v. 17), Jesus tells us that He came to make men righteous. In this He tells us what manner of men they are whom He came to make righteous. They are sinners. "I came not to call

righteous but sinners." The anarthrous terms throw the qualities of the opposing classes into strong relief. Of course Jesus means by these terms the really righteous and really sinful. This Harnack perceives. "The righteous", he rightly remarks, "are really, apart from all irony, the righteous; and the sinners are really the sinners; and Jesus says that His life-calling is not to call the one but the other." Here, says Harnack, is an immense paradox. "It is one of the greatest milestones in the history of religion", he declares; "for Jesus puts His call in contrast with all that had hitherto been considered the presupposition of religion." So Celsus, he adds, already saw; and that is the reason of his passion when he writes:<sup>78</sup>

Those who invite to the solemnization of other mysteries make proclamation as follows: "He who has clean hands and an understanding tongue, come hither", or "He who is pure from all fault, and who is conscious in his soul of no sin, and who has led a noble and righteous life, come hither." This is what is proclaimed by those who promise expiation of sins! Let us hear, on the other hand, what kind of people the Christians invite: "Him who is a sinner, a fool, a simpleton, in a word an unfortunate—him will the Kingdom of God receive. By the sinner they mean the unjust, the thief, the burglar, the poisoner, the sacrilegious, the grave-robber. If one wished to recruit a robber band, it would be such people that he would collect.

The contrast here is very arresting and very instructive. But we can scarcely call it paradoxical to invite sinners to salvation—as Origen did not fail to remind Celsus. Paradox is already expressly excluded when Luke, in his record, adds the words, "to repentance". There is no paradox in calling not righteous but sinners—to repentance. Harnack, no doubt, asserts that this addition is "inappropriate". So little inappropriate is it, however, that it would necessarily be understood even if it were not expressed, and it is understood in the records of Matthew and Mark where it is not expressed. There can be no doubt that Jesus came preaching precisely repentance (Mk. i. 15, Mat. iv. 17): and when He says that He came to call not

<sup>78</sup> Origen, *Contra Celsum*, iii. 59.



righteous but sinners, it is clear that this was just because He was calling to repentance. All paradox, moreover, is already excluded by the preceding "parable" of which this declaration is the plain explanation: "They that are strong", says Jesus, "have no need of a physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call righteous but sinners." If Jesus' mission is like that of a physician and its end is healing, how could it be directed to the strong? Just because He came to save, He came to call only sinners. "But", says Harnack, "we have no certainty that this saying stood originally in this context (see Wellhausen on the passage), nor that the saying of Jesus originally combined both clauses." And if it did (he contends),—it would not yield the idea of calling to repentance. For in that case, sin would be likened to sickness, and sickness requires healing not repentance. It is best, then, to take the simple words, "I came not to call righteous but sinners" by themselves. They need no presupposition to be supplied by the preceding "parable": "they stand on their own feet with equal surety". This is obviously special pleading. Harnack does not desire the qualifications provided by the context, and therefore will have no context. Meanwhile, it is clear that Jesus who came preaching the Gospel of God, and crying Repent! (Mk. i. 15, Mat. iv. 17)—to preach which Gospel He declares that He "was sent", (Lk. iv. 43)—very naturally represents that His mission is not to righteous but sinners; and equally naturally likens His work to that of a physician who deals not with well people but with the sick. He does not mean by this to say that sin is merely a sickness and that sinners must therefore be dealt with in the unmixed tenderness of a healer of diseases; but that the terms of His mission like those of a physician cast His lot with the derelicts of the world. He has come to call sinners, and where would men expect to find Him except with sinners?

When Jesus declares, "I came not to call righteous but sinners", then, He uses the words "righteous" and "sin-

ners" in all seriousness, in their literal senses. By "righteous", He does not mean the Pharisees; nor by "sinners" the Publicans. Nevertheless it is clear that He so far takes His start from the Pharisaic point of view that He accepts its estimate of His table-companions as sinners. He does not deny that those with whom He ate were sinners.<sup>79</sup> His defence is not that they were miscalled sinners, but that His place was with sinners, whom He came to call.<sup>80</sup> Similarly His employment of the term "righteous" may not be free from a slight infusion of ironic reference to the Pharisees, who, by their question, contrasted themselves with the others and thus certainly ranked themselves with those "which trusted in themselves that they were righteous and set the rest at nought" (Lk. xviii. 9). His saying would at least raise in their own minds the question where they came in; and thus would act as a probe to enable them to "come to themselves" and to form a juster estimate of themselves. That such a probing of their consciences was within the intention of Jesus, is made clear by a clause in His declaration, preserved only by Matthew, interposed between the "parable" of the physician and the plain statement of the nature of His mission: "But go and learn what this meaneth, I desire mercy and not sacrifice" (Mat. ix. 13).<sup>81</sup> He is as far as possible from implying, therefore, that the Pharisees were well and had no need of His curative ministrations. He rather subtly suggests to them (and perhaps with

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<sup>79</sup> Cf. H. A. W. Meyer on Mat. ix. 10: "Observe that Jesus Himself by no means denies the *πομπὴν εἶναι* in regard to those associated with Him at table, ver. 12 f. They were truly diseased ones, sinners."

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Johannes Weiss (p. 167): "The answer which He gives to the criticism of the Scribes neither provides a complete analysis of His motives nor wholly reveals what He holds as to the publicans and sinners. He justifies His conduct only by an immediately obvious reason against which there is nothing to adduce: 'The strong have no need of a physician, but the sick' . . . He goes to those who need help and where He can help."

<sup>81</sup> Cf. H. A. W. Meyer *in loc.*: "Through that quotation from the Scriptures . . . it is intended to make the Pharisees understand how much they too were sinners."

Hos. vi. 6 in mind we would better not say so subtly either) that they deceived themselves if they fancied that to be the case. In thus intimating that the Pharisees were themselves sinners, He intimates that there were none righteous. A. Jülicher, it is true, vigorously asserts the contrary,<sup>82</sup> and insists that the "righteous" must be as actually existing a class of men as "sinners": and A. Loisy follows him in this. Jesus, looking out upon mankind, saw that some were righteous and some sinners. With the righteous, He had nothing to do; they needed no saving. It was to the sinners only that He had a mission; and His mission to them was, as Luke is perfectly right in adding, to call them to repentance. There were many who needed no repentance (Lk. xv. 2), but no sinner can be saved without repentance, and Luke's motive in adding "to repentance" is to make this clear and thus to guard against Jesus' call of sinners being taken in too broad, not to say too loose, a sense. This, however, is quite inconsistent with the whole drift of the narrative. Jesus is not separating mankind into two classes and declaring that His mission is confined to one of these classes. He is contemplating men from two points of view and declaring that His mission presupposes the one point of view rather than the other. Reprobation of Him had been expressed, because He associated with publicans and sinners. He does not pursue the question of the justice of the concrete contrast—though, as we have seen, not failing to drop hints even of it. He responds simply, "That is natural, I came on a mission not to righteous men but to sinners." The question whether any righteous men actually existed is not raised.<sup>83</sup> The point is that His mission is to sinners, and that it ought to occasion no surprise, therefore, that He is found with sinners.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, ii., pp. 175, 322.

<sup>83</sup> So far rightly, H. H. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, E. T., vol. ii., p. 51: "In these words He left quite untouched the question whether they were truly righteous in this sense."

<sup>84</sup> Cf. J. A. Alexander: "The distinction which He draws is not between two classes of men, but between two characters or conditions of the whole race."



What Jesus does in this saying, therefore, is to present Himself as the Saviour of sinners.<sup>85</sup> He came to call sinners; He is the physician who brings healing to sick souls. He does not tell us how He saves sinners. He speaks only of "calling them", of calling them "to repentance". From this we may learn that an awakened sense of wrong-doing, and a "change of heart", issuing in a changed life, enter into the effects of their "calling",—that, in a word, it issues in a transformed mind and life. But nothing is told us of the forces brought to bear on sinners to bring about these results. Meanwhile Jesus declares explicitly that His mission in the world was to "call sinners". That was no doubt implicit in all the definitions of this mission which have heretofore come before us. It is here openly proclaimed. Harnack says this saying is not Messianic, "because", he explains, "it has nothing to do with the Judgment or the Kingdom". When He who came to announce the Kingdom of God, calling on men to repent, called sinners to repentance,—had that nothing to do with the Kingdom? A "call to repentance"—has that not the Judgment in view? Who in any case is the Saviour of Sinners if not the Messiah? And who but the Messiah could proclaim with majestic brevity, "I came not to call righteous but sinners"?

## 7

Lk. xix. 10:—For the Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost.

This saying is very much a repetition of the immediately preceding one in more searching language. Harnack himself points out the closeness of their relation. "This saying, says he, "in the best way completes that one, with which it is intimately connected; the 'sinners' are the 'lost', but in

<sup>85</sup> J. Weiss will not allow that Jesus spoke more than the "parable" of the physician; but he recognizes that the Evangelist, by the main saying he puts into Jesus' mouth reflects the belief of the community that Jesus is the Saviour of sinners: "All those called into the community, felt themselves saved sinners, and in the retrospect of the whole work of Jesus, He appears as the savior of sinners. Cf. Lk. xix. 10."

being 'called' they are 'saved'." The expressive language of the present saying is derived from the great Messianic prophecy of Ezek. xxxiv. 11 ff., which Jesus has taken up and applies to Himself and His mission. Harnack is thoroughly justified, therefore, in saying: "What is most important about this saying, along with its contents, is that Jesus claims for Himself the work which God proclaimed through the prophets as His own future work." The whole figurative background of the saying, and its peculiarities of language as well, are taken from Ezekiel. "Thus saith the Lord Jehovah", we read there: "Behold I myself, even I, will search for my sheep, and will seek them out. As a shepherd seeketh out his flock in the day that he is among his sheep that are scattered abroad, so will I seek out my sheep and I will deliver them . . . I will seek that which was lost, and will bring again that which was driven away, and will bind up all that which was broken, and will strengthen that which was sick. . . ." Jesus obviously means to say that He came like this shepherd, with the particular task laid upon Him to seek and to save what was lost. Because the statement is introduced as the reason, we might almost say the justification, of His saving that "sinful man", Zacchaeus, the word "came" is put prominently forward,<sup>86</sup> with the effect of declaring with great emphasis that it was the very purpose of Jesus' "coming" "to seek and to save that which is lost". Here too Harnack's observations are just:

Ἡ ἀποστολή is given the first place here with emphasis. Thus it is made very clear that the salvation of what is lost (see Mat. x. 6, xv. 24; Lk. xv. 6, 9, 32) is the main purpose of Jesus' coming. What appears often in the parables and in separate sayings, is here collected into a general declaration, which elevates the saving activity of Jesus above all that is accidental. He Himself testifies that it is His proper work.

The term "lost" here is a neuter singular, used collectively.<sup>87</sup> It is simply taken over in this form from Ezek.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. H. A. W. Meyer: "ἡ ἀποστολή: emphatically placed first."

<sup>87</sup> Cf. the similar use of the collective neuter in Jno. vi. 37, xvii. 224.

xxxiv. 16, where Jehovah declares: "I will seek that which was lost."<sup>88</sup> In explaining His saving of Zacchaeus, Jesus assigns him to the class to seek and save which He declares to be His particular mission. Precisely what He meant by speaking of the objects of His saving actively as "lost" has been made the subject of some discussion. Hermann Cremer, for example, wishes us to bear in mind that "lost sheep" may always be found again; that they exist, so to speak for the purpose of being found. And A. B. Bruce, taking up this notion, even reduces the idea of "the lost" to that of "the neglected", and invites us to think of Jesus' mission as directed to "the neglected classes".<sup>89</sup> Such minimizing interpretations are not only wholly without support in the usage of the terms, and in the demands of the passages in which they occur. They are derogatory to the mission which Jesus declares that He came to execute. He speaks of His mission in tones of great impressiveness, as involving supremely great accomplishments. Obviously "the lost" which He declares that He came to seek and to save were not merely neglected people but veritably lost people, lost beyond retrieval save only as He not merely sought them but in some great sense saved them. The solemnity with which Jesus speaks of having come as the Saviour of "the lost" will not permit us to think lightly of their condition, which necessarily carries with it thinking lightly also of His mission and achievement.

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<sup>88</sup> Harnack therefore remarks that Wellhausen rightly supplies "sheep", translating: "For the Son of man came to seek and save das verlorene Schaf." Is the employment of the singular, "Schaf", here accurate? Wellhausen can scarcely intend it to apply to Zacchaeus as the example of a class.

<sup>89</sup> *The Kingdom of God*, p. 138. Bruce allows that the middle voice of the verb ἀπόλλυμι sometimes imports "irretrievable predition", but he will allow no such connotation to "the neuter participle τὸ ἀπολωλός." The neuter participle τὸ ἀπολωλός is found in the absolute sense of the "the lost", however, only in Lk. xix. 10. The participle occurs, however, as a qualifier of substantives in Lk. xv. 4, 6, 24, 32, Mat. x. 6, xv. 24. These are all the passages which Bruce has to go on: they obviously do not sustain his contention.



The solemnity of this declaration is much enhanced by Jesus' designation of Himself in it by the great title of "the Son of Man." He does not say here simply, as in the sayings we have heretofore had before us, "I came", or "I was sent", but, speaking of Himself in the third person, "The Son of Man came." By thus designating Himself He does far more than explicitly declare Himself the Messiah and His mission the Messianic mission, thus justifying His adoption of Ezekiel's language to describe it. He declares Himself the transcendent Messiah, and in so doing declares His mission, to put it shortly, a divine work, not merely in the sense that it was prosecuted under the divine appointment, but in the further sense that it was executed by a divine agent. Great pregnancy is at once imparted to the simple verb "came" by giving it the transcendent Son of Man for its subject. To say "I came" may mean nothing more than a claim to divine appointment. But to say, "the Son of Man came" transports the mind back into the pre-temporal, heavenly existence of the Son of Man and conveys the idea of His voluntary descent to earth. We recall here the language of Mk. i. 38, and see that intimation that Jesus thought of His work on earth as a mission of a visitant from a higher sphere, raised into the position of an explicit assertion. We perceive that Jesus is employing a high solemnity of utterance which necessarily imparts to every word of His declaration its deepest significance. The terms "lost", "saved" must be read in their most pregnant sense. Jesus represents those whom He came to seek and save as "lost"; but He declares that the Son of Man who came from heaven for the purpose has power to "save" them. The stress lies on the greatness of the agent, which carries with it the greatness of the achievement, and that in turn carries with it the hopelessness, apart from this achievement by this agent, of the condition of the "lost". It is with the fullest meaning that Jesus represents Himself here as the Saviour of the lost.

If Jesus represents Himself here as the Saviour of the

lost, however, does He not represent Himself as the Saviour of the lost of Israel only? We have heard Him in a previous saying, with the same passage from Ezekiel lying in the background, declaring, "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Mat. xv. 24). Is not salvation here similarly declared to have been brought by Him to Zacchaeus' house only because Zacchaeus too was a son of Abraham?<sup>90</sup> Jesus is speaking, primarily, of course, of His own personal ministry, which was strictly confined to Israel.<sup>91</sup> It was in the prosecution of His personal ministry to Israel that He came to Zacchaeus' house, bringing salvation. When He justifies doing this by appealing to the terms of His mission as the Saviour of the lost, He naturally has primary reference to the salvation of Zacchaeus, that Son of Abraham, and may be said by the "lost" to mean, in the first instance, such as he. Must we understand Him as having the lost specifically of Israel therefor exclusively in view? The evangelist who has recorded these words for us certainly did not so understand them. They are in themselves quite general. The Gentiles too are sinners, and are comprehended too under the word "lost". However they may have lain outside the scope of Jesus' personal ministry, they did not lie beyond the horizon of His saving purpose.<sup>92</sup> If we cannot quite say that He tells us here that His mission of salvation extends to them also,

<sup>90</sup> Cf. the language of Lk. xiii. 16. We cannot take the words in a spiritual sense, even with the modification suggested by Holtzmann and Plummer who combine the two senses.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Zahn p. 623, note 73: "According to the whole evangelical tradition, Jesus repeatedly indeed visited localities with a preponderant heathen population, and even worked some healings there (cf. Lk. viii. 27-39, Mat. xv. 26-28, xv. 29-39, and see *Commentary on Matthew*,<sup>8</sup> pp. 531 ff.), but He never preached to the heathen or even once entered a heathen's house (cf. Lk. vii. 2-10, Jno. vii. 35, xix. 20-32, and see *Commentary on John*,<sup>8</sup> pp. 391f. 511, 518)."

<sup>92</sup> Cf. in Luke, iii. 5, 6; iv. 24 ff.; xiii. 18-21, 29; xiv. 22f.; xx. 16; xxiv. 47. See above in Mat. xv. 24. On the universalism of Luke, cf. Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. iii, pp. 172 f. On the universalism of Jesus, cf. F. Spitta, *Jesus und die Heidenmission*, 1909, and the article "Missions" in Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*.

we need not contend that He tells us that it does not. The declaration has, in point of fact, nothing to say of the extension of His mission. It absorbs itself in the definition of its intensive nature. It is a mission of salvation. It is a mission to the "lost". Jesus in it declares that the explicit purpose of His coming was to save the lost. This is the great message which this saying brings us.

## 8

Mk. x. 45: For verily the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many.

Mat. xx. 28: Even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many.

Although Harnack too includes this saying among Jesus' testimonies to the purpose of His "coming", he nevertheless, expresses grave doubt of its authenticity; and this doubt passes, with respect to the latter member of it, into decisive rejection. The grounds on which he bases this doubt and rejection are three.<sup>93</sup> The saying is not recorded in Lk. xxii., 24-34, a passage which Harnack chuses to consider another and older form of the tradition reproduced in Mat. xx. 20-28 = Mk. x. 35-45. The transition from "ministering" to "giving the life as a ransom", Harnack represents as, although not unendurable, yet unexpected and hard: "ministry" is the act of a servant and no servant is in a position to ransom others. Nowhere else, except in the words spoken at the Last Supper, is there preserved in the oldest tradition an announcement by Jesus that

<sup>93</sup> In these criticisms Harnack pretty closely follows Wellhausen, *Das Evangelium Marci*, 1903, p. 91: "The ἀπολύτρωσις through the death of Jesus intrudes into the Gospel only here: immediately before, He did not die *for* others and in their stead, but He died *before* them that they might die afterwards. The words καὶ δοῦναι κτλ. are lacking in Lk. xxii. 27. They do not in fact fit in with διακονῆσαι, for that means 'wait at table' as the third and fourth evangelists rightly understand. The passage from serving to giving life as a ransom is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. It is explained by the service at the Lord's Supper, where Jesus administers His flesh and blood with bread and wine." Wellhausen is an adept at this sort of carping, surface verbal criticism.



He was to give His life instead of others.<sup>94</sup> As these reasons bear chiefly upon the latter portion of the saying, Harnack contents himself with rejecting it, and allows to Jesus the former half, which commends itself to him, moreover, by its paradoxical form and the pithiness of its contents. The statement of these grounds of doubt is their sufficient refutation. There is no reason to suppose that the incident recorded in Lk. xxii., 24-36 is the same as that recorded in Mat. xx. 20-28 = Mk. x. 35-45. The differences are decisive.<sup>95</sup> Jesus does not represent the giving of one's life as a ransom for others as a servant's function, or even ascribe the act to a servant. He represents the giving of one's life as a ransom for others as a supreme act of service for one, not Himself a servant, to render when He gave Himself to service to the uttermost. Harnack Himself allows that in one other saying, at least, Jesus does represent His death as offered for others, and, indeed, in a subsequent passage, himself extracts all the probative force from this objection, by pointing out that no presumption can lie against Jesus' expressing Himself concerning His death as He is here reported as doing (p. 26):

Whether Jesus Himself expressly included in the service which He performed, the giving of His life as a ransom for many, we must leave an open question; but the matter is not of so much importance as is commonly supposed. If His eye was always fixed upon His death (and the zealous effort to throw this into doubt is, considering the situation in which He ordinarily stood, simply whimsical) and knew Himself as the good shepherd,

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<sup>94</sup> Johannes Weiss, *Die Schriften*, etc.<sup>1</sup> I. p. 161, tells us that the grounds on which recent criticism denies the saying to Jesus are these three—which may be compared with Harnack's: "First, the entire life-activity of the Lord is here reviewed ('He came'); secondly, the term 'ransom' and the whole series of conceptions opened up by it, do not occur elsewhere in Jesus' preaching; and thirdly, the parallel declaration from the Discourse-Source, Lk. xxii. 27, contains nothing of the redemptive death." That is to say, in brief, Jesus cannot have said what He is here reported to have said, because He is not reported to have said it often.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. G. Hollmann, *Die Bedeutung des Todes Jesu* and Runze as there quoted.

John has only said the most natural thing in the world when he puts on Jesus' lips the declaration that the good shepherd gives his life for the sheep. Whether Jesus really said it, whether He, in another turn of phrase, represented His life as a thing of value for the ransoming of others, is not to be certainly determined; but if He designated His life in general as "service" then His death is properly included in it, for the highest service is—so it has been and so it will remain—the giving of the life.<sup>96</sup>

The case being so; it is surely unreasonable to deny to Jesus words credibly reported from His lips in which He declares that His ministry culminated in the giving of His life for others, merely because He is not reported as having frequently made this great declaration.<sup>97</sup>

There is the less reason for doubting that we have before us here an authentic saying of Jesus', because it was eminently natural and to be expected that Jesus, at this stage of His ministry, when describing the nature of His mission, should not pause until He had intimated the place of His death in it. According to the representation of all the evangelists, it was characteristic of this period of His ministry that He spoke much and very insistently of the death which He should accomplish at Jerusalem, and of the indispensableness of this death for the fulfilment of His

<sup>96</sup> Somewhat similarly, Johannes Weiss, who denies Mk. x. 45, Mk. xx. 28, to Jesus but allows to Him Lk. xxii. 27, writes (*Die Schriften*, vol. I, pp. 161-2): "It is, however, of course not inconceivable that Jesus should have included also His approaching death in this work of service and love. It is even probable that He was of the conviction that His death would somehow accrue to the advantage of the men for whom He had labored in word and deed. But whether He thought directly of a sacrificial death, or of a vicarious punishment, such as is described by Isaiah in the Fifty-third chapter,—that must remain doubtful, Cf. ix. 24." Why—when He certainly knew Isaiah liii, certainly applied it to Himself, and is credibly reported to have spoken of His death as a sacrificial offering (Mk. xiv. 24) and as a vicarious punishment (Mk. x. 45)? The discussion by H. J. Holtzmann, *Synopt.*, p. 160 is notable from the same point of view.

<sup>97</sup> It is purely arbitrary for Harnack to add in a note: "If the declaration," as to giving His life as a ransom, "comes from Jesus, we have at least no guaranty that it was spoken in connection with the *διακονεῖν* and was introduced by *ἦλθον*." There is no justification in any legitimate method of criticism for thus rending unitary sayings into fragments and dealing with each clause as a separate entity.

task. "From that time", says Matthew, marking the beginning of a period, "began Jesus to show unto His disciples, how that He must go unto Jerusalem . . . and be killed."<sup>98</sup> His insistence upon this teaching during this period is marked by all the evangelists again and again,<sup>99</sup> and it was immediately after the third of these insistences which have been recorded for us that the incident is introduced by Matthew and Mark which occasioned the declaration before us. Jesus' preoccupation with His death is strikingly betrayed by His allusion to it even in His response to the ambitious request of James and John, and that in such a manner as to show that it held, in His view, an indispensable place in His work.<sup>100</sup> It would have been unnatural, if when, in the sequel to this incident, He came to reveal to His disciples the innermost nature of His mission as one of self-sacrificing devotion, He had made no allusion whatever to the death in which it culminated, and the indispensableness of which to its accomplishment He was at the time earnestly engaged in impressing upon them.

The naturalness, not to say inevitableness, of an allusion to His death in this saying has not prevented some expositors, it is true, from attempting violently to explain away the open allusion which is made to it.<sup>101</sup> Thus, for example, Ernest D. Burton<sup>102</sup> wishes us to believe that "to give His life" means not "to die" but "to live",—"to devote His life-energies"—and that Jesus here without direct reference to His death is only exhorting His followers to devote their lives without reserve to the service of their fellows. In support of this desperate contention, he urges that he has not been able to find elsewhere the exact phrase, "to give

<sup>98</sup> Mat. xvi. 21; cf. Mk. viii. 31; Lk. ix. 22.

<sup>99</sup> Mat. xvii. 22f, Mk. ix. 30f, Lk. ix. 43ff; Mat. xx. 17ff, Mk. x. 32ff, Lk. viii. 31ff.

<sup>100</sup> Mat. xx. 22, Mk. x. 38.

<sup>101</sup> Not Harnack, whose phrase: "The announcement that Jesus gave His life as a *λύτρον* for others, that is to say, was to die for all" . . . indicates his conception of the meaning of the words.

<sup>102</sup> *Biblical Ideas of Atonement*, 1909, pp. 114ff.



life", used as a synonym of "to die".<sup>103</sup> It does not seem very difficult to find;<sup>104</sup> but in any event Burton might have remembered that this phrase is not so much used here as the synonym of "to die", as the wider phrase "to give His life a ransom for" is used as a synonym for "to die instead of".<sup>105</sup> In other words, the employment of the term "to give" is determined here by the idea of a ransom—which is a thing given, whether it be money or blood—and not by the idea of dying.<sup>106</sup> Its employment carries with it, indeed, the implication that Jesus' death was a voluntary act—He gave it; but the thought is not completed until the purpose for which He gave it is declared—He gave it as a ransom.

In this context, the saying occurs as an enforcement of Jesus' exhortation to His disciples to seek their greatness

<sup>103</sup> He finds the phrase "give your lives" in the exhortations of Mat-thias to his sons, 1 Macc. ii. 50 f.; but he supposes it to mean there, "to devote your life energies", an interpretation which did not suggest itself to Josephus, *Antt.* xii. 6. 3, Niese iii. pp. 120 f. (cf. Sirach xxix. 15, and, with *παρδίδωμι*, Acts xv. 26, *Hermas, Sim.*, ix. 28.2; *Just. Apol.* I, 50 from Is. 53, 12).

<sup>104</sup> See preceding note, and also cf. Ex. xxi. 23: *δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς*. A. Seeberg, *Der Tod Christi*, etc., 1895, p. 350, says: "The words *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν* refer in any case to death, for this formula which corresponds to the Hebrew *שָׁבַב לְנַפְשׁוֹ* occurs frequently in the sense of the surrender of the life in death." In a note he cites Ex. xxi. 23, 1 Macc. ii. 55, Sr. xxix. 15, with other less close parallels. There can be no doubt that "to give His life" means to Clement of Alexandria, for instance, *Paed.* I, ix, somewhat past the middle, simply to die.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Th. Zahn, *Das Ev. d. Matthaeus*,<sup>1</sup> 1903, p. 604, ed. 3, 1910, p. 611: "The greatest service, however, will be done by Him only in the gift of His life. No doubt this is not said clearly by *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ* by itself; *δοῦναι* rather finds its necessary supplement only in the object-predicate *λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*. But just this action described so figuratively, can take place only in a voluntary endurance of death; for no one can give a purchase-price for another without in doing so depriving himself of it."

<sup>106</sup> Cf. H. A. W. Meyer, on Mat. xx. 28 (E. T. II, p. 51): "*δοῦναι* is made choice of, because the *ψυχὴ* (the soul, as the principle of the life of the body) is conceived of as a *λύτρον* (a ransom)." Note Josephus, *Antt.* xiv. 7.1: *λύτρον ἀντὶ πάντων ἔδοκεν*, and cf. LXX Ex. xxi. 50, xxx. 12.

in service. He adduces His own example. "For even the Son of Man", He says, "came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many." To enhance His example He designates Himself by the transcendent title, "The Son of Man."<sup>107</sup> If any, the Son of Man might expect "to be ministered unto" in His sojourn on earth. In His sojourn on earth—for, when we say "Son of Man" we intimate that His earthly life is a sojourn. The eye fixes itself at once on a heavenly origin and a heavenly issue; and we necessarily think of pomp and glory. If even the Son of Man "came" not to be ministered unto but to minister, what shall we say of the proper life-ideal for others? Jesus is not speaking of the manner of His daily life on earth when He speaks here of "coming" to serve. The manner of His daily life on earth was not that of a servant. He lived among His followers as their Master and Lord, claiming their obedience and receiving their reverence.<sup>108</sup> He did not scruple to accept from others or to apply to Himself titles of the highest, even of super-human, dignity. In this very saying He speaks of Himself by a title which assigns to Him a transcendent being. It was not the manner of His earthly life but the mere fact of this earthly life for Him, which He speaks of as a servile mission. That He was on earth at all; that He, the heavenly one, demeaned Himself to a life in the world; this was what required explanation. And the explanation was, service.

This was not news to His followers. He is not informing them of something hitherto unimagined by them. He is reminding them of a great fact concerning Himself

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Harnack (p. 10): "That Jesus says here, not 'I' but 'the Son of Man' is explained from the contents of the saying, which acquires force from Jesus' laying claim at the same time to the (future) Messianic dignity." This is saying too little and it says it with a wrong implication, but it allows the main matter. Jesus' use of "the Son of Man" here plays the same part that Paul's phrase "being in the form of God" plays in Phil. ii. 5.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. the striking presentation of the facts here by Zahn, *Matthew*, p. 603.

which, He intimates, it were well for them to bear in mind. He "came", not to exercise the lordship which belongs naturally to a great one like Himself, but to perform a service. What the service which He came to perform was, and how He performs it He tells us by mentioning a single item, but that single item one lying so much at the center that it is in effect the whole story. "To minister *and* to give His life a ransom" are not presented as two separate things. They are one thing presented in general and in particular. The "and" is not merely copulative; it is intensive,<sup>109</sup> and may almost be read epexegetically: "The Son of Man came to minister, *namely* to give His life a ransom."<sup>110</sup> It is in "to give His life a ransom" that the declaration culminates; on it that it rests; through it that it conveys its real meaning. For this is the wonderful thing of which Jesus reminds His followers, to compose their ambitious rivalries—that He, the Son of Man, came unto the world to die. Dying was the service by way of eminence which He came to perform. Dying in the stead of others who themselves deserved to die<sup>111</sup>—that they need not die. We do not catch the drift of this great saying until we perceive that all its emphasis gathers itself up upon the declaration that Jesus came into the world just to die as a ransom.

The mode in which the service which Jesus came to render to others is performed is described here, then, in the phrase, "to give His life a ransom for many." It would be difficult to make the language more precise. Jesus declares that He came to die; to die voluntarily; to die voluntarily in order that His death may serve a particular pur-

<sup>109</sup> Cf. H. A. W. Meyer: "intensive: adding on the *highest act*, the culminating point in the *διακονῆσαι*."

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Seeberg, p. 368: "Jesus became man, in order as Messiah, to give His life in death, for of course the words *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν* give the content of *διακονῆσαι*."

<sup>111</sup> Whoever the "many" are, they certainly include the "sinners" whom He "came to call" (Mk. iii. 17, Mat. ix. 13, Lk. v. 32) and "the lost" whom "He came to seek and save" (Lk. xix. 10). For these "sinners" and "lost" He came to give His life a ransom. This is the way He saves them.



pose. This particular purpose He describes as a "ransom"; and the idea of a "ransom" is explicated by adding that, in thus giving His life as a ransom, His given life, His death, is set over against others in a relation of equivalence, takes their place and serves their need and so releases them.<sup>112</sup>

It is always possible to assign to each word in turn in a statement like this the least definite or the most attenuated meaning which is ever attached to it in its varied literary applications, and thus to reduce the statement as a whole literally to insignificance. Thus Jesus' strong and precise assertion that He came into the world in order to give His life as a ransom-price for the deliverance of many has been transmuted into the expression of a dawning recognition by Him that His death had become inevitable and of a more or less strong hope, or expectation, that it might not be quite a fatal blow to His wish to be of use, but might in some way or to some extent prove of advantage to His followers.<sup>113</sup> According to H. H. Wendt,<sup>114</sup> for example,

<sup>112</sup> Cf. H. A. W. Meyer on Mat. xx. 28: "ἀντί denotes *substitution*. That which is given as a *ransom* takes the *place* (is given *instead*) of those who are to be set free in consideration thereof." The "meaning is strictly and specifically defined by λύτρον (לִּפְדּוֹן) according to which ἀντί can only be understood in the sense of *substitution*, the act by which the ransom is presented as an equivalent to secure the deliverance of those on whose behalf it is paid." In the κοινή, ἀντί seems to be going out of use. Instead of it ὑπέρ is employed (L. Rademacher, *N. T. Grammatik*, 1911, pp. 115-116). It must therefore be held to be fully intended when used.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. C. G. Montefiori, vol. I, p. 260: "Moreover Jesus may just conceivably have realized that His death would be to the advantage of many; that many would enter the Kingdom as the effect of His death. Menzies takes this view. He thinks 'Jesus became reconciled to the prospect of death when He saw that He had to die for the benefit of others'. This is a possible view, though I think it an unlikely one. It is rebutted by Pfeiderer, *Urchristentum*, I, p. 372. Holtzmann thinks that λύτρον here is a translation of an Aramaic word which may merely mean 'deliverance'. Jesus 'delivered' people by causing them to repent . . . ." "Holtzmann" at the end of this extract is a misprint for "Hollmann": see G. Hollmann, *Die Bedeutung des Todes Jesu*, 1901, pp. 124f: "The following is then to be summarily derived from our passage: (1) that Jesus' death stands on the same plane with Jesus' life-work; (2) (negatively) that it

Jesus makes no reference whatever here to the "ransoming" of individual souls from the guilt and punishment of sin: "it is more correct to say that Jesus meant the bringing about of the salvation of the Messianic end-time in a wholly general sense".

Because He now, as death threatened Him for His works' sake, was determined rather to give His life up than be untrue to the vocation imposed on Him by God (Jno. x. 13-18); and because in strong trust in God, He was assured that His death would work out not for the destruction but for the furthering of His work; He could designate His yielding up of His life a "ransom", that is a means for bringing about the Messianic "liberation" for all those who would permit themselves to be led by Him to the Messianic salvation.

According to Friedrich Niebergall,<sup>115</sup> on the other hand, there is no objective reference in the allusion to a ransom: "the figure is doubtless here only an expression for the religious impression that by Christ's death we are liberated from evil Powers". In a similar vein Johannes Weiss says:<sup>116</sup>

When Mark wrote this declaration it was immediately intelligible to all his readers. For their religious life was governed by the fundamental feeling that they were liberated from the dominion of the devil and the demons (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 2, Gal. iv. 8) and therewith delivered from the terrible destruction which impended over the kingdom of sin at the end of the ages.

Questions, such as have been raised by the dogmaticians, as to the meaning of the saying "will no longer occupy us", says Weiss, "if we keep the main idea in mind, that the immediate liberation from the dominion of demonic tyrants which was felt directly by the ancient Christians

prevents many souls from falling into destruction; (3) (positively) that it brings many hitherto unbelieving to salvation. There can be added as most probable that (4) their salvation lies in the operation of *μετανοια*."

<sup>114</sup> *System der Christl. Lehre*, pp. 308ff, 323.

<sup>115</sup> Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum N. T.*, v., 1909, pp. 102 f.

<sup>116</sup> *Die Schriften*, etc.<sup>1</sup> vol. I, p. 161. He speaks of the statement as Mark's, not Jesus'. Cf. W. Beyschlag, *Leben Jesu*, vol. I, p. 356: a deliverance "from the dark powers which hold men morally in bondage."

was a mark of the ministering love of the Christ who gave His life for them."

Comments like these merely lead away from the simple, penetrating declaration of Jesus, the meaning of which is perfectly clear in itself,<sup>117</sup> and is further fixed by the testimony of His followers. For Jesus' declaration did not fall fruitless to the ground: it finds an echo in the teaching of His followers, and in this echo we can hear His own tones sounding.<sup>118</sup> It marks the very extremity of perverseness, when an attempt is made to reverse the relation of this key-declaration and its echoes in the apostolical writings, explaining it as rather an echo of them. How this is managed may be read briefly in, say, H. J. Holtzmann's comment on Mk. x. 45.

The thought of the Discourse-Source, Lk. xxii. 27, is so expressed here in Paulinizing form (*cf.* Ro. xv. 3) that Jesus also is represented as having found His vocation only in service (Phil. ii. 7, 1 Cor. ix. 19), and as having yielded up His life in that service (Phil. ii. 8). . . . While, however, the disciple can only "lose" his life in the service of his Lord (Mk. viii. 36 = Mat. x. 39, xvi. 25 = Lk. ix. 24, xvii. 33), it is the part of the Lord to give it voluntarily, according to Gal. i. 4, ii. 20. Especially, however, the "give His life a ransom for many" corresponds to the "who gave Himself a ransom for all" of 1 Tim. ii. 6 and the "He gave Himself for us that He might ransom us" of Titus ii. 14, that is, the idea of Jesus is glossed by a reminiscence of the Pauline doctrine of redemption.

Perverse as this is, it at least fixes the sense of Jesus' declaration. The attempt to represent it as a reminiscence of the Pauline doctrine of redemption shows at any rate that it is identical with the Pauline doctrine of redemption.

It lies in the nature of the case that a brief saying, consisting of only two short clauses, made, moreover, not for itself but in order to enforce an exhortation to conduct becoming in followers of Jesus, should not tell us all we

<sup>117</sup> We content ourselves with referring here to the excellent remarks of James Denny, *The Death of Christ*, 1903, pp. 36ff, cap. pp. 42ff.

<sup>118</sup> *Cf.* Zahn, p. 605, note 90: "The conception of the redemption (*redemptio*) wrought by Jesus and especially by His death, would not recur everywhere in the New Testament, if it did not go back to Jesus Himself." Zahn then cites the details.



should like to know of the great matter which it thus allusively brings before us. Many questions arise for guidance on which we must look elsewhere. Fortunately answers to some of them are supplied by the sayings which have already engaged our attention. We can scarcely refuse to correlate Jesus' testimony in them, for example, that He came "to call sinners", that He came "to save the lost" with His testimony here that He came to do many a service,—above all, this service, by His death to ransom them. Undoubtedly the giving of His life as a ransom is the manner in which He saves the lost. And undoubtedly by the "lost" are meant just "sinners", and by "sinners" in turn are meant those who are not "righteous", that is to say the guilt-laden.<sup>119</sup> What we have here, then, is a declaration by Jesus that He came to save lost sinners by giving His life a ransom for them. The effect, called in a former saying "salvation", is clearly in the first instance relief from the penalties due to their sin: He purchases lost sinners out of the obligations which they have incurred by their sin, by giving His life a ransom for them. That is as far perhaps as our particular saying will carry us. Others of the sayings which have come before us, however, carry us further. They tell us that Jesus secures for lost sinners also perfected righteousness of life—and perhaps something like that is after all suggested in this saying also, for it too has to do with conduct. His disciples are exhorted to follow Jesus' example, and it is implied that His example is a perfect one. The ransom-paying certainly lies at the bottom of all and of that alone is there explicit mention. But there is a call to perfection of life too: and not a call to it merely, but a provision for it. In a word there is a complete "salvation" hinted at here: relief from sin both in its curse and its power. Say that it is in this its completeness only hinted at. That is to say that it is hinted at.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Harnack (p. 20): "The 'lost' and the 'sinners' are, however, still more closely characterized by the contrast 'not the righteous',—they are really the dying and guilt-laden, who must perish without Him."

## III

We shall only in the briefest possible manner sum up the results of this survey of the eight sayings in which, according to the report of the Synoptics, Jesus declared the purpose of His mission. In doing so we may take our start from the remarks with which Harnack opens the summary of the results of his survey of practically the same series of sayings. "The eight sayings from the Synoptics which we have collected and studied", says he, "contain very few words, but how much is said in them! On investigation they compose a unity which is equally important for the characterization of Jesus, and for the compass and range of His work." We shall wish to say a word each on both of these matters.

First of all, we note, then, that these sayings are not without their teaching as to Jesus' person. The simple phrases, "I came", "I was sent", naturally, do not of themselves testify to more than Jesus' consciousness of a divine mission. It is quite clear, however, that, this divine mission of which He thus expresses consciousness, stands in His mind as that of the Messiah. He speaks in all these sayings out of the Messianic consciousness and assumes in them all Messianic functions. Even that, however, does not exhaust their implications.<sup>120</sup> There is a certain pregnancy of speech in them, a certain majesty of tone, a certain presupposition of voluntariness in the action expressed by the "I came",—of active acquiescence lying behind the "I was sent"—which have constantly led expositors to feel in them a claim greater than that to the Messianic dignity itself. Harnack will not admit that even the specifically Messianic consciousness speaks through them, and yet is constrained to exclaim (p. 28):

<sup>120</sup> A. Seeberg, *Der Tod Christi*, etc., 1895, p. 348, is quite right when he says: "All the passages in which a coming of Jesus into the world is spoken of (Mk. ii. 67, Mat. v. 17, ix. 113, Lk. v. 32, xii. 219, xix. 10) fix their eyes upon a nearer or more distant purpose of His Messianic vocation."

Who, then is this "I" that here "came". . . . Undoubtedly there lies in that "I came", no matter who is meant, something authoritative and final. There lies in it the consciousness of a divine mission, as indeed it is interchanged with the expression "I was sent." The finality, however, is given by the definitions of purpose. He who came to perfect the law, He who was sent to recover the lost sheep, that is, to fulfil the prediction of the coming of God Himself, He who came with fire and sword—He comes as the final and ultimate one.

To others, even this seems inadequate; and they are right. Justice may be done by it to the impression which the reader receives from these sayings of the majesty of the speaker; scarcely to the impression which they equally make on him of the speaker's sense of complete control over all the circumstances of His mission, including the mission itself. It is this strong impression which expresses itself in the constant tendency of expositors to see in the "I came", "I was sent" a testimony by Jesus not merely to His divine mission but to His heavenly origin. "In the coming of Jesus", expounds A. Seeberg, for example,<sup>121</sup> "it is not some kind of an appearance (*Auftreten*) of Jesus in the world that is spoken of, but His entrance (*Eintritt*) into the world, such as is unmistakably spoken of in Jno. xvi. 28, where the coming into the world corresponds to the going away to the Father".

Unquestionably in some of these sayings Jesus speaks out of a consciousness of preëxistence. That is not merely suggested by the appearance in one of them, instead of the simple "I came" of a more significant "I came out" (Mk. i. 38), which is scarcely completely satisfied by any other supplement than "from heaven" or "from the Father". It is clearly presupposed in two of them by the employment, instead of the personal pronoun, of the descriptive periphrasis, "the Son of Man", the particular Messianic designation which especially emphasizes preëxistence (Lk. xix. 10, Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28). The declaration of Mk. x. 45 = Mat. xx. 28 runs most strikingly on the same lines with Phil. ii. 5 ff., and bears similar testimony to the pre-

<sup>121</sup> As cited.



existent glory of the great exemplar of humility, whom both passages hold up to view. The whole force of the example presented turns on the immense incongruity of the Son of Man appearing in the rôle of a servant; this force would be much decreased, if not destroyed, if the Son of Man had never been anything but a servant, was in His own nature a servant, and was fitted only for a servant's rôle. That three out of eight of these sayings thus imply the preëxistence of Jesus, and take their coloring from this implication, perhaps sufficiently accounts for the tendency of commentators to read the whole of them from this point of sight. We know at least that He who says in them, "I came", "I was sent", was conscious of having come from heaven to perform the mission which He ascribes to Himself.

In this implication of a preëxistence in glory, distinct in some of these sayings, possibly to be assumed in them all, they range themselves by the side of the more numerous similar sayings of Jesus recorded in the Gospel of John.<sup>122</sup> "The not infrequent addition, 'into the world'," remarks Harnack, in commenting on these, "shows a new horizon, alien to Jesus Himself". Not so. The difference in this as in other things, between the Synoptic and the Johannine record, is rather quantitative than qualitative. This Johannine feature too is found in the Synoptic record; but in fewer instances.

It is not, however, of the person of Jesus, but, as was to be expected—for do they not speak of His mission?—of His work, that we learn most from these sayings. According to their teaching Jesus' work may be fairly summed up in the one word, "salvation". He came to call "sinners"; He came to seek and save "the lost"; He came to give His life a "ransom" for many. Everything else which Jesus testifies that He came to do takes a place

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<sup>122</sup> The Johannine passages are adverted to by Harnack twice, pp. 2 and 22. For a synoptical view of them see B. F. Westcott in the "additional note" on Jno. xx. 21.

subordinate and subsidiary to "salvation". Even the "fulfilling" of the law. Harnack is wrong in attempting to co-ordinate the two functions of Saviour and Lawgiver in Jesus' testimony to His mission. "According to His self testimony, the purpose of His coming and thus His significance is given in this—that He is at once Saviour and Lawgiver. . . . Redeemer and Lawgiver: all that constitutes the significance of His coming is exhausted in that collocation . . . Programmatic in the strict sense are only these two sayings: 'I came to save' and 'I came to fulfil the law'."<sup>123</sup> Jesus does declare that He came to fulfil the law, and by this He means also "to fill it out", to complete and perfect it, so that it shall be a faultless transcript of the will of God, the Righteous One. But not this only, or even mainly. He means more fundamentally that He came to get the law observed, so that it shall be perfectly expressed in righteous lives. His mind is more on the transforming of law-breakers into law-keepers, than on the perfecting of the codex itself. That is to say, He is thinking of salvation; of salvation in its ultimate effects. And what could be more poignant than to declare side by side, "I came not to call righteous but sinners", "I came to make human lives the perfect reflection of the law of God"?

Those whom Jesus came to call, He describes as sinners and as lost, that is to say as lost sinners; as those who can lay claim to no righteousness of their own and who have no power to obtain any, that is to say as helpless dependents on Him the Saviour. To them He comes to preach the Gospel of the Kingdom; He calls them to repentance; He seeks them out and saves them; He gives His life a ransom for them; He writes the law of God upon their hearts. This is the process of His "salvation". Their own energies are enlisted: He preaches the Gospel of the Kingdom to them and calls them to repentance. Their hearts are changed: He writes the law of God upon their hearts and sets them spontaneously to fulfil it. But beneath all this,

<sup>123</sup> Pp. 25-26.

there lies something deeper still which attracts to itself especially His greatest word: "I came to save". He gives His life a ransom for them. And it is only as He thus ransoms them by the gift of Himself that they cease to be "lost"; and having thus ceased to lie under the curse, can cease also to lie under the power of sin.

Harnack pushes this greatest declaration, "I came to give my life a ransom for many" into the background. It makes little difference, he hints, whether Jesus ever said it or not. Jesus certainly died. And if all His work in the world was comprehended—as He witnesses that it was—in the category of ministry, then of course His death was included in this ministry. We may even say it was the culmination of His ministry, since the gift of one's life is the highest ministry which he can render. But the main matter is that Jesus declares that He came into the world to minister—whether by living or dying. "What it has meant in history that Jesus expressly said that He did not come to be ministered unto but to 'minister'—that cannot be expressed in words! All the advance in ethics, in these nineteen centuries which have flowed by, has had its most powerful lever in this".<sup>124</sup>

*Imitatio Christi!* It certainly is the most powerful lever to move men to endeavor which has ever entered the world; it has revolutionized all conceptions of values; it has transformed the whole spirit of conduct and changed the entire aspect of life. But it has one indispensable precondition. Only living things can imitate anything. Dead things must be brought to life. Lost things must be found. Sinners must be saved. Even the heathen knew that he may see the good and yet pursue the bad. The awakened soul cries out, O wretched man that I am who shall deliver me out of this body of death? Jesus has done for us something far greater than set us a good example, and summon us to its imitation: something without which there could have been no imitation of His example; no transformed ethics; no transfigured

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<sup>124</sup> P. 26.



lives. He has undoubtedly set before our eyes in living example the perfect law of love. But He has done more than that. He has written it on our hearts. He has given us new ideals. And He has given us something even above that. He has given us the power to realize these ideals. In one word, He has brought to us newness of life. And He has obtained for us this newness of life by His own blood.

It is this that Jesus declares when He says, "I came to give my life a ransom for many." And therefore this is the greatest declaration of all. In it He shows us not how He has become our supreme example merely, but how He has become our Saviour. He has set us a perfect example. He has given us a new ideal. But He has also given us His life. And in giving us His life, He has given us life. For "He gave His life a ransom instead of many".

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

## HEBREWS, THE EPISTLE OF THE DIATHEKE

In the following article an attempt is made to trace the part which the Greek *διαθήκη* plays in the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

We leave the Greek word untranslated, because it is in part with the problem of its proper translation that we are concerned and it appears best not to prejudice the question. We notice first of all that Hebrews is the only New Testament document in which the concept and the term *diatheke* appear with any degree of prominence. In the teaching of our Lord we meet with the idea only once, in the institution of the Supper. More frequently it occurs with Paul, in Romans (ix. 4; xi. 27), 2 Corinthians (iii. 6, 14), Galatians (iii. 15, 17; iv. 24), Ephesians (ii. 12), altogether nine times in six contexts. In Luke's writings we find it, apart from the institution of the Supper, once in the Gospel (i. 72), and twice in the Acts (iii. 25; vii 8). Once also it is met with in the Revelation of St. John (xi. 19). This makes sixteen instances of its occurrence outside of Hebrews. Over against this stand seventeen occurrences in Hebrews alone. In other words in this single Epistle the conception is more frequent than in all the rest of the New Testament writings put together.

Both these facts require an explanation—the relative quiescence of the idea in the New Testament as a whole, no less than its sudden activity in Hebrews. It seems strange at first that a conception which plays so dominant a rôle in the Old Testament and so strongly colors the representation of religion there should have found so little employment in the later stage of revelation. The cause is usually sought in this, that other ideas like the Kingdom of God and the Church have forced it into the background and taken its place. But this is rather a fuller statement of the problem, and only in so far of help towards the solution, than the solution itself. For the question

persists: Why did other ideas, and precisely these ideas, become so dominant as to relegate the diatheke-idea to semi-oblivion? To this question the answer can only be found in the momentous change to which in the development of redemption and revelation the general character of religion became subject. Through the coming of the Messiah and the accomplishment of His work the people of God received a Messianic organization; their whole constitution and manner of life became determined by their relation to the Christ. Now the Old Testament idea of the berith, had in the long course of its history, scarcely come as yet into fructifying contact with the Messianic hope of Israel. Therefore at the dawn of the new dispensation it was not prepared to take the lead in the great rearrangement of doctrinal values characteristic of this epoch. While inherently not incapable of entering upon an organic union with the Messianic point of view, yet on the surface it did not suggest or invite such an interrelation. It will be remembered that the great prophecy of Jeremiah concerning the new berith which Jehovah will make with Israel in the future is not Messianically oriented. A definite, specific historical situation was required to draw this ancient idea into the service of the new Messianic outlook created by the appearance of Jesus and the accomplishment of His work.

In general we may say that such a situation was bound to arise as soon as the consciousness of the original and unique blessings conferred by Christianity led to a comparison between the present stage of redemptive attainment and the past. It is the retrospective, comparative mode of thinking applied from the exalted standpoint of Christian privilege and seeking to reach an adequate apprehension of the rich content of the latter by placing it over against the lower pre-Christian stage of redemption and revelation that has in most cases resurrected the diatheke-idea and brought it into new significance. This is entirely in accord with the first use made by Jeremiah of the idea in connection with the



future. The future order of things appears to the prophet as a berith because he pointedly compares it with and exalts it above the past and present order of things. Partly in dependence on this prophetic passage, but also with a broad historical comparison between the era introduced by the sacrifice at Sinai in the time of Moses and the era introduced by His own sacrifice, our Lord speaks of the latter in the institution of the Supper as a new diatheke. Again it is under the influence of the same comparative train of thought when Paul in 2 Corinthians iii. represents his apostolic ministry as a service connected with a diatheke, the new diatheke, not of the letter but of the Spirit, over against which he places the ministry of Moses as subservient to another diatheke, embodied in the Old Testament Scriptures. It may be observed in passing that the Apostle here by way of metonymy applies the term diatheke to the Scriptures themselves, since he alternates the phrase "the reading of Moses" with the other phrase "the reading of the old diatheke" (verses 14 and 15). This is the first instance of the literary usage of the term so familiar to us in the names Old Testament and New Testament as designations of the two canons of Scripture. The fact should not be overlooked, however, that even this literary usage has its roots in the Hebrew Scripture since berith there appears as a synonym of thora, law, and consequently like the latter comes to designate the written code as a rule of faith and practice. On the other hand there is no proof that the literary turn given by Paul to the phrase "old diatheke" had anything to do with the apocalyptic custom of representing the alleged oracular utterances of ancient Scriptural personages as their "testament" *e.g.* "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs." The other source is plainly indicated because Paul in the same sense speaks of the reading of Moses and the reading of the old diatheke.

With equal clearness the comparative view-point as inducing the emergence of the conception can be observed in Galatians iv. Here Paul speaks of two contrasting διαθήκαι,

*i.e.* two great religious systems operating by diverse methods and with opposite results, the one a Hagar-diatheke, geographically associated with Mount Sinai, the other a Sarah-diatheke having its local center in the heavenly Jerusalem. There is a difference between this and 2 Corinthians iii. insofar as there the old and the new were contrasted in their original God-willed and God-given character, whilst here in Galatians the Sinaitic-Hagar-diatheke is the old system as perverted by Judaism. But the comparative manner of handling the idea is the same in both passages and in both cases is alike responsible for its introduction.

These are the only instances in the New Testament, apart from Hebrews, where the term is applied to the Christian dispensation. In all other cases its use is purely retrospective, the reference being to the ancient theocratic order of affairs. Coming with the result obtained to Hebrews, it is not difficult to see that here likewise the motive of comparison between the old and the new religious systems very largely underlies the prominent use made of the diatheke-idea. In view of the specific purpose which the writer pursues it was inevitable that this idea should spring into prominence. We need not at this point discuss the problem why the author of Hebrews institutes such a careful and elaborate comparison between the old theocratic and the new fabric of religion. The old view, still widely taken of the matter, is that the readers of the Epistle, by reason of their Jewish descent and Old Testament associations, perhaps also their proximity to the still existing temple-service, were personally and practically interested in the comparative merits of the two systems contrasted and in need of fresh assurance in regard to the superiority of the Christian religion to that of Judaism. In recent times this older view has been steadily losing ground and it has been widely assumed that the interest of both author and readers in the Old Testament mode of religion was produced by theoretical rather than by practical considerations, the Mosaic institutions being used merely as a foil to set off

the excellence of Christianity as the supreme and final religion. As observed, it is immaterial for our present purpose to take sides in this debate for on either view of the question the comparative structure of the Epistle's argument stands out in bold relief. For whatever purpose he did it, the writer plainly wanted to contrast the old dispensation with the new. For doing this he needed a common denominator, and since the old order was to all intents a berith, a *διαθήκη*, the new order had, in order to be commensurable with the other, to be likewise represented under the same aspect. The only other form of which the writer might have availed himself to carry through the comparison was that of law and legal organization. The Epistle actually in a few passages approaches this point of view (vii. 12 "the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of law"; viii. 6 Christ is "Mediator of a better covenant which has been legally enacted upon better promises"). But it is easy to see that, however admirably this might suit the Mosaic order of things, the Christian order could not be adequately described as a new law, since in its fundamental aspects it transcends the category of law and since precisely in this supra-legal character consists a large part of that superiority of the Christian state which the author is intent upon bringing out. The exigency, therefore, of the comparative view-point, here no less than in the case of our Lord and of Paul, brought the diatheke-idea to the front and incorporated it in the new Christian thought-system.

While this explanation of the prominence of the idea in Hebrews is undoubtedly correct so far as it goes, it does not quite satisfy. One cannot help feeling that after all the writer's attitude of mind towards the conception is a somewhat different one from that of Jesus and Paul. With Jesus and Paul the term is taken up for the momentary purpose of comparison and, having served its purpose, allowed to drop out of sight. It exerts no further influence upon the structure of thought. Even what it expresses



might have been expressed in other terms without essentially altering the content of truth. It is not so in Hebrews. Here the *diatheke*-idea shapes and colours the doctrinal outlook to a considerable degree and in important respects. Though the writer may at first have called it into requisition for formal purposes merely, yet we can clearly perceive how in his hands it outgrows this subsidiary function and leaps to the rank of a valuable concept doctrinally suggestive and stimulating to the author's own mind, fruitful and pregnant with new potentialities of thought. Therefore to take this idea out of Hebrews would have quite different results than would follow its elimination from the teaching of our Lord and Paul. Through its removal the inner organism of the Epistle's teaching would be injured and significant lines and shades of its doctrinal complexion obliterated from our view. Its revelation-value would suffer a real impairment.

In order to show that this is so it will be necessary to face a problem which up to this point we have purposely refrained from injecting into the discussion. The problem concerns the meaning of the word *diatheke* in its religious usage. The two renderings "covenant" and "testament" have long contended for the supremacy. Of the thirty-three times in which the word occurs in the New Testament the Authorized Version renders it twenty-one times by "covenant" and twelve times by "testament." This already marks a considerable preponderance of "covenant" over "testament". In the Revised Version this preponderance becomes far greater, for here of the twelve instances of "testament" only two remain, so that the proportion according to the Revisers stands thirty-one to two. When the Revised Version was made, therefore, *i.e.* more than three decades ago, the meaning "covenant" seemed in a fair way of dislodging the other rendering from the English Bible. This preference for "covenant" was undoubtedly due in large measure to the presumption in its favor created by the Old Testament. In the Hebrew Scriptures the meaning "testament"

has no standing at all. Proceeding on the legitimate principle that in a matter of this kind harmony and continuity may be assumed to exist between the two canons of Scripture, the translators naturally felt bound to retain "covenant" so long as the import and context of a passage did not absolutely exclude it. At the same time there seems to have persisted in the mind of the Revisers a feeling that their verdict in favor of "covenant" was not absolutely final. They appear not to have been enough convinced to rule the rendering "testament" entirely out of court. In each of the cases where they substitute "covenant" for the "testament" of the Authorized Version they give in the margin "testament" as a possible alternative. And not only this, they offer of their own accord the same marginal alternative in nine additional cases, where the Authorized Version had already "covenant". That is to say, even where the Authorized Version and the Revised Version agreed in favoring "covenant", the Revisers deem it necessary to warn the reader that the possibility of the word meaning "testament" must be reckoned with. As a matter of fact, then, the Revision, so far from decisively settling the question, has by accentuating in so many instances the double possibility of rendering, placed the old problem more than ever in evidence.

That this was a wise suspension of judgment seems to be borne out by the recent course of investigation. If at the time of the Revision "covenant" was gaining on "testament," the rôles have now been reversed. The opinion of writers who of late years have occupied themselves with the subject has been steadily moving away from the rendering "covenant" to the other translation. Even where a stop is made at the half-way station of "disposition", "arrangement" and the specialized meaning of "testament" not insisted upon, the idea of "covenant" is none the less deliberately rejected as inapplicable. In this point Riggensbach and Deissmann and Behm and Lohmeyer all agree. This remarkable veering around of opinion is the result

of a new method of approach to the problem. The linguistic method of settling such a question is at present in the ascendant. The interest of scholars is no longer directed towards giving *diatheke* a meaning which shall keep it in touch or harmony with Old Testament precedent but exclusively towards explaining it from the common, secular Hellenistic *usus loquendi* at the time when the Septuagint and the New Testament were produced. The discovery and utilisation for New Testament science of the papyri and ostraka has made it possible to turn "the light from the Orient," as upon so many other things, also upon the *diatheke*-idea. The Septuagint has been studied with the distinct thought in mind that it should not be read in dependence upon the Hebrew original but treated as a linguistically self-explanatory document. Even the classical meaning of the word, in distinction from the later Hellenistic usage, has been exhaustively traced through its several stages and thus a complete history of the development of *διαθήκη* in the Greek language from its earliest emergence down to the eve of the New Testament period and to a much later point, has been laid before us.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of all this investigation and discussion it is now claimed by prominent scholars that *diatheke* in Hellenistic Greek bore and could bear no other meaning than that of "testament" and consequently must have been meant in the same sense by the Septuagint translators and the New Testament writers, at least if we assume that these desired to be understood by their readers. Now, since nothing is more certain than that such a conception of *berith* as a "testament" is utterly foreign to the intent of the Hebrew Scriptures, the position taken implies that the Seventy by

<sup>1</sup>*Cpr.* Riggensbach *Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Hebräerbrief* in the volume of Theological Studies dedicated to Theodor Zahn, 1908; Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, second and third ed., 1909; Norton, *A Lexicographical and Historical Study of Διαθήκη from the Earliest Times to the End of the Classical Period*, 1909; Franz Dibelius, *Das Abendmahl*, 1911; Behm, *Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Neuen Testament*, 1912; Lohmeyer, *Διαθήκη*, 1913.



translating as they did committed a stupendous blunder, and that in two directions; first by importing a false idea into the Old Testament, secondly by failing to reproduce the correct idea there found. So far as the Septuagint is concerned, this might not seem in itself such a very serious matter. We do not ascribe to the Greek Old Testament infallibility; its text is not to us a canonical text. None the less the matter is of considerable importance. The seriousness arises from the connection between the Septuagint and the New Testament. For the New Testament writers inherited this blunder from the Seventy. They also took diatheke as "testament" and labored under the same delusion that the berith of the Hebrew Scriptures was to be so understood. In other words there is involved in the case a huge misunderstanding of the Old Testament on the part of the writers of the New.

The advocates of the new view, however, are not much troubled by this. They care as little for the inspiration and infallibility of the New Testament, as we would be apt to care for the inerrancy of the Septuagint. But not only are they not seriously disturbed by the matter, they are enthusiastically elated over it. To their mind it is a most extraordinary case of religious good coming out of linguistic evil. To the cause of religion the Greek translators rendered by their mistake a signal service. The Old Testament idea of the berith, that is of the "covenant", was an idea of very inferior worth and questionable associations, belonging to a low plane of religious development. It is at bottom unworthy of the relation between God and man, ideally considered, to think of the two as contractually united. And, on the other hand, the idea of God issuing a testament, that is making sovereign disposal in matters of religion is an inherently noble conception. Although, therefore, the procedure of the Septuagint cannot be justified philologically, we are invited to hail its result as a great religious gain. Deissmann speaks about it in the following words: "The Bible which conceives of the relation

between God and man as a divine 'testament' moves, with Paul and Augustine, on a higher plane than the Bible (*i.e.* the Hebrew Scriptures) which represents God as making contracts."<sup>2</sup> And Behm delivers himself to the same effect: "The act of making a contract with its synergism gives way" (through the rendering of the Septuagint) "to the monergism of the sovereign pronouncement by which God prescribes His will to man, either commanding or promising gifts, by way of law or of grace."<sup>3</sup>

What shall we say to these things? In our humble opinion the conclusion which these scholars arrive at is a mixture of error and truth, both as regards its linguistic side and as regards the comparative estimate they put upon the religious value of the two ideas of "covenant" and "testament" as exponential of the spirit of the older and later Scriptures respectively. To begin with the linguistic aspect of the question, the whole antithesis between *berith* as meaning "covenant" and *diatheke* as meaning "testament" is, in the absoluteness with which it is here advocated, untenable and in the highest degree misleading. To charge the Old Testament, on account of its *berith*-conception, with the doctrine that God synergistically enters into contracts with man is a gross injustice. The fact is that, preoccupied with their own specialty of Hellenistic Greek, the scholars who make this charge have failed to keep up with the progress of Old Testament science. Even if *diatheke* meant "testament" pure and simple in Hellenistic Greek, even then a downright conflict of the Hebrew Bible with this could only be made out by giving *berith* the unqualified modern sense of "covenant" *i.e.* of "contract", "agreement". But the adequacy of such a rendering will no longer be upheld by any reputable Old Testament scholar. The sense of "contract", "agreement" does not belong to the essence of the *berith*-conception at all. This does not mean that sometimes in the

<sup>2</sup> *Die Hellenisierung des Semitischen Monotheismus*, p. 175, quoted by Lohmeyer, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Neuen Testament*, p. 31.

Old Testament the berith does not appear in the form of an "agreement" between parties and that this may not be an important feature theologically considered. It only means that even in such cases what constitutes the agreement a berith is not the two-sidedness but something else which equally well can appear where there is no compact at all. This essential element is the absolute confirmation of the arrangement by means of a religious sanction or ceremony; in other words it is the introduction of the divine factor securing stability that gives to the berith its specific character. This is so in the secular berith between man and man; but it is from the nature of the case more emphatically so when God is one of the parties entering into an arrangement with man. The circumstance that in virtue of its berith-character the arrangements must derive its security not from man but from God has for its necessary result that God where He Himself enters as a party acquires in the transaction a monergistic preponderance which from the outset excludes any idea that He parleyed and contractually negotiated with man in a manner derogatory to His divine position. It thus appears that even where there is a reciprocal relationship the berith-aspect of it is the very aspect that keeps it within the bounds of religious dignity and decorum. However bilateral the arrangement may be in its outcome, to God alone belongs the prerogative of initiating it and with Him alone lies the right of determining its content. God never deliberates or bargains with man as to the terms of the berith He condescends to enter into. Man may accept voluntarily but can in no wise modify what the sovereign divine will arranges for him. Thus even in the case of an avowed bilateral berith there already is seen to exist a balance of monergism on the divine side sufficiently strong to exclude every thought of a contractual procedure unworthy of God. But the berith by no means involves such a two-sided arrangement everywhere in the Old Testament. There are numerous instances where the berith is wholly one-sided in its import, where man as-



sumes no obligations but is purely receptive in regard to it, in other words, where it amounts to a solemnly sanctioned promise or disposition on the part of God. Such are the berith made with Noah and that made with Abraham. Further the frequent equivalence of berith and "law" can only be explained on this same principle. The conclusion of the matter, therefore, is that the element of two-sidedness plays a very subordinate rôle in the Old Testament usage of the term berith, and where it does enter, it is very much restricted in scope. The characterization of the Old Testament God as a God making contracts quoted above from Deissmann derives its main support from the rendering "covenant", which, as we have seen, is a very inadequate rendering. If regard is had not to the modern associations of the word "covenant" but to the actual nature of the Biblical berith as ascertained by induction, no ground for criticism on that score exists.

But, although the charge of religious inferiority can not justly be brought against the Old Testament berith-conception, it may still be asked, whether the charge of linguistic conflict between it and the Greek *diatheke*-idea does not remain? The *diatheke* may not be something higher or more God-worthy than the berith, but is it not something specifically different, so that after all the Greek Bible places the idea in a false light and deflects it in a wrong direction? For the answer to this question all depends on what the Greek *diatheke* did actually mean or can have meant to those who equated it to berith. If it could mean and did mean nothing else but "a last will," then the conflict with the sense of berith lies on the surface and there is no use in trying to argue it away. Nor will it do to say that revelation in its progressive development has the right to modify a conception or even to empty it of its old and fill it with a totally new content. For the later Scriptures in this case are not conscious of such a modification or refilling of the form; on the contrary they profess to employ *diatheke* in such a way as to make it retain its full identity with be-

rith. If the identity does not exist, then it is a case of self-delusion such as can hardly be reconciled with the dignity of revelation. The only recourse, therefore, lies in maintaining that the understanding of diatheke in Hellenistic Greek was not so absolutely tied down to the sense of "testament" as we are asked to believe. This, we believe, can be maintained, without any stretch of the linguistic conscience. The facts appear to be as follows. *Διαθήκη* is a derivative of the verb *διατίθεσθαι* (in the middle voice). The verb means "to order for one's self", "to dispose for one's self". To this general meaning of the verb, the noun must at one time have corresponded in the sense of "arrangement for one's self", "disposition for one's self". But, as is frequently the case with general terms, the noun acquired in course of time a specialized, technical meaning which became so prevalent as to force the original unspecialized signification into the background and practically put it out of use. Diatheke became a term of jurisprudence. In this capacity it had two meanings, the one very common, the other, it seems, more rarely employed. The common meaning was that of "testament", "last will", the rarer one that of "treaty", or "mutually obligating law". This specializing development had already run its course before the close of the classical era, so that in Hellenistic Greek diatheke had become monopolized by jurisprudence as a technical term. Now the question in hand reduces itself to this, whether in the face of a fixed specialized usage the Septuagint, and in its wake the New Testament writers, could attribute to diatheke any other meaning than that of "testament" and still have reasonable ground to believe that in doing this they would be understood by their readers. This question may confidently be answered in the affirmative. It is true that, so far as our knowledge goes, "testament" was the sense commonly connected with the word. But, as already stated, it was not absolutely the only sense; side by side with it, there existed the sense of "treaty" or "mutually obligating law". Even strict adherence to actual usage,

therefore, did not compel the translators or the readers to identify a *diatheke* in every case with a "last will". But, what is of more importance, it should further be remembered that the technical meaning acquired by a word may or may not kill the potentialities inherent in the word for reasserting its old use or making new growth in some other direction. A term can become so technical as to lose all adaptability for wider and freer usage. The Latin words "testamentum" and "sacramentum", and the corresponding English words "testament", "sacrament" are examples of this. In their case the memory of the native sense, which in virtue of their etymology they possessed, has been lost beyond all possibility of resurrection; if any new development occurs it will have to take its point of departure in the technical usage. But it is not necessarily so in every case. A word can become technical and yet a more or less clear consciousness of its original, plastic force and etymological sense may survive enabling the latter to spring into living use whenever the emergencies of expression require it. Now the word *diatheke*, it seems to me, belongs distinctly to this second class. While it had come to mean almost exclusively "testament", the older meaning of "disposition for one's self" "arrangement for one's self", which was the parent of the technical use, had only become momentarily non-active, but could by no means be counted dead and buried. The stock remained alive and capable of sending forth a fresh shoot. We must not overlook the important fact, that, while the noun *διαθήκη* became specialized, the corresponding verb *διατίθεσθαι* did not share to the same extent in this specializing development. Of course, it had to follow the noun into the field of jurisprudence; when *διαθήκη* meant "testament", *διατίθεσθαι* could not help acquiring the sense of "to make a testament". But there was this difference, that the noun practically dropped its other meanings whereas the verb had only gained a new technical adaptation without detriment to its other usage which remained precisely what it was before. To the Greek



mind *διατθεσθαι* did not necessarily call up the idea of a testamentary transaction; it could express a disposition or arrangement for one's self in any other sphere uncolored by the associations of the law-court or the last will. This, however, could not be without retroactive influence upon the destinies of the noun. The etymology of the noun *διαθήκη* is so perspicuous that it could never be entirely detached from its parent-stock still living with unimpaired vigor in the verb. A *διαθήκη* is so clearly the result of *διατθεσθαι* that whatever the latter signified, the former also must have remained capable of signifying anew when occasion called for it. If then the Septuagint translators for good reason thought it desirable to detach the term diatheke from the restricted contemporary meaning and revert to its original freer force, the technical usage can have presented no insurmountable obstacle.

The next question is, whether the Septuagint, self-interpreted, suggests anywhere that it wants diatheke to be understood as "testament." It is à priori extremely improbable that this should be the case. A "testament" always carries the implication of the prospective death of the person who makes it. How could such a thought have been applied to God who is throughout the maker of the religious diatheke? In the New Testament the diatheke as a "last will" is once brought into connection with the sacrifice of Christ, once with the promise of God to Abraham. The former case cannot be put on a line with what the translators of the Septuagint are charged with having perpetrated, because Christ, unlike God, is in His human nature subject to death and can appear in the rôle of testator. The other instance (that in Gal. iii.), which actually makes God the testator of the inheritance bequeathed to Abraham, is occasioned by Paul's desire to emphasize the subsequent unchangeableness of the promise. That Paul in an exceptional case and for a concrete reason gives this specific turn to the idea and discounts the element of a contemplated death cannot, of course, give plausibility to the

assumption that the Septuagint associated God with the idea of a "last will" on the broadest scale. It ought also to be noticed how in both these New Testament instances the writers do not content themselves with implying the testamental character of the *diatheke*, but take particular pains to call our attention to it so that the import of the word in the context cannot possibly be misunderstood. By accentuating this and using the technical terms of jurisprudence the writers reveal that they are conscious of using the religious *diatheke* in a meaning not normally associated with it. In the Greek Old Testament it is totally different. The translators here give no indication anywhere by their manner of rendering of their desire to have *diatheke* understood as "testament". It may be said that as translators they were precluded from doing this by their dependence on the original from which every allusion to a "last will" in connection with *berith* was absent. Still in other cases the translators of the Septuagint have not been restrained by strict adherence to the Hebrew text from injecting or suggesting their own theological ideas and it is certainly strange that in the numerous cases of their employment of *diatheke* they should have entirely failed to do so. All the more is this to be wondered at, since a direct temptation to underscore the meaning "testament" offered itself in the fact that the Hebrew Scriptures had already associated the two ideas of *berith* and inheritance. Jehovah in virtue of the *berith* gives the inheritance of Canaan to Israel. Of course in the original this combination has nothing whatever to do with the idea of the *berith* as a "last will". But it offered a splendid opportunity for a translator who understood *diatheke* as "testament" to make his understanding of the matter unmistakable. When nowhere a hint to this effect is given, we may safely conclude that the Septuagint had no special proclivity towards identifying the religious *diatheke* with a testament.

If not specifically "testament" what then did the *diatheke* of the Greek translators mean? Would we come nearer

to their intent by saying they meant it in the sense of "covenant"? In our opinion an affirmative answer may be given to this in so far as that which we understand by a "covenant" must have entered in a number of cases as a constituent element into their conception of the berith and of the diatheke, while it is entirely incapable of proof that the idea of a technical testament associated itself for them with these words. They speak sometimes of the diatheke in the same way that the Hebrew Bible speaks of the berith, as a *διαθήκη* *with* and *between* persons, and this certainly suggests that it appeared to them as a mutual agreement. There is reason therefore to believe that their idea of the diatheke was sufficiently wide and elastic to include the covenantal element. And yet the simple equation of diatheke and "covenant" might easily become misleading. The two above-named constructions are not the favorite constructions of the Septuagint. They prefer to speak of a diatheke which God makes *towards* men, and this already suggests that the covenantal idea, while not excluded, is in their mind subordinated to and delimited by another idea. This other idea is that of the sovereign prerogative of God to regulate without human interference the redemptive relation that shall exist between Himself and His people, even though this relation may in the outcome partake of the nature of a mutual fellowship and agreement. That the preference given to diatheke as a rendering for berith actually arises out of consideration for God as the principal factor in the transaction appears from the following: where the berith is made between man and man and consists in a mutual agreement, the translators do not employ *διαθήκη* but *συνθήκη*, a word exactly corresponding to the word covenant; on the other hand, where the berith lies between God and man, even though it possesses equally the character of a mutual agreement, they never employ *συνθήκη* but always *διαθήκη*. Plainly then their avoidance of the former is due to the thought that it connotes something that cannot be properly predicated of



God. The preposition *συν* in *συνθήκη* expresses the co-equality and coëfficiency of the persons concerned in the berith. Such a coëquality and coëfficiency cannot exist between God and man; even where God most condescendingly enters upon a relation of true friendship with man, it is still out of place to conceive of this as a treaty in the ordinary sense. God cannot forego the right of sovereignly framing and imposing the arrangement that shall control the religious intercourse between Himself and man, and that He exercises this right is admirably expressed by the preposition *διὰ* in *διαθήκη*. To this extent and to this extent only we are warranted in saying that the Septuagint shrinks from conceiving of the Old Testament religion as a "covenant." What it wants to avoid is the contractual character of the religious relation in its origin, not its reciprocal character in the outcome. The translators had no interest and could have no interest in representing God as the framer of a "last will" and the conveyor of property. All that they wanted out of *diatheke* was the emphasis which the word enabled them to throw upon the one-sided initiative and the unimpaired sovereignty of God in originating the order of redemption. And fortunately the linguistic usage did allow them to utilize the word for this purpose. Since the original etymological meaning of "a person's free disposition in his own interest" still clearly shows through the specialized sense of "testament", they could fall back upon it and were not compelled to take the technical associations of *diatheke* into the bargain. Had this been otherwise, had the word become so absolutely and irretrievably identified with the conception of a "last will", then the substitution of *διαθήκη* for *συνθήκη* in the sole interest of escaping from the synergistic, contractual implications of *σύν* would have been a desperate remedy. It would have meant for fear of misrepresenting the form to sacrifice the substance of the idea. Surely the Septuagint translators were not foolish enough to affirm, irrespective of all inevitable incongruities, that the berith was a "testament"

simply because in one important respect they could not properly call it a "covenant". Their procedure appears intelligent only on the supposition that they believed diatheke capable of retaining or reacquiring the sense of "disposition". And it should be emphasized that in making diatheke, so understood, the vehicle for conveying the content of the Old Testament berith the Greek translators evince the most exquisite tact. The rendering represents not one of their blunders but one of their most felicitous strokes. The supreme interest they attach to safeguarding the divine dignity and prerogative is not something of later origin and imported by them *ab extra* into the Old Testament world of thought. On the contrary it constitutes one of the ideas indigenous to the Old Testament revelation itself. Thence and from no other source the Septuagint derived it. They prove themselves in this case excellent craftsmen by reason of their faculty of sympathetic apprehension no less than by reason of their skill in faithful reproduction. In one respect they even improved upon the Hebrew original: for, while in the Hebrew Scriptures the divine sovereignty in regulating the religious life of Israel is uniformly recognized and prevailing colors the representation, it does not find direct expression in the word *berith* itself. Such expression the makers of the Greek Bible first gave it. They for the first time made the word and the conception cover each other with approximate perfection. And by thus enshrining the concept in the word, they created the means for the conservation and faithful transmission of a great religious treasure to the later Church.

We now approach the question, what data the New Testament passages offer for determining the sense of diatheke. Of course, the answers cannot help being strongly influenced by the conclusion reached regarding the Septuagint usage. Still we must not forget that the New Testament writers lived in a new-created world of redemptive realities and apprehended this world with new-born forms of thought. The possibility should be reckoned with that

the ancient conception of the *διαθήκη* felt the effect of the powerful forces set free in the spheres of redemption and revelation. To what extent, we ask, do the facts show that such was actually the case? At the outset it may be well to moderate our expectation of fresh insight into the content of the idea to be afforded by the manner of its occurrence in the New Testament writings. As already stated, where it is not introduced in a purely retrospective sense but reinstated as a conception remaining permanently applicable to the new order of things ushered in by Christ, this is done largely in a comparative manner, that is to say, without much reflection upon the inherent character of the idea. The new order is a *diatheke* because the old order was. This is taken for granted rather than consciously realized through apprehension of the continuity of organic structure in both cases. Hence the difficulty of telling in many passages what conception the *diatheke* in such comparative statements actually called up to the writer's mind. It would be exegetically wrong to seek to elicit answers from such contexts on a question which probably was not present to the consciousness of the author at all. Still even so there are sufficient indications to enable us to affirm that the three senses, "covenant", "authoritative disposition", "testament", are all represented in the New Testament vocabulary. The idea of "covenant" in the specific sense, that is with positive reflection upon the community of interests, the intercourse and fellowship between God and man, is perhaps least in evidence. This does not necessarily mean that it was least familiar to the writers, only it so happens that it obtrudes itself less and its currency is therefore less easily verified. Outside of Hebrews the passages recording the institution of the Supper most clearly attest its presence. To be sure these are the very passages in which a number of modern expositors, Zahn, Deissmann, Dibelius, confidently claim that the meaning "testament" can be established with a strong degree of plausibility. Our Lord here brings the new *diatheke* into connection with the cup containing His blood,



that is with His death. This invites the interpretation that through His death the new religious basis on which it puts His followers is as a legacy bequeathed to them. In favor of this view a further argument is drawn from Lk. xxii. 29, where, immediately after the institution of the Supper, our Lord speaks of the provision He makes for His followers in the future kingdom and uses to describe this act the word *διατίθεσθαι*, the rendering proposed being: "I bequeath unto you, as my Father bequeathed unto me etc." If the technical use of the verb could here be substantiated it would create a presumption in favor of the technical sense of the noun *διαθήκη* in the immediately preceding institution of the Supper, the more so since the imagery of joint-eating and -drinking with Jesus at His table on the one hand and the eschatological outlook of the Supper, in which Jesus also speaks of the drinking of new wine in the kingdom of God, on the other hand, appear to draw the two statements very closely together. These two arguments, weighty as they may seem at first sight, on closer inspection lose much of their force. It is true our Lord establishes a connection between His death and the new diatheke inaugurated. But this by no means shuts us up to viewing the diatheke as a testament put into effect through the death. The true interpretation of the Lord's Supper is that it appears as a sacrificial meal, to which His death forms the sacrifice. If, therefore, the new diatheke is connected with the death of Jesus, the connection will have to be sought along the line of sacrifice, that is to say, the death must be assumed to give birth to the diatheke in the same capacity and for the same reason which make it the central feature of the sacrament. It is, therefore, à priori probable that the diatheke appears as something inaugurated by a sacrifice, and that is not a "testament" but either a "religious disposition" or a "covenant". The obvious parallel in which Jesus places the blood of the new *διαθήκη* with that of Ex. xxiv., where the blood is none other than the blood of sacrifice inaugurating the Sinaitic berith, also re-

quires this interpretation. And when it is said of the blood as exponential of the death that it is *ὑπὲρ πολλῶν*, "on behalf of many", this yields a thought utterly incongruous to the concept of testament, for a testator does not die in behalf of or with the intent of benefiting his heirs, whereas the benevolent intent of the death of a person fits admirably into the circle of sacrificial ideas. As to the passage from Luke, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the verb *διατίθεσθαι* can there have the technical meaning of "to bequeath" on which the force of the argument depends. Jesus, it will be observed, puts His own *διατίθεσθαι* for the disciples on a line with the Father's *διατίθεσθαι* for Himself. Now the Father's provision of the kingdom for Jesus, from the nature of the case, cannot be considered a testamentary act, since God does not die. This already compels the rendering: "I appoint unto you as my Father appointed unto me", with which we are familiar from our English Bible. To this must be added that the more plausible construction of the sentence makes the object of the *διατίθεσθαι* of Jesus for the disciples something that could hardly be the object of a testamentary disposition. The English versions construe: "I appoint unto you *a kingdom*, even as my Father appointed unto me *a kingdom*". But for reasons, which it is not necessary here to detail, the construction given by the Revised Version in the margin decidedly deserves the preference. It reads: "I appoint unto you that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, even as my Father *appointed* unto me *a kingdom*." If the object of Jesus' *διατίθεσθαι* for the disciples were a kingdom, as it is on the ordinary construction, this might properly fall under the rubric of a legacy, but the eating and drinking with a person in his kingdom do not naturally fall within the terms of a bequest. For these reasons we believe that the testamentary idea may safely be eliminated from the institution of the Lord's Supper. As to the choice between the two other meanings "disposition" and "covenant" the latter decidedly deserves the preference. The new diatheke appears from the

point of view of its valuableness to the disciples. This already points to the covenant-idea. More specifically, the benefit conveyed by it consists in the approach to God mediated by the forgiveness of sins. It is equivalent to a new basis of intercourse between God and the disciples. Finally the pointed reference to the berith at Sinai, which was to all intents a two-sided agreement, and to the prophecy of Jeremiah, which speaks of the future new berith as a supreme favor to be bestowed upon Israel shows that the emphasis rests upon the resulting covenantal fellowship rather than upon the divine sovereign initiative that lies back of the new order of things.

A careful study of the Pauline passages yields a somewhat different result. It is true where Paul speaks retrospectively of the *διαθήκαι* as forming part of the distinctions and prerogatives of Israel, as in Rom. ix. 4 and Eph. ii. 12, this might seem to favor the notion of "covenant" as involving a privileged relation to God. But in the passage of Romans the coördination of *διαθήκαι* with such terms as "the promises" and "the law" proves that a one-sided disposition of God could easily be viewed as a favor and distinction conferred upon Israel. In Eph. ii. 12 the phrase "covenants of the promise", in which the genitive is epexegetical, yields positive proof that Paul regards the *διαθήκαι* as so many successive promissory dispositions of God, not as a series of mutual agreements between God and the people. Far more energetically however does the Pauline principle of the sole activity of God in the work of salvation draw the diatheke-idea into its service where the latter is considered not by manner of retrospect merely, but is applied on the comparative principle to the Christian system itself. Here every reflection on the covenantal aspect of the new religious relation is absent and the diatheke-idea is pointedly used to bring out how God sovereignly sets in motion and effectually organizes and carries through all that is necessary to securing the religious end contemplated in His purpose. Thus in 2 Corinthians iii. the two



*διαθήκαι* compared, that of the letter and that of the Spirit, represent two great systems and methods of religious procedure, working themselves out through two corresponding ministries, that of Moses and that of Paul, and thus inevitably shaping the result of human destiny and experience according to their intrinsic law of operation. The old *diatheke* is the system of legal administration: it issues into bondage, condemnation and death. The new *diatheke* is the system of spiritual procreation and endowment prevailing through Christ: it produces liberty, righteousness and life. The sense of contract is not only absent here: one may perhaps go so far as to say that the introduction of it would have jarred upon the singlemindedness wherewith the Apostle pursues the opposite element in the conception, that of the divine sovereignty and monergism of procedure. Only, over against Deissmann it should be observed that Paul pursues this principle in a thoroughly impartial way, with reference equally to the Old Dispensation, and to the New. In speaking of the order of grace as a *diatheke* in this one-sided divinely-monopolized sense, Paul is not conscious of imparting to the *diatheke* a different character from that which it bore previously. The legal order of things is as little a contract here as that which took its place: it was according to Paul a *diatheke* in the same absolute, sovereign way as the Gospel-order of things. The form is the same, the content poured into it differs; and the form as such is indifferent to the distinction between grace and works. Although there was an agreement at Sinai, in Paul's view it was evidently of such an origin and nature that it could be equally well represented as the result of a divine disposition and the name *diatheke* employed with exclusive reference to this its source in the activity of God.

The contrast between the Hagar-*diatheke* and the Sarah-*diatheke* in Galatians iv. 24 proceeds along similar lines. That the Hagar-*diatheke* here stands for the old Sinaitic system, not in its original divine intent but in its Judaistic perversion, creates no formal difference; the *diatheke* is

viewed here as in 2 Corinthians iii. as a project and organism determining religious status, bearing, propagating itself, as the figure strikingly expresses it, unto liberty as unto bondage.

The term is placed at the farthest remove from every association with "covenant" by Paul's way of handling it in Galatians iii. There can be little doubt that here the desire to throw the strongest possible emphasis on the supremacy of the principle of promise and grace in Old Testament history has induced the Apostle to compare the Abrahamic diatheke to a "testament". That Paul here has in mind a "testament" follows from two considerations: first, the legal terminology employed is derived from testamentary law and is such as was not used in connection with covenants or legal dispositions generally; second, in the context the idea of the *inheritance* is pointedly associated with the diatheke. The Apostle means to say, the gracious principle on which God pledged to Abraham and in him to all believers the inheritance of salvation was as absolutely immutable, as absolutely incapable of being modified or replaced by the subsequent law-giving, as if it had been a testamentary disposition: "A testament, though it be but a man's testament . . . no man makes void or adds thereto" . . . even so "a testament confirmed by God beforehand, the law which came four hundred and thirty years after doth not disannul so as to make the promise of none effect." To our minds it might easily seem as if the idea of a "testament" were poorly adapted to bring out the character of immutability which Paul wishes to emphasize. A "testament" as we know it might more easily be a figure for changeableness than the opposite, for until the testator dies it is subject to repeated modification or absolute recall. How then can Paul say: "*no one* maketh it void or addeth thereto." It has been proposed to take "no one" in the sense of "no one except the testator". But Paul evidently means "no one, not even the testator", and the purpose for which he employs the representation requires him to mean

it so, for the point is precisely this, that not even the testator, God, could subsequently through the giving of the law have modified the arrangement made with Abraham. It is plain, therefore, that here is a "testament" which, once made, cannot be changed. Professor Ramsay, I believe, has furnished the solution to this difficulty by calling attention to the difference between the testament of Roman law and a kind of testament possible under Syro-Grecian law.<sup>4</sup> The Roman testament, as we know it, is changeable till the testator dies, but under the Syro-Grecian law a prospective disposition of property could be made during the lifetime of the possessor, frequently carrying with it adoption, which after having been once sanctioned in public immediately carried with it certain effects and was not after that subject to modification. Comparing the berith God made with Abraham to such a diatheke Paul could within the terms of the representation properly say that God could not have meant to change its fundamental character as a dispensation of grace and promise through the later giving of the law at Sinai, and that therefore the law may not be interpreted on a legalistic principle but must be subsumed under the Abrahamic arrangement as a means to an end. Perhaps it will be said that Paul by giving this turn to the diatheke has imported into it what the berith-idea of Gen. xv. did not contain, in other words, that in saying God meant it so when making the promise to Abraham, the Apostle is historically at fault. The charge would be warranted, of course, if Paul had used this peculiar testamentary conception for a different purpose than that for which in Genesis the berith-idea is introduced. But this is by no means the case. The purpose for which in the one case the form of the berith, in the other case that of the "testament" comes in, is absolutely identical. The berith with Abraham was not a covenantal berith at all. It was a disposition-berith in the strictest sense, intended exclusively by God for the purpose of binding Himself in the strongest

<sup>4</sup> *Expositor*, 1899, pp. 57 ff.



possible way by His own promise, and so rendering the promise unalterably sure. It is for nothing else than for faithfully translating this import of the berith into the thought-form of his readers and so bringing it home to their understanding that Paul says God made with Abraham a testamental diatheke. Under the circumstances this amounted to saying: the berith God made with Abraham was as unchangeable as a diatheke is among you. It simply accentuates, in the most emphatic way, what to the narrator of Genesis himself is the salient point of the transaction.

Before returning to Hebrews, we must cast a glance at the use of the conception in the two cases where Luke records it. In the Gospel i. 72 the diatheke is equivalent to the promise given to the fathers; the parallelism in which it stands with the "oath" of God proves this: "to remember his holy diatheke, the oath which He swore unto Abraham, our father." In the other passage, Acts iii. 25, Peter addresses the Jews as "sons of the prophets" and "sons of the diatheke which God made with the fathers". "Sons of the prophets" of course does not mean "descendants of the prophets" but "heirs of what the prophets have predicted". Similarly "sons of the diatheke" does not mean "begotten by the diatheke", but "heirs of what the diatheke conveys in the way of blessing". This, of course, admits, though it by no means positively requires the construction of the diatheke as a "testament". "Heirs of a testament-diatheke" is a more suggestive, and more directly self-explanatory form of statement than "heirs of a disposition-diatheke". But it can not be said that the latter interpretation is in itself unnatural. "Sons of the berith" for "heirs of the promise of the berith" is as allowable a figure, as good Semitic idiom, as "sons of the prophets" for "heirs of the predictions of the prophets". But, whether the notion of "testament" be found here or not, it is at any rate clear that the Lucan and Petrine usage in these two passages agrees with the prevailing Pauline mode of representation. Peter, like

Paul, emphasizes the sovereign promissory source of God's dealings with His people and does not reflect in the present connection upon the reciprocal relation resulting from it. In passing it may be remarked that in Stephen's speech, Acts vii. 8, "the diatheke of circumcision" means nothing else but "the law, ordinance of circumcision". The reference is to Gen. xvii., where the word berith has the same sense. The author of Genesis, who in chapter xv used the term berith in the sense of a promise, here takes it as "law", "appointment". He did not mean that God in the same sense twice made a berith with the patriarch. First God gave a promise-berith, then He imposed a law-berith. So Genesis intends it and so Stephen quotes it.

We are now ready to return to Hebrews and bring to bear upon it the light we have obtained from the remainder of the New Testament. In view of what has been found, it is not likely that diatheke bears in the Epistle the uniform meaning of "testament". Riegenbach's assertion to this effect is staked on the fact that in ix. 16, 17 the necessity of rendering "testament" is self-evident, and that this one passage must be considered regulative for the author's understanding of the term throughout. The major premise of this argument is unassailable. The wording of the statement in the passage named compels us to think of a testament: "where a diatheke is, there must of necessity be the death of him that made it, for a diatheke is of force where there has occurred death: for does it ever avail while he that made it liveth?" Besides this, the purposeful introduction of technical law-terms is just as noticeable here as in Galatians iii. Of course there have been exegetes who thought they could even here adhere to the meaning "covenant". Westcott is one of these.<sup>5</sup> He thinks that the necessity of death dwelt upon in the passage has nothing to do with the legal decease of a testator, but relates to sacrificial death. According to him the thought is: a covenant cannot go into effect except a sacrificial victim have died. It does not, of

<sup>5</sup> *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 265.

course, escape Westcott that the author, instead of saying this, makes the quite different assertion, a covenant cannot go into effect except the *covenant-maker* have died. How can that possibly be explained on the principle of sacrifice? Westcott appeals for explaining it to the idea of identification between the offerer and his sacrifice, so that when the animal dies the offerer, in this case the covenant-maker, dies with it. "He who makes a covenant is, for the purposes of the covenant, identified with the sacrificial victim, by whose representative death the covenant is ordinarily ratified. In the death of the victim his death is presented symbolically." In other words the author of Hebrews meant really to say: "A covenant cannot go into effect except in his sacrificial substitute the covenant-maker has first died." There can be no objection to the symbolical-vicarious interpretation of sacrifice in general or of covenant-sacrifice in particular. We believe most thoroughly in its soundness. But that does not answer the question why the author of Hebrews should in this passage have found it necessary to call attention to the fact that not merely the sacrifice but in the sacrifice the covenant-maker dies, and that only so the covenant can go into effect. Westcott himself feels the necessity of accounting for this peculiar form of statement, and therefore offers the additional explanation that the death of the covenant-maker in the sacrifice serves to express the idea of the subsequent unchangeableness of the covenant: "the unchangeableness of the covenant is seen in the fact that he who has made it has deprived himself of all further power of movement in this respect." The man is dead and can no longer act. On the impossibility of this explanation the whole exegesis breaks down. The idea of unchangeableness, irrevocableness of the covenant, on which Westcott would suspend it, is foreign to the context. What the writer wants to prove by the death of Christ is not the subsequent unchangeableness or irrevocableness of the diatheke but its sure effectuation. Herein lies precisely the difference between Gal. iii. and this ix. chapter of Hebrews. Paul says



no one *annuls* or *adds* thereunto; our author says: a *diatheke avails, is of force, goes into effect* when a person dies. Besides this, if the writer had actually wanted to express the thought of irrevocableness and unchangeableness, the representation of the *diatheke* as a testament in the Roman-law-sense would have lain far nearer to his hand and be far more suited to his purpose, than this tortuous, artificial appeal to symbolic suicide of the covenant-maker in his sacrifice. Still further, the full absurdity of the exegesis is felt only when the attempt is made to apply the principle in question to the death of Jesus. Can we say that the covenant inaugurated by Jesus through the sacrifice of Himself is now irrevocable and unchangeable because, the covenant-maker now being dead, the covenant is ipso facto exempted from all danger of change or annulment? The case of Jesus is precisely peculiar in this, that He does not remain dead; the whole ingenious device of proving the unchangeableness from the death would be a mere pretense at argument, lacking all cogency for the case in hand. We may, therefore, confidently dismiss this exegesis as impossible. The *diatheke* in Heb. ix. 16, 17 is nothing else but a "testament", and its testamentary aspect serves the single purpose of bringing out the certainty of its effectuation. Just as the death of a testator under the Roman law automatically puts into effect his last will, even so the death of Christ with absolute inevitability secures all the effects for which it was intended.

Now, Riegenbach's major premise being thus granted, are we bound to accept his conclusion, that *diatheke* must uniformly throughout the Epistle mean the same thing that it means here? We think not. There are several considerations that lead us to believe that the treatment of the *diatheke* as a "testament" is a peculiarity of this one passage and not representative of the author's ordinary view. The very fact that the author takes great pains by the use of legal terminology to call the reader's attention to the possibility of construing the *diatheke* as a "testament" operates

against the view that it should ordinarily have been so understood either by him or by the readers. Then there is the important phenomenon that the author immediately before and after the passage under discussion predicates things of the diatheke which do not properly belong to a "testament". In verse 15 the death of Christ is said to have taken place for the redemption from transgressions committed under a former diatheke. "Transgressions" do not naturally invalidate a "testament", but do have a disannulling effect upon a "covenant" or a "disposition." And in verse 18 the writer says: "Wherefore even the first diatheke has not been *dedicated* without blood". It is plain that here already the idea of "testament" has been again dismissed as suddenly as it had been introduced; the author has shifted back to his ordinary conception of the diatheke as a "covenant" or a "disposition", for to a "testament" the idea of "dedication" does not apply. Evidently the writer finds it difficult to keep himself well within the terms of the figurative, accommodating use to which for the moment he is led to put the conception. Finally it is still possible to point out what it was that first suggested to the author the rendering "testament" as a means of which he might avail himself to set forth impressively the effectiveness of the death of Christ. This was nothing else than the mention of "the inheritance" at the close of verse 15: "For this cause is He the mediator of a new diatheke that a death having taken place for the redemption from the transgressions that were under the first diatheke, they who have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance." The author in speaking of the inheritance is at first still unconscious of the train of thought which it may open up. But no sooner has he written down the word than all at once the possibility of attaching the inheritance to the diatheke in the sense of "testament" suggests itself to him and he is quick to see the striking use that may be made of it in furtherance of his argument. But the novel turn given to the word under such circumstances offers no indication of the meaning con-

nected with it elsewhere in the Epistle. To assume that it signifies "testament" elsewhere we need other evidence than this single passage. And such evidence does not exist. In none of the other contexts where *diatheke* occurs is there anything that even remotely suggests the idea of a last will. And against it speaks decisively the representation of Jesus as the sponsor and mediator of the new *diatheke*. Neither of these two functions that of a sponsor or that of a mediator appear among the legal accompaniments of a testament.

But if not the idea of a testament, what then is the idea which our Epistle ordinarily connects with the word *diatheke*? The answer is that both the other aspects of the conception so far found in the earlier documents are here represented with a fair degree of equilibrium. The usage of our Lord, who spoke of a "new covenant", and that of Paul, who practically everywhere views the *diatheke* as a divine disposition, both reappear in Hebrews, and they are not merely mechanically held together but organically and harmoniously united. The Epistle speaks the last word in the Biblical development of the *berith-diatheke* idea and that not only in point of chronology but likewise as giving the idea its full-orbed, consummate expression. And this is due to the fact previously alluded to, that the writer of Hebrews is positively interested in the conception, loves it for its own inherent character, finds it congenial to his own religious idiosyncrasy, and so is able to penetrate it with his thought and raise it to the highest state of doctrinal fruitfulness. The two aspects distinguishable in the *diatheke* correspond closely to the two poles between which the religious thinking of the author moves. His thinking would have partaken of this twofold character even if the *diatheke*-idea had remained unknown to him; the latter is by no means the source of his doctrine but, as a reagent, it has materially contributed to the strengthening and clarifying of the two great thoughts that existed and worked in the writer's mind apart from it. Let us look at each of these



two thoughts separately and at the corresponding elements in the diatheke with which they are found interacting.

In studying the Epistle it soon becomes clear that it deals with the diatheke from two different points of view. In a number of passages it appears as an institution established and set in operation for an ulterior end. This is in line with the understanding of the diatheke as a divine disposition, and leaves out of regard its character as a state of fellowship with God, in which latter respect it is not, of course, a means to an end, but an absolute end in itself. It is true the direction to an ulterior purpose admits of being combined with the idea of a covenant: a covenant between two parties can serve to realize some extrinsic end. As a matter of fact, however, while this may be so in the abstract, the concrete statements of the Epistle in regard to the ends which the diatheke subserves are such as to exclude the idea of their being reached by a "covenant" and fit in only with the idea of a system or disposition. The instrumental diatheke appears in the following ways. Back of the diatheke stand the promises, and it is for the fulfillment of the promises that the diatheke has been instituted. Hence it is said to have been enacted upon the basis of promises, inferior promises in the case of the first diatheke, better ones in the case of the second. The diatheke further appears as a means to the end of the *τελείωσις*, *i.e.* the attainment of the religious goal of approach to and communion with and service of God. Here, it will be seen, the fellowship with God, which we ordinarily associate with the covenant-idea appears as lying above and beyond the diatheke, as the end lies above and beyond the means.

Over against this we may place other passages in the Epistle which represent the diatheke as the realisation of the religious ideal and therefore as an end in itself. In viii. 10, in the passage quoted from Jeremiah, the diatheke is held to consist in this, that Jehovah is the God of Israel, and Israel to Jehovah a people. The life of the people of God is essentially an intercourse with God and this inter-

course appears in ix. 14, 15 as the very essence of the diatheke. The diatheke is also called a *διαθήκη αἰώνιος*, "an everlasting covenant", chap. xiii. 20, and this implies that in it the whole religious process comes to rest: for the predicate *αἰώνιος* in Hebrews expresses not only endless duration but inclusion among the eternal realities which have absolute value and significance in themselves. Now it is plain that in this second absolute aspect the character of the diatheke can only be expressed by the rendering "covenant". It is only as a "covenant" and not as a disposition that it lends itself to being eternalized after this fashion.

These two principal aspects of the diatheke answer perfectly to the two outstanding features of the Epistle's teaching. The first of these consists in the emphasis placed upon the absoluteness, sovereignty and majesty of God and the monergistic divine initiative and prosecution of the work of salvation. In various ways, altogether apart from the diatheke-conception, this finds expression. God is the Majesty on high (i. 3), the one for whom are all things and through whom are all things, whom it therefore behooves, even through great suffering with sovereign hand to carry through His saving purpose (ii. 10), the living God (ix. 15, xi. 31), a consuming fire (xii. 29). But in keeping with this the writer vindicates for God not merely the original planning and inception but also the further effectual carrying out of the work of redemption. There are various servants in the house of God, and Christ is even a son over the house, but the principle remains in force: "He that built all things is God" (iii. 5). And how this thought of the underlying divine initiative and energizing flows together with the diatheke-idea may be seen from the doxology in xiii. 20, 21: it is the God who omnipotently brought again from the dead the Lord Jesus, with the blood of the eternal diatheke, who also makes the believers perfect in every good thing to do His will, working in them that which is well-pleasing in His sight through Jesus Christ. On this principle it is further to be explained that

the new diatheke can be represented as a new species of legislation. God has enacted it. The reason is not that it is legalistic in content or import, but simply that God has instituted it with the same supreme authority with which He promulgates His law. How much weight the author attaches to this point may be seen from the change introduced in ix. 20 into the quotation from Ex. xxiv. 8. Here the Septuagint reads: "this is the blood of the diatheke which God *disposed* ( *διέθετο* ) towards you". The writer substitutes for this: "the blood of the diatheke which God *commanded* towards you." In line with this conception of the diatheke as a divine arrangement carrying the pledge of its unfailing effectuation in itself is also the function of *λεμότης* and *ἔγγυος* performed by Christ in connection with it. Of the latter term *ἔγγυος*, to be rendered as "sponsor", this is plain on the surface. Christ is the "sponsor" of the diatheke insofar as He guarantees the fulfilment of the promises to which the diatheke has reference. The term is not a technical term either in connection with a "testament" or a "covenant" and it most naturally attaches itself to the understanding of diatheke as a divine promissory dispensation. It forms the connecting link between the diatheke and the important rôle which the word "promise", "promises", plays in the Epistle. As for *μεσίτης*, the English literal rendering of the word by "mediator" is apt to lead to the premature conclusion that it goes with the diatheke as a two-sided covenantal agreement and marks Jesus as the one who brings the two parties together by mediating between them. While *μεσίτης* has this meaning in the Greek language of law, its legal use is by no means restricted to it and at least three other meanings have been fully established as equally current.<sup>6</sup> We shall not weary

<sup>6</sup>The other three meanings are: 1) the person with whom parties at law deposit the object in litigation until the suit has been decided; 2) the witness who vouches for the veracity of a statement; in this sense the verb *μεσιτεύειν* is used in chap. vi 17 God pledged Himself with an oath for the truthfulness of His promise; 3) the person who vouches for the execution of engagements made; in this sense *μεσίτης* becomes synonymous with *ἔγγυος*.



the reader with an account of the recent discussions on this point: suffice it to say that the trend of present scholarship is towards considering *μεσίτης* and *ἑγγυος* as entirely synonymous in the vocabulary of the writer of Hebrews. The *μεσίτης* is he who guarantees for God the sure accomplishment of what has been stated or promised in the *διαθήκη*. So taken the word, no less than *ἑγγυος*, becomes a witness to the prominence in the writer's mind of the sovereign, promissory aspect of the *diatheke*.

The other aspect of the *diatheke*, that of covenantal fellowship and intercourse with God appealed equally much, if not more, to the religious temperament of the writer. It has long been observed that the type of Christianity represented by the Epistle is peculiar in the almost exclusive emphasis it places upon the exercise of religion in the conscious sphere. The important subconscious processes, sometimes designated as mystical, which play so large a rôle in the Pauline teaching, are very little in evidence in Hebrews. Hence also the Spirit as the author and bearer of this hidden subconscious union with God and Christ is seldom referred to. Where the Holy Spirit is mentioned in Hebrews it is as the source of the extraordinary *charismata*, and even here His operation is highly personal, for He is said to distribute these gifts according to His own will (ii. 4). It would be foolish, of course, to attribute the absence of this specifically Pauline strand of teaching to the author's ignorance or denial of it. The many and intimate relations with Paul's type of doctrine in other respects forbid us to assume any conscious departure or opposition here. But without ignoring or denying the deeper and more mysterious underground of the religious process, the author could feel himself more strongly drawn towards exploring and cultivating the more advanced stage of the process, for whose sake all previous operations exist, its blossoming out into conscious Christian experience. The author of Hebrews is a great spiritualizer. The efflorescence of religion in the clear luminous regions of the believer's noëtic life evokes

his supreme interest. In several important connections we can trace the influence of this spiritualizing factor in the shaping of his thought. These will afterwards receive separate attention. For the present it suffices to observe that to a mind thus spiritually oriented the interpretation of religion in terms of the covenant was bound to offer a special attraction. For it is precisely in religion as a covenant-religion that everything is reduced to ultimate, spiritual, conscious values. The new covenant is the ideal covenant because in it the will and law of God are internalized, put on the heart and written upon the mind. Here its nature as a covenant can first freely and perfectly unfold itself.

The full significance, however, of this interlocking of the principle of spirituality in religion and the covenant-idea will not be perceived until we remember in the next place that the spiritualizing tendency of the Epistle is of a peculiar, God-centered kind, and that only in this specific form it perfectly fits into the covenant-type of religion. We do not hesitate to say that in hardly any New Testament writing is the essential character of the Christian religion as consisting in face to face intercourse with God, mediated by Jesus Christ, so clearly realized and so pointedly brought out as in our Epistle. The supremacy of the spiritual, when closely looked at, is only a result of drawing every religious state and act into the immediate presence of God, where nothing but the spiritual can abide. To be a Christian is to live one's life not merely in obedience to God, nor merely in dependence on God, nor even merely for the sake of God; it is to stand in conscious, reciprocal fellowship with God, to be identified with Him in thought and purpose and work, to receive from Him and give back to Him in the ceaseless interplay of spiritual forces. It is this direct confrontation of the religious mind with God which finds in the covenant-idea its perfect expression. To be in covenant with God,—what finer and what more adequate definition of the perfect religious life could be conceived than this? The classical formula in which already under the Old Testament

God Himself expresses His conception of the covenant and which through Jeremiah has descended to our author reads: "I shall be to them a God and they shall be to me a people", and "All shall know me from the least to the greatest." According to this the covenant means that God gives Himself to man and man gives Himself to God for that full measure of mutual acquaintance and enjoyment of which each side to the relation is capable. The highest concrete analogy for this is that offered by the prophet Hosea when he compares the berith between Jehovah and the people to the marriage-bond between husband and wife, which when perfect leaves no room for divided interests or possessions. Some of the Psalms also reach the same high altitude where the soul rises above every thought of self, even above the consciousness of its own need of salvation, and desires and receives God for His own sake.

Let us now endeavor to trace the influence which this covenantal understanding of the relation between God and man has exerted upon the theology of the Epistle. And first of all its doctrine of revelation must be considered here. The Epistle makes much of the fact that God has revealed Himself to His people. In part, of course, this is accounted for by the supernaturalism which the writer has in common with all the Biblical writers. No redemptive religion, however conceived, covenantal or otherwise, can dispense with the basis of divine, supernatural self-disclosure. But there are perceptible differences in the way in which the several types of Biblical teaching account for this necessity and in the statement of the supreme end which they make it subserve. Special, supernatural revelation is necessary for a soteriological reason, because man in his sinful, lost, helpless condition is dependent on the sovereign, gracious approach of God in word and act to recover his normal religious state. As such, revelation bears an instrumental saving character. This view of it also Hebrews shares with the other New Testament writings. Revelation, however, alongside of this, and even



through all its saving activity also serves the purpose of establishing as from God to man that train of personal communication in which the end of religion consists. In this aspect one might define it as divine speech for the sake of divine speech; God reveals Himself, because in His love for His own and interest in them it is natural for Him to open up and communicate Himself. Revelation in a sense is the highest that God has to give because in it He gives Himself. And while in the ordinary understanding of it revelation is in order to salvation, the reversed sequence also can lay claim to recognition: salvation is in order to prepare man for further, perpetual revelation carrying its right of existence in itself. Such speech of God existed in the state of rectitude; such will continue to exist in the eschatological state of the world to come, when all abnormality of sin and every need of salvation shall have been forever surmounted. And, as already intimated, even in the soteric process of revelation this higher and ultimate function of it finds simultaneous employment. All saving transactions are so many approaches, so many occasions of meeting between God and man in which the forces of help become fountains of love, God the great physician of souls making friends of all His patients. Now it is in the emphasis placed upon this specifically religious aspect of revelation that the influence of the covenant-idea can be clearly traced in our Epistle. It is not accidental, that the first sentence with which the writer opens his discourse reads: "God having spoken . . . spake." It is as a speaking God that he grasps Him and desires to bring Him in touch with the readers. And the word also that is employed in this first sentence and prevailingly afterwards to describe the revelation-speech of God deserves notice in this connection. It is the verb *λαλεῖν*, a verb used in the New Testament with reference to the speech of God outside of Hebrews only in John and Acts and which brings out most strikingly the idea of familiar intercourse, denoting speech not primarily for the purpose of conveying information but for

the purpose of maintaining fellowship. Further the verb *διαλέγεσθαι*, expressive of the two-sided mutually responsive speech that takes place between God and man may here be mentioned as entering into the author's vocabulary. Because the divine word is not merely for instruction or salvation but brings God personally near to the believer, it becomes in itself an object of enjoyment, hence the Epistle speaks of tasting the good word of God (vi. 5). And it is further in agreement with this personal, practical view taken of revelation when, throughout, the direct provenience of the word from God is emphasized. In a very striking way God regularly appears as the speaking subject in the quotations made from the Old Testament. Where Paul contents himself with the formula, "as it is written", or "as the Scripture says", Hebrews prefers to make the affirmation of the divine authorship explicit and employs the formula "God says". That this is not the result of meaningless habit, but possesses doctrinal significance, appears from the cases, where, rhetorically considered, it would be unnatural to introduce God as the speaking subject, since in the passage quoted He is the Person spoken of. Even in such cases the author insists upon emphasizing that the statement about God came from the mouth of God Himself. It is God who said "the Lord shall judge His people (x. 30). And so vivid is the realisation of this supreme fact of the direct divine authorship of Scripture that what we call the secondary authors, that is, the writers of the Biblical books, are, again in distinction from Paul's custom, scarcely ever mentioned. The only case where the name of a Bible writer is introduced is chap. iv. 7, and even here the phrase is not "David saying" but "God saying in David." There are even passages where pains seem to have been taken to bring out the relative unimportance of the secondary authorship by more positive means than the mere omission of the writer's name. In a couple of instances use seems to have been made for this purpose of the indefinite pronoun "some one" and the indefinite adverb "some-

where": "*One has somewhere testified saying*" (ii. 6); "For He hath spoken *somewhere* of the seventh day on this wise" (iv. 4). By this manner of statement the impression is conveyed that in view of the authority wherewith God invests every word of Scripture the human instrumentality through which the divine word was mediated becomes a matter of little or no importance. As a matter of fact the word of revelation is so literally to the writer's mind the word of God that it is represented as having been spoken by God being locally present in His messengers: "God of old times spoke unto the fathers *in* the prophets"; "God said *in* David". The conception is not instrumental, as if "*in*" were a Hebraizing construction for "by means of"; it should rather be compared with the similar form of statement by our Lord to the disciples: "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you" (Mat. x. 20), and by Paul who offers to the Corinthians a proof of Christ speaking in him (2 Cor. xiii. 3).

But, while this immediateness of the approach of God to man through His word is made a characteristic of all revelation, and found illustrated in the Old Testament Scriptures, the writer evidently associates it in the highest degree with the New Covenant. Over against the many portions and the many modes in which the ancient speech of God came to the people in the several prophets, he places that uniform and undivided revelation that was concentrated in Him who is a Son. The purpose for which the author draws this contrast is precisely to exalt the New Covenant by reason of the absolutely unmediated and most intimate union with man upon which in it through Christ God's revelation-speech has entered. Revelation in a Son is superior to that in prophets and superior to that in angels because as Son of God Christ is the effulgence of the divine glory and the expressed image of the divine substance, in no wise differing from God Himself, so that to hear His voice is to hear in the most literal sense God's own voice and to come in direct touch with the divine life expressing



itself in the divine word. It is characteristic of the Epistle that, in connection with the revealing office of Christ, it places all the stress upon His divine nature, whereas in connection with His priestly office, the reality of His human nature is strongly emphasized. Both features are explainable from the covenant-idea. In regard to the priestly function we shall have occasion to show this later on. At this point it may be observed that the ideal revelation, if it is to fulfill its covenant-purpose of establishing real contact between God and man, can have no other than a strictly divine Mediator. Otherwise the bearer of the divine word would intervene between the covenant-God and the covenant-people and stand as a barrier to the close union contemplated. The perfect identification of Christ with God, therefore, is necessary to the belief that the Son has brought the highest and final revelation and raised the covenant-intercourse to a point beyond which it cannot be perfected. This can be observed most clearly perhaps on the negative side. Repeatedly the readers are warned in the Epistle that unbelief over against the New Testament revelation and rejection of its Gospel are a far more serious offense and must be followed by far more tremendous consequences than a similar line of conduct under the old dispensation. "Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things that were heard, lest haply we drift away. For if the word spoken through angels proved steadfast and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation (ii. 1-3)?" And "A man that hath set at naught Moses' law dieth without compassion on the testimony of two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, think ye, shall he be judged worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith He was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace" (x. 28-30)? "See that ye refuse not Him that speaketh. For if they escaped not when they refused Him that gave oracles

on earth, much more shall not we escape, if we turn away from Him that gives oracles from Heaven" (xii. 25, 26). In such passages the revelation mediated by angels and by Moses and by the prophets is represented as imposing a lesser degree of responsibility than that mediated by Christ. Now the reason for this cannot lie in the fact that the angelic or Mosaic or prophetic message was insufficiently authenticated as to its divine origin or less completely derived from God. On the contrary the author explicitly states that the word spoken through angels proved steadfast, *βεβαιος*, and the same thing is emphasized regarding the Mosaic revelation at Sinai: neither of these could be disobeyed with impunity. But neither of these two, nor even the prophetic word, could be placed on a line with the revelation in Christ because here the word spoken comes invested with the divine majesty which it derives from the unique organ of its transmission, the Son of God. The measure of responsibility here evidently is not the truthfulness of the message, for that is alike in all true revelation, but the closeness of contact with God that is effected. Under the Old Testament there was not that immediateness and directness which the author claims for the self-disclosure of God in Christ. Between God and the people there stood the angels and Moses; between God and us stands only the Son. And, strictly speaking, even this is an incorrect form of statement which fails to reproduce the author's intent at its most vital point: as regards Christ, no intervention between God and us in the matter of revelation can be affirmed. By Christ's activity in this sphere absolutely nothing is detracted from the immediacy of the divine approach to man. Hence "the word of Christ" (vi. 1) is spoken of in precisely the same sense as is ordinarily connected with "the word of God", and in which "the word of Moses" or "the word of the prophets" could never be referred to. A stronger proof of the author's belief in the deity of our Lord than this whole representation that God spake under the Old Covenant through inter-

mediate organs but under the New Covenant in Christ directly cannot be conceived.

But the practical character of revelation as a covenant-speech shows itself in still another way. The Epistle conceives of the divine word as not merely proceeding from God originally, but as also remaining in living contact with God ever afterwards. God continues to stand back of His revelation, nay abides immanent in it. The Scriptures of the Old Testament and the word spoken in Christ are as personal an address from God to the later generations as they were to those who first heard the divine voice proclaim them. The author is at the farthest remove from considering the word by itself as a detached deposit of truth separated from the mind that conceived or the mouth that spoke it, having its own objective existence. It is significant that all his statements on this subject refer to revelation in terms of speech and not in terms of writing. The speech is an organic, living process, a part and function of the speaking person, whereas the written communication is only a picture or symbol of the life-process it reproduces. But God's word, even when written, has this peculiarity that it retains the character of inspired, vitalized speech, opening up the depths of the divine mind and addressing itself in the most direct face-to-face way to the inner personality of the hearer. So vividly does the author realize this, that in a well-known passage it leads him to a formal personification of the *λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* in which attributes and activities are predicted of the word, belonging, strictly speaking, to God Himself only, and in which a remarkable transition is made from the word to God as co-ordinate subjects in the same sentence: "The word of God is living and active and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, both in their joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart. And there is no creature that is not manifest in *His* sight; but all things are naked and open before the eyes of *Him* with whom we have to do"



(iv. 12-14). Misled by the vividness of the personification some have thought that the author here speaks of Christ as the personal Logos after the manner of the Johannine teaching. But of the Logos-Christ it would have been unnecessary to affirm with such pointed emphasis that in His operation He is living and active and incisive, because His personality is self-evident, and what the writer by means of these predicates here wants to affirm of the word of God is nothing else than that it works as a personal agent upon the soul of man as a personal reagent. God acts in and through His word and thus the word has the same power and effect that belong to God Himself. Especially the figure of the sword searching the vitals and laying bare the inner attitude and disposition of man is very striking. Because the word of God confronts man with God personally he cannot in the presence of it remain neutral and treat it after an indifferent, disinterested fashion; it is a challenge to his soul that must provoke reaction and incite to faith or unbelief according to the inner disposition of the heart with reference to God.

Owing to this permanent identification of God with His word, the lapse of time is not able to detract aught from the freshness and force that belonged to the self-disclosure of God at its first historic occurrence. It is not necessary to project one's self backward through the interval of the ages in order to feel near to the source of the revelation. The fountain of the living water flows close to every believer. The author might have said with Moses and Paul: "Say not who shall ascend into heaven, or who shall descend into the abyss? The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart: such is the word of faith which we preach" (Rom. x. 6-8; Deut. xxx. 12-14). It is true, the Epistle speaks not only of the *καινή* but also of the *νέα διαθήκη* and the latter phrase represents the new covenant as fresh and recent in comparison with the more remote Mosaic revelation. It should, however, be observed that, although the Epistle is addressed to Christians of the second generation,

it none the less conceives of its readers as in the most immediate sense made recipients of the divine word spoken by Christ and through that word brought into no less direct communion with the supernatural world than the cotemporaries of the earthly life of Jesus. God spake unto the fathers in the prophets: He spake in a Son unto *us*. And through this speech they have come unto Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, nay unto God and Jesus the mediator of a fresh covenant Himself and, as we have seen, the danger incurred by disregarding this speech of God in Christ is for them no less but greater than it was for those who refused a hearing to the terrible voice of the Sinaitic legislation. The word remains what it was at the beginning when it fell fresh from the lips of Christ, a signal of the presence of God and a vehicle of approach for the world of the supernatural.

*(To be continued.)*

*Princeton.*

GEERHARDUS VOS.

## THE BAYAN OF THE BAB.\*

It is pleasing to see members of the consular service taking interest in the antiquities, history, literature and religions of the countries in which they reside. America has had many literary Consuls who have brought honor to our country and fame to themselves. English diplomats, like Sir John Malcolm, Sir Henry Rawlinson and James Morier have added to our knowledge of Persia. At present Mr. Minorsky, of the Russian service, late of the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission, is making a first-hand study of the Ali-Allahi sect. Mr. A. L. M. Nicolas has followed his illustrious predecessor, Count Gobineau, Minister at the Court of Mohammed Shah, in investigating the religions of Persia and enlightening the western world about them. Count Gobineau published *Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale* and collected manuscripts which have been a valuable mine of information, especially about Babism. Mr. Nicolas has investigated the modern sects of the Shiah's and has published not a little regarding the Sheikh's and Babis. Among these are *The Science of God*, an essay on Sheikhism, translations of the Bab's work, *The Seven Proofs*, *The Arabic Bayan* and a *Life of the Bab* from original sources. Mr. Nicolas has special qualifications for this work, having been born in Persia where his father was in the diplomatic service, and having lived many years in the country. At present he is Consul at Tabriz. As a near neighbor, it has been my pleasure to converse with him and Mr. Minorsky regarding the religious conceptions and conditions of the Persian people. Now Mr. Nicholas has completed a difficult and laborious task in giving to the world the translation of the *Bayan of the Bab*. It will enable the western world to form

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\* *Le Béyan Persan* traduit du Persan par A. L. M. NICOLAS. Consul de France, Tauris (Geuthner, Paris). *Kitab-i-Nuqtat-ul-Kaf*. The Earliest History of the Babis, compiled by HAJJI MIRZA JANI of Kashan, edited by EDWARD G. BROWNE, professor in Cambridge University, England.



a truer conception of Babism, the source of Bahaism, of which Americans hear considerable and whose new prophet Abdul Baha visited America in 1912.

The other work before us is the *Nuktatul-Kaf* by Mirza Jani. This is published in the Persian text from a unique manuscript preserved and brought to Paris by Count Gobineau. It is an invaluable treatise on the early history of Babism. With this is published in English an Index of the Bayan. Professor Browne is a high authority on Babism, having investigated in Persia its history and conditions and spent a lifetime in the study of its literature. He has published besides the above, the *Episode of the Bab, or the Traveller's Narrative*, and *The New History*, both translations from the Persian, with copious and valuable notes, *A Year among the Persians* and extended articles on Babism in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. These all contain information about the Bayan.

#### I. THE AUTHOR OF THE BAYAN

In considering the Bayan, I must content myself with a brief reference to its author; for any adequate consideration would occupy a whole article. Mirza Ali Mohammed, a Sayid, was born at Shiraz in 1819, 1820, or 1821. He was educated in the Sheikhi sect of the Shiah under the influence of Haji Kasim of Resht, the successor of Sheikh Ahmad of Ahsa. These were regarded as divinely inspired guides. At the age of twenty-four M. Ali Mohammed put forth the claim to be the Bab or Door of Communication of Divine knowledge. Afterwards he advanced his station, claiming to be the Kaim or Mahdi, the return of the twelfth Imam. Still advancing he took the title of Nukta or Point of Divinity. He proclaimed his Manifestation at Mecca. On his return to Persia he was arrested and confined at Shiraz and Ispahan. Owing to the activity of his propagandists and the consequent agitation, he was taken to the extreme northwest of Persia and confined at Maku, under the shadow of Ararat, and

later at Chirik near Salmas. Thence he was taken to Tabriz in 1850 and executed.

The Bab made known his "revelations" in a number of books. His writings<sup>1</sup> are said to comprise five hundred thousand verses. Some of these were *Commentaries* on the Koran, one was on the Surah-i-Yusuf, others were on Surah-i-Kawsar, Surah-ul-Asr, Surah-ul-Bakara. Besides there were the *Seven Proofs*, the *Names of All Things*, Prayers, Communes, and especially the Bayans. Many of his writings are lost; some may have remained hidden in Persia; others were taken by the Babi exiles to Turkey and may be in manuscript at Acca. Others have been collected at the Institute of Oriental Languages at St. Petersburg, in the Nationale Bibliotheque at Paris, and at the British Museum. Most of the Bab's writings are in Arabic, but some important ones are in Persian. The term Bayan is applied to all the writings of the Bab in a larger sense, meaning the "explanation" of the Truth. In the narrow sense there are two Bayans, one Arabic and one Persian. A third is mentioned by Gobineau, a summary in Arabic of the other two. But Mr. Nicolas<sup>2</sup> and Professor Browne<sup>3</sup> believe that some general work must be referred to and not a book technically called the Bayan. The Kitab-ul-Ahkam, Book of Precepts, was translated into French by Gobineau. A French translation of the Arabic Bayan by Mr. Nicholas has been followed by this rendering of the Persian Bayan. This is in four volumes, the text comprising 630 pages, besides prefaces and valuable tables of contents. In connection with it may be used the *Index of the Persian Bayan* which occupies pages liv-xcv of Professor Browne's volume. The Bayan in the original has never been printed.

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<sup>1</sup>Lists of these are given in Mr. Nicolas' *Life of the Bab*, pp. 20-47, by Professor Browne in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889 and in his *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 335-340.

<sup>2</sup>*Life of the Bab*, pp. 1-7.

<sup>3</sup>*Traveller's Narrative*, p. 346.

## II. THE TIME AND PLACE OF ITS WRITING

The Bayan was written during the Bab's imprisonment at Maku,<sup>4</sup> a frontier fortress of Azerbaijan, off from the centers of Persian life. There<sup>5</sup> the Bab's imprisonment was light. He was allowed to write treatises as well as correspond with his followers. This was 1847 to 1849. When he was removed to Chirik, his confinement was stricter.

After the great persecutions of 1846-1853, the Babis were fearful and scattered. Babi books, including the Bayan, were prohibited. Soon (1867) the Bahai "revelation" abrogated and superseded them. The Bahais neither cared to preserve nor to circulate them. The manuscripts became scarce and hard to procure. Professor Browne says,<sup>6</sup> "The Babi books ceased to be renewed and for the most part reposed undisturbed and forgotten on shelves and in boxes." They were "buried in an oblivion most profound and most complete. They have been almost utterly unknown to the European world."

## III. STYLE AND LANGUAGE

Many of the writings of the Bab are in Arabic and in the form of "verses." These verses were regarded as the highest proof of the truth of the Manifestation. As Mohammed pointed to his Surahs as the proof of his mission, so the Babi converts with profound admiration for the "verses" declared them to be the inspiring cause of this faith. Yet to unbelievers, whether Persian Mullahs or foreign savants the language and style of the Bab's writings are not inspiring but are positively distasteful. Professor Browne says,<sup>7</sup> "The Arabic treatises are of interminable length, at once florid and incorrect in style, teeming with grammatical errors the most glaring,

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 230, 274, 292, also *Life of Bab*, p. 71, and Abdul Fazl's *Bahai Proofs*, p. 43.

<sup>5</sup> The writer has visited Maku. It is strongly situated for old time warfare.

<sup>6</sup> *New History*, xxvii.

<sup>7</sup> *New History*, xii, xxvi.



iterations the most wearisome, and words the rarest and most incomprehensible." Again, "They were voluminous, hard to comprehend, uncouth in style, unsystematic in arrangement, filled with iterations and solecisms." Of the Surah-i-Yusuf, he says,<sup>8</sup> "It is obscure and ungrammatical"; of the Book of the Pilgrimage, "It has the faults of grammar and obscurity of all the Bab's books." Baron Rosen of Petrograd, another eminent student of Babism, agrees with this. He says:<sup>9</sup> "As to the innumerable grammatical errors which abound in the Arabic text and in the Persian Commentaries, they are the result without doubt of the author himself, and it would be ridiculous to correct them." He calls them jargon and adds, "The reader should throw off all logic and good sense, then he will be successful in understanding the literary monuments which adepts of the faith call with unconscious irony 'the clear exposition.'"

The Persian Ulema likewise criticized them. At his trial in Tabriz, when the Bab repeated "verses," they said,<sup>10</sup> "We do not undersand such verses." Mirza Abul Fazl, the Bahai apologist, discusses the subject in his book *Farayad*.<sup>11</sup> He admits the criticisms and says that the Bab silenced his opponents by showing similar examples of bad grammar in the Koran. In truth the Bab seems to have been fully aware of the weakness of his grammar for the Persian Bayan<sup>12</sup> says that by "Harut and Marut," the imprisoned angels, are meant two habits,—*accidence* and *Syntax*, from which, in the Bayanic Dispensation, all restrictions have been removed. The Bayan<sup>13</sup> prohibits the criticizing of its grammar and also the study of grammar except in so far as it is necessary in order to understand

<sup>8</sup> *Journal, Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, pp. 907, 900.

<sup>9</sup> Nicolas' *Beyan*, Vol. II., Preface, and *Life of Bab*, p. 56.

<sup>10</sup> *New History*, p. 287.

<sup>11</sup> *Bahai Proofs*, p. 262-263. He adds that objection was afterwards made to Baha Ullah that "his words contain no grammatical errors, so they do not resemble Divine Words."

<sup>12</sup> *New History*, p. 22.

<sup>13</sup> *Bayan*. Unity II. chap. 1. IV, 10.

the Bayan. In accordance with this, Browne says that the Bab and his earlier followers entertained a profound contempt for grammar. Mr. Nicolas<sup>14</sup> on the other hand, maintains that the errors of the Bab's writings are attributable to imbecile copyists, who, frozen with fear of persecution and in secret, copied the manuscripts. He says; "As to the grammar, can we really believe that the author of an infinity of volumes, written in Arabic, did not know that language? Did the Bab voluntarily fill them with mistakes? The Koran contains errors which they have attempted to justify, in entire grammars written to prove that rules ought to be taken from revealed books." He quotes testimony to show the admirable language of the Bab's writings from one who had seen faultless manuscripts and others that were faulty and declared that the original documents were inerrant and are corrupted by the crass ignorance and stupidity of the copyists.<sup>15</sup> He pleads that critics should not crush the Bab with disdain on account of faults which he has not committed, seeing it is quite impossible to conceive of the Bab having such a profound influence on learned men of Persia so that they lost their heads and were ready to prostrate themselves before him as the Manifested Imam Mahdi, if his "verses" were so incoherent and faulty! Anyhow it is well that the translator tries faithfully to understand and interpret the text, and does not do as others who, he says, "allow themselves to twist the text with scandalous fantasy, and act towards the book as towards a conquered city."

#### IV. THE CONTENTS IN GENERAL

The Bab's writings he divides into five classes. (1) The Verses, written in the poetic style of the Koran. (2) Supplications and Prayers. (3) Commentaries and homilies. (4) Scientific Treatises. (5) Books in the Persian

<sup>14</sup> *Bayan Persian*. Vol. II, Preface, and *Life of Bab*, pp. 57-60.

<sup>15</sup> It is interesting to read of a modern instance of appeal from a text as found to an original inerrant text.

language.<sup>16</sup> In general character they are metaphysical, allegorical, almost whimsical. To one acquainted only with strict Mohammedanism, they seem to be a farrago of heterodox imaginations. But in reality the beliefs are found in the Shiah sects of past ages and many of them among the Sufis, Sheikhis, Ali Allahis and others of the present time. Professor Browne finds the greatest resemblance to the Ismielis, Hurufis and Ghulats. Of the doctrines,<sup>17</sup> "there was hardly one of which he could claim to be the author," and "fascinating as they were to the Persian mind, they were utterly unfitted for the bulk of mankind." They set forth a "new religion designed to replace and supersede all existing creeds—visions of a New Creation, of a Reign of God's Saints on Earth, and of a Universal Theocracy conformed in every detail to a mystical Theosophy, wherein are blended, under the guise of ultra-Shiite nationalism, theories of numbers more fantastic than those of Pythagoras or Plotinus, with theories of the Divine Names and Attributes more intangible than those of the Cabbala or of Spinoza."

To arrive at an understanding of the doctrines is no small task for "percepts have but a small proportion to dogma and dogma a still smaller proportion to doxologies and mystical rhapsodies of almost inconceivable incomprehensibility." "Great conceptions, noble ideals, subtle metaphysical conceptions exist, but they are lost in trackless mazes of rhapsody and mysticism, weighed down by trivial injunctions and impractical ordinances." Count Gobineau says, "The Bayan is enigmatical and circuitous, and needs a commentary." Mr. Nicolas acknowledges its obscurity but says,<sup>18</sup> "It needs a key as do the books of philosophy of the Sufis. The majority of Persian readers would not understand it. It is written in a special language of the savants, under a profound sense of the intimate world of appearances. These savants do not show any

<sup>16</sup> *Unity*, VI, 1., III, 17, *Traveller's Narrative*, pp. 343-345.

<sup>17</sup> *New History*, xii, xiii, xxvi.

<sup>18</sup> *Life of Bab*, p. 3.



desire to make known their knowledge of God to the people and the reader of their works needs a long apprenticeship. They turn the words to a different sense." Both the bad grammar and unintelligibility may be largely accounted for by what Abul Fazl, with pride, refers to when he says:<sup>19</sup> "Although the Bab had not studied the Arabic language yet the verses flowed from him without pause or reflection." It is their boast<sup>20</sup> that the Bab was not educated in the schools and wrote without meditation or correction as many as a thousand verses in three hours.

The Bayan is the last form of the doctrine of the Bab. His adherents claim<sup>21</sup> that had he lived longer he would have developed it more fully. Mr. Nicolas doubts this, but it is quite possible that he would have announced himself as "He whom God should manifest." We can not dogmatize on this point, but there had previously been a development, if not in the Bab's conceptions, at least in his promulgations of doctrine. His first books are but little removed from Shiah doctrine. Thus in the *Commentary on the Surah-i-Yusuf* and the *Ziarat-Nama* he does not break with Islam nor declare the Koran abrogated. Ramazan is still the fast. He is simply the Bab—the door of communication with the Imams. So, Mr. Nicolas says, "His first book *Risala-i-Fiqqiya* is essentially Mussulman. The Bab hid his ideas for a time and restrained his disciples from publishing them." To this purpose of concealment, Mr. Nicolas attributes part of the obscurity of his style, in that he envelops his thought in metaphors and in folds of rhetoric yet not so but that those not blind could see it. He had to act like a teacher of infants—using sugar-coated pills—giving out truth step by step, for people were more fanatical than the Jews of Christ's time.

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<sup>19</sup> *Bahai Proofs*, pp. 29-30, 67-68.

<sup>20</sup> *New History*, p. 112.

<sup>21</sup> See Writer's "Claims of Bahaism" in *The East and the West*, July, 1914.

## V. THE CLAIM OF THE BAYAN TO AUTHORITY

What is the witness of the Bayan to itself. It claims divine origin and inspiration. God says,<sup>22</sup> "This is my Word by the tongue of the Person of the seven letters, the Bab of God." The proof of this is the "Verses" (*ayat*, signs), which like the Koran, can only be produced by divine power, and are the essential, appropriate and permanent evidence of a prophet's mission. While in popular esteem the eloquence and poetic diction of these verses is higher, yet wisdom which shows adaptation to men's minds and the needs of the age is said to be the criterion in the new Dispensation. One Bayan was revealed in Arabic to be a more cogent proof to Moslems. The Bayan is incomparable, inimitable like the sun, of such excellence that "all creatures working together could not produce the like of it." It proceeds from the same Tree of Truth as the Koran and, though identical in substance of teaching, surpasses it as the Koran excels the Gospels; and henceforth it demands obedience in place of the Koran, and will continue to be the standard till the next Manifestation. Without divine aid, it is incomprehensible. It must be transcribed in the best calligraphy. It should be read morning and evening to the amount of seven hundred verses, but cannot be committed to memory. He who believes it is in Paradise. The proof in the Bayan is thus stated (II, 1): "One who recites verses without thought or hesitation, who in the course of five hours writes a thousand verses without pause of pen, who produces commentaries and learned treatises of so high a degree of wisdom that the Ulema (Doctors) could not comprehend . . . there is no doubt that all this is from God."

## VI. EXTERNAL STRUCTURE

The external structure of the Bayan is peculiar. It is arranged according to the symbolism of numbers to which I shall again revert. The Bayan was designed to comprise

<sup>22</sup> *Bayan*, II, 1. Index, s.v., "Revelation," "Verses."

nineteen Books (*Vahids* or Unities) of nineteen chapters (*Babs* or Portes). In its present form it extends to the tenth chapter of the ninth Book. Mirza Jani,<sup>23</sup> the *Hasht Behesht*<sup>24</sup> and *Subh-i-Azal*<sup>25</sup> all imply that eleven Books had been completed by the Bab and eight were to be written by his successor, *Subh-i-Azal*. If so, this portion has been lost. Some of the Books (Unities) expected from *Subh-i-Azal* were completed.<sup>26</sup>

#### VII. DOCTRINE OF THE BAYAN CONCERNING GOD AND HIS MANIFESTATIONS

God is incomprehensible, inscrutable, inaccessible. "The way is closed and seeking is forbidden." None can approach God or know his Essence. "There hath been and is no way to the Eternal Essence." "None but Himself knoweth Himself." Yet God says; "I was a hid Treasure; I desired to be known, therefore I created." First of all and eternally He created the Primal Will. This Primal Will is the *Nukta* or Point, the Mirror of God. By it and through it were created all things. It is the cause of all worlds. First of all were created (or emanated) as from its very being eighteen spirits or letters, which with the Primal Will form the "First Unity" or "The Letters of the Living." These are eternal, for "there never was a time when God did not have slaves to adore Him." The world is eternal, life is eternal. Eternally God gave life.

The Primal Will has been manifested in all the Great Prophets, the Lords of Dispensations. Through them alone God is known. The first Manifestation in this Cycle was Adam, 12210 years before the Bab. There have been cycles before Adam and there will continue to be world without end. No Revelation is final. All the Manifestations as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed and the Bab are identical. They are like the same sun, rising

<sup>23</sup> *New History*, p. 381.

<sup>24</sup> *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 353.

<sup>25</sup> *Nuktatul-Kaf*, p. xix and xxxi.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xciv.



on different days and from different dawning points. But each succeeding one was superior and more excellent than his predecessor, comparable to a child in his successive stages of growth, so that if Adam represents a boy of one year the Bab would be as one of 12 years. The present Manifestation includes all the preceding ones, and whosoever believes in him, believes in all the preceding ones, and potentially in all the succeeding ones. If a believer in a previous Manifestation refuses to follow the present one, his faith is null and void. Knowledge of the Manifestation is knowledge of God; refuge with the Manifestation is refuge with God. The only way is through the Prophet of the Age and belief in God without belief in him is of no avail. All actions performed for him, and only those, are done for God. The time of the coming of a new Manifestation is known only to God.

As manifested in the Bab; the Primal Will, the Nukta or Point, has two stations: one of divinity and one of servitude or humanity. In the former station the Bab says: "In truth I am God and there is no other God than me, the Master of the Universe." "As for me, I am that Point of God, whence all that exists has found existence." He is the Point of Truth, the Tree of Truth, the Name which guides all men to the Kingdom of all Power. By earlier and later Persians this Primal Will is called the Word. Browne and Nicolas both use the term in this connection, though I have not found it so used in the Bayan. As the Point all things emanate from the Bab and return to him and to none other. He has a position before all, can do as he pleases, and is the power through whom men act. He produces the Revelation in the Bayan which points to God and has its source in Him. He is identical with Jesus, with Mohammed, with Imam Husain; yet as the Point of the Bayan he is superior to all others in such a degree that if the previous revelations be represented by two letters of the alphabet, the Bayan is equal to the remaining twenty-five.

With the Manifestation there is a "Return" of the chief believers of the previous manifestation. The first Book of the Bayan, is devoted to this doctrine. Jesus, inferior to Mohammed, foretold him and returned in Mohammed. Those who believed in him returned in the following ages to believe in Mohammed and in the Bab and will return to believe in succeeding Manifestations. Specifically, "Mohammed has returned to the world with every one who believed in him truly or otherwise." In the first group of Letters of the Living are Mullah Husain Bushrawayi,<sup>27</sup> the first believer who was the "return" of Mohammed, and Kûrat-ul-Ayn who was Fatima. Others of them were the twelve Imams and the four Babs of the Minor Occultation, called also the four Lords, four Lights or the supporters of Creation, Provision, Life and Death. Attached to the first nineteen, are nineteen other groups of spirits or disciples returned to complete the perfection of all things. This doctrine is explained to mean not metempsychosis, but rather the appearance of persons similar in character, spirit and attainments to those of the previous dispensation as John the Baptist is said to be Elijah, that is, come in his spirit and power. Yet no one can feel in reading the history of early Babism that this interpretation suffices. Rather is it explained in the words of Professor Browne:<sup>28</sup> "These ultra Shiah sects do but reassert like the late Ismielis, Batinis, Carmathians, Assassins and Hurufis, the same essential doctrines of anthropomorphism. Incarnation, Reincarnation or Return and Metempsychosis, which doctrines appear to be endemic in Persia and always ready to become epidemic under a suitable stimulus. In our own day they appeared again in the Babi movement, of which especially in its earlier forms they constituted the essential kernel."

It should be noticed that this Babi doctrine reduces the Imams to the rank of the apostles of Jesus, or of the Bab's

<sup>27</sup> *New History*, p. 334.

<sup>28</sup> *A Literary History of Persia*, Vol. I, p. 311.

own preachers. This is not Shiah belief. The Bab in his first books as the Ziarat-Nama taught,<sup>29</sup>—as the Shiah, that the Imams are effulgences of the Divine Glory, Manifestations of God's attributes and Intercessors and he himself approached their shrine with fear and contrition. But he lowered their rank. So Mr. Nicolas says,<sup>30</sup> "The Bab has an opinion of the Imams entirely different from that of the Shiah. He considers them high personages but not as having access, behind the bars, to the divine secrets. They are commentators on the Koran and as such they can make mistakes." The exaltation of the office of the Great Prophets and of the Bab's own dignity and personality appears in his later claims. The Surat-ul-Tauhid says, "I bear witness that if any one believes in the Imams" so as to interfere with "his pure and simple adoration of God, or if any one thinks that their rank is comparable with that of the great prophets, that one has error." Mr. Nicolas rightly judges that this idea so hostile to the Imams and the belief of the Shiah, if declared, would have caused the immediate death of the Bab, before he had had opportunity of publishing his doctrine, and that even his best disciples would have turned away from such teaching as blasphemies.<sup>31</sup>

A striking characteristic of the Bayan is the emphasis put upon the coming of "Him whom God shall manifest." He is to be expected. He will certainly appear before the number of Mustagas is completed which equals 2,001 years (or possibly 1,511, Browne). The day of his advent is known only to God. In view of it none must injure another lest they injure the Manifestation unknowingly nor even beat a child; in every assembly a vacant chair is to be left for him. He will be the fulfillment of the verse, "There is none like unto him." He is the Most Great Name, eternally pure, independent of all and dependent only on

<sup>29</sup> *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 900.

<sup>30</sup> *Bayan Person*, Vol. I, Preface.

<sup>31</sup> The Bahais have restored the Shiah idea of the Imamate and conferred the dignity and office upon Abbas Abdul Baha.



God. His commands are equivalent to God's commands and none is to ask him, "Why?" He has a right to all things and the best of everything should be presented to him. It is impossible that any one should claim falsely to be he. No one should reject him as they have the Bab. He will be self-evidencing. Those who do not accept him cease to be believers. He will be the "speaking book"; one verse revealed by him will be better than a thousand Bayans; to understand one verse of his is better than to know the whole Bayan.

#### VIII. ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATIONS AND SYMBOLS

The Bab, following the Ismielis, interprets allegorically many of the fundamental teachings of Islam. These are explained in the second Unity (Book) of the Bayan. The General Resurrection is the rising or appearance of a New Manifestation and lasts till his departure. The resurrection of the dead is man's receiving spiritual life by faith on him. Man has two bodies, the "essential or material" and the "inner or astral." The former returns to dust at once and forever. The "astral" body departs with the spirit at death. The "Questioning in the Tomb," taught by Islam, means the summons by the angels or messengers of the next Manifestation to those in the tomb of ignorance to accept him and believe, and the return of the angels to God is the report of the missionaries to the Bab. The "Bridge of Sirat" is the severe testing at the call to faith. The one who accepts passes over the bridge into "Paradise" which is the condition of belief and assurance and the perfection it brings. Professor Browne affirms<sup>32</sup> that Mirza Jani teaches that "a material heaven and hell and the like are mere figments of the imagination." Yet in the Bayan a future heaven and hell are taught. Mr. Nicolas shows<sup>33</sup> that the Bab was not much concerned with eschatology but cites various passages regarding heaven. The strongest

<sup>32</sup>*New History*, p. 335.

<sup>33</sup>*Bayan*, Vol. I, pp. xxvi-ix.

settles definitely that the Bab taught the existence of a future paradise.<sup>84</sup> "As to what passes after death, no person but God knows what it is. God has created in his Paradise all that men desire of his kindness and they find the things which eye has never seen and ear has never heard, nor has been conceived in the heart of any one."<sup>85</sup> If the seas of heaven were ink, if all the things were pens, and every one a writer, no one could make known the things of Paradise after death. He who enters the Paradise of the Manifestation of God will enter the other Paradise after death." Hell is ignorance of or rejection of the Manifestations; its fire is unbelief. Yet devils take the souls of the unbelievers to the Treasury of Fire, though the worst fire is grieving or denying the Beloved. Hades is the interval between two Manifestations. The Last Judgment for the people of the Bayan will be the coming of Him whom God shall Manifest. The "Day of God," "Day of Judgment," "Day of Resurrection," is the Day of the Manifestation and is externally like any other day.

Much is made of the symbolic significance of letters and numbers. The *abjad* counting in Persian and Arabic gives a numerical value to various letters of the alphabet. A word of the same numerical value is often substituted for the name of an adherent either by concealment or with spiritual significance. Thus<sup>86</sup> a name of God is put, as vahid for Yahyá, the name of Subh-i-Azal, dayyan for Assad is 'Mirza Assad Ullah etc., and they are entitled the Ismullah, the Names of God. The mystical meaning of letters was a science to be diligently studied; 70,000 angels watched over each letter. For example, in the Moslem formula, Bism Ullah etc., "In the Name of God, the compassionate,

<sup>84</sup> *Bayan*, II, 16, p. 125.

<sup>85</sup> This indicates an acquaintance with the New Testament. This appears from other quotations as, "The first shall be last and the last first"; Hour coming "as a thief"; "cup of water to a believer"; Believers are "to do as they are done by"; Selling in temple, etc., *Index*, LXVIII.

<sup>86</sup> *Baháí Proofs*, p. 43.

the merciful," the first letter "b" represented the Bab. It is formed with a dot under it which represents the Point or Nukta. Each of the others letters, 18 in number, was assigned to a disciple and they were called the Letters of the Living (hayy, living, equals 18)<sup>37</sup> So Mullah Husain Bushrawayi was "sin" or "s". He and his 18 were the "First Unity."<sup>38</sup> Each "Letter" presided over a month and over a day of each month. Among them was at least one woman, Kurrat-ul-Ayn, who was in Fatima's stead or that of Mary Magdalene.<sup>39</sup>

Again the Kalima-i-Shahadat, "There is no God save God," was divided into two parts. The first had five "letters of negation," "no God," and the second part seven "letters of affirmation," "save God." From the first are derived the "Infernal Letters"; from the second the "Supreme Letters." Only these and the "First Unity" are allowed to make commentary on the Koran. In the Bayan the Bab is often spoken of as "He of the seven letters"<sup>40</sup> because of the affirmation and because his name, Ali Mohammed has seven letters. Moslems are designated "Letters of the Koran" and Christians usually "letters of the Gospel." Cities and provinces are referred to by their initial letter, as land of Fa = Fars. Nineteen is the sacred number. As early as the twelfth century this number was used as symbolic by Sheikh<sup>41</sup> Mukkuyya Din, a Sufi leader. Possibly it arose from 19 years being a complete cycle of the moon. The letters in Vahid (Unity) count 19 (v = 6, a = 1, h = 8, d = 4). So does vujud, absolute existence, 19 x 19 or 361 is the number of all things (Kuli Shey). The year was divided into 19 months of 19 days each, the Bayan was to be 19 books of 19 chapters each. Every one should write monthly 19 tables of 19 names of God. The Bab's "Book of Names" is also divided into "Unities" con-

<sup>37</sup> The chief disciples of Hakim, the Druse Incarnation, were called "Letters of the Truth."

<sup>38</sup> *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 399.

<sup>39</sup> Abdul Baha greatly praises Mary Magdalene.

<sup>40</sup> *Traveller's Narrative*, p. 425.

<sup>41</sup> *New History*, p. xiii.



taining 19 chapters each. The Koran was (by chance!) 6 x 19 Surahs, and had 19 Angels. Nineteen was to be the basis of fines and measurements. The miscal was to be divided into 19 parts, one-nineteenth or nineteen per cent of the income was to be donated to the Letters or their descendants. Sets of 19 were to take the place of dozens. Nineteen rings inscribed with the names of God with 19 papers were to be left to heirs. Every one must do 19 days service to the Point. There were to be 19 shrines, 19 doors of Paradise, 19 gates of Fire, 19 gates of light, 19 kinds of the new writing, the Khatti Badi. The dowry was 5 x 19 or 95 miscals, the rosary 95 beads, the King's Palace with 95 doors. Every one who acquired 6,005 miscals must give 95 to the Point. To the Manifestation also must be given 19 precious stones (3 diamonds, 4 topaz, 6 emeralds, 6 rubies). The teachings of the Bab were to be 19 volumes (3 Verses, 4 Prayers, 6 Commentaries, 6 Philosophy). There were 19 letters in the new Bab formula, Bism Ullah il Amna ul Akdas, as there had been in the old one. Such is wisdom! Such is divine truth!<sup>42</sup>

#### IX. RITES AND CEREMONIES

The Bab followed the rites of Islam with some changes. Prayer retains its important place, but public congregational prayer is abolished. Believers will assemble for worship, but there must be no leader, Imam or Peesh-namaz.<sup>43</sup> Only at funerals there may be public prayers, but even then no leader. The greater the assembly at a funeral, the more pleasing to God. In the mosque no one should mount a pulpit. Chairs should be used there as well as in schools and homes, even for children. Mirrors are a suitable decoration for mosques because they suggest to believers that they should reflect God. Special mosques are to be erected in honor of the Bab and the Letters of

<sup>42</sup> By a curious coincidence, Mormonism also invented a new alphabet called the "Deseret Alphabet," and divided Salt Lake City into nineteen Bishoprics; Brigham Young's fortune was willed to nineteen classes of his wives and children. Ann Eliza who sued for divorce, was his nineteenth wife."

<sup>43</sup> *Bayan*, Vol. IV, p. 165.

the Living. These are to be Houses of Refuge. Refugees are not to be impeded, and are recommended to be pardoned. The income of these shrines is to be expended exclusively for them. Land for God's house may be taken by right of eminent domain. Merchandising must not be carried on in its precincts. Old shrines are abolished. If one prays in the house of an unbeliever he must pay one misal in penance. Postures, like those of the Moslems, are continued. Ceremonial impurities do not invalidate prayer, for example, wearing clothing made of the hair of animals or touching animal excretions. Yet the worshipper must be clothed in an *Aba* (cloak); a *jubba* (coat) is not sufficient. A special form of call to prayer (*Azan*) is prescribed for each day, as is the manner of paying the Muezzin. Special forms of invocation are prescribed as for the beginning of any work, or on reading the Bayan. At the birth of a child the word Mustagas is to be used. Instead of reading the Bayan, there may be substituted the zikr, saying, "Allah izhar," or the seven names of God derived from Vahid, repeated 100 times. Each day of the month has its ejaculation which must be repeated 95 times as the first day, "Allah Abba," the second day, "Allah Azim," etc. Four prayers are specified for the lights of the throne, and one for sunrise on Friday. For example, a salutation to the sun is; "The brightness of thine aspect is only from God, O rising sun! and bears witness unto that which God hath witnessed concerning Himself, that there is no God but Him, the precious, the beloved!" On the evening of Friday,<sup>44</sup> mention of the Name of God should be made 202 times. Prayers may be in Persian as well as Arabic. They should not be long and wearisome. The Fast requires abstinence from eating, drinking and indulgence from sunrise to sunset. Smoking is at all times under the ban. Warning is specially given against anger, complaint against God and the Bab or doing anything which is not of God. The fast is to be a remembrance

<sup>44</sup>By Meeting Day may be meant the first day of each month, every 19 days, as the week is abolished by Babism.

of God. It will last a month of 19 days; is fixed in the first of March and is enjoined on all from the age of 11 to 42 except the sick, travelers and some others.

Pilgrimage is continued. One of the first Books of the Bab contained directions for visiting the shrines of the Imams at Kerbela,<sup>45</sup> but later old shrines were abolished. The new substitutes were the house of the Bab at Shiraz, the Tomb of the Martyrs at Sheikh Tabarsi and the Mosques of the "Letters." Only the well-to-do should go on pilgrimage, and each one on arrival should give four miscals of gold to the shrine.

Begging is prohibited. Giving is enjoined for the cause of God, to the Bab, the "Letters" and their descendants. Little is said about the poor, but some fines are assigned to them. Circumcision is not enjoined, as it was not in the Koran. The custom is kept up. The only feast, as far as I have learned, is the old Persian Noruz, the vernal equinox. It is called the day of the Nukta or Point, the Day of God. On it there are to be rejoicings with playing of music. The solar year is established instead of the Moslem lunar year. Afterwards, the anniversary of the declaration of the Bab, May 23, 1844, was made a feast. The care of the body of the dead is minutely prescribed.<sup>46</sup> It is to be treated with great respect. It is to be washed three times with rosewater and camphor, saying certain words. While washing the head say, "Ya fard," the breast, say, "Ya Hayy" and so while washing the right side, left side, right foot, etc. It is to be shrouded in five garments of different stuff, first silk, last cotton. A cornelian ring is to be placed on a finger of the right hand, inscribed with a verse in recognition of God. The words inscribed are not the same for a man and a woman. Coffins are to be of solid substances as glass or stone. Transporting bodies of the dead for burial at the shrines is forbidden. Nevertheless the Bab's body was twice transported and over hundreds of miles.

<sup>45</sup> Ziyarat-nama, see *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 900.

<sup>46</sup> *Bayan*, Vol. iv., pp. 100-106. (viii., ii.)



Other ceremonial laws descend to trivial details. Legal purifications are not required, yet it is directed that one wash completely every four days, go to the bath and take off the hairs of the body with depilatories every eight or fourteen days. Men are permitted to shave the beard or the head. They must write on their breasts with henna *ar-rahman*, and the women *allahoume* or *bism*. Henna should be used to stain or dye the body and hair. Bathing should be by pouring, not by plunging in a tank. A mirror may be used night and morning. Perfumes, especially rose-water and attar, are strongly recommended, whether in the toilet, or for a corpse, among one's books or in the house of God. Garments of pure white are to be preferred. After white which corresponds to the highest spiritual principle, colors in the descending scale of purity are yellow, green and red.<sup>47</sup> Silk, ivory, gold ornaments and utensils are permitted. Doors are ordered to be made high,<sup>48</sup> and the King is told how many doors to have in his palace and surely to make one mirror-room. The rate of silver to gold is fixed at 1:10; a new calendar is introduced with new names for days and months and a new script; inheritance and divorce laws are formulated. A new style of salutation is enjoined; men are to say, "Allah Akbar," and to reply "Allah Azam," women, "Allah Abha" and to reply "Allah Ajmal." Traveling is only permitted for trade; the study of the sciences is discouraged as unprofitable, and especially of foreign and dead languages and grammar. The study of philosophy, jurisprudence and logic are prohibited, and their books are to be destroyed, as well as all books of the Moslems except the Koran. On the other hand sciences bearing on the construction of talismans are recommended as they will enable the wearer to recognize the Manifestation. The six names of God are to be used as talismans.

<sup>47</sup> *Index*, LXII, *Beyan Persan*, Vol. ii, p. 41, note.

<sup>48</sup> This is a good point as many a traveler with a bruised pate can testify.

## X. MORAL LAW

Here we come to a striking feature of the Bayan,—not only the absence of a moral code but even of moral principles, and precepts. With all the multiplicity of ceremonial rules there is an amazing lack of enforcement of right conduct. I will mention all I have found. Children should honor their parents. They should not be maltreated, made to stand till weary at school or beaten, and should be encouraged to play. Animals should not be cruelly treated. Gentleness in general is enjoined, and oppression and the injuring or enchaining of another condemned. The Gospel command to love one another and the Golden Rule are stated. Carrying arms, except in the Jihad, is prohibited, as are tobacco, wine,<sup>49</sup> asafoetida, opium and all drugs except in the industries. Merchants must not read each others correspondence and must pay their debts. This is the sum total of moral instruction. I do not find that theft, adultery, murder, lying, profane swearing, false-oaths, sin and guilt are mentioned in the forty pages of Browne's *Index*. A moral system is conspicuous by its absence.

Finally regarding the family, the Bayan announces no great principles. Marriage is made obligatory on all. The wife must be content with her husband and love her children. The parents should show love for each other before the children. All should have children to continue the worshippers of God. If the first wife is childless, the husband can take another. If the man is powerless, the wife must leave him and marry another. A believer should marry only a believer. One who becomes a believer should separate from the unbelieving partner, or if one perverts, the other should separate. Divorce is limited as to its rapidity, but not as to its cause. If they quarrel or are incompatible, they may separate. They should wait 19 Babi months (one year) before remarry-

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<sup>49</sup> "The prohibition of wine appears to be less absolute than in Islam, *Journal Royal Asiatic Society*, 1889, p. 501.

ing, that possibly their desire for each other may return. Within the year they may arrange a reconciliation and 19 days afterwards be reunited. If the year passes the divorce is completed and both may remarry. But a limit is put. The man may not divorce his wife and remarry more than 19 times! The dowry, which is paid as alimony in case of divorce, is 19 miscals of gold (\$300) in cities and 19 miscals of silver in villages. Woman's privileges are but slightly enlarged, notwithstanding the Bab maintained Kurrat-ul Ayn when she broke through the conventionalities of Islam.<sup>50</sup> There is no foundation for the statement of Bahais that the Bab taught the equality of the sexes. Women may not go on pilgrimage, but may go to the mosque at night. In the mosques a special place must be set aside for the women's chairs. Their manner of worship is prescribed. They are excused from the offering of gold more than once. A woman's face may be looked upon by the members of the family in which she grows up. She may even talk with a man outside of her household, if necessary, but "if they limit themselves to 28 words, it is better for the woman and the man."

Such is the system of religion which lies at the foundation of Bahaism—which our faddists in America are propagating as a new universal religion. For, with little change, Babism is Bahaism, transferred without due credit and promulgated by Baha Ullah in the *Kitab ul Akdas*. Do we not marvel that American Bahais can see in the Bab's books and system the "marvellous wisdom of the true prophet, with intuitive power, making light to gleam in a dark world," "with remarkable knowledge of science, unequaled utterances, marvellous literary power as the messenger of God"?<sup>51</sup>

SAMUEL G. WILSON.

*Tabriz, Persia.*

<sup>50</sup> Professor Browne says: "The sermon preached at Badasht by Janab-i-Kuddus lends some color to the accusation that the Babis advocated communism and community of wives."

<sup>51</sup> See Writer's *Bahaism and its Claims*, Revell & Co., New York.



## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*Ethics and Modern Thought: A Theory of Their Relations.* The Deem Lectures, delivered in 1913 at New York University. By RUDOLPH EUCKEN, Professor of Philosophy, University of Jena. Translated from the German Manuscript by Margaret von Seydewitz. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press. 1913. Pp. 127. \$1.00 net.

These lectures on ethics were delivered before the War and before our philosophical teachers had left the study and the lecture-hall to enter the arena of international politics. While intended for the cultivated lay public rather than for the professional scholar, the lectures will be found to contain the essentials of Eucken's philosophical message. We find in them, eloquently expressed, an appreciation of the regenerating power of Christianity in past ages; a close approximation to the Christian doctrines of grace in the recognition of man's inability to reach the moral ideal, and of his need of aid from a source higher than himself; and a clear insight into the moral needs and discords of the age in which we live, with an admission of the inadequacy of modern culture to meet these needs.

Eucken believes that the ethical systems now in vogue fail to meet the present situation. Religious Morality is too mild and subjective and lacks sufficient breadth to transform the whole of life. The Morality of Reason addresses itself to the select few and has too little influence upon the man of to-day. The Morality of Work has inner limitations; men become only parts of a structure and nothing at all in themselves, and civilization develops great power without providing for its moral guidance. Social Morality offers strong motives to the individual, but is too optimistic in its conception of man, too superficial to offer a foundation for morality which it presupposes rather than creates. In his search for an ethical principle Eucken has recourse to his familiar conception of the Spiritual Life, a comprehensive whole embracing all the departments of man's activity such as science and art, and inclusive of the whole of human society. "The centre of life and its ruling motive lie in man's relation to a superior spiritual life, which is at the root of his own being and yet has to be acquired by his own action and effort." The duty of man is at once to discover and to create a new spiritual world. Just how the "Spiritual Life" is related to the God of religion is not indicated with entire clearness either here or in the author's larger works.

It will be seen that Eucken's proposed system of ethics has close

affinities with religious morality and the morality of reason, both of which it was designed to supplement. While the *Spiritual Life* is supposed to be broader than religion, including the domains of art and science and industry, it is recognized that "it is a loss for morality that religion no longer maintains its former ruling position"; and the historical instances of the triumphs of morality are taken from the history of the Christian Church: "It was moral earnestness and moral strength that were above all instrumental in causing early Christianity to overcome the pagan world. . . . It was moral energy that gave the Reformation its power to advance and conquer, while the soft and beautiful Renaissance perished because it lacked morality." Eucken belongs, again, with the Kantians in ethics rather than with the utilitarians. Utilitarianism, he believes, does not change its character by becoming social utilitarianism, and all inner values are destroyed where the sole aim of life is to provide the *means* of life.

Eucken's lectures were, not inappropriately, first delivered from a church pulpit, and in tone and substance they are sermons upon the text, "Fight the good fight of faith."

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

*The Soul of America.* By STANTON COIT. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1914.

It would be difficult to find four hundred pages more full of both truth and error, of vision and utter blindness. The book is more suggestive than satisfying. The purpose of the writer is nowhere better stated than in the concluding sentence . . . "We must attack supernaturalistic theories of the spiritual life, for the hastening of the Kingdom of Righteousness, without denying the untold benefit which the world has derived from the spiritistic religions of the past." The method of the author is implied in the latter part of the quotation; for not only would he not deny the "benefit," but would borrow the paraphernalia and about all else that is incident to the reality. The book is really an attempt to read a superimposed social theory into the history and genius of America. It is a fine instance of the impossibility of identifying the purely academic with the throbbing actual. The intellectual conceit of the author in the earlier chapters is unbounded.

The book can best be reviewed from the back cover forward as indeed the last sections were written first and the earlier parts were afterthoughts. Much that Doctor Coit has to say of America falls far short of an adequate interpretation. That our author is lonely even among his own humanistic brethren is indicated by the following (p. 363), "I have given this elaborate analysis because, as it seems to me, ninety-nine persons out of a hundred who hold my fundamental views in regard to the principles of ethics, religion and politics incline to disbelieve in ritual altogether." This is no small matter in the conception of things in the book as it has taken quite a hundred pages to discuss 'ritual' and it is declared (p. 262) that in refusing to naturalism,

democracy, and national idealism a system of signs by which the deepest personal responsibilities of social life might be announced and established among the many" "they are unwittingly robbing humanism of indispensable organs." Despite the crystalized feeling (p. 364) that "nobody must wear a garment which shall stand to the community as a sign that he who wears it is one who repudiates supernaturalism, miracles, presumptions of an aristocratic priesthood, and the like", Doctor Coit would have the propagandists of his type of belief (or rather of disbelief) wear a garb as distinctive as that of the Salvation Army Workers with the words printed on their caps and bonnets, "Democracy in Religion" and "The Religion of Social Justice" and he would have the preacher or lecturer wear a distinctive robe. Doctor Coit does not disclose in the many pages devoted to the psychological aspect of the situation, the real explanation which is that the less a man believes the more likely he is to feel the need of being identified by something distinctive in his garb or maner, just as many a man in high position has no considerable respect for himself apart from his position because he has no consciousness of power within himself, nor does he feel the power of the ideas and ideals which ought to be the very breath of his life.

The discussion of the "Drama and the Ritual" and of the "Ritual and the Fine Arts" is interesting but far from enlightening. In the last chapter, devoted to "Democratic Forms of Public Worship" we find the philosophy of our author's position. Doctor Coit holds that the new non-conformists, that is the humanists, emphasize too strongly the mere logical appeal to reason. Doctor Coit would have the appeal made through the ritual. He is in perfect harmony with most of the reformers of the present day who incline to discard the more definitely and deliberately intellectual and to rest their case upon the emotional, the experiential, the religiously pragmatic, in fine, as in this case upon ritual rather than upon reason much less upon revelation. The remarkable sale of the book would seem to indicate the public taste just now, else it is because the title is misleading, or because there are so many now ready to grasp at anything which even suggests a solution.

In the heated debate in the Assembly a few years ago when the book of "Common Worship" was approved, Doctor Henry Van Dyke distinguished a ritual as a *required* form of worship. The vast majority of American protestants would agree with Doctor Van Dyke and disagree with our author. Our author must, however, in the nature of the case use "ritual" as a voluntary form of worship if he is to use it at all.

Doctor Coit's revolt against the supernaturalistic is not because it is irrational but because he sees that it at least recognizes, if not emphasizes, the individualistic and, as he would and no doubt does hold, would be destructive of the socialistic. We must not forget that the book is sent out as a "constructive essay in the sociology of Religion." The



revolt against the unsocial in Religion is quite in order. If one has experienced the suppression of religious emotion, and the "expulsive power" of a vast emptiness, incident to being the only worshipper not in an official robe, in a regularly appointed service in a great Church of England cathedral, then one will readily sympathize with any reasonable attack which Doctor Coit or any one else might make on the unsocial in religious services. The too common failure is not to see that one purpose of ritual is to add to the social in religious service by enabling all to take active part. Doctor Coit does well to employ all the power to be found in ritual forms in the humanistic services. To recognize the value of ritual whether in gentile or Jewish services does not mean that one can take the position that ritual is the only thing in Christianity worth saving and that ritual is the sufficient explanation of Christianity which our author seems to assume. At all events he is very sure that the humanistic religion can not be made a "going" religion without ritual.

This book is special pleading for the two volumes, long in preparation, and published since this book. The reviewer has examined the newer volumes which constitute a Bible for the humanistic religion. It is the belief of at least some of the leaders that the "Religion of Science, Democracy, and Personal Responsibility in the Service of Humanity must become, like Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, a Religion of a book." This compilation is likened to the work of the compilers of the New Testament and to the work of the editors of the Old Testament. It is at once an authority and a manual for social worship. The second volume takes care of the musical part of social services. Doctor Coit and his associates are not pioneers but have followed Comte who renounced faith in God and immortality and deified ideal humanity and transformed his positive philosophy into a cult of humanity.

So much for the end aimed at and the chief means in the method of procedure. There are three parts in the book. Part One, "Religion and Nationality" is in nine chapters. Part Two, "Christianity to be reinterpreted in the Light of Science and American Idealism" is in fifteen chapters. Part Three, "Christianity to be Expressed in Scientific Language and Democratic Symbol" is in five chapters. Much of Parts Two and Three appeared in "National Idealism and a State Church" published seven years earlier. Part Two would have needed but little change. Part One was written as an introduction to make Parts Two and Three seem to fit American conditions, but it utterly fails. In attempting to show how to conserve American Spiritual Resources there is a section on "America the Living Church of All Americans." This is where the book leads. It would seem all but absurd for a man who has spent the major part of his adult life in Europe to attempt to interpret America, and to lead it. The book is academic in atmosphere and artificial in argument, but it has slain its thousands.

*Princeton, N. J.*

CHAS. M. CANTRALL

*The Rediscovered Universe or the Power of Right Thinking and Righteous Living.* By DANIEL CONRAD PHILLIPS. Sherman, French and Co., Boston, 1914.

The reviewer is in perfect agreement with the opening statement of the Preface, "This book was never planned". The author was fifty years collecting the material and has written out of the bitterness of a life of resentment against the restraint of Christianity; for whatever be the direction taken, he arrives at the door of Christianity with a big stick in his hands. There is much smug complacency and unpardonable conceit. The author appears to think himself to have possessed unusual acumen and from the days of his youth to have known, all but intuitively, the errors incident to, the inherent evils of, and the fraud perpetrated in all religions and especially in Christianity. Much of his criticism might be well characterized in the language he uses in describing others—"The fulmination of inflated vanity, irrelevant and immature" (279). In the introduction the book is spoken of thus: "Its pages are fearless, full with positive assertion, regardless though human selfishness be stung and though beliefs entrenched in six thousand years of imperious dogmatism be rudely reversed" (V). The Bible is described thus, "Its history was a recital of unremitting crimes; its descriptions revolting; its ethics an offense to intellect, a shame to refinement, an outrage upon modesty." There is much respect for Jesus and for John the Baptist (p. 326) but all the message of Jesus is eliminated which does not fit with the author's scheme. Jesus is said to have taught "self-assertiveness" and the people under His teaching to have "learned to hearken back to Nature" which is news to most of us. "In this volume it is only political demagogism veneered with religion that is criticised, a religion itself a debasing idolatry reflected from ancient heathenism" (p. 316). The pulpit is the machine of worship, and worship is idolatry" (331).

The book is not philosophical enough in its phraseology to employ the word "Monism" but uses the word "Nature" to account for everything. A bit of history, philosophy, and theology or any one of the three would have prevented many a blunder if not have made the book impossible. The great achievement of life is "Get right with yourself." It is not "Behold the lillies *how* they grow" but "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you" (p. 319). Jesus prayed to the Father *within* Himself. "For aid, retire to the solitude and in its silence commune with the infinite—the Father within you" (p. 314). "Pray to your own divinity which is the Father within you. And when you pray retire to a cosy room (p. 316). This is the road to poise and power and to the "Rediscovered Universe."

Of the twenty-eight chapters those on "Evolution," "Testament Building," "The Reformation," and "Thomas Paine" received the greater effort. We are told of the parallel lines in the lives of Jesus and Paine, and a line is quoted from the fifty-third of Isaiah to describe Paine. "Back to Nature and her righteousness is our only slogan"

(p. 59). Enough has been presented to show why the Chapter on "Christ" exhausts itself in less than two pages. Jesus is presented as an imitator of Gautama. Surely this book ought not fall into the hands of the uninformed. The reviewer has failed to find in these pages "The Power of Right Thinking and Righteous living."

Princeton, N. J.

CHAS. M. CANTRALL.

### APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Die Beicht im Zusammenhange mit der sakralen Rechtspflege in der Antike.* Ein Beitrag zur näheren Kenntnis kleinasiatisch-orientalischer Kulte der Kaiserzeit. Von FRANZ STEINLEITNER, Dr. phil. Leipzig: Kommissionsverlag der Dieterich'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, Theodor Weicher. 1913. 8vo; pp. 135.

"The following essay," says the author, "moves in the frontier region between philosophy and theology, in the field of the history of religion."

Hermann Usener and his school have led the way to the study of the problems in the history of religion presented by that period "when young Christianity entered upon its victorious course in the slippery field of the religious syncretism and theocracy of vanishing antiquity, and introduced into the history of mankind a completely new epoch of its spiritual life." Franz Cumont in his great Mithras-works and, after him, Hugo Hepding in his studies on the Attis-worship, have shown us how to illuminate dark subjects by collecting the scattered material from every quarter and subjecting it as a whole to intelligent scrutiny. The road having been opened by such competent hands, it has been diligently walked in; investigation into "the chaos of ideas and religious usages of that period of strong religious agitation" has been pushed steadily on. We need recall but such leading names as A. Dieterich, Anrich, Reitzenstein, Wendland, and the essays published in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, in the *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuchen und Vorarbeiten*, and, in part, in the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums*. As a result we understand as never before the vital contact in which the world of antiquity, which was passing away, and the rising world of Christianity stood with one another; how "the two worlds, however inimicably they envisaged one another and bitterly struggled with one another, were nevertheless inseparably bound together"; how "the Christian spirit, liberated from Judaism, formed a new body for itself out of the members of dying antiquity, and thus the spirit of Greece and the religiousness of the Orient, stamping themselves on Christian ideas and usages, won new life for themselves and lived in Christian clothing".

When we remember, however, that the earliest Christianity gained its adherents largely from the lower classes, and afterwards established itself preëminently in the region in which the old popular



religions most flourished, it will be perceived that in the investigation of the process of the Hellenization of Christianity, the study of the popular religions can least of all be neglected. "Along with the popular religion of Greece, whose usages were concentrated in the Mysteries, the Oriental religions come into consideration, and not least among them the Phrygian worship, which was spread throughout the whole of Asia-Minor, and whose inscribed and sculptured monuments are found scattered over the whole of the Roman Empire." In these circumstances it has seemed to the author eminently worth while to attempt to gain a better knowledge of the popular religious ideas and usages of the Phrygian and Lydian cults. As a contribution to that end, he has selected a particular element in their religious usages for investigation, the institution of Confession. "Whether and how far this sacrament of the church is to be considered an inheritance from old Oriental piety and beliefs may be left meanwhile out of consideration. The fact is that this cult-institution existed in the Oriental religions which strove with Christianity for the dominion of the world, and everywhere in the Roman Empire set themselves in the longest and most lasting opposition to its victory."

The material for his investigation Dr. Steinleitner finds in a considerable body of Lydian and Phrygian inscriptions of the class commonly called Votive or Expiatory Inscriptions, coming from the second and third Christian centuries, supplemented by some inscriptions from Knidos of the first or second century before Christ, and a few literary notices. This material he gathers together from all sources, reprints, and re-edits with an adequate commentary. This constitutes the first part of his work (pp. 7-74). The second part (pp. 75-123) is an essay, founded on this collected material, on "Confession in Antiquity". This essay really constitutes a very interesting exposition of the theology of the inscriptions and gives us a valuable insight into the religious ideas which ruled the minds of the people of Asia Minor near the opening of the Christian era. The first chapter treats of "the relation of man to deity in the Lydian-Phrygian religion"; the second of "sin and punishment according to the Lydian and Phrygian Expiatory-Inscriptions"; the third of "religious administration of justice in Lydia and Karia"; the fourth of "Confession in the cults of Asia Minor"; while the fifth adds a section on "a confession in the mysteries of Samothrace and the Isis-worship".

When Dr. Steinleitner comes to sum up at the end (pp. 121 ff.), the results of his discussion he naturally lays his stress on the chief object which he had in view, namely, the establishment of the existence of a regular institution of Confession in the primitive religion of Lydia and Phrygia, "in which the sinner confessed his sin before the priest as the representative of the deity in order to propitiate the deity and thus to become free from sickness and want, the consequences of the sin." Other elements of the old religion, however, interest us more: most of all its conception of deity as both all-powerful and as intimately concerned with human life in all its manifestations. "If we sum up

briefly what has been said," remarks Dr. Steinleitner at the end of the discussion of this matter, "the religion and life of the Lydian and Phrygian people in its lower strata appears as dominated by the belief that the deity is the absolute lord and owner of His worshipper, but no ruthless tyrant, like, say Baal in the Syrophoenician religion, but certainly the *τύραννος* or *κύριος* and yet also the greatest benefactor and the righteous judge, from whose hand the believer receives blessing and calamity as a child receives its mother's caresses and its father's chastisements." Dr. Steinleitner seems to consider this conception of deity one-sided in its emphasis on the power and all pervading activity of God. It seems to us a conception which does great credit to its sharers.

One of the results of it was to develop a series of epithets for the deity which expressed its power and rulership, and among these epithets *κύριος* was prominent. "The title *κύριος*, which meets us in this inscription," says Dr. Steinleitner on one occasion, "is a divine predicate, conceived in a genuinely Oriental fashion and thoroughly intelligible in the Eastern world, that occurs in Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, and that found also its way into the religious language of Christianity." Christianity did not derive its employment of *κύριος* as an epithet of God—or as a standing designation of Christ—from the folk-religions of the Orient: it is well to know, however, that the heathen converts to Christianity could find no difficulty in catching the high implications of the term as used by Christians.

Another result of this conception of God was the highly supernaturalistic coloring given by it to the whole view of life. "A further characteristic of the Lydian-Phrygian religiousness and of its view of the relation between God and man," writes Dr. Steinleitner, "is the belief in epiphanies of the deity in which the deity reveals its might suddenly and unexpectedly to believers, a belief, shared no doubt with the Lydians and Phrygians by other stocks of Asia Minor. The notion of the epiphany of a god or demonic being is primitive Greek, and was possessed also by other peoples. But between the idea and significance of the *ἐπιφάνεια* of the deity or of a demon in the popular belief of the Greeks and divine appearances in the belief and conception of the peoples of Asia Minor and the Orient, this difference exists—that the appearance of the deity for the pious oriental on the ground of his belief in an absolute dependence on the deity, extending to all situations in life, and of its constant care for the health of his soul, which shows itself in atonements, expiations and all kinds of asceticism, means not only a beneficent intrusion into the life of the individual or the establishment of a community, but also an *experience of religion*, in the mystical sense, in which he lives and moves." Dr. Steinleitner wishes, it is true, very illegitimately to apply this point of view at once to the conversion of Paul in a naturalistic psychological explanation of the supernatural features of the narrative. Paul was anything but a cold casuist, like his Pharasaic companions; his religiously readily excitable character, his inward faith, his vital

mysticism can at bottom find its roots only in the Anatolian inheritance of the former tent-weaver of Tarsus. We must consider also the whole mystical nature of the Apostle: he experienced other ecstatic conditions and could relate "visions and revelations of the Lord". "Out of these psychological and religious foundations, which Paul had brought with him from his Anatolian home with its old traditions of visible epiphanies of the deity, and its ever new experience of the *δυνάμεις* of gods and demons in ecstasies and visions, we may perhaps explain his experience of Christ before Damascus as an ecstatic, visionary occurrence." But even such a bizarre use of it as this does not destroy the value to the student of the New Testament of the fact here made evident that "*ἐπιφάνεια* is in this religious language the *terminus technicus* for a sudden and unexpected appearance of the deity, in order to help its worshippers in time of need and misfortune". When Paul speaks of the glorious epiphany of our great God and Savior, Jesus Christ, he was using language which had a perfectly determinate meaning for his readers.

It is perhaps natural that in inscriptions of this kind the only sins which are mentioned are breaches of the rules of the cult, by which breaches the deity is supposed to be offended, and it may not be quite justified to infer from this fact that the Lydian-Phrygians had no consciousness of distinctly ethical faults as sin. There is a tendency apparent to extend the responsibility for acts of sin beyond the individual who actually commits them to his group; and there is an instance of vicarious satisfaction for a fault—a brother undertaking the task for a sister. There is even an instance in which the sin appears to be carried back of the sinful act to the sinful wish. On the whole, however, we get little help to the understanding of New Testament language from this section. We note only that the word for sinning is *ἁμαρτάνω* (*ἁμαρτία* occurs, but not frequently). We lay no stress on the mention of an "unpardonable sin". And we do not find ourselves particularly interested in the treatment of sickness (*δοθέναι*) as the punishment of sin, or of the use of *κολάζειν* and *κόλασις* with apparent preference for the notion of punishment.

The most valuable contribution which these inscriptions make to the interpretation of the New Testament is due to the appearance in one of them—perhaps in two others—of the term *λύτρον*, to express the means by which immunity from the consequences of a fault was secured from the deity. For naturally the confession of the fault to the priest did not complete the making of satisfaction for it. The climax and completion of the expiatory process was formed rather by the erection of a tablet on which the sin and its punishments with the name of the sinner were notified, and that by requirement of the god. The ordinary expression for this command to make expiation in the Lydian inscriptions is *ἐπιζητεῖν*, although sometimes *ἀπαιτεῖν* also occurs. In the case of the particular inscription which we have mentioned, however, we read *λύτρον κατ' ἐπιτάγην Μηνί Τυράνῳ καὶ Διὶ*



Ὁ γμηνῆ καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ θεοῖς. The interpreters have puzzled themselves over this λύτρον. Sir William Ramsay and Perdrizet take it in the sense of εὐχῆ; Buresh leaves to it its sense of "ransom" but scarcely knows what then to do with the inscription. Steinleitner with too great deference to A. Deissmann, as we think, starts with the idea of the price of emancipation for a slave, and thinks that we must assume that a man was supposed to come into bondage to the deity by sin and required to be ransomed out by this expiatory offering. We see no reason why we should travel so roundabout a pathway to so simple a conclusion. The λύτρον simply indicates the expiatory tablet as the price paid to the god for immunity for the fault committed. And thus we have before us a special use of λύτρον, parallel to the special use of it which Deissmann has so fully illustrated as the emancipation-price of slaves, in which it is used as the immunity-price of faults in the service of deity. The point of interest is that we have here a usage of λύτρον very closely akin to the sense in which it and its derivatives are employed in the New Testament—in our Lord's great saying in Mk. x. 45, Mt. xx. 28, for example, and in the Apostolic doctrine of "Redemption". When we read for example in Heb. ix. 15 of a "ransoming of transgressions" we are moving in the same circle of ideas as when we read in this inscription: "Artemidorus the son of Diodotus and Amia, together with his six kinsmen, knowing and unknowing, a ransom according to command, to Mên Tyrannus and Zeus Ogmenus and the Gods with him." This is "a ransom of sin": it is a price paid (though not of silver or gold) by means of which is obtained "the remission of sin" (Eph. i. 7, Col. i. 14).

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*The History of Religions.* By GEORGE FOOT MOORE, D.D., LL.D., Professor of the History of Religions in Harvard University. I. China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, Rome. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiv. 637.

This volume is one of the latest issues of The International Theological Library, and fully sustains the standard of scholarship set by its predecessors. The work is a compendium of separate studies on the different religions in each country named on the title-page. A second volume is promised on Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. The plan of the treatise embraces the religions of civilized peoples only, and therefore the so-called primitive religions are omitted.

To write such a book as Professor Moore has given us is a large task. No one writer can have first-hand information on so many religions; he is compelled to base his statements on those of other men who are the original investigators in each individual religion. The author frankly admits this, but points out that a work of this character secures unity in the method of treatment and in the point of view better

than could be obtained by a collection of independent treatises by different authors—which would be merely a series of monographs between the same covers. This assertion of Professor Moore is doubtless correct, and there is probably no man in America who could have accomplished such a task better than he.

It would have been more satisfactory in our judgment if the author had indulged more freely in references to well-recognized authorities for many important statements. There are some such references in the volume, but it would probably have been better if they had been more numerous. There is an appendix in which the literature pertaining to each particular religion is admirably presented, but this does not altogether compensate for the lack of references in the body of the work.

Professor Moore has very wisely treated the different religions in a broad fashion in their *milieu*, or, as he expresses it himself:—"In the presentation of the several religions, the endeavor is made, as far as the sources permit, to show their relation to race and physical environment and to national life and civilization, to trace their history, and to discover the causes of progress and decline and the influences that have affected them from without." This conception of his task has led the author to produce a book not only more accurate in its broad presentations of the religions, but more lifelike and realistic.

The principle of division in the classification of the religions is geographical,—that is, according to the countries in which the religions have firmly established themselves. These countries are named on the title-page, already given. It is a convenient arrangement, and has some advantages. It affords for example, an opportunity to describe the influences in any country of the religions on each other. One disadvantage is that it occasionally breaks up the unitary treatment of a particular religion into a consideration of its manifestations in different lands, and does this occasionally even at the expense of chronological sequence. Thus the treatment of Buddhism is divided into three parts, separated from each other by a consideration of other religions. The Buddhism of China is first studied, then that of Japan, and finally that of India; although Buddhism was, of course, introduced into China some centuries after its origin in India.

The religions of China are discussed very fully under the heads of The Religion of the State, Moral and Political Philosophy (Confucianism), Taoism, The Religion of the Masses, and Buddhism. The religion of the country in general the author defines as a union of nature worship and of ancestor worship, the latter constituting the private religion of all classes. The Emperor himself (when there was one) offered public worship for the entire Empire. Professor Moore describes minutely the celebrated imperial sacrifice to Heaven, but does not draw any inference as to whether it was an indication of a primitive monotheism, although he declares that "Heaven is in the ancient Chinese religion a personal god." The author hesitates to express an opinion as to the religious views of Confucius, though he thinks his

ethical rationalism was not incompatible with a real religious faith. An interesting account is given of Neo-Confucianism, which is declared to be probably not so much materialistic as pantheistic. The treatment of Chinese Buddhism is not very extended, though probably sufficient. The writer studies the religions of Japan in two chapters, one on Shinto, the other on Buddhism. The former as the worship of the gods of nature and natural forces is generally supposed not to have any ethical aspect, but Professor Moore thinks it must be credited with some kind of ethical sanction. There is a full account of Japanese Buddhism, including its many schools or sects. The religions of Egypt are adequately treated in chapters on the Religion of the Old Kingdom, and that of the Middle Kingdom and the Empire. The history of Egypt given in connection with this is excellent. For some reason the religions of Babylonia and Assyria have not quite as much space as some would have desired. There is an admirable discussion of the religions of India in four chapters, viz., the Religion of the Veda, the Great Heresies, the Philosophical Systems, and Hinduism. In the Rig-Veda, Professor Moore declares, the gods are in the main great powers of nature, but nevertheless the following striking statement is made as to a potential monotheism: "It is, however, not the varying forms these speculations take that here concern us, but the fact that in many, and to our feeling often grotesque, forms, the poets and thinkers of this period are struggling to express mythologically, theologically, or metaphysically, after their ability, the idea that at the origin of all things, before heaven and air and earth, above the whole pantheon of nature deities, there is one ground of being—one god, some would say, and call him creator; to others it is the nameless One. The antecedents of monotheism, pantheism, monism lie crossed and tangled in these early ventures at the riddle of the universe." (p. 271). A brief account is given of the religion of the Jains, and its similarity to Buddhism is recognized. The author states at this point a fact about Jainism which is paralleled in other religions: "The primitive atheism of the sect did not satisfy the religious needs of the masses and the veneration of the founder grew in the course of time into a worship." The account of Buddhism in India is quite concise, but nevertheless most excellent. Professor Moore thinks that Nirvana could be attained in this life, and exhibits clearly Buddha's agnosticism as to life after death, as well as the existence of a personal God, and other religious tenets. The presentation of the philosophical systems of India is perhaps too meager to be of great value. The treatment of Zoroastrianism impresses us as especially good. The religions of the Greeks are considered under chapters headed; Religion in Early Greece, From the Age of Colonization to the Peloponnesian War, Poetry and Philosophy, and Later Greek Philosophy. These chapters, especially the one on Poetry and Philosophy, we have found among the most interesting in the entire work. The relation to religion of later Greek philosophy from Epicureanism to Neoplatonism is well presented. The last two chapters are devoted to the religions of the Romans,



first that of the city of Rome, and then Religion under the Empire. These religions are very fully treated, and many of the topics, *e.g.*, the Mysteries, are presented in an attractive way.

There is nothing in this work of Professor Moore bearing directly on the science or the philosophy of religion since the subject did not call for it, but the material here presented will serve, as in all similar works, as the basis for these other studies. It is of interest perhaps to note that one of Professor Moore's Harvard colleagues, Professor Toy, has published synchronously with this volume a History of Religion. The latter, of course, can be successfully written only after such a study as the one before us—as well, we may add, as after the investigation of the so-called primitive religions likewise.

Because of its conciseness of treatment this work is not easy reading. We do not know any volume on the subject in which so much information is packed into so small a space. It is as a rule, however, written in a clear style, and should be invaluable to all students of the religions that are treated.

An excellent index enables the reader to study special religious doctrines topically, or in cross-sections through the different religions; as for example pantheism, incarnation, resurrection, retribution after death, etc.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

*McCormick Theological Seminary.*

*The Facts of Life in Relation to Faith*, by P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON, D.D.,  
New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 8vo; pp.  
x-294.

This work is a sequel to the author's well and favorably known, *The Fact of Christ*. Through the correspondence which this earlier work brought to the author, many difficulties were presented to him by perplexed minds, and the present volume is in the nature of an answer to these inquiries. Dr. Simpson considers Christian faith as standing not only amid the facts of life, but as facing those facts especially that are supposed to be antagonistic to it. An introductory chapter treats of The Creed of Experience as the Christian makes proof of it, and rightly regards this as the best test of truth and reality. The great facts of life which cause every thinking man perplexity are: The Indifferent World, (*i.e.*, indifferent to ethical and religious ideals); The Problem of Pain; The Atheistic Fact (sin); The Reality of Christ (which is taken as a fact of life); The Claim of Humanism (whether its claim to be the real and rich way of living over against the Christian life is true); The Veto of Death; The Comment of Today (the verdict of the centuries on the claims of the Christian faith). It will be seen that the writer is handling the world-old problems which have perplexed the human mind, distressed the human conscience, and been a trial to Christian faith. These problems are treated by Dr. Simpson in a very simple yet helpful manner, and the book should be

of service to every soul that finds itself facing these difficulties. We cordially commend the work to this class of readers.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

*McCormick Theological Seminary.*

*Christian Psychology.* By the REV. JAMES STALKER, D.D., author of "The Life of Christ", "The Life of St. Paul", etc. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo; pp. 281.

The third series of lectures on "The James Sprunt Foundation" is presented in this volume. The lectures were given before The Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Va., and, in accordance with the conditions of the foundation, they are now published.

They are not a treatise on general psychology. Neither do they discuss the psychology, either of religion in general or of the Christian religion in particular. Nor yet do they deal with the difficult subject of Biblical Psychology. On the contrary, their aim is the almost unique one, to set forth the relation of psychology to Christianity, to indicate the ways in which the science of psychology can help the propagation of Christianity and especially the development of the Christian life.

This is done in a succession of lectures or chapters entitled "From Individuality to Personality"; "Body, Soul and Spirit"; "The Five Senses"; "The Memory"; "The Imagination"; "Habit"; "The Reason"; "The Heart"; "The Will"; "The Conscience." Two very valuable appendices close the book; one, on "The Temperaments"; the other, by Prof. C. A. Beckwith, D.D., of Chicago, on "Psychology and Evangelism."

These lectures are in the author's well known style which, as regards simplicity, clearness, strength and, above all, winsomeness and grace, leaves nothing to be desired. To take up the book is to read it through; and to read it through is to comprehend, to appreciate, to remember and to apply it. Few, indeed, are the writers who have Dr. Stalker's gift of style.

He does not claim to be a professional psychologist, and he never parades his learning. Yet he cannot conceal his familiarity with all that is valuable in modern as well as ancient psychology, and his expression is so perspicuous because of the vast mass of digested learning out of which he writes.

Here and there we cannot quite agree with him, as when he holds that the Bible in speaking of man as "composed of body, soul and spirit" advocates a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy; but even then, and perhaps specially then, we recognize the fruitfulness and the truth of the interpretation which he bases on the division.

When everything is excellent it is hard to discriminate. Yet we cannot but refer to the chapters on "The Heart," "The Will," and "The Conscience" as of very striking value.

As might have been anticipated, Dr. Stalker does not, like most of the psychologists of religion, try to explain all the phenomena of the Christian life as only psychological and so necessary processes. On

the contrary, he holds most decidedly, that these phenomena presuppose the supernatural facts and doctrines of the Christian religion; that human consciousness is not simply a stream of expression, but that this expression postulates a substantial soul; and that while the force of habit, especially in the old, is practically omnipotent, it may be overcome, even in the old, by the real omnipotence of divine grace: and none of his discussions are so illuminating and convincing probably as those in which he illustrates and vindicates these positions. It is particularly at these points that he makes a genuine contribution to psychology itself.

In his Preface, Dr. Stalker remarks that "it has long been his conviction that much more use than is common might be made by preachers of the materials furnished to them at college." The book that we have been reviewing is meant to be a proof of this, and it is so cogent a proof that we are constrained to ask him if he will not go on and give us other proofs of the same kind.

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus*, herausgegeben von LIC. DR. HEINRICH HOFFMANN UND PROF. LIC. LEOPOLD ZSCHARNACK. 9 Heft. Spinozas Stellung zur Religion. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage des theologisch-politischen Traktats. Nebst einem Anhang: Spinoza in England (1670-1750). Von Dr. Georg Bohrmann. Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann vormals J. Ricker. Giessen. 1914. S. 1-84. M. 2.40.

4 Quellenheft. John Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity (Vernünftigkeit des Biblischen Christentums) 1695. Uebersetzt von Prof. Dr. C. Winckler in Berlin. Mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von Prof. Lic. Leopold Zscharnack. Idem. S. I-LXVI, 1-140. M. 5.

The series of which these two volumes form part, is intended to afford material for use in seminar work in systematic theology. The first mentioned is an exceedingly clear and interesting presentation of the religious views of Spinoza as contained in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* first published anonymously in 1670. Spinoza's attitude towards religion has always been somewhat of a puzzle. The *Ethics* presents him as a pantheist who denies revelation; his letters reveal a deep respect for the Bible and its contents. Which is the true Spinoza? Dr. Bohrmann decides the question by a careful examination of the contents of the *Tractatus* with the result that Spinoza is found to occupy the usual rationalistic attitude towards the religion of revelation. In things outward the church is entirely subordinate to the state; in things inward the individual's piety must not be disturbed. The Bible (here Spinoza confines himself to the Old Testament) must be subjected to a thoroughgoing historical criticism before being accepted. The foundation of revelation is not reason but imagination. Its certitude is therefore, merely moral. It does not yield theoretical knowledge but practical. Christ is the man in whom God has revealed his plan of salvation; he is therefore more than a prophet. Miracles as a



basis of faith are an asylum ignorantiae. There is nothing specially new in this presentation of Spinoza's religious attitude, but it is put into clear and convenient form and if accompanied by the reading of the *Tractatus* would shed great light on much of the present day rationalizing criticism of Christianity. The appendix contains an interesting account of the English hostility to Spinoza during the 17th and 18th centuries, a hostility that did not abate until the time of Coleridge (1772-1834).

The other volume is a source book. During the Winter Semester of 1911-1912, in Berlin, the editor used "The Reasonableness of Christianity" together with Locke's "Essay", Book I and IV, as material for seminar work and found abundant material for discussion in the problems historical, philosophical, and dogmatic, there presented. The translation is of course intended for German students, but the introduction, containing an analysis of the argument of the treatise, its relation to Locke's other writings, its rationalistic tendency, Locke's religious attitude, etc., will be found profitable reading by all who are interested in the genesis of the "newer" Protestantism.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*Mind and Spirit. A Study in Psychology.* By THOMAS KIRBY DAVIS, D.D. Boston, Sherman, French & Co., 1914. Pp. VI, 1-115. \$1.

This book, written by a member of the Class of 1850 now in his 89th year, explains and defends the conviction that not "mentality" which man shares with many of the animals, but "spirituality" imparted to those who hear the Gospel, believe it, and receive the Saviour, is man's most important endowment. The opening chapter is autobiographical, telling how Dr. Davis, while a student at Yale in the 40's, influenced by Dr. Channing, lost his faith in evangelical Christianity and how he won it back again. In successive chapters he then explains his views of Revelation: a restatement of the usual reasons for holding the Bible to be authoritative: the "True Psychology" that man according to the New Testament is composed of Body, Mind, and Spirit, and that most of the evil in the Church and out comes from the undue use of mind; the Second Birth and the New Life; the Holy Spirit of Promise. Like the ancient hero, Dr. Davis *ferrum cingitur ac densos fertur in hostes*. His attack is fearless but he is at his best not when he defends the faith but when he commends it.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

### EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*The Ideals of the Prophets.* Sermons by the late S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Together with a Bibliography of his Published Writings. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xii, 239.

"Before his death on the 26th of February, 1914, Dr. Driver left

instructions that a volume of his sermons should be published, and even chose a certain number for the purpose." His "own selection has been considerably enlarged with a view to forming a group, both representative of his ordinary teaching and connected together by a certain unity of subject and treatment." "He took a special delight in preaching about the ideals of the Old Testament prophets; accordingly most of these sermons will be found to bear on this topic. All of them were delivered in Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, of which he was a Canon in virtue of his office as Regius Professor of Hebrew; he was never connected with any other church; so that the present volume will serve, in some degree, as a memorial of his thirty-two years' ministry there, from 1882 to 1914" (Preface, p. vii. by G. A. C[ooke]).

The twenty sermons which make up the volume are academic; being addressed to the intellect without appeal to the emotions, and with no attempt to lead men to action, though not without "application". They are expositions of great texts of the Old Testament. Too often in past times these texts have been wrested from their setting and interpreted as though their primary reference is to Christ. It is the evident purpose, and the laudable endeavor, of Dr. Driver to rescue these great passages from abuse and recover their true exegesis. And he has good success. In clear language and straightforward manner he gives his exposition; an exposition which will command respect, and in the large will be recognized as indubitably correct.

"One point in particular Dr. Driver frequently discusses in these sermons—the fulfilment of prophecy" (Preface, p. viii); and in doing so he constantly alludes to a lack of correspondence between the details of the prophecy and the fulfilment, between the prophet's expectation and the actual event. For example, in Dr. Driver's opinion the author of Is. xxxv. expected that a highway would be made through the desert for the ease and comfort of the exiles returning to Jerusalem, an avenue shaded by stately trees, with cool water gushing forth at intervals by the wayside "for the refreshment of the redeemed of the Lord as they journeyed homeward (p. 83 f.; and on passages in Is. xl-lxvi., p. 86). Such is the literal interpretation of a part of the prophecy contained in Is. xxxv. But on extending this method to other parts of the same prophecy and to kindred prophecies strange results follow. It then appears that the exiles in Babylonia are suffering from grievous bodily defects and from harsh imprisonment; they are blind, deaf, dumb, lame, and are in bonds and languish in a dark dungeon (vs. 5 f.; xlii. 7; xlix. 9; lxi. 1); but the prophet expects that they shall recover sight, hearing, speech, and the use of their limbs; the chains shall be stricken from them and the doors of the prison-house opened; and a highway shall be made in the desert, every valley being exalted and every mountain and hill made low, in order that the road may be level (xl. 3 f.). Then in the latter days the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the mountains, and

shall be exalted above the hills (ii. 2); and shall become, as Ezekiel thought it would, a very high mountain, with the city and temple on its summit (Ezek. xl. 2 ff.); and from under the eastern threshold of the temple a stream of water shall issue, which at the distance of fifteen hundred feet is ankle-deep, at three thousand feet has become knee-deep, at forty-five hundred feet waist-deep, and at six thousand feet is unfordable (Ezek. xlvii. 1-5; *cp.* Zech. xiv. 8). But as for the neighboring country of Edom, whose inhabitants were the bitter foes of Israel, the prophet expected that its streams would be turned into pitch, and its dust into brimstone, and its ground would become burning pitch, never quenched by day or night, its smoke ascending forever (Is. xxxiv. 9-11). Such is the expectation of prophets, if the literal interpretation of chapter xxxv. of the book of Isaiah is consistently applied throughout that chapter and to other passages similar in theme. It is incredible that the prophets had such a crude conception of the glory of Zion and the shame of its foes. Nevertheless interpreters have not hesitated to place such a meaning on passages like the opening verses of the second chapter of Isaiah. And when one calls to mind the convulsion of nature, physically possible of course, which has been suggested to elevate mount Zion until it overtops all other mountains of the world, then one can indeed conceive of interpreters in this manner despoiling the glowing prophecies of their poetry and demanding a fulfilment which would make the hills in amazed delight leap about like lambs and all the trees of the forest clap their hands in glee. It would be well for expounders to remember that when Isaiah speaks of a highway from Assyria for the remnant of Jehovah's people, like as there was for Israel in the day that he came up out of the land of Egypt (Is. xi. 16), the prophet has mainly in mind for the moment how God in his providence opened a passage through the arm of the Egyptian sea at the time of his people's dire need (Ex. xiv. 21); but the history, so familiar to the prophet and his people, taught them all that, though the Lord did lead them, yet the entire way from Egypt to Canaan was beset with terrors and hardships and enemies. And when the prophet declares that there shall be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, and adds that the Egyptians shall worship as the Assyrians; and the Egyptians shall be Jehovah's people, and the Assyrians the work of his hands, and Israel his inheritance (Is. xix. 23 ff.), the prophet is not foretelling the continuance of the roads that already connected the two countries, nor of the construction of yet another, but is merely announcing the change from present enmity and exclusion to easy communication from one nation to the other, and friendly intercourse, and admission to the privileges of Jehovah's people.

As stated in the preface, in words already cited, the fulfilment of prophecy is frequently discussed in these pages. But the volume is not a treatise on this subject, and does not profess to be. The sermons are fugitive discourses, not even collected by Dr. Driver himself, and



do not include all the great texts of the Old Testament which bring out the various aspects of the teaching of the prophets. The discussion is necessarily fragmentary. And these fragments must be gathered up, taken from their setting sometimes, and supplemented, if one would even begin to understand the prophets of Israel aright. It may be quite true, as Dr. Driver asserts, that the anticipations and expectations of the prophets have not been, and never will be, exactly realized (pp. 6, 89, *et passim*); but even so that is apart from the essential facts. It is an irrelevant matter. The outstanding fact is that although the prophecies of the glory of Zion were not fulfilled immediately, but the years passed by and all things continued as they were, though the ultimate goal of human history was not reached so soon as the crisis was passed which the nation was facing (p. 88), though the exiles did not return from Babylonia over an avenue miraculously leveled for them through the desert, and promises were not always "realized in the form in which they were expressed" (p. 147), yet the prophets themselves, their successors, and the godly Israelites generally never thought that the event disproved the prophecy, and never lost confidence in him who had uttered it. They preserved the predictions as the word of God, and nourished their souls upon them in firm faith in their trustworthiness. Evidently from the first they knew the manner of prophecy and understood that 1. The prophets "write often as poets" (p. 87), and (1) there "are cases in which it may reasonably be supposed they are using figurative language" (p. 89). It is the truths underlying the figures upon which we must concentrate our attention, if we would understand aright such prophetic passages as Is. ii. 2 f.; xix. 23; xxv. 6; lvi. 7 (p. 147 f.). A striking example, not alluded to in these sermons is the vision of the prophet Ezekiel, where the Israelites in exile are pictured as dead, buried in Babylonia or their bones lying scattered unburied on the great plain (Ezek. xxxvii). But God will cause the bones to come together, lay sinews and bring flesh upon them, cover them with skin, and put breath in the bodies and make them live and stand upon their feet (vs. 6-10); and God will open the graves and cause the dead to come forth, and will put his Spirit (or breath) in them, and they shall live and be brought into their own land (vs. 12 ff.). (2) The prophets employ types and symbols and emblems. Sometimes "Egypt or Assyria, Tyre or Philistia, are not named for their own sake, but as representative of the heathen world generally" (p. 148). The actual Zion "was the prototype of a wider and greater community of the future" (p. 146). And (3) the prophets "construct ideals" (p. 87). "Zechariah's ideal picture [of the coming king] is modelled upon the life and doings of the Israelite king: and in so far as Christ was not such a king literally as David and Solomon were, an agreement in *every* detail is more than we have a right to expect" (p. 161). In the same manner the psalmists, for example in Pss. xlv. and lxxii., set forth the glory of the coming King of Israel by ascribing to him all qualities of mind

and grandeur of court and tokens of wide dominion which made royal greatness at that period of history. The best and highest that can be conceived regarding a king will be true of him. Universal sway is expressed by naming as tributary the peoples of the geographical districts, or the remotest of them, into which the world in that age was divided. "The great ideals of the prophets . . . must be read, and interpreted, as ideals: the imaginative form in which the prophets' thoughts and aspirations [under the "influence of the Spirit"] are set forth must be recognized as such, and not regarded as necessarily, in all its details, a prediction of the future" (p. 91). 2. The pictures of the future are frequently drawn upon the canvas without perspective. The events depicted appear together, their relation to each other in time not being indicated or being revealed merely as successive. Often a prophecy is like a constellation in the sky, in which the beholder sees the constituent stars as though they were set in the same plane, all at an equal distance from him, whereas he is looking through a vista of shining suns. Perhaps an example is Is. x. 25; xi. 1, 10, 11 f. It may be that "the prophets foreshortened the future", if by that statement one means that "they did not realize the length of period which must elapse before corrupt human nature could be so transformed as to constitute a perfect or ideal society". Perhaps they conceived the Messianic age as beginning immediately after the troubles were past to which the nation in their own time was exposed (p. 172). Whatever their "anticipations" were, it was their common practice to speak quite indefinitely, and announce the event as belonging to "the latter days", occurring "in that day", or coming "afterward" (Is. ii. 2, 12; iv. 2; Joel ii. 28, iii. 1, 18 [English]; Amos ix. 11; Mic. iv. 1, 6). They searched "what time or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did point unto" (1 Pet. i. 11). And each generation looked forward to the latter days, expecting them, and looking for the consolation of Israel. 3. As the prophets understood and taught, it was the purpose of God, as revealed in the promise to the line of David, which guaranteed Zion's security to each generation and every age. Even when Assyria or Babylonia is threatening and destroying; even then the promised King is the guarantee that God's kingdom will ultimately triumph over these and all other foes (Ps. ii.; Is. vii.; Mic. v.). 4. "The prophets almost uniformly see the future through the forms of their own social and religious organization; their own times, their own surroundings supply the figures under which they represent it" (p. 160). Many prophecies, clothed in this garb, announce not a single event, but a long course of developing history. The process generally begins under the form in which it is first described; and as the fulfilment proceeds, when the old dispensation gives place to the new dispensation, the prophecy continues to unfold in forms appropriate to the new order of things. When the time for the completion arrived, "the forms and ideas and truths of the Old Covenant had only to be reapplied: the principles by which the Church

was constituted and governed were an extension and readaptation of those of the Jewish theocracy. The reality, however, transcended even the far-seeing anticipation of the psalmist" and other prophets (p. 149). These various phenomena of prophetic literature are so many lights which illumine the method and meaning of the prophets, lights flashed by Dr. Driver here and there in these sermons, and yet others which are not exhibited in this collection.

Only occasionally do the person and work of the Messiah require mention in these discourses. At such times Dr. Driver speaks of the Christ in no uncertain terms. For example, in a sermon on Lam. i. 12, he says: "In the poet of the Lamentations and in those like-minded with himself on whose behalf he speaks, we see . . . the innocent suffering with the guilty, the innocent so associated with the guilty by ties of kindred and other relations that they can not escape from their punishment. In the Passion of our Lord we have more than this; we see the innocent not suffering *with* the guilty, but suffering *for* them, and taking upon Himself not merely the sins of His own nation, but those of the whole world" (p. 58). "The Ascension of our Blessed Lord marks a significant stage in the triumph of His glorified and risen life: it is the initial step in His exaltation and session at the right hand of God, the place of highest honor, to which He is exalted, and where He reigns as King, destroying by the virtue of His death and by His ever-present grace the power of sin over those already incorporated into His kingdom, and extending by means of His Church His dominion throughout the world" (p. 173). To those who have become acquainted with the inner spiritual life of Dr. Driver, this triumphant confession of his faith in Christ is no surprise.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

*The British Academy. The Philistines: Their History and Civilization.*

By R. A. STEWART MACALESTER, M.A., F.S.A., (Professor of Celtic Archaeology, University College, Dublin). The Schweich Lectures, 1911. London: Published for the British Academy by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, E. C. 1913. Royal 8vo; pp. viii, 136. 3 shillings net.

This book represents the latest studies into the origin of the Philistines and their history while settled on the sea-coast of Palestine. Mr. Macalester brings to the task his own intimate acquaintance with the topography and archaeology of the maritime plain, and lays under tribute the discoveries and discussions of the last twenty years, which bear upon Philistine matters. He indulges in much speculation and allows free play to fancy, but along with this perishable material he constructs the substantial framework of Philistine history. The statements in ancient writings, and various traditions, indicated that the Philistines were related to the early inhabitants of the island of Crete. The facts brought to light in recent times, and marshalled by Professor Macalester, confirm this conclusion.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.



*The British Academy. The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples.* By the REV. C. H. W. JOHNS, M.A., Litt.D., Master of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge. The Schweich Lectures, 1912. London: Published for the British Academy by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, E. C. 1914. Royal 8vo; pp. xv, 96. 3 shillings net.

The author of these lectures is a specialist in the literature of Hammurabi's times. He treats his subject in the spirit of an archaeologist, which seeks evidence and regards mere speculation as serving a useful purpose, but not to be taken too seriously. His interpretation of the laws, both Babylonian and Hebrew, is acute, and cannot wisely be neglected by students of either of these national literatures. An extensive descriptive "bibliography of the literature relating to the code of Hammurabi" is appended, occupying pages 65-91.

Three matters which lie in the background of Dr. Johns' discussion may be mentioned. The lecturer seems to assume that the Israelites when they entered Canaan were a nomad pastoral people, unacquainted with settled life and with the laws and customs of settled life; and that they had already become the dominant race in Canaan "in the period when the Mosaic laws were instituted" (pp. vi ff.). This theory is, indeed, fundamental with a certain school of criticism, but Dr. Johns treats critical speculations lightly. Now, the earliest traditions of the Israelites, current among the people almost or quite as early as Moses' own day according to general critical opinion, knew that the ancestors of Israel, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, whether these names be regarded as denoting persons or tribes, dwelt originally and later for long periods of time in the midst of civilized settled communities, in Mesopotamia and Canaan and Egypt, were herdsmen yet did not entirely neglect agriculture, intermarried with town-dwellers, adopted into their own tribe numerous servants from these peoples, and conformed to customs of their neighbors. The Israelites borrowed practices from the Canaanites after the conquest, it is true; but a trace of Babylonian, Canaanite or Egyptian law or custom among the Israelites is not evidence that it entered Israel after the conquest of Canaan or even in preparation for the invasion of Canaan. Long before that date it may have been habitated among the Israelites. Dr. Johns perhaps nowhere definitely asserts that these things waited for adoption by Israel until the conquest. Moreover, besides this intercourse which the Israelites had with other peoples during the centuries before the conquest, there was another avenue through which ancient laws may have been introduced into the legislation of Israel before the conquest. Dr. Johns himself says: "A leader in the position to which tradition assigned Moses could perfectly well promulgate a code of laws as full and complete as the whole Mosaic law, even for a people in the primitive state of society in which Israel is often supposed to have been at the Exodus. . . . He had only to avail himself of the knowledge of

cuneiform, available at that time both in Canaan and in Egypt, and import copies of the Hammurabi Code from Babylonia if they were not at hand where he then was. He could exercise his judgment as to what would be suitable for his people, add what he chose, and reject what he disliked. That he did this or anything like it is not asserted, but it would be so natural for any one in his position then that we have no excuse for surprise if we should find indications of his having done exactly that" (p. 21).

A second matter. The author does not distinguish between revelation and inspiration, and accordingly ascribes to the church opinions which have, indeed, had vogue in certain quarters, but do not represent the teaching of the great theologians. At the very end of his closing lecture, however, he makes a statement which is thoroughly consonant with the doctrine of inspiration. To explain the correspondence between the ancient code of Hammurabi and the later Hebrew Book of the Covenant, and speaking of such men as Philo and the author of the Acts of the Apostles, who tell of the acquaintance of Moses with the wisdom of Babylonia and Egypt, he asks: "Did not these learned men, who themselves knew much of that knowledge, recognize in the Books of Moses many startling parallels to the wisdom of Babylonia? Was it not the only acceptable way to account for such parallels to assert boldly that Moses did know these things, but in such a way that, guided by God, he used them so far as they were in accordance with Divine revelation?"

A third matter which Dr. Johns once, and then quite incidentally mentions, is really a method of legislation familiar in ancient law, but foreign to modern enactments. It explains arguments and measures which have sometimes mystified readers of the Bible. According to Deut. xv., the law of the Hebrew bondman, Ex. xxi. 2 ff., covers the bondwoman as well. "It may, indeed, be contended," says the lecturer, that this enactment of the Book of the Covenant "was intended to cover only one special case, but it is more reasonable to suppose that it takes a special case as a norm for all" (p. 45). This casual remark of the lecturer has a wide application. The modern legislator seeks to frame a general statement which shall include a whole class; the ancient legislator sometimes named a particular case and used it as a type to represent the class. This method is found employed even in so basal a document as the Ten Commandments.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

*Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos.* Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des jüdischen Hellenismus. Von FRIEDRICH FOCKE, Dr. phil. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments. Neue Folge. 5. Heft.) Pp. 131.

Dr. Focke in this monograph takes his stand with the writers who in recent years have revived the theory of the composite character of

the *Sapientia Salomonis*. The unity of the work had been denied as early as the middle of the seventeenth century by Houbigant, and towards the close of the following century by Eichhorn, afterwards also by Bretschneider, Bertholdt, and Engelbrecht not to speak of the phantastic view of Nachtigal, who regarded Wisdom as a mosaic to whose composition no less than seventy-nine wise men, divided into two assemblies, each of which had held three sessions, had contributed. These earlier denials of the unity of the book seemed to have been permanently disposed of by the commentary of Grimm which appeared in 1860, and under whose influence the later discussions of Deane, Farrar, Bois and Siegfried felt warranted in setting aside every idea of compositeness without further refutation. Since the beginning of the present century, however, the question has been reopened and there are indications that the tide is setting the other way. Lincke in 1903, Weber in 1904, Kohler in 1906, Gartner in 1912, though widely differing as to the component parts, all agreed in the verdict that the book is composite. Focke is of the same opinion, only he finds himself unable to support the arguments advanced and the concrete conclusions reached by these recent writers, and comes forward with a new division, based on a new method of analysis. While both the earlier and the later dissectors thought to discover the principal seam at the beginning of Chap. XI or XII or XIII, Focke locates it between Chapters V and VI. He argues at length that the insertion of the treatise on idolatry contained in Chapters XIII-XV is so carefully led up to in the immediately preceding and so naturally linked with to the immediately following context, that all doubt of the original unity of authorship is here excluded. Wendland and Geffcken have shown that there existed a fixed scheme for the apologetic and polemic treatment of idolatry on the part of Jewish writers, the identical outlines of which can be pointed out in Philo, Josephus, the *Oracula Sibyllina* and *Sapientia*, so that on this score also no ground whatever exists for assigning the treatise on idolatry to a separate author. The writer has in this section simply followed a traditional model which furnished him not merely with the form but practically also with the substance of his digressions. The insertion of the treatise on idolatry at this particular point was caused by the emergence of the principle repeatedly stated in the closing verses of Chapter XII and carefully taken up again in the opening words of Chapter XVI, that the object of sin is made by God the instrument of punishment of the sinner, for the illustration of which the fate of the Egyptian idolaters was particularly adapted. But the same idea of retaliation already appears in Chapter XI, 15, and proves the coherence of what lies between this verse and Chapter XIII. Apart from this the unity of Chapter XI, 5 ff. with the entire sequel of the book is established by the consistent method of contrasting with a calamity inflicted upon the Egyptians a blessing bestowed upon the Israelites. This method called by the rhetoricians *συνκρίσις* is first introduced in XI, 5 and afterwards applied till the end of the book. And inasmuch as



Chapter VI ff. are obviously continuous with the sequel, Focke considers the literary unity of everything following Chapter V, 24 demonstrated.

The problem of the book lies according to him in the relation of Chapters I-V to the remainder of the book. On the one hand the linguistic phenomena are to such a degree identical that the author of the later chapters must have had a hand in writing the introductory part. On the other hand the doctrinal contents and the historical situation are so different in the two sections that they cannot possibly have the same provenience. And side by side with the fundamental sameness a measure of linguistic peculiarity also appears in the first five chapters. Focke thinks that justice can be best done to these divergent features by assuming that Chapters I-V are of Palestinian origin, were originally written in Hebrew, had reference to the persecution of the Pharisees by the aristocratic Sadducean party during the reign of Alexander Jannaeus 102-75 B.C. The Alexandrian writer translated this treatise into Greek and prefixed it to his own discourse written with reference to the persecution of the Jews in Egypt by Ptolemy VIII Lathyrus, about the year 88 B.C. In this way both the linguistic and the doctrinal differences are believed to become reconcilable with the plain signs of a uniform redaction of the whole.

We must confess that this part of the author's argument appears less convincing to us than the preceding one. None of his reasons for finding a different author in the first five chapters carries conclusive weight. It is true the figure of wisdom is not equally in prominence in these chapters as in the later section, Chapters VII-IX. Neither, however, is it actually absent, and after Chapter IX it again goes into relative abeyance, although this part of the book is assigned by Focke to the same writer who composed the panegyric on wisdom of VII-IX. That a different conception of God is found in each of the two parts, we cannot admit in the sense that the two aspects, that of the mercy and that of the justice of God, could not have coexisted in the same mind and colored in succession two parts of the same discourse. Two stages in development of the conception of God at any rate can hardly be represented here, since, as stated above, the author places the two documents united in Wisdom in the closest contiguity as to their origin. The ethical and the national element in the divine character, the former of which Focke finds in Chapters I-V, the latter in the sequel, could also lodge together and find successive expression in the same work, the more so since it is not excluded that the various parts of the treatise may have been written at different times and under the influence of different moods. The motivation of the mercy of God from His omnipotence seems to have been a characteristic feature of the later Judaism, but its prominence in the second part and absence from the first part cannot prove anything, since this is clearly connected with the emphasis on the divine mercy in the later and the emphasis on the divine justice in the earlier chapters. The

main weight is thrown by the author on the eschatological difference: the outlook of the pious in the first part of the book is towards the future recompense after the resurrection, whilst in the second part everything is staked on the immortality of the soul. This could have force only if the first section had on the author's own view been composed at a time when the intermediate state was to the mind of Palestinian Judaism a blank, and the idea of the relatively blessed state of the souls of the pious previously to the resurrection unknown in that quarter. But the contemporary apocalyptic literature of that date proves the opposite. And there is nothing to show that the writer of Chapters I-V ignored or denied the pre-resurrection blessedness, no more than it can be proven that the writer of the following chapters was opposed to the resurrection-hope. The whole difference is a relative one of emphasis, and Focke himself is compelled to admit that the resurrection itself is not explicitly referred to in Chapters I-V. But the whole contention that the atmosphere of the two sections is so different as to postulate difference of origin is weakened by Focke's own assumption of a sufficient degree of likeness in the two situations to make the earlier one adaptable to the later one in the view of the Alexandrian writer. If such great doctrinal divergence existed, how did the second writer come to overlook this or to put up with it? If his mind was sufficiently eclectic for this, we can scarcely doubt that it may have lodged the alleged divergencies from the beginning within itself.

To the linguistic argument in favor of difference of authorship, we suppose the writer himself allows only secondary weight. Its force also is broken by the admission that the second writer has through his translation of the first document left his literary stamp upon this. This renders it *a priori* difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate difference of origin from the language. Of course if it could be proven that a Hebrew or Aramaic original shines through, the case would be different. Focke actually attempts to make this plausible in a few instances. In none of these the evidence is clear enough to amount to linguistic demonstration. It is far less illuminating than the phenomena to which Wellhausen has called attention as evidencing the Aramaic background of the Synoptics.

As to the historical situation to which Wisdom addresses itself, we do not think the author has succeeded in definitely overthrowing the traditional view, according to which the enmity and persecution reflected in the first five chapters, as well as that of the later section, arose from the Egyptian authorities. Focke thinks this impossible for Chapters I-V, because, in part at least, as he correctly observes, the enmity and persecution are from Jews against Jews, and moreover moved on lines apparently identical with the party-lines drawn between Sadducees and Pharisees. Both features, however, can be explained, on the common view. Especially if the date of the writing be put at the time of Caligula and during the troubles caused by this emperor's provocation of the religious sensibilities of the Jews, there is reason

to believe that the writer was confronted not merely with pagan enemies but also with apostate paganized Hebrews, who joined in the persecution of their own race. That the difference between the parties coincides more or less with that between Pharisees and Sadducees, need not cause wonder, for to a considerable extent the Sadducaic position approximated that of paganism.

Attention should be called to two special conclusions of the author which are interesting from a theological point of view. Focke combats the almost commonly-accepted view that Wisdom marks an earlier stage in the development of that Alexandrian Hebrew-Greek religious philosophy of which Philo is supposed to be the consummate representative. A philosopher the author of Wisdom was in no sense. The Hellenistic coloring and the few philosophical phrases that have entered into his work he derived not from the study of the schools but from the common atmosphere of culture in which he lived. As to Philo he cannot have back of him such a continuous development as nowadays is frequently assumed, because in that case his isolation at the time and subsequently becomes unintelligible.

The second point relates to the alleged influence of Wisdom on Paul. The author devotes considerable space to a close examination of the evidence adduced in support of such dependence by Grafe and others. His conclusion is that in no case can direct dependence be demonstrated. The cases most frequently adduced appear to be largely cases of common borrowing from the Greek Bible and show, as *e.g.* the handling of the figure of the potter, side by side with the unavoidable similarities, such differences of application, as positively to exclude the thought of Paul having borrowed from Wisdom.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

*Zur Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion in ihrer universalen Bedeutung.* Zwei akademische Reden von Wolf Wilhelm Grafen Baudissin. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke. 1914. Pp. 56.

The common title under which the author has joined these two rectoral orations describes more accurately the purport of the second than that of the first. In the first entitled "Old Testament Science and the History of Religion" the problem of universality emerges only towards the end. The larger space is given to a retrospect of the development of Old Testament science in the direction of a history of the Old Testament religion and to a review of the more modern discussions concerning the influence of other religions upon that of Israel. In regard to the former point the author calls attention to the precedence of theology in this field. Classical science made the transition from the study of mythology to a scientific treatment of religion as a historical growth later than and perhaps in partial dependence on the pursuit of this new method by biblical scholars with reference to the Old Testament. To be sure in its older form this method was vitiated by the rationalistic misconception that the historical development to be



traced was a matter of doctrine, a misconception to which the name Biblical Theology still bears witness. Even under the wrong name, however, much was done to clear the way and lay the foundations for the work which now under a better nomenclature the History of the Old Testament religion may take in hand. In his discussion of the comparative problem Baudissin evidently means to make a generous allowance for the elements that the religion of Israel had in common with the religions of the surrounding nations and for the influence exercised from various quarters upon the Old Testament religion. On the latter point his statements are not so much along the line of positive opinion as of a mere objective review of possibilities. Even on so fundamental a question as to whether the primitive Semitic religion of Israel was like that of the Arabs, or partook of the astrological character of the Babylonian religious system, he remains non-committal. And, what is most important, he refuses to admit that the key for our historical understanding of the biblical religion can be found in anything that was borrowed from outside. The specific character of Israel's religion must be due to something indigenous. Baudissin finds the source of this first of all in the intense Semitic consciousness of the greatness of the deity and in the unique position and prestige enjoyed by the deity in consequence of the intertwining of religion and tribal organization. This reminds of the view developed some decades ago from a more positive standpoint by Grau in his book "Gottes Volk und sein Gesetz." Next to monotheism, and far outweighing it in religious importance, stand the ethical conception of God and the unique estimate put upon personal spiritual communion with Him as the highest possession of man. These two features the writer derives from the inner religious experience of the heroes of Israel's religion, the prophets. It will be noticed that thus the monotheism and the ethico-religious spiritualization are made to appear as two coördinate strands in the development, whereas the representatives of the Graf-Wellhausen school generally represent the monotheism as the result of the ethicizing of the prophetic conception of God.

In the second oration entitled "Nationalism and Universalism" these two aspects are not merely considered in their contrast but also as to the dependence of the latter upon the former. Baudissin subscribes to the paradox of Kuenen, that Israel has given to the world the most universalistic religion, because its religion was most intensely national in character. This is affirmed on the principle that in the most national and specific traits, the universal and generic is apt to find its strongest expression. It is not made clear, however, how in the concrete case of Israel, the element which chiefly made for universalism, the ethico-religious conception of religion, is connected with the national consciousness. For this element according to Baudissin himself was born in the inexorable depths of the prophetic consciousness. It is true the prophet did not lack the national spirit. Only, by taking recourse to the region of psychological mystery, as a sort of modern substi-

tute for the old factor of revelation, the writer at the outset surrenders the possibility of historically explaining the unique prophetic consciousness either from national factors or otherwise.

*Princeton,*

GERHARDUS VOS.

*Das Antisemitische Hauptdogma*, beleuchtet von EDUARD KÖNIG, Dr. Phil. et Theol., Ord. Professor und Geheimrath in Bonn. Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Weber's Verlag. 1914. Pp. 64.

The doughty Bonn Professor, who has fought for the good rights of the Old Testament on so many fronts, in this brochure takes up its defense, and incidentally also the defense of Old Testament science, against the attacks of a certain type of Antisemitism. There is one extreme wing of the Antisemitic propaganda which does not hesitate to decry and reject the biblical religion, including Jesus and Christianity, in toto, on the plea of its being so typically Semitic as to be irreconcilable with and injurious to the national Germanic aspirations. Others however go less far in their condemnation of the biblical teaching. Loath to cut themselves loose from the Bible and Christianity after so radical a fashion, and yet desiring to put the social, political and economic objections raised to the influence of the Hebrew element in modern civilization on a broad basis, they distinguish between two strands in the biblical development, one of which they attack as the root of all that appears to them at the present day offensive and dangerous in the activity of the Jews, whilst from the other they derive all that is good and noble in the Old Testament religion and in Christianity. In part the distinction is drawn between Judaic and Israelitish elements, in which case the northern tribes are idealized at the expense of Judah; in other cases, and alongside of this, however, the claim is made that Aryan elements were present and influential among ancient Israel, and that to them is due the production of what it is still possible to cherish as a valuable inheritance from that ancient source. Dr. König is, as usual, very methodical in his presentation of the polemic material that has been advanced along both lines and in the reply to its main arguments. It is amazing to learn what shallowness of biblical scholarship, what cheap, journalistic credulousness in regard to the wildest and most baseless speculations, the rabid Antisemites display in their writings. One cannot help suspecting that to a considerable extent it is not with them a case of honest conviction but of unscrupulous use, regardless of historical support, made of any material that may suit the purpose of their propaganda. An amazing feature of the situation is that the anti-Semitic writers do not hesitate on their part to accuse Old Testament scholars of incapacity in understanding the true trend of the biblical development and introduce themselves as discoverers and liberators in a field enslaved to blind traditionalism. In exposing the fatuousness of all this the author renders a valuable service. At the same time his work, although of small compass, gives a good summary of what has been written of recent years in support

of the theory of non-Hebrew or non-Semitic influence in the development of the biblical ideas, from a more reputable quarter, though in most instances with little more historical foundation. Especially the sketch of the modern controversy, if it may be dignified by that name, about the Aryan or semi-Aryan descent of Jesus is helpful. Not only those who are interested in the question of Anti-Semitism, but also the general theological student will find Dr. König's pamphlet well worth careful perusal.

Princeton,

GEERHARDUS VOS.

*New Testament History: A Study of the Beginnings of Christianity.* By HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL, Ph.D., President and Professor of Systematic Theology: The Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colorado. New York; Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. (Copyright, 1914.) Pp. 314. \$1.50 net.

"The Abingdon Press", we are informed, is a trade name adopted by the Methodist Book Concern, and Dr. Rall is president of a divinity school of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The *New Testament History* is one of a "Bible Study Text-book" series, prepared to meet the needs of college students, and projected, as the publisher's announcement says, "by a joint committee representing the Eastern and Western sections of the Associations of College Instructors in the Bible, the departments of colleges and universities and of teacher training of the Religious Education Association, the Student Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A., and Sunday School Council." The present volume, the author tells us in his advertisement on the cover, is written "frankly from the modern point of view and assured results of critical study are used", but it "does not deal primarily with critical questions nor obtrude critical processes. It aims to set forth positively and reverently the great facts of these writings." The final aim is said in the introduction to be "to secure the study of the Bible itself".

It is a pleasure to note that the material which the author uses has been studied with thoroughness and care, that it is well organized and presented in a clear and interesting style. Following the suggestion of the sub-title, Dr. Rall gives a brief but admirable summary of conditions prevailing in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman worlds at the time of the Advent, and traces the rise of Christianity from its beginning as a Jewish sect to its establishment as a universal religion. Some of his generalizations are striking and illuminating. Paul, a Hebrew of the Hebrews and a Roman citizen, carried through the empire in the Greek language the message of a Jewish Messiah. The story of the life of Jesus was used to make converts, while the words of Jesus were used in the teaching of disciples thus won. In Stephen's speech the attack upon the temple stirred the Sadducees and what he said about the law aroused the Pharisees. Luke tells us how the churches were founded; Paul's letters tell us how they grew and what was their life. The result of Paul's work was "a Christianity made conscious of its



independence and its power, of its world-saving message and its world-embracing fellowship, and established on firm foundations throughout the empire".

The author's interest is directed avowedly to the broad features and the spirit of the Christian movement rather than to the details of chronology. His chronological conclusions, however, seem to require more elaborate defense, as when, on the basis of Galatians, he places Paul's first missionary journey after the council at Jerusalem, and compresses the Apostle's leadership in active missionary work within the seven years from 59 to 59.

Of more importance is Dr. Rall's attitude toward the supernatural facts which underlie the Christian history, and the transcendent elements in the consciousness of Jesus. His position here may be said to be faintly depreciatory or non-committal. The virgin birth was "evidently not essential for the faith of the early church" (p. 35). It is significant that the resurrection is discussed not in Part II, "Jesus", but in Part III, "The Jerusalem Church"; and no post-resurrection utterance of Jesus is quoted as authentic. Paul, it is admitted, believes in a bodily resurrection, but will not dogmatize about the nature of the resurrection body, and "lays no stress upon the physical" (p. 141). In modern fashion the question of the empty tomb is ignored, and the conviction that Jesus "was living" is quietly substituted for the conviction that he had risen from the dead. The historical question of the nature (or fact) of the resurrection and the appearances is, it is implied, unimportant. "The actual issue is whether we believe in the reality of the spiritual world" (p. 141). "The conviction of the living Christ is central for Christian faith to-day. But the foundation of that conviction is not primarily the story of the appearances. It is, rather, the personality of Christ itself, etc." (p. 142). When Dr. Rall says that "the conviction that their Master was living was what brought together the scattered disciples" (p. 148), he allows himself, as do many other modern writers, a certain looseness of language. The conviction that Jesus was living was doubtless held from the first by the disciples, as a similar conviction was held by the disciples of Socrates. If "living" means no more than this, it does not explain the facts; if it means risen from the dead and reigning, this should be stated without ambiguity. Clearness of thought and precision of language are certainly much to be desired at this point.

Dr. Rall gives us in the main an admirable and sympathetic study of the apostle Paul and of his work in spreading Christianity through the Roman empire. Less adequate is his treatment of the apostle John and of the Johannine writings. After the year 70 it is said, we have a good many New Testament writings, "but they do not give us history". The Gospel of John bears eloquent witness to Paul's influence, and is far more of a sermon than a biography. Its author is a "preacher" (p. 288). It was John's "great service" that he joined together "the Jesus of Nazareth whom the Gospels set forth with the divine Christ whom Paul proclaimed." It is not clear just why Dr. Rall admits the other

Gospels as historical sources and yet dismisses the fourth Gospel in so summary a fashion. In a previous chapter he had said that "the fourth Gospel states what is the common purpose of all. The Gospels are sermons rather than biographies" (p. 46); and, on the other hand, he himself uses the Gospel of John in at least half a dozen places to correct or supplement the statements of the other Gospels and of the Acts. The call of the four disciples, the crisis at Capernaum and the day of the crucifixion are examples. Dr. Rall, in fact, unconsciously illustrates two tendencies observable in the course of present-day criticism, and it would be well if these tendencies were brought to the attention of the college students whom he wishes to instruct. There is, if we mistake not, a growing recognition of the historical value of John's Gospel, and a growing perception of the fact that we must accept as historical the Jesus of all four of the Gospels or else find an historical Jesus in no one of them.

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

*Popular Lectures on the Books of the New Testament.* By AUGUSTUS H. STRONG, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., President Emeritus of the Rochester Theological Seminary. Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Toronto, Can.: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1914. Pp. xxiii, 398. \$1.00.

Dr. Strong is best known to the religious public by his elaborate treatise on Systematic Theology, but his other writings and his addresses have given him an enviable reputation as a scholar of wide outlook and a master at once of thought and of expression in his treatment of philosophical and religious themes. The present volume, with the exception of the eighth chapter, "is a stenographic report of lectures delivered to a large Sunday-school class, which at times numbered as many as three hundred". The style of the lectures is colloquial, but, while they are not burdened with the citation of critical authorities, they aim to be representative of the best modern scholarship. In these Popular Lectures is presented an "Introduction" to the New Testament in the best sense of that term. They give not only a well-considered account of the externals of date, authorship, occasion of writing and analysis of contents, but they reveal an insight into the essential meaning and spiritual message of each book which could only come with a life-long and enthusiastic study of the New Testament. The clearness and simplicity of style will commend the volume to the lay reader, while the professional student will be newly impressed with the fact that the New Testament is a wonderful book, wonderful not only in its constituent parts but in the balance and relation of these parts to one another. Dr. Strong's Introduction will prompt the reader to turn with new zest to the New Testament itself in the hope that he may discover for himself some of the treasures that the author has found.

Some of the dates given by Dr. Strong for the New Testament books are as follows: Matthew 58, Mark 55 or 56, Luke 59, John

before the end of the century, Acts before the close of 61, 1 and 2 Thessalonians 51, Galatians 54, Romans, 56. Philemon 61, Ephesians, "the most wonderful of the letters which were written by Paul", Colossians and Philippians 63, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus 64 or 65, James 47, 1 and 2 Peter 66, 1 John 96 or 97, Jude 64-66, Hebrews 66, Revelation, "an inspired commentary upon Christ's apocalyptic discourse before he suffered", 67 or 68. It will be noticed that Dr. Strong is operating with two different systems of chronology, one of which places the close of Paul's first imprisonment in 61 and the other in 63. There are several other slips in the matter of dates, showing the need of more careful revision or proof-reading. Thus Paul's ministry in Ephesus is said to have begun in 54 (p. 217) but in 57 (p. 189); and 66, instead of 61, is given on p. 89 as the date of the close of the first imprisonment. Chapter VIII on "John's Gospel the Complement of Luke's" is based on Gûmbel's *Das Johannes-Evangelium eine Ergänzung des Lukas-Evangeliums*, 1911 (not 1900 as stated).

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*John Huss—His Life, Teachings and Death—After Five Hundred Years.* By DAVID S. SCHAFF, D.D., Professor of Church History, The Western Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xv, 349. \$2.50 net.

*De Ecclesia: The Church*, by John Huss. Translated, with Notes and Introduction, by DAVID S. SCHAFF, D.D., Professor of Church History, The Western Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 8vo; pp. xlvi, 304. \$2.50 net.

One of the most obvious things to say about these two books is that their appearance in quick succession in the early summer of 1915 is most timely. July 6th was the five hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of John Huss; and though the first half of the year has already brought forth many addresses, lectures, and articles in honor of the famous Bohemian theologian, reformer, and patriot, the second half will no doubt witness even more services of commemoration in our churches and a broader popular interest in the man and his work. But it is not only with reference to their usefulness for such purposes but rather also in the wider historical sense that these notable volumes are most opportune. Good books in English on Huss have been remarkably scarce: a single digit could express the number, even when we include several translations of important German works; while of his own writings, only his letters—on the whole, the most interesting and satisfactory expression of himself he has left us—have been made available for the English reader (Workman and Pope, London, 1904). Dr. Schaff has, therefore, rendered a valuable double service in publishing this biography of Huss



and this translation—the first, apparently, ever made into any language of Huss's most important doctrinal treatise. Mutually complementary as the volumes in large measure are, they together give the reader a fairly adequate knowledge of the career, teachings, and personality of the man whose name is to this day the outstanding fact in the history of his native Bohemia.

The first chapter of the biography is a brief but comprehensive presentation of "The Age in Which Huss Lived", special attention being given to the various types of criticism that had been, or were being, levelled at the papacy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After this introductory survey of the general historical background, the author devotes nine chapters to the portrayal of Huss's early life, his academic career, his revolt against the archbishop of Prague, his opposition to the pope, his withdrawal from Prague, his trial and death at Constance. Ever and anon the stream of the narrative broadens beyond the narrow confines of the strictly personal aspects of the story and affords the reader a pleasing glimpse of some of the many historic features of the surrounding landscape. The narrative style is not of uniform excellence, but at its best it is impressive in its vividness. Almost every page bears witness to the author's skill in using the original sources—excepting those in Bohemian, with which he acknowledges only a slight acquaintance; and much of the tragic pathos of the last scenes is due to the judicious citations from the prison letters.

The phrase used in the title, "After Five Hundred Years", is to be understood in the light of the statement in the Preface: "This biography is intended not only to set forth the teachings and activity of John Huss and the circumstances of his death but also to show the perpetuation of his influence upon the centuries that have elapsed since he suffered at the stake." This purpose is realized, though only to a most limited extent, in the last two chapters, dealing with "Huss's Place in History" and "Huss's Writings and the Hussites"—chapters which because of the historical judgments they contain are in some respects the most valuable in the book, but which because of their heterogeneous materials make a confused impression.

The caption of the third chapter, "Huss's Debt to Wyclif", is scarcely suitable. It leads the reader to expect much more than he receives. Nor would this early stage of the narrative have been the proper place for the discussion of this problem of the relation of the Bohemian to the English reformer. As to the author's final verdict—for he comes back to the matter in his closing chapter—he has no doubt struck the safe middle course between the two extreme views that have been held concerning the dependence of Huss upon Wyclif: that of Neander, who, writing before the publications of the Wyclif society began, had no means of determining the extent of this dependence, and rather unduly magnified the claims of Matthias of Janow as Huss's chief spiritual antecedent; and that of Loserth, who conclusively proved that Huss adopted not only many of the ideas of Wyclif but also whole sentences and paragraphs of his writings. But since the publication

in 1905 of Huss's commentary *Super IV. Sententiarium Petri Lombardi* there is substantial agreement among the experts—even Loserth concurring in the revised estimate—that however slavishly Huss may at times have followed Wyclif, he was a man of much more extensive learning and greater independence in thought and expression than was commonly supposed before this last named work appeared. Count Lützow, one of the best of recent biographers of Huss, repeatedly emphasizes Huss's knowledge of Augustine and of Gratian's *Decretum*, and Dr. Schaff in his Introduction to the *De Ecclesia* calls attention to the fact that Huss made independent use of the Scriptures, and contributed original arguments, for the support of his principles of ecclesiology.

The book is furnished with a good index. The Preface contains a helpful bibliography. There are two appendices; the first being a "Chronological List of Events in Huss's Life or Bearing Upon It", and the second dealing with a spurious account of Huss's journey to Constance, his trial and death at the stake, alleged to have been written by Pogius, a member of the Council of Constance.

We have noted two typographical errors in dates: p. 47, 1306 for 1406; and p. 299, 1415 for 1215.

The *De Ecclesia*, which Dr. Schaff in the second of the volumes before us presents in an English translation with notes and introduction, is of the highest order of importance for the understanding of Huss's teachings. It was from this writing that the authorities at Constance drew the fatal charges of heresy. It dates from the period of Huss's self-imposed exile from Prague, 1412-1414, and belongs to the latter rather than to the former half of the period, as appears from the fact that it makes frequent references to the views of eight doctors of the theological faculty of the University of Prague published in February 1413. The treatise may fairly be regarded as a deliberate and unimpassioned *apologia pro vita sua*—the maturest and most comprehensive expression of his doctrinal teaching and his conceptions of ecclesiastical reforms.

Some of the most important ideas set forth in the course of the twenty-three chapters into which the work is divided are the following: the church is "the totality of the predestinate, including all, from the first righteous man to the last one to be saved in the future"; Christ is the only head of the church; prelates may be reprobate; the Roman pontiff and the cardinals do not constitute the church; the church is founded on the rock Christ (Matt. xvi. 16-18 is the basis of an extended discussion); belief in Christ is the only necessity for salvation; the pope is, or rather "may be" "the vicar of Christ and may be so to his profit, if he is a faithful minister predestined unto the glory of the head, Jesus Christ"; the church is not infallible either in its members or in its rulers; only those prelates are to be obeyed who live in accordance with the precepts of the Gospel; diverse popes have been heretics; the church may be ruled without pope and cardinals; the pope is apostolic when he follows the apostles; both clerics and laics are to scrutinize and test the commands of superiors in the light of Scriptural teaching;

capable priests ought to make much of their duty as preachers; only those whom God has already excommunicated should be excommunicated by the church; interdicts wrong the innocent members of the community and are not sanctioned by the example of Christ or his apostles.

The Scriptural references are very numerous. Dr. Schaff mentions 347 quotations from the New Testament and 72 from the Old.

The translation itself seems to be all that could have been desired. It is at least thoroughly readable. At the same time the use of dashes instead of parentheses for the insertion of an occasional Latin original is awkward, and the appearance of some of the pages would have been improved if the matter contained in brackets in the text had been put into footnotes.

The headings of the chapters—which we assume the translator has furnished—do not always seem the best possible, as, for example, that of the seventeenth chapter, "Huss's Resistance to Papal Authority."

The "Notes" are valuable so far as they go. They throw much light upon obscure, doubtful, and sometimes erroneous statements in the text.

One of the most useful services Dr. Schaff has rendered in this editorial work is the locating, in the writings of the fathers and the doctors of the church, of the many excerpts made by Huss.

The Introduction gives brief sketches of the life of Huss, of the circumstances under which he wrote this treatise, of its contents, and of his debt to Wyclif, and closes with a sober estimate of the historical importance of this work: "Its pages will enable him who reads to feel some of the pious and heroic spirit of its author, the preacher of Bethlehem chapel, and at the same time to appreciate more fully what was the doctrinal and hierarchical system handed down from the classic period of the Middle Ages to the age of Wyclif and Huss. According to the letter of this system these two men were justly pronounced heretics, but not according to the Scriptures to which they appealed."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*The Life of Andrew Martin Fairbairn, D.D., D. Litt., LL.D., F.B.A., etc., First Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford.* By W. B. SELBIE. New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 8vo; pp. viii, 456. \$3.00 net.

Principal Fairbairn was born in 1838 and died in 1912. His life was one of such varied and distinguished achievements that any worthy account of it could not fail to make interesting and profitable reading. His is one of those careers of marked representative significance which can impart to biographies something of the dignity and value of cross sections of contemporaneous history. Born of humble Scotch parents; reared in the strictest traditions of the United Secession Church; earning his own living while yet a boy at school, and



then preparing himself, with his mother's aid, for entrance at the University of Edinburgh; as a student earnest and diligent, and, though slow in attaining his intellectual maturity, self-reliant and independent in judgment; early reacting against the prevalent type of Calvinism and becoming a minister of the small but increasingly influential Evangelical Union (popularly called "Morisonian") Church,—he began his life-work by becoming a pastor of this denomination first at Bathgate, Scotland (1860-1872), and then at Aberdeen (1872-1877). In both of these charges he made a name for himself not only as a highly gifted and edifying preacher but also as a popular lecturer and a scholarly and forceful writer on philosophical and theological themes. In 1877 he accepted a call to the Principalship of Airedale College, Bradford, England, a Congregational theological training school. His influence as a teacher and as an organizer of theological education was epochmaking throughout the Free Churches of England; and when, from about the year 1880, largely under the leadership of the Congregationalists, a plan was being matured for the establishment at Oxford of a non-residential, post-graduate, and purely theological school for Nonconformists as such, the tacit understanding among the leaders of the enterprise was that Dr. Fairbairn must be the head of the new institution. Mansfield College, of which he thus became the first Principal, was opened in 1889. His term of service in this office lasted until 1909, when, owing to the infirmities of his age, he resigned. It was in this position that his largest and best work was done. His own contributions to the intellectual life of Oxford, and likewise those of his colleagues—many of whom were former pupils of his—from the outset commanded the respect of scholars at home and abroad, while the changes made under his guidance in the curriculum and in the methods of instruction gave him a commanding position in the realm of theological education in England. Dr. Sanday, indeed, goes the length of saying: "If it is possible to speak of British theology as a whole, if there is something of a common spirit and of common aims running through it, no single institution has done so much for this as Mansfield."

We have only hinted at a few of the elements that contribute to the interest and value of this biography. We must refer the reader to the book itself for the many other engaging features in this man's character and career—his simple and earnest piety; his beautiful home life; his broad humanitarian sympathies—for twenty-one years he was President of the Mansfield House University Settlement in the East End of London; his political activity, especially in behalf of the Free Churches; his charming letters; his reflections on his extensive travels on the Continent, in India, and in the United States; his wide acquaintance and intimate friendship with distinguished contemporaries; his brilliant successes as a lecturer, as an occasional speaker, and as a theological writer; his care and affection for his pupils, his ability to help them in their intellectual difficulties and inspire them with his own noble ideals.

Dr. Selbie, the author, a former pupil of Fairbairn's, later his colleague at Mansfield, and now his successor in the principalship of the College, was well qualified to prepare this biography. His pages breathe the beautiful spirit of a disciple's devotion to his master and friend, but avoid all exaggerated praise. The reader is left with the impression that the book furnishes a true portrait of a man who lived an exceptionally large, useful and good life.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*A History of American Baptist Missions.* Revised Edition with Centennial Supplement. By EDMUND F. MERRIAM. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1913. Pages xxix, 288. 50 cents net; postpaid 60 cents.

A large part of this story of Baptist missions deals with the history and labors of the various missionary societies at the home base within the Baptist fold, the first eleven chapters being confined to this feature. Then follow accounts of the actual founding and growth of the missions themselves, beginning with the work of the Judsons in Burma. Notable among these reviews is the ever-inspiring story of the Telugu Mission in Southern India (Chap. 14).

Of dogmatic interest is the author's reply to the objection that the three thousand on the Day of Pentecost could not have been immersed, because so many could not have been thus baptized in a single day (Acts ii. 41). He points out that at Vilumpilly, in this (Telugu) mission, in a single day, July 3, 1878, from 6 to 10 a. m., and from 2 to 6 p. m., 2,222 candidates had been immersed in a perfectly orderly manner, with only two clergymen officiating at any one time (pp. 141-142). And again, on Dec. 28, 1890, in the baptistry of Dr. Clough's mission compound at Ongole, 1,671 were immersed "in all decency and good order in four hours and twenty-five minutes" (p. 147). This of course would not establish the whole Baptist contention as to the mode of Baptism. At best it can only weaken an extreme objection sometimes urged against it. The author is pretty thoroughly convinced that immersion is the only Scriptural, and therefore essential form of this rite (pp. 11, 190, 194, 258). But this is never made so prominent as to become an embarrassing intrusion to readers outside his own denomination. Indeed, the Church at large can only rejoice with Mr. Merriam in the century of Baptist missionary achievement that has made his book a possibility and a necessity.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

*John Hus, The Martyr of Bohemia.* A Study of the Dawn of Protestantism. By W. N. SCHWARZE, Ph.D. Professor of Church History in the Moravian College and Theological Seminary, Bethlehem, Pa. Illustrated. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1915. Pp. 152. 75 cents net.

Of the contributions to the five hundredth anniversary of the death of the Bohemian Reformer, this little study will assuredly have a

welcome place. It is of course a mere outline, but a good one. It is written for the average reader who may be unversed in the technical controversies which constitute the historic background amidst which John Huss emerged. The illustrations are modern and wisely distributed. Though the account is unburdened by historical detail, the circle which it represents is large. A long approach,—geographical, racial, theological,—is made to Huss, and after we leave him by the stake on the Brühl outside the city of Constance, his influence is swiftly traced in the Hussite wars, on to the modern Moravian Church, in which review the omission of even the name of Count Zinzendorf is inexcusable. Outside of Huss himself, was not he almost the patron saint of the Moravian Brethren?

Huss' trial at Constance, like Luther at Worms, or Luther and Zwingli at Marburg, or Beza at Poissy, is one of the dramatic scenes of Reformation history. Professor Schwarze has written it up for us with almost the lively touches of an American reporter, though with far more concern for accuracy. It is, as we should expect, the best part of the book.

The spirit of Huss abides. Who can visit the little city on the *Bodensee*, and go into the *Consilium-Saal* on the second floor of the old *Kaufhaus*, where the Council met, and see the fine frescoes by Pecht and Schwörer, or pass to the old Dominican monastery, now the *Insel Hotel* (what changes the centuries do make!), or pause at the little house hard by the *Schneitzthor*, or sit in the *Münster*, or, best of all, wander out from the city and up the shaded walk that leads to the *Hussenstein*, a huge rock overgrown with the kindly ivy and guarded (far better than its hero was) by a tall iron fence, read the inscription telling of the deed, five centuries ago, that has made that spot forever holy and the memory of Huss and Jerome of Prague a fadeless benediction,—who can do this, and not thank God that "Such as these have lived and died"?

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

*The Revival of the Gift of Healing.* By Rev. HENRY B. WILSON, B.D., Rector of St. John's, Boonton, N. J., and Director of the Society of the Nazarene. Including Suitable Prayers and an Office for the Anointing of the Sick. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co.; London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 78.

According to the author of this booklet the Christian Church, all through the centuries since the apostolic age, has been "operating one-half her powers", and so fulfilling only a part of her mission in the world. The gift of healing was never withdrawn (p. 10), and so the therapeutic ministry of the Church ought never to have been abandoned. In this neglect of a vital function which was designed to be permanent, Mr. Wilson sees the perfectly logical explanation of much of the dissatisfaction and defection within the Church, and the taking up with such extremes as Christian Science, New Thought, Faith Cure, and the Emmanuel Movement (pp. 11, 38). Yet he is



aware that the idea for which he contends has been abused, and does not hesitate to rank Christian Science, New Thought, Church Miracles, Mental Therapy, etc., as among these abuses (pp. 13, 15, 23, 30, 42-43). Nor does he hesitate to criticize the Prayer Book for this neglect.

The healing for which this author pleads is a purely religious act performed by a genuinely religious person and in the name of Christ, but robbed of all magical association (pp. 9, 40-41, 45). The idea is now embodied in the aims of the "Society of the Nazarene." The stock quotation is James v. 14-15 (*cf.* Mark vi. 13), and something is made of the healing of the lame man at the Temple (Acts iii. 1 ff.). The practical working out of the theory in detail, while not the Romish sacrament of Extreme Unction, is a carefully conceived ritual. Anointing becomes an "office" (Chap. 5). A confession is followed by a pronouncement of absolution. Though the oil has no magical properties (p. 57), it must first have been blessed by a bishop, and for this office a form is given (p. 68).

That some truth may reside in Mr. Wilson's contention, we may not deny. But the presentation of his case, as given in this booklet, is, to speak frankly, far from convincing, if not actually weak. The most that can be safely argued from the passage in James is simply the power of concerted believing prayer, which all true Christians everywhere accept. There is no conclusive intimation of any miraculous gift, or that the transaction was to become an ecclesiastical rite with attendant ritual. Nor was this the primary feature of the Comforter's dispensation. Even Christ found it easier to command a cure than to say: "Thy sins are forgiven thee" (Luke v. 23-24). Bodily healing was only a means to an end. Spiritual productivity, conviction of sin, sanctification,—this was the goal of the Church. "Greater works than these shall ye do, *because I go unto the Father*" (John xiv. 12. *Cf.* xvi. 7-15). It was this "greater" work that Christ commended to His Church. In view of these facts, it is furthermore unlikely that a gift which so soon vanished from the Church and remained unrecognized so long, was ever, in the strict New Testament sense of it, meant to be a permanent part of the Church's equipment.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*Sabbath Theology.* A Reply to Those who Insist that Saturday is the Only True Sabbath Day. By MAURICE S. LOGAN. Published under the auspices of The New York Sabbath Committee, 31 Bible House, New York City. 1913. Pp. xvii, 451. \$1.50.

This volume, as the subtitle explains, is written to refute the Seventh Day Adventists. The careless reader may wonder why a book of such solidity should be needed in a controversy seemingly of no great moment. Our author assures us, however, that in the half-

century before 1912, the Seventh Day Adventists increased from 3500 members to 114,000; that their present-day mission is to proclaim the "Third Angel's Message" the vital point of which is that Sunday is the "mark of the beast"; that in their propaganda they oppose Sabbath legislation, encourage the violation of existing Sabbath laws, and promote in every way possible the desecration of the Sunday Sabbath.

The nub of the argument seems to be in the opening chapter. Is the Sabbath on which God is said in Genesis ii. 3 to have rested, the seventh day of the week or the first day? Our Adventist brethren hold to the former; our author asserts the latter. The Adventist belief involves the further belief that God created the heaven and the earth in six twenty-four-hour days; that time began with the first day of creation; and that God rested on the seventh day of the first week of time. Mr. Logan believes that the creation days were indefinite periods; that time began with the first measured day of man; that God rested, consequently, on the first day of the first week of time. The Jewish Sabbath was on the seventh day of the week. How is this to be explained? The worship of the sun had come, by reason of the widespread of idolatry, to be connected with the first day of the week, and during the stay in Egypt many of the Israelites had yielded to this worship. To break the association God changed the day of Sabbath from the first to the seventh. This expedient was merely temporary, however, because the first day, the day of the original Sabbath, was "all the more gloriously restored in the Resurrection of His own Son, who is the 'Sun' of Righteousness."

The book is written with spirit and conviction. There is contained in it a great deal of interesting information and subtle reasoning. Doubtless it will be of use to those who are called on to meet the arguments of the Adventists. Nevertheless, some of the assertions made are open to criticism, such as, "The Sabbath even would not seem to be a needful institution, either physically or morally, till sin made it needful." Again, that the original Sabbath was the first day of the week, seems to contradict the plain language of Scripture. To be sure the temptation in polemics is not to be over nice in the employment of the argument that will bring the result desired. Still it is always better not to plow with the heifer of the opponent, which means in the present case to avoid subtle distinctions and unsupported conclusions in controverting the subtle distinctions and the unsupported conclusions of the Seventh Day Adventists.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

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## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*The Reconstruction of the Church.* By PAUL MOORE STRAYER. New York: The Macmillan Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 309. \$1.50 net.

The reconstruction which the author advocates is not radical or

revolutionary; it is more a matter of emphasis and method than of substance and aim. Nor is it the suggestion of one who is a mere theorist, but an active pastor who is seeking to adapt the work of the church he is serving to the needs of the community. He writes this volume as the result of his own experiments, and as an expression of the hope that all Christian churches will become more alive to the moral issues involved in the social and the economic conditions of the day. It is really a plea for more efficient methods in churches which are now "suffering under the law of diminishing returns".

The author deals particularly with the message and program of the church. In treating of (1) *The Revised Message* and "the need of a social Gospel" his purpose is to suggest that the daily lives and business practices of confessing Christians must be brought into closer conformity with the law of Christ. It is possible that he should have suggested a more insistent proclamation of the fundamental doctrines of grace, and of the need of a personal Saviour; but it is to be understood that he assumes all this and is only urging Christian ministers to adapt their message to existing conditions and to teach their hearers what Christian discipleship demands in the intricate social and industrial problems of the day. He further endeavors to show "the spiritual possibilities of business life", the "social creed" the church must advocate and adopt in case she is to minister to "the men of toil", and the effort which must be made "to Christianize a competitive world" by introducing the Master's law of service.

Part II of the volume contains a diagnosis of the present situation of the church in view of its main purposes which are held to be "moral and religious instruction and worship". It is shown that these purposes are not being attained for the vast majority of persons in our land, and particularly in our cities, and the failure of the church is due in large part to the lack of a definite program, to deficient methods of propaganda, and to lack of virile leadership. The church is declared to be "at the parting of the ways".

Part III deals with "*Reconstructing the Program*". It is insisted that the test of efficiency must be fearlessly, if carefully, applied to all church activities. If the usual services, with which all Protestants are familiar, are not found to be suitable in character or time to any particular community, they should be altered to meet the obvious needs of that community; especially is this true of the Sunday evening and the mid-week services. There must be found new methods of bringing the message of the church to the masses of the people, and new ways of serving the social needs of the communities to which the churches are ministering. The church needs to be kept in the consciousness of the people by judicious advertising. It has a special opportunity and task in the rural districts of America; both there and in the cities it can at times render a great service by supplying recreational centres for the young. Among the greatest of the present needs is that of closer coöperation and of actual union between the various denominations and branches of the church.



Such in substance is the content of this volume. From some of its positions and suggestions many readers will differ; yet among recent volumes, written with a view to discuss the problem of "the church and social service", this one is distinguished by discrimination, courage and restraint.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Restatement and Reunion.* By BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER, Fellow, Dean and Lecturer in Theology and Classics of Queen's College, Oxford. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 194. Two shillings and sixpence, net.

This "Study in First Principles" is by an eminent representative of the Anglican Church, and is intended primarily for the consideration of members of this church; but as it relates to the popular question of church union, it cannot fail to be of interest to the members of other Christian communions. It comprises four related discussions, which are entitled as follows: *I. The Simplicity of Christianity, II. Authority, Reunion and Truth, III. What Does the Church of England Stand For, IV. The Conception of The One Church.*

In the first of these discussions the author attempts to present "the essential elements of the Christian message in such a way as to render it independent of all subtleties of historical criticism or metaphysics. The following is the result: "First, Christianity is a disposition of the soul: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' Secondly, a resultant course of action: 'If any man would be my disciple, let him take up his cross and follow me.' Thirdly, a consequent achievement: 'If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.' Fourthly, if it be asked, 'And who is sufficient for these things?' there is the promise of a response on the part of the divine to such feeble efforts as we may make: 'Knock, and it shall be opened unto you,' 'My grace is sufficient for thee.' Fifthly, there is the assurance that failure can be retrieved: 'For this my son was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found.' Lastly, there is the sure and certain hope, 'This is the promise which he promised us, even life eternal.'"

This summary seems to omit certain verities which many hold to be of the very essence of Christianity; and those who are thus impressed will probably find an explanation as they read the second paper, which treats of *Authority, Reunion and Truth*, and which suggests rather a low view of the character and authority of Scripture. The intimation is made that the authority of the church needs to be established, but that this can be done only by a reunion of the church, effected by a restatement of Truth. "The divided branches of the church must draw together, first for coöperation in good works and then for discussion of belief."

In such a "clearer delimitation of truth", and in aiding the movement toward reunion, the Anglican church should take a leading part; for, in the third paper, *The Anglican Church* is shown to stand for "Comprehensiveness", for "the considerate and sympathetic temper", for

"intellectual humility", for "a synthesis of Hebraism and Hellenism", for "sanity and charity". For this reason "the Church of England should be competent to make" a "contribution to the problem of theological restatement", "a problem never more urgently pressing than today".

With the thought in mind of this movement toward a reunion of Christendom, the last paper, *"The Conception of the One Church"*, tranverses the ground (a) of the historical course of the church *"From the Unity to Disruption"*; and (b) *"The Preliminaries of Reunion"*, which must include "sympathetic and non-controversial discussion", "coöperation in good works", and a "temporary federation or alliance, without any central authority possessing coercive powers". (c) *"The Problems of Intercommunion"* between the Anglican and the non-Episcopal churches, is shown to be not only serious, but acute. Because of her position on this question, the Anglican church is shown to be "holding back" movements toward reunion "in every part of the globe". This last admission seems to be rather at variance with the things for which Anglican communion has been shown to stand; but the frank statement is quite in accordance with the candor, frankness, fairness and sincerity of the author, and with his evident desire to do all in his power to bring into closer and more sympathetic relations the separated parts of the one universal, Christian church.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Christian Principles.* By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 157. 50 cents net.

These lectures by the distinguished minister of Westminster Chapel, London, were first delivered in the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York, under the auspices of the "Bible Teachers' Training School". They deal with realities which form the very essence of Christian beliefs, and of which it may be said that "the measure in which they are the master things of life is the measure in which Christianity is a living experience". These are, first, the spiritual nature of man; and, secondly, the right and the obligation of the direct dealing of man with God; thirdly, the relation of reason and faith; fourthly, the losing and finding of life, the dethronement of self and the consequent enthronement of Christ; fifthly, the realization of the Christ life, when Christ is for life both its centre and its circumference; lastly, the passion of Christ and of his Church for the perfected kingdom of God upon earth.

These lectures are not speculation, but are interpretations of the truth revealed in Scripture, to the authority of which they make their constant appeal.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Variety in the Prayer Meeting.* By WILLIAM T. WARD. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 192. 50 cents net.

Any book which can aid in reviving interest in the prayer service

of the Protestant churches should be welcomed by the Christian public. This little volume of suggestions, intended as "a manual for leaders", contains practical suggestions which will certainly tend to make the prayer meeting not only less stereotyped, as the title indicates, but also more full of life, attractiveness, and helpfulness. The brief chapters treat of the nature and value of the service, the leader, the room, the opening exercise, the scripture lesson, the music, the benediction and "other things worth while". In the "Appendix" is found a valuable bibliography.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, July: ARTHUR C. MCGIFFERT, Christianity and War—A Historical Sketch; STANLEY A. COOK, Significance of the Elephantine Papyri for the History of Hebrew Religion; GERALD B. SMITH, What Shall the Systematic Theologian expect from the New Testament Scholar?; THEODORE B. FOSTER, "Mysterium" and "Sacramentum" in the Vulgate and the Old Latin Versions; ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, The Abandonment of the Canonical Idea; BURTON S. EASTON, Trial of Jesus.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oberlin, July: FRANCIS B. DENIO, Israel's Philosophy of History; HANS C. JUELL, The Fourth Gospel a Genuine Narrative; WINTHROP D. SHELDON, The Moral Dynamics of World Power; WARREN UPHAM, Geologic and Archaeologic Time; MILEHAM L. O'HARRA, The Incarnation; JAMES MUDGE, To What Extent Does God Reign?; JOHN T. WARD, The Work of Christ; HAROLD M. WIENER, Professor Lofthouse and the Criticism of the Pentateuch.

*Catholic Historical Review*, Washington, July: THOMAS J. SHAHAN, In Memoriam: Rt. Rev. Camillus P. Maes, D.D., 1846-1915; CHARLES W. CURRIER, The Church of Cuba; H. T. HENRY, A Forgotten American Hymnodist; JAMES A. ROONEY, Early Times in the Diocese of Hartford, Conn.; H. C. SCHUYLER, Apostle of the Abnakis: Father Sebastian.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, July: P. BATIFFOL, France at War; F. B. JEVONS, Human Thought and the Philosophy of Höffding; ARCHDEACON OF HALIFAX, Prayer Book Revision: Procedure by Canon; H. J. WHITE, "Dogmatic" Variations in St. Matthew; A. C. HEADLAM, Kikuyu: The Archbishop of Canterbury's Statement; CYRIL BICKERSTETH, St. Augustine's "City of God" and the War; W. C. BISHOP, Prayer Book Revision: The Present Stage; BASIL LEVETT, Mysticism; J. W. HORSLEY, The Church and Prison Reform; The War: Our Danger; A. C. HEADLAM, Nestorius and Orthodoxy.

*Constructive Quarterly*, New York, September: ARCHBISHOP EVODKIN, A Constructive Sketch of St. John the Divine; M. J. LAGRANGE, Some Points recently gained in the Study of the Epistle to the Romans;



ARCHBISHOP SÖDERBLOM, Soul of the Church of Sweden; MEREDITH DAVIES, Congregationalism and Its Ideal; ADOLF DEISSMANN, Christianity in Germany During the War; E. A. PACE, Education and the Constructive Aim; CHARLES JOHNSTON, Controversy between St. Paul and St. James; ARTHUR J. GOSSIP, Footnote to Buddhism.

*East & West*, London, July: DR. EVERY, Anglican Church in Latin America; A. W. TYNDALE, Seeing is Believing. A scene in Kashmir; Raymond Lull; C. E. TYNDALE, Seeing is Believing. A scene in Kashmir; J. STEELE, Missionary Education; DEAN CARTER, The Call to Repentance for the Church's Failures in the Mission Field; B. A. YEAXLEE, A Plea for Making Many Books; C. HARFORD, Fifty years of Medical Missions.

*Expositor*, London, July: G. BUCHANAN GRAY, Sacrifices of Cain and Abel; JAMES H. MOULTON, Early Liturgical Development of the Lord's Prayer; ALLAN MENZIES, The Art of the Parables; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Eschatology of the Old Testament and Judaism; P. T. FORSYTH, The Mind of Christ on His Death; JAMES MOFFATT, Four Notes on Ephesians. *The Same*, August: H. R. MACKINTOSH, The Eschatology of Jesus; P. T. FORSYTH, Christ's Offering of His Soul for Sin; J. M. THOMPSON, Is John xxi an Appendix?; LAURENCE E. BROWNE, Journeys of St. Peter; G. MARGOLIOUTH, Abner's Answer to Ishbosheth; A. E. GARVIE, Prologue to the Fourth Gospel and the Evangelists Theological Reflexions; ALEXANDER SOUTER, The Koridethi Gospels; C. ANDERSON SCOTT, Not Discerning the Body.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, July: THE EDITOR, Notes of Recent Exposition; J. A. ROBERTSON, The Tragic Schism: Has it Been Healed?; M. GASTER, "The Lord of Hosts"; EDWARD GRUBB, The Anointing of Jesus; ROBERT OSWALD, The Task of To-Day. *The Same*, August: THE EDITOR, Notes of Recent Exposition; ELEANOR A. JOHNSON, The Unrealized Christianity of Shelley; THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES, The Niffer Story of the Creation and the Flood; ALFRED E. GARVIE, The Pioneer of Faith and of Salvation; J. AGAR BEET, The Study of Theology. *The Same*, September: THE EDITOR, Notes of Recent Exposition; CAVENDISH MOXON, Jesus' Teaching and Modern Thought; ALFRED E. GARVIE, The Pioneer of Faith and of Salvation; E. W. HIRST, The Implications of the Golden Rule; A. H. SAYCE, The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, July: F. CRAWFORD BURKITT, Johannes Weiss: In Memoriam; WILLIAM A. BROWN, Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion; FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, Function of Educated and Uneducated Ministry; PAUL E. MORE, Evolution and the Other World; GEORGE BATCHELOR, Three Notable Dreams; DANIEL J. FRASER, Recent Church Union Movements in Canada; THOMAS N. CARVER, What Ails the Church?

*Hibbert Journal*, Boston, July: EUGENE TROUBETZKOY, Unity Beneath the Present Discord; NORMAN SMITH, The Moral Sanction of Force; CLOUDESLEY BRERETON, A Spiritual Balance-Sheet of the War; S. M. MITRA, War Philosophy, Hindu and Christian; A. KEENE, War, and

How to Meet it: the Views of British Thinkers; J. A. R. MARRIOTT, The War and the Theory of the State; EVA MADDEN, Behind the Scenes; BERNARD HOLLAND, Some Inscriptions; J. M. WILSON, Christ's Sanction as well as Condemnation of War; E. A. SONNENSCHEN, The Golden Rule and its Application to Present Conditions; PHILIP A. BRUCE, Race Segregation in the United States.

*Hindustan Review*, Allahabad, May-June: P. A. WADIA, Napoleon's Place in History I; MARY MARKOVITZ, Position of Women in Persia; C. J. RYAN, Mosque of Sultan Selim II at Constantinople; G. A. CHANDAVARKAR, The Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; AKSHAY K. GHOSE, Napoleon and the Kingdom of Italy; SHAIKH F. HUSAIN, Origin of Tazia-keeping in India; K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, Growth of the Philosophical Spirit in English II.

*Homiletic Review*, New York, July: COUNT LÜTZOW, Message of John Hus to the Preachers of To-Day; CHARLES S. MACFARLAND, Religious Education and the New Internationalism; J. G. STEVENSON, Religion and the Child; T. RHONDDA WILLIAMS, The Minister's Social Conscience. *The Same*, August: GEORGE L. PARKER, Parish Psychology; J. G. STEVENSON, Religion and the Child; CALVIN D. WILSON, Ecclesiastical Points of View; WILLIAM E. GRIFFIS, Does the Bible Throw Any Light on the Race Question?

*International Journal of Ethics*, Concord, July: J. C. MEREDITH, Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Neutrality; HENRY C. EMERY, What is Realpolitik?; MORRIS R. COHEN, Legal Theories and Social Science; ALAN J. DORWARD, Betting and Insurance; W. K. WRIGHT, Private Property and Social Justice; ELSIE C. PARSONS, Marriage and Parenthood—A Distinction; J. C. FLÜGEL, Ethics and the Struggle for Existence.

*Interpreter*, London, July: T. HERBERT BINDLEY, Relation of the Fourth Commandment to the Christian Sunday; ARTHUR WRIGHT, Allegories of the Fourth Gospel; A. C. BOUQUET, Christology in the Making; T. F. ROYDS, Job and the Problem of Suffering; H. D. A. MAJOR, The Secret of a Nation's Welfare; Our Conception of God; H. H. B. AYLES, A Recent Attempt to Determine the Original New Testament Text; J. C. HARDWICK, The Christian Apologetic of Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin, July: JOHN ASHTON, Pessimism or Supernaturalism; DAVID BARRY, Influence of Error on Responsibility; J. BYRNE O'CONNELL, Beginnings of Philosophy; J. M. FLOOD, Sacred Latin Poetry; JAMES MACCAFFREY, Position of Irish Catholics during the Reign of James I.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, July: JACOB NACHT, Symbolism of the Shoe with Special Reference to Jewish Sources; JACOB Z. LAUTERBACH, Midrash and Mishnah. A Study in the Early History of the Halakah II; B. HALPER, A Volume of the Precepts by Hefes B. Yasliah; ALEXANDER MARX, Recent Hebrew Bibliography and Palaeography; I. M. CASANOWICZ, Recent Works on Comparative Religion; B. HALPER, Recent Rabbinical Literature.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, July: A. H. FINN, The Tabernacle Chapters; T. H. ROBINSON, Text of Jeremiah 6: 27-30 in the Light of Ezekiel 22: 17-22; A. GUILLAUME, David's Lament over Saul and Jonathan; H. J. BARDSLEY, Derivation of the Acta from Early Acts of Peter; R. H. MALDEN, St. Ambrose as an Interpreter of Holy Scripture; C. H. TURNER, Notes on the Apostolic Constitutions. II the Apostolic Canons; P. BATIFFOL, Un texte peu remarqué de Saint Augustin sur le Canon de la Messe; C. H. TURNER, Ordination Prayer for a Presbyter in the Church Order of Hippolytus.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, July: H. S. SOUTTAR, Work of our Doctors and Nurses in the Field of the War; COULSON KERNAHAN, The Noblest Man I have Known: S. J. Stone, the Hymn-Writer; ERNEST E. GENNER, Theology and Experience; W. ERNEST BEET, Military Annals of the Manchester Regiment; F. W. ORDE WARD, The Kingdom of God; T. H. S. ESCOTT, The International Cement of Art and Letters; W. J. ACOMB, Shakespeare's Cardinal Wolsey; JOHN S. BANKS, Clement of Alexandria; W. HANDLEY JONES, Message of H. G. Wells.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, July: J. A. W. HAAS, Social Christianity; MARTIN L. WAGNER, Theology of Freemasonry; JOHN C. MATTES, Foundation of the Faith; HUGO W. HOFFMAN, Commentary on 1 Peter; L. A. FOX, Scientific View of Conscience; S. G. WEISKOTTEN, Problem of Our Church in New York City; ARTHUR T. MICHLER, The Individual Communion Cup; E. L. WESSINGER, Place of the Church in Evolution; HUGO W. WENDELL, Papacy and Modern Times; JOHN H. STRENGE, Ancient Position of Women; C. F. PFATTICHER, Ritschl and Mysticism; HUGO W. HOFFMAN, A Suggested Theological Exchange; GEORGE H. TRABERT, Doctrinal Position of the Lutheran Church and her Relation to Other Churches; CHARLES R. KEITER, The Mohammedan Missionary Problem II.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, July: JOHN A. HIMES, The New Obedience; HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, Place of Art in Worship; T. B. STORK, Pulpit Prayer; JACOB A. CLUTZ, American Defects of Sentiment; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Christ's Authority Throughout the New Testament; L. H. LARIMER, Lutheran Education; J. S. SIMON, Revelation and Dogmatics; W. A. LAMBERT, War Letters of a Pastor to his Colleague.

*Methodist Review*, New York, July-August: JAMES M. BUCKLEY, Study our Episcopacy; JAMES MUDGE, Father of American Literature; WORTH M. TIPPY, New Era for Motherhood; HARRY F. WARD, Songs of Labor; ELBERT C. HOAG, Cerebral Records; CHARLES E. LOCKE, Wages and Wickedness; H. C. SHELDON, Notion of a Changing God; C. A. HERRICK, Laureate of the English Seasons; FLORA L. ROBINSON, The Faqir's Conspiracy.

*Methodist Review Quarterly*, Nashville, July: J. W. HUDSON, America's International Ideals; G. W. DYER, A Man; E. R. HENDRIX, Principal Rainy, the Great Church Leader of Scotland; W. J. MCGLOTHLIN,



Augustine, Great Sinner, Saint, Thinker, Theologian, Church-maker; ED. F. COOK, Japan's Imperialistic Program as Seen in Korea; PORTER McFERRIN, Daniel Webster, Orator and Statesman; F. S. PARKER, Worship in the Congregation; T. C. CHAO, Bright Side of Superstition; O. D. WANNAMAKER, Primal Memories; LOUISE S. HOUGHTON, The McAll Mission and the War.

*Monist*, Chicago, July: ROBERT P. RICHARDSON and EDWARD H. LANDIS, Numbers, Variables and Mr. Russell's Philosophy; HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER, Definition of Number; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Ultimate Constitutents of Matter; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Newton's Hypothesis of Ether and Gravitation from 1693 to 1726; E. H. STRANGE, Bergson's Theory of Intuition; PAUL CARUS, Anyness and Pure Form.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, July: ELMER L. COBLENTZ, Jesus' Messianic Consciousness; ROBERT F. REED, Aim of the Sermon; N. C. SCHAEFFER, Truth; PAUL B. RUFF, The Newer Orthodoxy; WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, The Logos Doctrine; PAUL J. DUNDORE, Philosophy of Evil; A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Sociology; A. T. G. APPLE, The Stars not Inhabited.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, July: W. O. CARVER, The Insight and Error of Eucken in Regard to Christianity; W. E. HENRY, Christianity and The City; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Recent Thought on the Atonement; J. F. LOVE, The Home Base; R. SAILLENS, Moral and Religious Effect of the War on the French People; J. M. BURNETT, Psychology and Preaching; JOHN A. FAULKNER, Dies ist mein Leib: A Celebrated Debate; WILLIAM C. TAYLOR, Tests of a Universal Religion.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, July: EDWIN PEARS, The Fate of the Dardanelles; WILBUR C. ABBOTT, Germany and the Prussian Propaganda; JOHN C. RANSOM, The Question of Justice; HENRY H. CURRAN, Home Rule for American Cities; JACQUES LOEB, Mechanistic Science and Metaphysical Romance; VIDA B. SCUDDER, Plato as a Novelist.

*Bilychnis*, Roma, Maggio: PAOLO ORANO, Dio in Giovanni Prati; ANTONINO DE STEFANO, Le origini dei Frati Gaudenti; MARIO ROSSI, L'opera di Thomas Kelly Cheyne; P. GHIGNONI, La guerra e il cristianesimo. *The Same*, Giugno: GIOVANNI COSTA, Imperio Romano e Cristianesimo; DR. DELIO, L'autonomia della religione; "CATHOLICUS", Che pensare del celibato ecclesiastico?; GIOVANNI PIOLI, Sulla via dell'Unione delle Chiese—L'esperienza di Kikuyu.

*La Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid, Julio-Agosto: J. G. ARINTERO, Por qué hay tan pocos contemplativos; FRANCISCO MARIN-SOLÁ, La Homogeneidad de la doctrina católica; V. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, La enseñanza de Santo Tomás en la Compañía de Jesús durante el primer siglo de su existencia; LUIS URBANO, De Cosmología; A. G. MENÉNDEZ-REIGADA, De Etica; E. COLUNGA, De Derecho eclesiástico.

*Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Heusden, Juni: A. G. HONIG, Albrecht Ritschl en Wilhelm Herrmann II; L. P. KRIJGER, Is het eten van vleesch, den afgoden geofferd, geoorloofd; F. W. GROSHEIDE, I Kor-

in the 15:33. *The Same*, Juli: S. GREIJDBANUS, Dr. Ihmels antwoord; F. KRAMER, Het Gebedsleven van Immanuel I; A. M. DIJRMANSE, Twee Lijnen in ons kerkelijk belijden. *The Same*, Augustus: T. J. HAGEN, Theologen in het leger; F. KRAMER, Het Gebedsleven van Immanuel II. *Lehre und Wehre*, St. Louis, Juli: Der Prophet Jonas; Der Unterschied zwischen dem neunten und zehnten Gebot. *The Same*, August: Paragraphen über den neuesten Chiliasmus; Der Prophet Jonas.

*Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Leiden, 49e Jaargang, Afl. iv: A. RUTGERS, VAN DER LOEFF, De zondvloed-verhalen der Israëlieten, vergeleken met die van andere volken; H. J. TOXOPEÛS, Nieuw licht op de betrekkingen tusschen Petrus en Paulus; H. R. OFFERHAUS, Rondom de verheerlijking op den berg.

*Theologische Studien*, XXXIII Jaargang, Afl. iii en iv: A. VANDER FLIER G. Jzn, Een betere methode tot het leeren der Hebreeuschwe taal; J. WEENER, Iets over het beeld Gods in den mensch; F. E. DAUBANTON, Ter inleiding tot de Didaktiek des Nieuwen Verbonds V.

*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, Innsbruck, xxxix, iii: FRANZ HATHEYER, Über das Erkenntnisbild in der Scholastik; J. B. UMBERT, Kajetans Lehre von der Kinderersatztaufe auf dem Trienter Konzil; JOHANN EV. RAINER, Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter Predigtreform-dekretes. II.

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